551.58B1/35d
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson)
Sir: Referring to the Department’s telegram No. 39 of March 18, 1929,5 advising you that the President had designated you as the delegate to represent the United States at the Conference on Counterfeiting Currency to be held at Geneva April 9, the Department directs you to be guided by the following instructions with regard to the matters dealt with in the draft convention which has been submitted by the Secretary General of the League of Nations and which, it is understood, is to be considered by the Conference.
In paragraph I, Article 1 of the draft convention it is provided that the Contracting Parties shall agree to adopt the necessary measures for introducing the rules laid down in that Article into their respective legal and administrative systems except in so far as they may be already embodied therein. With respect to this provision it may be said that this Government would desire to have it changed so as to provide that the High Contracting Parties agree themselves to take or propose to their respective appropriate law-making bodies the necessary measures for the adoption of the rules set forth in Article 1 of the draft convention. In this relation it may be pointed out that the treaty-making power of this Government could not well agree to bind the law-making body to the adoption of specific legislation.
So far as concerns the other provisions of paragraphs I to V, inclusive, of Article 1 of the draft convention it may be observed that they appear to impose no requirements which are not covered by laws of the United States at present in force.
It is provided in paragraph VI, Article 1 of the draft convention that no distinction should be made in the scale of punishments for offenses referred to in the convention between acts relating to domestic currency on the one hand and to foreign currency on the other hand. With reference to this provision it may be stated that the penalties provided in the Federal statutes of the United States relative to the counterfeiting of foreign obligations and securities are not at present as severe as those imposed by laws denouncing the counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States. However, an effort might be made to remedy this position by equalizing these penalties through statutory amendments.
With respect to the provisions of paragraph VII, Article 1 of the draft convention it may be observed that confiscation of counterfeit money and material and apparatus fitted or intended for counterfeiting purposes is provided for in the Federal statutes of the United [Page 396] States and that the surrender of such property to the interested government in case of counterfeiting of foreign moneys can be accomplished by direction of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Concerning the provisions of paragraph VIII, Article 1 of the draft convention, it should be stated that the Federal statutes of the United States do not permit the participation of civil parties in criminal proceedings.
The Department would have no objection to the incorporation in the convention of the provisions of paragraph IX, Article 1 of the draft convention relating to political offenses.
The Department does not object to the provisions of paragraph X, Article 1 of the draft convention relating to the punishment in their own country for offenses committed abroad of nationals of that country. However, inasmuch as the United States recognizes the general rule of extraditing its nationals for offenses committed in a foreign country, subject to the provisions of existing treaties, the provisions of paragraph X would not be applicable to the United States.
The Department would have no objection to the provisions of paragraph XI, Article 1 of the draft convention relative to the punishment of foreigners for offenses committed abroad, but it should be pointed out that this country does not come within the category of those referred to in this paragraph “whose internal legislation recognizes as a general rule the principle of the prosecution of offenses committed abroad”, and that, therefore, this paragraph would not be applicable to the United States.
With regard to the remaining paragraphs of Article 1 of the draft convention relative to the maintenance of central offices in each country to deal with investigations, correspondence, communications and conferences concerning the subject matter of the convention, it may be observed that a central bureau in the United States charged with the suppression of counterfeiting, namely, the Secret Service Division of the Treasury Department, has been in existence since 1864 and is in close touch with the institution issuing currency and with the police authorities throughout the country. It is believed that it will be entirely practicable for this Division to effect contact with the central bureaus abroad and with good results.
It is further believed with particular reference to the provisions of paragraph XIII, Article 1, that direct communication between these central bureaus will facilitate their activities and add materially to their effectiveness.
With regard to the provision of paragraph XIV, Article 1, for furnishing specimens of the currency issues of the several countries, it may be stated that the United States could not comply with this provision without violating the policy of its Treasury Department as [Page 397] established for a long period of time and that it is not believed that this policy should be changed. However, it is suggested that the same result could be accomplished if the foreign governments would obtain United States currency in exchange for legal tender, which exchange could be made directly with the Treasury of the United States so that the currency obtained will be known to be genuine.
Referring to the provisions of paragraph XV, Article 1, it may be stated that periodical conferences attended by representatives of the contracting governments might prove advantageous.
Paragraph XVI, Article 1, refers to “letters of request relating to offenses referred to” in the convention. Before giving further consideration to this matter the Department would desire to be informed exactly what is intended to be included in such “letters of request”. If it is intended to refer merely to correspondence relating to counterfeiting operations and their suppression it may be stated that in the opinion of the Department such correspondence should be conducted directly between the central bureaus and confirmed by copies despatched through the usual diplomatic channels.
Article 2 of the draft convention provides that the offenses referred to in the convention “are recognized as extradition crimes” and that “extradition will be granted in conformity with the internal law of the country applied to”. In the interest of clarity and since in the United States the laws do not permit the extradition of a fugitive except for a specific offense and in accordance with the requirement of a treaty or a statute, it is deemed preferable that it be stated in this Article that extradition will be granted for certain specific offenses, and an appropriate phrasing for the Article would seem to be somewhat as follows:
“Extradition will be granted in conformity with the internal law of the country applied to for the offenses of . . . . . . . and . . . . . . . and . . . . . .”
In its practical operation the provisions of the convention relating to extradition would, if entered into by the United States and other Powers, constitute an agreement to extradite without exception as to the nationals of the Contracting Parties. However, in view of the provisions of paragraph X, Article 1, relating to countries in which the principle of the extradition of nationals is not recognized and of the experience of this Government in such matters, the result of such an agreement would be that nationals of the United States would be extradited by it while nationals of most of the other Contracting Parties would not be extradited by their respective governments. The Department would be averse to attempting to commit this Government to such an arrangement and, therefore, would desire an addition to Article 2 of the draft convention providing that the Contracting Parties [Page 398] shall not be obligated to surrender their own citizens under the provisions of the convention. The Department might be willing to qualify this provision by a further provision that the Contracting Parties may surrender their own citizens if they see fit to do so. For your confidential information it may be stated that the practical effect of the proposed addition without the qualifying clause would be that the United States would be unable under its laws to surrender its own citizens, whereas with the addition of the qualifying clause it would have the power to surrender them. It may be argued in opposition to the inclusion of an exception in favor of nationals that countries which do not extradite their own nationals have the power to punish them for crimes committed abroad. On its face this argument has considerable force, but the experience of the Department indicates that the power to punish nationals for crimes committed abroad is exercised very leniently when exercised at all.
The extradition laws of the United States are not very comprehensive and do not cover several matters which are ordinarily dealt with in the extradition treaties which the United States has entered into. Therefore, embarrassment might be expected to be caused this Government should it enter into this proposed convention without covering some such matters which are not dealt with in the internal law of the United States. As examples may be pointed out the usual provisions contained in extradition treaties of the United States (1) that no person shall be tried for any crime or offense committed before his extradition other than that for which he was surrendered unless he shall have been given a reasonable opportunity to leave the country after trial or punishment; (2) that a fugitive shall not be surrendered when the offense with which he is charged is barred by the Statute of Limitations in the country where the offense was committed; (3) that if a person whose extradition is requested be actually under prosecution for an offense in the country where he has sought asylum, or shall have been convicted thereof, his extradition may be deferred until such proceedings be terminated or until he shall be set at liberty in due course of law; (4) that if a fugitive claimed by one of the Parties to the convention shall also be claimed by one or more Powers pursuant to treaty provisions on account of crimes or offenses committed within their jurisdiction, he shall be delivered to that State whose demand is first received unless such demand is waived; (5) that the person provisionally arrested shall be released, unless within a specified time, usually two months from the date of his commitment or arrest, the formal requisition for his surrender, with the necessary proofs, be made, and (6) that if the fugitive shall have been convicted of the crime or offense for which his extradition is requested a duly authenticated copy of the sentence of the court before which such [Page 399] conviction took place shall be produced and that if the fugitive is merely charged with a crime a duly authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest in the country where the crime was committed and of competent evidence in the form of affidavits or depositions making out a prima facie case of guilt shall be furnished.
So far as concerns the remaining Articles of the draft convention it may be said that they appear to be unobjectionable.
The modifications which have been set forth above as desirable from the standpoint of this Government are considered to be important and, as at present advised, the Department would not desire to have you sign a convention in which such modifications were not substantially incorporated.
You will, of course, feel free to consult the Department during the progress of the conference by telegraph or otherwise. In the event that an agreement is reached upon the terms of the convention satisfactory to this Government, the Department will authorize you by telegraph to sign the convention in accordance with the enclosed full powers.
I am [etc.]
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