Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I

500.A15a3/550

The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy²

Memorandum

During the stay in Washington of the Japanese Delegates to the London Naval Conference, they attended two meetings with the American Delegates to the Conference on Tuesday December 17 and Thursday December 19, 1929, respectively.

At these meetings the Chairman of the Japanese Delegation, the Honorable Reijiro Wakatsuki and the Chairman of the American Delegation, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson presented their points of view on certain questions affecting Japan and the United States.

Mr. Wakatsuki after emphasizing Japan’s great desire for the success of the London Conference and an actual reduction of naval armaments explained that Japan had always made it the fundamental principle of her national armament to hold such strength as would not disturb the sense of national security of her people. In other words, a strength insufficient for attack and adequate for defense. Japan desired to obtain agreement from all Powers concerned to her having a ratio of 70 per cent of the largest naval strength as being that necessary for defense purposes in the adjacent waters of Japan. Mr. Wakatsuki said that he understood that the Secretary of State had proposed to Ambassador Debuchi to contrive to find some means of solving this question by taking into consideration the actual conditions. He then asked for information upon which to construct such a plan. He desired particularly to be informed as to the details regarding the provisional understanding between the United States and the British Government in regard to large sized cruisers.

Mr. Stimson replied to express his great desire for the success of the London Conference and to set forth his views frankly.

On the question of 10,000 ton cruisers, he said there existed no agreement except what he had told Ambassador Debuchi some time ago. The American Government demanded 21 such cruisers on the recommendation of its naval advisers while the British Government thought that the United States should be satisfied with 18 ships. The American Government thought that that was near enough to an agreement to enable the two countries to go to London with every hope of success. The difference of three ships could some how be adjusted. However, as yet he had no figures of adjustment.

As to the larger ratio suggested by Mr. Wakatsuki, he said he would reply, giving the result of his careful thought after his consultation with his colleagues and his survey of the minds of the people. He considered the Government ought to represent such opinion as the people would think just and right.

Mr. Stimson then referred to the Washington Conference which brought about the situation that led to the convening of the Conference at London. He said the American people felt that this country had been very generous and made great sacrifices in order that an agreement might be reached. America in 1921 had the largest navy program in the world but was ready to give up that position and, moreover, to pledge herself to maintain the status quo of the fortification in the Philippine Islands and her other Pacific possessions in order to facilitate disarmament by removing the sense of rivalry, jealousy and competition and particularly to relieve Japan of any anxiety as to her national security. He referred to the improved good feelings between America and Japan resulting from the successful outcome of the Washington Conference. The American people believed in good faith that that agreement could only have been reached by the United States giving up a very large portion of her naval strength and consenting to the maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in her possession in the vicinity of Japan.

Mr. Stimson commented on the regrettable renewal in the last seven or eight years of competition of naval construction in the classes of ships not covered by the Washington Treaties. There was therefore a feeling that that Conference had not altogether been a success. America had not been party to that competition in the beginning but after the failure of the Geneva Conference felt constrained to take to naval building once again, as was shown by the Acts of Congress authorizing the construction of 23 10,000 ton cruisers. The last Act was peremptory which meant that the President must build unless some international agreement as to disarmament could be arrived at. Moreover, the American navy had formulated a big plan involving an enormous expenditure to build the other classes of ships that might be necessary to complete the American fleet. He explained that in order to show the importance which the American people attached to the necessity of catching up with the navies of the other Powers unless some agreement of disarmament could be concluded.

Such being the case when asked by Mr. Debuchi as to the opinion of the United States in regard to the desire of Japan to hold a higher ratio in cruisers than in capital ships, he had replied frankly that that would give a bad impression to the American people and would not conduce to the success of the Conference. A great many Americans would feel such a change to be unfair to themselves.

The American people, the Secretary continued, strongly felt that battleships were the center of naval strength. They had never considered a battleship fleet as obsolete. However, the United States was willing to try to find a way to reduce the strength of that class. He knew also that that was Japan’s wish. The United States, however, would not feel it in her interest if Japan reduced the battleship fleet in which the ratio of 5–5–3 had already been agreed upon and turned the moneys thus saved to the building of cruisers in which Japan was asking for a ratio of 10–10–7. The United States did not seek to impose a position of inferiority on any nation. He had told Ambassador Debuchi therefore that they would rather discuss matters at the Conference giving careful consideration to the actual conditions of the situation without referring to the question of ratio. He hoped that a basis for an understanding or agreement might be found in the light of what Japan had actually been doing in regard to her cruiser strength.

He had therefore been very disappointed to learn that Japan had recently increased her proposed cruisers strength from 206,000 tons to 226,000 tons. He would rather make the subject of discussion the actual strength of 206,000 tons than any figures calculated merely on account of the ratio. He could not but feel that the American people would regard the high figures with serious misgivings and that as a result it might demand a corresponding increase in the American cruiser program.

So his opinion had been that if Japan would keep her needs down to the actual existing strength, America would be willing to try to meet her on the same principle and to persuade other nations to come to an agreement. Great Britain had already shown her willingness to reduce her cruiser strength lower than what she proposed in 1927 and if the latter came down, America would go down even further. All he could promise now was to give the utmost sympathy and fair consideration to the Japanese claim.

Mr. Wakatsuki was gratified that Mr. Stimson was willing to give sympathetic consideration to the Japanese attitude. The Japanese people had a feeling that they had been pressed to accept the form of disarmament stipulated at the time of the Washington Conference. Without criticizing the results of that Conference, he mentioned that Japan had claimed from the beginning a ratio of 70 per cent and the people deeply regretted that that claim had not been accepted. The Government explanation of the benefit of maintaining the status quo of fortification in the Pacific had conciliated some portion of the people but the general feeling of regret had not been wiped away. Public opinion favored 70 per cent being put forward strongly at a further disarmament conference for the class of ships not covered by the Washington Conference. This had been a national conviction. He pointed out that Japan had agreed also to maintain the status quo of fortifications of her own islands. Japan had also made sacrifices by scrapping warships. At anything short of 70 per cent, Japan’s sense of national security would be disturbed. He had no idea of reopening the 5–5–3 ratio agreed upon at the Washington Conference as to capital ships. However, as to other categories of ships not covered by the Washington Conference no agreement whatever had been completed at that Conference. It had only been agreed upon that the size of cruisers should be limited to 10,000 tons,—a size which did not exist at that time. Subsequently a number of cruisers of 10,000 tons had gradually come into existence, developments had been effected in other instruments of war and the general situation had been greatly changed since the time the Washington Treaties were concluded. Therefore, he thought it would not be adequate to make the ratio of the Washington Treaties the basis upon which to argue disarmament today.

As to capital ships, Japan had never thought that they were obsolete. They still constituted the center of armament. Japan thought that in order to meet the necessity of naval reduction it would be advisable to prolong the age, reduce the size, lengthen the period of replacements, and so on, of this class of war ships. It was the Japanese feeling that it was not Japan alone that would profit by it, but all nations concerned at the same time. Japan had no thought of utilizing the moneys saved by reducing the capital ship strength for augmenting the cruiser tonnage. This he was saying just on the spur of the moment, but he believed that it was the conviction of the Japanese people.

He would not object to studying the matter as Mr. Stimson had suggested from the point of view of actual conditions and without reference to the question of ratio. However, he was given to understand that between the United States and Great Britain the principle of parity had first been decided upon and the concrete figures taken into consideration as an application of that principle. Japan had proposed to have an agreement on the ratio first, in the sense that some standard had better be adopted as in the case of the Anglo-American arrangement. He thought that it would not be inadvisable to approach actual conditions and concrete figures, keeping the ratio always in mind. Later, he would be glad to submit for Mr. Stimson’s consideration a plan conceived in that sense.

Mr. Wakatsuki referred to Mr. Stimson’s disappointment in regard to the figures of 206,000 tons and 226,000 tons which Japan now proposed as cruiser strength.

The difference of 20,000 tons was calculated on the basis of the 70 per cent ratio. Therefore this suppositive tonnage might come down as tonnage to be held by the superior navies would come down. The figures stood high simply because the superior navies seemed to claim high figures. Mr. Wakatsuki said in reply to an inquiry from Mr. Stimson that he would submit his plan for consideration. If America were going to hold 18 8–inch-gun 10,000 ton cruisers, Japan would desire to possess a certain number of 10,000 ton cruisers and a certain number of cruisers of less than 10,000 tons aggregating 126,000 tons distributed among 13 ships. This represented the eventual figures but in the transitory period pending the replacements of the Furutaka class cruisers, Japan desired to hold fourteen ships consisting of the eight 10,000 ton cruisers, four Furutaka class cruisers with 7,100 tons each, and two more ships with a tonnage of less than 10,000 tons. This he considered very much inferior to a fleet consisting of cruisers with a uniform tonnage of 10,000 tons.

Mr. Wakatsuki referred to submarines, and their adequacy as weapons of defense for a country like Japan consisting of islands widely scattered on the sea and holding an inferior naval strength. Japan would be content to hold nothing more than her present strength of 78,500 tons. She would have no objection if other Powers held ten sevenths of her submarine strength.

With regard to small cruisers and destroyers, Japan stood ready to effect reduction according as the other Powers concerned decreased their holdings.

Mr. Stimson thought that it might be preferable not to discuss only the question of 10,000 ton cruisers but to take other categories of ships into consideration at the same time. He felt that if the discussion centered on 10,000 ton cruisers alone it would be quite difficult to arrive at an agreement satisfactory to the American people. It could not but feel that the amount of 226,000 tons meant that Japan desired an increase of her naval strength on one hand and demanded a reduction of American naval strength on the other.

At this point the meeting adjourned to December 19th.

Mr. Stimson referred to the good feeling existing between Japan and the United States largely as a result of the confidence which had been set up after the Washington Conference, and said that this knowledge made him enter this Conference anxious that nothing would change or diminish this feeling.

He thought that the figures relating to Japanese naval strength mentioned by Mr. Wakatsuki would cause anxiety in the American public mind. The President who is seeking reduction would be most disappointed. The President and all those who are also in touch with public opinion realize that the American people would feel that this country with its immensely long coast line on two oceans, separated by the Isthmus of Panama, would normally require a much larger defensive force than a nation situated like Japan in a compact group of islands.

Mr. Stimson said he hoped that they would be able at the Conference to find a way by which the national feeling of the Japanese people could be protected and their national sensibilities not in any way offended by anything like an attempt to impose upon them or put them in a position of inferiority to other nations.

After again stating that the American people and Congress would regard a cruiser tonnage of 226,000 tons for Japan as so high that it would necessitate counter building on the part of America, Mr. Stimson referred to the matter of submarines. He said that the American Government is very strongly opposed to the use of submarines for destroying commerce and was very glad that it was joined by Japan in the Washington Conference Treaty (unfortunately not ratified by all of the other nations) which forbade their use indiscriminately for destroying commerce.

Mr. Stimson said he felt that the danger of too great a reliance on submarines, and too large a construction of submarines, the uses of which are comparatively limited apart from commerce destroying, is that it creates a temptation to use them against merchant ships under conditions where they cannot obey the rules of war. He recognized that other nations might differ in their opinion as to the usefulness of submarines in warfare, but hoped that at least the construction of submarines might be restricted so as to avoid their use against merchant commerce in the inhuman manner which had been used in the past. Mr. Stimson said that he hoped that this Conference might successfully reaffirm the humane principles of the 1922 Treaty on the subject of commerce destroying submarines.

Mr. Stimson feared that the nearly 80,000 tons of submarines suggested for Japan by Mr. Wakatsuki would be thought by the American people to be unduly high and he feared that such large construction might tend to lessen the good feeling of which he had already spoken, and might excite a demand in America for the construction of a large force of anti-submarine craft like destroyers and light cruisers. Mr. Wakatsuki in reply said that the Japanese people have in mind only the maintenance of national security and therefore it had never entered their mind that the Japanese Navy might ever excite the mistrust of other Powers. He again said that cruiser tonnage is a relative question and that if other Powers came down in their strength, Japanese figures would naturally decrease. He also said that Japan would be most willing to conclude a treaty at the forthcoming Conference such as the kind referred to in the Treaty of 1922 forbidding illegal use of submarines.³

Mr. Wakatsuki, with reference to the use of submarines as a weapon of defense, suggested that if both Governments consulted experts in the matter, it would eventually become very much clearer.

Mr. Stimson and Mr. Wakatsuki both expressed their gratification of the very friendly and frank nature of the conversations and considered that a very considerable progress had been made in the direction of a mutual understanding.

Washington , December 26, 1929.

2. Copies also sent to the British, French, and Italian Embassies.
3. Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 267.