500.A15a3/590
French Memorandum of December 20, 1929, Delivered to the British Government and Communicated to the Other Interested Governments98
In accepting, on October 16, the invitation of the British Government to take part in the London Naval Conference, the French Government reserved the liberty of defining its views regarding the problems which will be included in the agenda of the deliberations and the questions generally which may arise at that international meeting. After the exchanges of views which have already taken place, it believes that the time has come to define its attitude with respect to essential questions of principle and method which will [Page 300] present themselves during the negotiations and the importance of which, transcending the technical limits of the case, deserves to be fully brought out.
I
The French Government has already had occasion to express its appreciation of the considerations which led to the step taken by the British Government in conjunction with the American Government. It understands too well the vital character of the task of limiting armaments, it has taken too active a part in the work carried on up to the present in this direction, not to welcome a proposal which tended, as expressly stated by His Excellency Mr. Arthur Henderson in his letter of October 7, to facilitate the task of the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations and later, that of the General Disarmament Conference.
It is, moreover, the naval disarmament problem which, since the meeting in April and May last of the Preparatory Commission of Geneva, must be considered as still presenting an obstacle to the conclusion of the work which that Commission carried on with the efficient cooperation of American delegates. Furthermore, the last Assembly of the League of Nations declared that an agreement between the principal naval powers was necessary to pave the way to a general understanding regarding the methods to be applied for the reduction of naval armaments; in fact the conversations which were already being carried on appeared to it as calculated to permit the resumption and the completion of the interrupted work of the Preparatory Commission, and, subsequently, the convocation of the General Conference.
It is, therefore, primarily in regard to principles and methods permitting the subsequent conclusion of a General Convention for the limitation of armaments that, in the opinion of the French Government, the powers meeting at London should come to an agreement.
The British Government has stated that the Government of the United States and itself had taken the Paris Pact as the basis of their conversations. The French Government, which has already had occasion to express the satisfaction with which it welcomed this statement, took so great a part in the preparation of that Pact that there is no necessity of indicating the importance which it attaches thereto. The Paris Pact is based on the force of public opinion, which is great, but its methodical application has not yet been organized; it does not settle all the questions of pacific procedure and mutual assistance against an aggressor, implied in the outlawry of war. It is undoubtedly a real step toward the maintenance of peace, but in its present state it cannot be considered as sufficient to guarantee the security of nations.
[Page 301]It is this consideration, no doubt, which prevented the British Government from contemplating a substantial reduction in its naval armaments and the American Government from giving up the rapid carrying out of its latest naval program. While both were in agreement in excluding any possibility of conflict between themselves, they were bound to consider that it was an essential task of their navies to assure the protection of their communications, which does not appear to exclude the hypothesis of their being led to intervene in a conflict originating in the violation of solemn pledges.
Whatever may be the importance ascribed to the Pact of Paris, it is essentially on the Covenant of the League of Nations that the French Government, as well as the other Governments belonging to the League, has undertaken to base the limitation and reduction of its armaments, of which naval armaments are but a part. However incomplete the measures taken for carrying it into effect may still be, this Covenant already provides the basis of a complete system of security based upon the application of methods of peaceful settlement and assistance to any State unjustly attacked. It is only in proportion to such outside assistance as they can rely upon that nations will be in a position actually to reduce their armaments. So true it is that a general technical agreement upon armaments implies a previous political agreement; so true it is that a complete naval agreement presupposes an agreement on the question of freedom of the seas, defining the rights of belligerents and those of neutrals and providing for the contingent cooperation of other fleets against that of an aggressor country.
However deeply it may regret this situation, the French Government is none the less determined to extend its full cooperation to the Powers meeting in London, to bring about such solutions as may be feasible at the time.
The question of methods is no less important. In accordance with the example set by the Washington Conference, the Government of the United States and the British Government would appear to have contemplated the adoption of a method of evaluation of naval armaments dealing only with the armaments of the five numerically most powerful navies, and based on mathematical tables.
The example, however, of the Naval Conference of Home is there to remind us that the principles of the Washington treaty met with a check when the League attempted, in 1924, to extend them to all navies, and it has frequently been demonstrated at Geneva that mathematical tables did not permit of rational application, valid for all States, of the principles defined in Article VIII of the Covenant, which contemplates a general reduction of armaments compatible with the security of each State, and with international obligations which would [Page 302] impose upon it a common action, account being taken of its geographical position and the conditions peculiar to it.
Now, the Conference will not have completely achieved its object unless it makes it possible to reach at Geneva a general agreement as to the methods for the limitation of naval armaments.
II
These general observations were necessary for the precise definition of the principles which will inspire the French Government in the course of the London negotiations.
1. It is upon Article VIII of the Covenant that the French Government, faithful to its signature, intends to base reduction of its armaments. It is, indeed, upon this basis alone—a basis which does not imply an a priori application of mathematical formulas, and upon which the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament has already based its work—that it would be possible, in its opinion, to prepare an agreement acceptable for the governments which will not be represented in London.
Two opposing methods, within the framework of Article VIII, were put forward at Geneva for the limitation of naval armaments, one by total tonnage and the other by classes of ships. The stronger navies were inclined to the latter method while the others declared themselves in favor of the former.
Desirous of facilitating the conciliation of these conflicting points of view, the French delegation proposed, as early as April, 1927, a compromise system which was favorably received by all the navies which will not be represented in London, and which was sympathetically considered by several others. The United States Government in particular twice had occasion to state publicly that it was willing to accept it as the basis for discussion. This system consisted in supplementing the limitation of fleets by total tonnage by publishing the distribution of this tonnage between the chief classes of ships and by regulating the transfer of tonnage from one class to another.
Such a system, which is moreover susceptible of adjustments of detail, may adapt itself all the better to the needs of the contemplated understanding between the American and British Governments in that it leaves to any States, that may desire to do so, full liberty to bind themselves more closely to each other. In spite of its preferences for the method of limitation by total tonnage, the French Government is still willing to agree to this compromise method if it permits of accomplishing the general agreement.
2. The preparatory work in Geneva established that there existed a close interdependence in the total defensive armaments of a country, between its land, naval and aerial forces. The French Government [Page 303] has frequently had occasion to declare that here was a fundamental principle of its policy of national defense, the importance of which arises particularly from the geographical position of France, a power both continental and maritime and the metropolis of a colonial empire spread out over the whole surface of the earth.
The Government of the Republic does not wish to find itself obliged to raise at London questions relating to the determination of land and aerial armaments, but it must point out the fact that the tonnage required to meet the needs of its naval defense is in close relation to the level of its land and aerial armaments, computed in accordance with the methods laid down by the Preparatory Commission at its last meeting. If the decisions of the latter were to be reconsidered, the particulars which it will afford as regards its naval armaments would become utterly valueless.
The French Government, moreover, desires to add that these difficulties will not prevent it from seeking solutions which will permit powers which may desire to do so and which may believe that they can do so in complete security, to enter into a definitive and binding agreement between themselves without awaiting the conclusion of the General Convention for the limitation of all armaments.
3. In the light of the foregoing observations, the delegation of France will have no difficulty in making known the importance of the tonnage corresponding to the national needs, in view of the geographical position of France on three seas, and the extent of her colonial empire, with an area of 11,000,000 square kilometers [4,247,100 square miles],99 a population of 60,000,000 people, and a trade amounting to 32,000,000,000 francs [about $1,280,000,000].99
The existence of this empire, the necessity of providing for the separate defense of each of the great groups which constitute it, the numerous political and economic ties which unite these great groups to each other and to the mother country, the need of protecting the integrity and the economic life of the latter, the task of providing for the security of more than 30,000 kilometers [18,630]99 of coast, in all, impose upon the French Navy duties which the French Government cannot ignore when it is called upon to apply Article VIII of the Covenant. The French naval budget, moreover, is lower today than it was in 1913, and the same desire for strict moderation will continue to inspire France in the estimation of her needs and in computing the forces necessary to meet them.
In this respect the French Government will take fully into account any guarantee of security that might be set up and which would give full effect to the engagements of international solidarity against an aggressor contained in Article XVI of the Covenant.
[Page 304]4. Moreover, remembering the beneficial effects produced by the Pacific treaty in view of the conclusion of the Washington naval agreements, the French Government considers that in a limited field, but one in which most of the European fleets are concerned, some progress might be achieved. Communications through the Mediterranean have an importance for the British Empire which the French Government does not disregard. They are equally vital for France. Could an agreement of mutual guarantee and non-aggression be effected between the Mediterranean naval powers to which those among them which will not be represented at London would be parties, and, first of all, a power like Spain, the importance of whose naval interest in the Mediterranean needs no mention? The French Government propounds this question, declaring itself in favor of the principle of such an agreement because it is earnestly desirous of bringing about reduction of naval armaments.
As the conclusion to this statement of general views, suggested to it by study of the agenda of the Conference, the French Government desires to state that none of the difficulties to which it has thought it necessary to draw attention appears to it to be insuperable.
Convinced that all the Governments that are to meet at London will enter upon these discussions with the same will as itself to cooperate sincerely in giving effect to such means as may lead to the overcoming of every difficulty, the French Government has confidence in the success of the negotiations that will pave the way for the General Conference for limitation and reduction of armaments which alone seems capable of satisfying the common will of the nations to organize for peace.