500.A15a3/455
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
I had a long interview with the Japanese Ambassador this morning. He said first that he was instructed by his Government to tell me two things. First, that in regard to my former note as to what took place at the Washington Conference Baron Shidehara wanted [Page 289] to call my attention to the fact, in respect to Senator Kato’s speech, that the Japanese delegates had merely wished to express their general concurrence but not to commit themselves as to anything concerning the ratio of auxiliary vessels. He pointed out that the time was so short after the Hughes’ “bombshell” as he expressed it, that they could not have taken any other position.
In the second place, that in respect to cruisers specifically there had been little discussion at the time of the conference and nothing had been agreed on that.
He said that Baron Shidehara nevertheless was willing, without compromising his original proposal of the cruiser ratio of 10–10–7, to discuss the matter of actual conditions. He pointed out this phrase had been used by me.
At this point I took occasion to tell the Ambassador of my proposition to the British made through Ronald Campbell on Saturday, namely, that care should be taken not to make any announcement of the detailed position of any power during the first speeches at the conference. I pointed out how inevitably the newspapers of each country would “dig in” if any such announcement was made and subsequent compromise would become very much more difficult. I pointed out also the different conditions which existed in 1921 when Mr. Hughes made his celebrated first speech. The Ambassador said he fully understood and would communicate it to his Government.
He then brought up the conferences that were going on between Prime Minister MacDonald and Ambassador Matsudaira and stated that Matsudaira had stated to MacDonald that the ultimate aim of Japan was to have 126,000 tons of large cruisers if the United States tonnage was taken tentatively as 180,000 tons. He pointed out that this made a ratio of 70 to 100. He said that this tonnage was ultimately to be distributed in thirteen vessels aggregating the 126,000 tons. He pointed out, however, that at present Japan had four of the large cruisers completed and four under construction; that in addition she had four smaller cruisers of 7,100 tons carrying eight-inch guns; that she wanted to build two more smaller cruisers with eight-inch guns, making fourteen cruisers altogether carrying eight-inch guns. He said, however, that this was merely a temporary condition, made necessary by her possession of the four smaller cruisers and that her ultimate aim would be as above stated—thirteen vessels aggregating 126,000 tons. He asked if Mr. Dawes would not be authorized to receive communications from Mr. Matsudaira and to negotiate with him. I told him that Mr. Dawes was already authorized to receive such communications and send them to me, but that for the present I found difficulty in having him negotiating over there while we were considering the matter here and that at present I would rather have that situation stand.
[Page 290]He then asked my view as to Japan having seventy per cent of the total auxiliary vessels. I countered by asking him which his Government laid more stress on—having seventy per cent of the large cruisers or seventy per cent of the total auxiliary vessels. He said that if we were willing they should have seventy per cent of the large cruisers it would be very easy to settle the question of the total auxiliary vessels—evidently feeling that we would have no objection to seventy per cent of that. I laughingly told him I could see that that might follow.
He then asked me about submarines, telling me that the Japanese planned to have 100,000 tons but were willing to cut to 80,000 and would not insist on parity with us—and thus would not object to our having more than 80,000. I asked him what Japan would do supposing we only had 75,000 tons and he was not prepared to answer, evidently indicating that it would not make any change in their plans. He asked me about our negotiations on destroyers which he understood were to be 150,000 to 200,000 tons. I told him that was not settled; that all we had done with Great Britain was to agree that we would have the same number and to feel that it did not make a very difficult proposition.
He then reminded me that I had asked him at an earlier conference what the position of his Government would be as to capital ships; whether they would prefer to reduce in size of ships or in the number of ships. He told me that that matter was still under the consideration of his Government.
He then told me that he brought me a special message of thanks from Baron Shidehara; that the Baron had noticed the opinion in the United States was more friendly to Japan than it had been and regarded it as due to the leadership of this Administration and he said that Japan felt that Mr. Hoover having been in Japan and I having been in Japan, it was a good time to work for intellectual cooperation and, if possible, to solve the question of immigration. He said he realized that we had first better solve the important question of the naval conference but that he had always hoped that this Administration would work out these other matters which would put American relations with Japan on the most happy foundation. I expressed my thanks for Baron Shidehara’s message but disclaimed any ability to lead the American public opinion to the extent that he mentioned.