Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I

500.A15a3/215

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi)

[Washington,] September 24, 1929.

The Japanese Ambassador said he had been instructed by his Government to convey the following messages.

• First. His Government wished it to be understood that in order to permit the Japanese Government to participate in the naval conference they must receive the invitation at least three months ahead. The reason was that the distance was so great and they could no longer use the Siberian Railway. They therefore wished to know when it was likely that the invitations would be issued. I told him that I understood their necessity and that I believed the Prime Minister was considering issuing the invitations immediately, probably before he came to this country, and that the conference would be set for the third week in January and that this would allow ample time. I told him, however, that it was not a matter for which we were responsible; that I had supposed his Government would make inquiry from London. He said they would, but he said smilingly, his Government regarded us as really responsible for the conference. I told him that it was all off our shoulders now and that Mr. MacDonald had the responsibility.
• Second. He asked what the chances were for further reduction in armament, expressing the hope that the reduction would go further than the press announcements. I replied that we would go as far as Great Britain; that that had been our position; that we would reduce as far as Great Britain and even further in displacement tonnage in view of the fact that we built a larger proportion of eight-inch cruisers.
• Third. He asked me when he would get the figures on the agreement between Great Britain and America. I told him I was willing to give them to him now; that that agreement was limited by Great Britain’s inability to go below 339,000 displacement tonnage; that their lowest figures to which they would be willing to go were fifteen eight-inch cruisers and thirty-five six-inch cruisers and that their latest proposition involved a large proportion of new replacements and a raise from 330,000 tons to 339,000 displacement tons. If Great Britain was unable to go below those figures our General Board advised us that we could not go below twenty-one eight-inch cruisers, the Omahas, and five new sixes as being parity with the British figures. I told him we were very sorry for this for we wanted to go much lower. He said that Japan wanted to go much lower and he brought out a slip of paper showing the following figures as to the Japanese eight-inch cruisers, viz:
  • Eight 10,000 ton eight-inch cruisers, aggregating 80,000 tons.
  • Four 7,100 ton eight-inch cruisers, aggregating 28,400 tons, or a total of twelve eight-inch cruisers aggregating 108,400 tons. Underneath this he had figures showing 70 percent of 180,000 equals 126,000 and 70 percent of 210,000 equals 147,000, and he explained that this meant that in case we built 18 of our eight-inch cruisers Japan would have to have 126,000 tons or about 20,000 additional tons of such cruisers, while if we built 21 cruisers aggregating 210,000 tons, Japan would have to build about 40,000 tons extra beyond what she now had. I asked him how about their six-inch cruisers. He replied that Japan only had 80,000 tons of six-inch cruisers.
• Fourth. He then said that speaking very frankly he hoped that we would cut down to 15 eight-inch cruisers and Great Britain to 12 eight-inch cruisers, in which case Japan would not have to build any more at all.
• Fifth. He then asked me how about the 10,000 ton six-inch cruisers. I told him that that had been merely a proposition of Mr. MacDonald’s but that we had not accepted it and that our Naval Board had advised that putting six-inch guns on such large cruisers would be an unnecessary waste. He replied that that was exactly the position of Japan.
• Sixth. He then asked me about submarines and destroyers. I told him what our position was and that we would go as low as Great Britain; that as to submarines we both would be glad, as had been our position in the Washington Conference, to abolish submarines altogether. He said he understood that but Japan, like Italy and France, felt that she required a certain number of submarines.
• Seventh. He brought up again the question of the ratio of 10–10–7. He said that Japan was like Great Britain in being an island dependent upon external food supply, while at the same time she was like the United States in having long commercial lanes to protect with no naval bases and thus required large cruisers. He said he hoped we would not be harsh in regard to the desire for an increased ratio; that at the time when the matter came up at the Washington Conference there were conditions which did not maintain now; that then the question of an alliance with Great Britain was complicating matters also that the American people were more suspicious of Japan but that now he thought all of those matters had been ironed out and that the American people would not object to a 10–10–7 ratio. I told him that I agreed with him on the point that the relations between the two countries were very friendly now and we would approach this in a friendly spirit, but that we had always felt that the same ratio as had been established in regard to capital ships should be maintained all through the fleet. Any different method would complicate matters. He said he appreciated that.
• Eighth. He then said that he wanted us to understand that Japan was very friendly to the conference and would stand beside Great Britain and America; that she would not be like France and Italy, who had a different attitude toward the conference. He said very emphatically that Japan would cooperate with us heartily. I told him I was very glad to hear it and thanked him for it.

H[enry] L. S[timson]