500.A15a3/182: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

276. After having had a night in which to think over the matter, I believe I realize better the full import of the President’s letter. Am sending you this, therefore, to be read in connection with my telegram No. 275, September 18, 9 p.m.

My next discussion with the Prime Minister will not be until after his return from Sandringham this afternoon, when I shall simply present the Washington correspondence to him, and shall be careful to avoid creating any atmosphere which would interfere with Mac-Donald’s [Page 248] natural reaction from the impact of this correspondence. Unquestionably, however, MacDonald will be led by the frank and confidential relations existing between us, to ask me in time for my personal views. Of course I have no right to express these unless they are in accord with the President’s and your own; it may possibly be useful to you in formulating instructions, however, to have some knowledge as to the run of my mind under the changing circumstances.

The President’s plan has my enthusiastic support and I feel that we must carefully consider from now on all the steps to be taken with reference to his plan and the manner in which the powers will eventually receive and treat it. Since I am in doubt as to your wishes, I request you to instruct me now as to whether you want me to urge MacDonald to come to a settlement, before he comes to the United States, of the technical differences arising from the two propositions now before us. If you do not wish such a preliminary settlement before he goes to America please so instruct me; I can see good reasons for such a preliminary settlement inasmuch as the President is suggesting a new line of thought and is laying the basis for a reorientation of the entire proposals and discussions, to use his words.

It is possible that the President’s new presentation of the matter may arouse the desire of the Prime Minister and his naval experts at once to give way in the present divergency in order to avoid having to meet the President’s proposal of achieving greater reduction by reorienting the entire discussion.

A new line of thought as to methods is opened up to me by the President’s letter, particularly in the event that the Prime Minister will give consideration to the President’s proposal, for MacDonald of course has to face in this matter greater difficulties than we do. I think it may be assumed that the British Admiralty cannot possibly be induced to support the President’s proposition and likewise that MacDonald can win if he will carry through the fight in the right way. For that reason it becomes of increasing importance to see to it that at the Conference the naval experts will not have any power to cause a delay in decisions. I can well understand that it will be embarrassing to deny to American naval experts a full recognition as members of the delegation of the United States, in view of the loyal cooperation which you are evidently receiving from them; however to grant them such full recognition would make it necessary to include on the British delegation representatives of the Admiralty. That situation to my mind could best be handled by your suggesting that you, MacDonald, the French Premier, and a corresponding official of Italy and Japan should be the only delegates and that these delegates might select such experts as they may deem necessary to advise them. Gibson and myself, I am sure, [Page 249] will feel honored to act as your advisers together with our two distinguished admirals or such others as you may select, although if you do not have us in mind we will in any event forgive you. In ray judgment it is important for us to follow this method of sole delegates, no matter what the subjects for consideration at the Conference will be; and this method will be imperative if the proposals of the President are to be taken up with any chance of success.

As a former director of the Budget an intimation from my subconscious self concerning the relation between our established policy of Government economy and State Department cable tolls orders me to cease.

Dawes
  1. Telegram in two sections.