500.A15a3/162: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
266. Following is text of letter referred to in my 265.53
“September 9th.
My dear General Dawes: Although the confidential memorandum which you handed to me last Friday54 is of the nature of an interim note and although it states that my last note to you will have to be considered by the Navy General Board, I send you this in order that there may be no confusion as to how we stand. If you look back at the various notes I have sent you I think you will agree that the position admits of no doubt but it might be convenient for the President to have a summary in a very definite form of what I have proposed.
1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the confidential memorandum of Friday are not quite clear, particularly where it is stated that ‘he now abandons his previous proposal of seven new replacement, 6-inch ships and proposes a replacement program of fourteen new, 6,500 ton, 6-inch ships.’ This is a misapprehension and the best way to remove it is to come back upon precise figures.
I have agreed to a standard number of fifty cruisers in 1936 and this is how that number is reached: The present strength of the British cruiser fleet built and building, but for the purposes of 1936 [Page 221] assumed to be built, is 58. Between now and 1936 fifteen of these will disappear on account of age, reducing us to forty-three. I have proposed to scrap the four Hawkins group bringing us down to thirty-nine. I explained to you in a previous note that immediately after 1936, say between 1936 and 1940, cruisers were to fall out in blocks and that as I could not accept a naval holiday, because it was impracticable from the point of view of employment of labor, I proposed to scrap prematurely a number of these aged cruisers solely in order to stabilize average building. I have now fixed that number to be scrapped previous to 1936 at three. That reduces us to thirty-six. Now I propose to build between now and 1936 fourteen by way of replacement and that brings us to the fifty standard. In other words, taken as a whole, the proposal now before President Hoover is that by the 31st of December, 1936, the British cruiser fleet will be fifty and no more. Should any be in the process of building at that date, they will only be sufficient to keep the standard at fifty and no more in succeeding years.
2. As regards the tonnage and the possibility of including in the fourteen which are proposed to be built ships of about 4,500 tons, I should like the President to consider this. In 1936 we shall have thirty-five 6-inch cruisers, fourteen of which will be replacement ships built between now and then of an average of 6,500 tons each; twenty-one will be older ships; two of the twenty-one are the Emerald and the Enterprise and the remaining nineteen are all of our C and D class of an average of slightly over 4,500 tons each. Therefore over half of the 6-inch group will be 4,500 ton ships. When we come to replace, after say about 1935, we shall have to face the agreement which I am willing to make that the total of 339,000 tons will not be exceeded assuming that there is no change in the pacific conditions of the world.
This, I hope, will enable the President to visualize the character of the total group and show him how impossible it is for me to promise a smaller tonnage in the ships to be built within next seven years.
3. I had hoped that by extending the age of our cruisers I might be able to meet the President still further but I am informed that all the calculations given above assume that a cruiser is not scrapped until it has been built for two years so that we are now working upon the maximum proposed by you during our conversations.
4. I wonder if I might venture to make a suggestion to you regarding the numbers of 8-inch ships which you say you are bound to build? The conversation which I had at Geneva, and which I reported to you on Friday, is, I am sure you will agree, a very serious obstacle in the way of a superiority of as much as eight in your program. (See my 263, September 6, 3 p.m., first paragraph.) If insisted upon I am unable to see any way out of the deadlock. I notice, however, that in the memorandum the very reasonable point is made that you must have ships capable of operating within a large radius.
Could you not build ships that would satisfy the radius requirement and at the same time get me out of my difficulties in relation to other powers; for instance, would it be feasible for you to build say five 10,000 ton cruisers carrying 6-inch guns that would enable you to have the eighteen 8-inch cruisers, which I understood originally was satisfactory to you, and at the same time enable you to use effectively the tonnage which you say you require in order to enable you to satisfy [Page 222] your people that you have secured parity with us? As I understand it the tonnage position will then be that we have 339,000 and you have 300,000 but for your shortage in tonnage you have a superiority of three 8-inch cruisers and possess five other 10,000 ton ships.
5. These proposals which I am making really touch bottom and expose me to risks which only the cooperative good will of other nations and even continued peace of the world will justify me in taking. They are really in the nature of an experiment in peace making and will have to be accompanied by two conditions:
- (a)
- That nothing is done at the Five-Power Conference and no failure experienced there which will upset the basis of security and responsibility embodied in the program. That means that the final ratification of our agreement would be after the Conference and not before it.
- (b)
- That we should agree to examine the situation in 1935 and see whether the experiment has been justified and to continue or otherwise the agreement beyond the end of 1936.
In this connection we should just follow the precedent of the Washington Agreement of 1922.
Very sincerely yours, J. Ramsay MacDonald.”