Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I

500.A15a3/79: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes)

Washington, July 26, 1929—4 p.m.

192. Your 204, July 25, 1 p.m. In view of the meeting of Mr. Gibson and yourself with Mr. MacDonald on Monday, it seems to us desirable to review the position of negotiations to date and explain for the guidance of yourself and Mr. Gibson our views as to the several matters.

• First point—We may summarize accomplishments in agreement with the British up to the present moment as:

  1. We have agreed that the conference shall be inaugurated as a consequence of the Kellogg Pact.

  2. We have agreed on parity in combatant strength.

  3. We have agreed that this parity should be separately by categories of capital ships, aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers and submarines.

  4. We have agreed not to disturb the provisions of the Washington Treaty, thereby fixing ratios of capital ships and aircraft carriers but see paragraph (a) infra under second point.

  5. We have agreed that a yardstick shall be adopted by which comparative value of the ships within the categories shall be measured.

  6. The American Government agrees, subject to reaching an agreement on other questions, to scrap excess destroyers and excess submarines down to the British level either at present or by 1936.

  7. We agree with Mr. MacDonald as to the principle of total abolition of submarines in international war. We realize with him that it may be impossible to secure consent of other nations, but we should make a mutual effort in this direction.

• Second point—There are left the following points which we would like to have settled in principle as necessary to assure the success of a conference.

  (a) We should like an agreement that all replacements of capital ships under the Washington Treaty shall be postponed until after 1936. This will give a holiday from major naval construction (capital ships and aircraft carriers) until after that date, and as at that time under that Treaty it will be necessary to revise the programs, that would be an appropriate date at which again to seek a further general revision of naval strength downward.

  (b) Entirely in accord with the suggestion that we must have a yardstick, we consider it essential that we should agree upon certain principles upon which the yardstick shall be based before we can present a definitive series of figures. It is our suggestion that in the cruiser category, for instance, we should take the new 10,000 ton, 8-inch gun cruiser as representing the standard, and that we should in measuring the relative combatant strength of other ships in the cruiser category, consider the elements of the yardstick at

  • Displacement.
  • Age.
  • Guns.

  Our general view is that protection, speed, habitability, et cetera, are entirely relative to the other factors, and do not require special consideration. No doubt these factors may deserve different weight for other categories.

  (c) We suggest that for cruisers we should adopt 20 years of age as the scrappable age, for destroyers 16 years, and for submarines, 13 years.

  (d) It is our impression that we should seek to equate our cruiser, destroyer and submarine tonnage as at 1936 instead of today, as this will better accommodate the British situation.

  (e) If the principles of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) can be adopted, we have resolved technical questions purely into the question as to the discounts from the standard that are to be allowed for age and gun calibre. We realize that technical difficulties will arise over the determination of these two factors, in which there will need to be a spirit of compromise, but we think that the whole problem will be infinitely simplified if we can agree upon the principles which we are to submit to the naval experts.

  (f) We are, of course, anxious to arrive at a situation which will allow us to reduce our authorized cruiser program, which would imply arriving at a theoretical tonnage in 1936 of somewhere from 200 to 250 thousand tons. We have made some rough calculations as to our own and the British fleets, taking into account age and gun calibre and taking into account the number of ships that would be scrapped by 1936 under the 20 year age limit, and taking into account the cessation of construction of the three new eight-inch cruisers and the two projected six-inch cruisers of the British Navy, and we believe that we could work it out quantitatively at about these limits.

  (g) Our view is that if we can agree to these principles a preliminary conference should be had in London, representative of the Five Powers, seeking their adherence to such of these principles as concern them.

  (h) Under the Washington Arms Treaty we are compelled to hold a conference of the five naval powers by 1931. We could by mutual consent merge these conferences into the one proposed for next December and avoid the necessity of holding two conferences on much the same subjects.

  (i) A formal conference should be called in December, following Mr. MacDonald’s visit. The result of that visit undoubtedly will be to further the building of good will and to pave the way for mutual understanding.

Stimson