500.A15a3/76: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:30 p.m.]
202. Upon receipt of the third section of your 182, July 21, 7 p.m., this morning I took the same over and read it to the Prime Minister. The first two sections I had read to him yesterday afternoon as I cabled you last night.
He fully recognizes the constructive importance of the suggestions contained in the third section and that the method of procedure proposed is especially valuable as isolating and defining the problem of technical differences, thus putting it in its proper relation to the other important questions upon which we seem in substantial agreement. As I explained through Mr. Myron Taylor, the Price Minister has full confidence in the sincerity, high purpose, wisdom and competence of our President in this naval matter and a disposition to trust the men whom he trusts in connection with it. Early this morning, and of course before knowing the contents of the third section [Page 157] of your 182, he had written me a note which was still at 10 Downing Street when I arrived and its terms were then discussed by us after the reading of the third section of your telegram. MacDonald is about to consult his Admiralty in connection with the statement of the British cruiser situation contained in the first two sections of your 182. As I told you through Mr. Myron Taylor, he apparently lacks an adviser with the particular qualities that Gibson has in his relations to us. His First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Alexander, has the qualities of loyalty and trustworthiness of Gibson but not his technical competency. MacDonald of course wants to be sure that his Admiralty figures are correct, especially since his impression of what they are will be much altered if the statements as to British cruiser strength contained in your telegram are correct.
The note which he handed me is as follows:
“I have been thinking over the despatch you showed me yesterday and though I have not yet had it (I am writing this early in the morning when only the birds are up and they even are sleepy) to study, it is clear that it raises a problem which we have assumed was smaller than it appears to be. We have been waiting for the ‘yardstick’, but the despatch of yesterday says that the gap between us is too wide for a yardstick to span. So we must examine it and I must get advice and guidance.
I propose, if it meets your convenience, to stay in town till we settle something. This week finds me full of concerns till the House rises. Would it be possible for us to meet on Monday morning to go into whole matter of this tonnage of cruisers and go at it till we agree on how we stand. If Mr. Gibson could be with us, I would bring Mr. Alexander, the First Lord (Civil), and a day or two ought to see the end of our preliminary conversations. Then, I shall go on a holiday!”
Upon inquiry as to whether I thought in view of the third section of your telegram he should modify the suggestions of his letter, I stated that I thought it would be valuable to you to have this letter showing the run of his mind before reading the third section.
From the discussion of the matter with MacDonald after knowledge of the contents of the third section of your cable it is evident that the Prime Minister will welcome an interpretation of the representations of his Admiralty to him, as to what point the British cruiser strength is to be checked, from Gibson whom he designates because of his technical knowledge as an “honest broker”. In other words MacDonald welcomes our help and suggestions in the responsibility which he must assume in fixing cruiser strength which, as you say, because of British preponderance in the cruiser class is primarily a question of British needs. I think therefore that the suggestion in his letter as to a conference between him, Alexander, Gibson and myself, on Monday is valuable but before agreeing to it would like your approval and comment. Since the conversations [Page 158] at such a conference, if you approve of it, would of course all be submitted to you and no decisions taken without your approval, it would at least result in some additions to our knowledge of the British position and the elements which would necessarily enter into the determination of their final attitude.