791.003/37
The Minister in Persia ( Philip ) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to supplement my despatch No. 373 of the 17th instant by reporting that I had a confidential conversation with Mehdi Gholi Khan Hedayat (Mokhber-os-Saltaneh), the newly appointed Prime Minister, on that date.
With regard to the Government’s action in denouncing the capitulatory treaties, Mr. Hedayat asserted, in effect, that Persia had taken this step with the firm intention of ridding herself of the special foreign privileges involved which were deemed obnoxious in the light of her desire to achieve complete independence and the right of self determination. He further declared that in taking this action Persia had been in no way influenced by the Soviet … or by Turkey; neither had the events in China any bearing upon this action. The Prime Minister went on to say that there existed, doubtless, foreign interests which oppose this decision on Persia’s part for reasons other than those of a desire for justice and the safety of the rights of their nationals.
Leaving aside such hypotheses, he assured me that Persia in this matter sought only what she considered her right. This she hoped to achieve in all friendliness and with the assistance of the friendly powers. Should it be necessary, however, to sever relations with any treaty power which refused to acknowledge the position assumed by Persia, the latter to its great regret would feel obliged to take such a step. I understood that the Prime Minister alluded to the question of the Treaties with France and Spain when making these remarks. He went on to say that the civil code of Persia was a good one, fundamentally, though based on the principles of Islam and lacking in some requirements to meet modern conditions.
It was hoped, however, to prepare a translation of this and other codes of law within the ensuing year and, in the meantime, Persia would earnestly await suggestions from the treaty powers in the matter of opening negotiations for new treaties.
I asked Mr. Hedayat if he thought, in consideration of the comparatively short time available for the reorganization of the judiciary, new treaty negotiations, etc., the Government would be favorably inclined to extend the period of validity of the various treaties after May 10, 1928. He said he could not give such an assurance at the present time, but that he felt convinced that when the good faith and earnest desire of Persia were more fully appreciated all would be amicably arranged.
[Page 587]I am inclined to the opinion that Persia has taken the step mentioned in a spirit of enthusiastic expectancy rather than in one of matured consideration. Probably it has been calculated that a bold denouncement of the treaties would precipitate a discussion and bring about the desired end more quickly than other means. Also it may have been considered that such a gesture would tend to impress the Soviet at a crucial moment when it is hoped that a favorable commercial understanding with that Government might be arrived at.
Whatever be the actuating causes of Persia’s decision, I feel now that our Government might do well to take the lead in frankly meeting the situation in a spirit of friendliness and, possibly, in demonstrating its willingness to open negotiations for a new treaty without in any way committing itself on the subject of capitulatory privileges. I am not advancing this as a definite suggestion but merely as a possible subject for the Department’s consideration.
I neglected to mention in my preceding despatch above cited that the British Minister spoke of having suggested to Prince Firouz the possibility that France might submit the question of the denouncement of her perpetual treaty with Persia to the Council of the League of Nations, of which Persia also is a member—the inference being that the decision of that body would undoubtedly be in favor of France, as a necessary party to any friendly denouncement.
I have [etc.]