817.00/4744: Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

120. Following from Stimson:

“Please inform the President. I deeply appreciate discretion granted me and shall not hesitate to use it when necessary. Desire, however, that he should have advance information of crises so far as they can be forecast in order that he may instruct me when he desires. Our negotiations with Sacasa delegates have been exceptionally frank and cordial and they have recorded themselves as in thorough sympathy with the fundamental elements of settlement stated in my telegram number 107, April 23, 11 a.m., and agreed to by Diaz, excepting of course retention of Diaz as to which they have made no commitment whatever although Cordero Reyes has announced Sacasa’s readiness to step aside. While hopeful of settlement I yet deem it quite possible that official and army pressure may force them to make final issue on this point. Have sent American officers today to Moncada to arrange conference with me if possible or at least to bring his views to Sacasa delegates as to this settlement. Whether he comes or refuses, crisis may be precipitated almost [Page 335] immediately and it may become necessary for me to threaten forcible disarmament of insurgents. In view of statement in your number 8057 as to possible elimination Diaz as a last resort, I desire President to clearly understand my views on that subject. In your numbers 7458 and 80 President expresses a hope for settlement to be worked out under Nicaraguan law and constitution with which I emphatically concur. I deem retention of Diaz practically necessary for adoption of such constitutional method. Our settlement plan would make President a mere figurehead so far as Executive power is concerned. This has been and will be explained to Liberals. Diaz will accept this limitation on his powers and cheerfully and loyally cooperate with execution of plan. After careful consideration we know no other Nicaraguan whom we could trust to so cooperate. Furthermore, selection of substitute would probably involve grave party and personal difficulties. In short, after two weeks investigation and most careful reflection I do not believe Diaz could be safely eliminated unless in favor of a provisional American executive which would involve legal and constitutional difficulties. Minister and Admiral emphatically concur and I request you show Eberhardt’s telegram number 23, January 23, noon,59 the statements in which are amply confirmed by my own investigation, to the President. For these reasons I favor insistence upon retention of Diaz as a necessary element of our plan, although we of course will loyally follow any different instructions should the President from his broader viewpoint, decide to give them to us. Stimson.”

Eberhardt
  1. Ante, p. 332.
  2. Ante, p. 325.
  3. Not printed.