Office of the Historian

817.00/4736: Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

Managua, April 29, 1927—noon.
[Received 8:25 p.m.]

116. Following from Stimson:

“Please inform President:

1.
Sacasa conferences [conferees?] expected Corinto today at 1 o’clock, will be brought here by special train, conference probably begins tomorrow. Navy deserves great credit for speed of transit.
2.
With Minister visited Leon, principal Liberal center, yesterday. Conferred with prominent Liberals some of whom came from hiding to meet us. Warned Conservative officials against harsh action pending conference. Arranged for several reasonable Liberal leaders to meet Sacasa conferees on train.
3.
Government military situation undoubtedly bad. After being amply furnished with men and munitions Government generals not only failed to push home initiated advantage of 3 weeks ago but have allowed Moncada to concentrate a probable equal force and take initiative. Complete incompetence or treachery or both indicated. Moncada though probably short of ammunition now in position to threaten river crossing, although Government soldiers still fighting well on the defensive.
4.
Admiral has perfected plans to protect crossing and prepared announcement to Moncada to be used if necessary endeavoring to avoid if possible anything in the nature of threat during conference.
5.
Diaz has behaved well consistently and is evidently willing to [Page 332] entirely subordinate his own personal interests to a constructive peace program. So far as I can see no other equally intelligent and conciliatory substitute for him could be found even if desired. No such thing as an impartial Nicaraguan between the two parties exists although both clamor for one.
6.
In conclusion we have on our side, first, the general desire for a fair solution of the party deadlock in 1928, coupled with a constructive program for future political fiscal improvement under American supervision which both parties approve of and desire, and third, in reserve, American military power. Against us there are, first, the bitterness naturally engendered among certain Liberals by the war, second, the general resentment against the Chamorro coup d’état56 which has crystallized against Diaz as its beneficiary and, third, a well led insurgent force which undoubtedly believes it can win the war unless blocked by us. Minister and Admiral concur. Stimson.”

Eberhardt
  1. On Oct. 5, 1925, General Chamorro seized the fortress dominating the city of Managua. See Foreign Relations, 1925, vol. ii, p. 639.↩