812.6363/2456

Translation of Opinion in the Mexican Petroleum Company’s Suit for “Amparo” as Announced by the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico, November 17, 192718

Having taken under review the case arising from the suit of amparo (the Spanish word amparo means literally shelter, hence protection; and the protection sought in a suit for amparo is similar to that sought in the United States in a suit for injunction) brought by the attorney-in-fact of the Mexican Petroleum Company of California against acts of the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor and the agent of said Department in charge of the Technical Petroleum Agency in Tampico, State of Tamaulipas, and alleging violation of articles 4, 14, 16, 22 and 27 of the Federal Constitution; and upon an examination of the record the following being disclosed (resultando):

Statement of the Case

First: By a writing dated January 26 of the current year and presented on the following day, Carlos Palomar, as attorney-in-fact of the Mexican Petroleum Company of California, a capacity which he proved by means of an authenticated copy of his power of attorney [Page 198]exhibited with his complaint, sought amparo against acts of the authorities before mentioned, which he said consisted of the issuance of official communications Nos. 1090, 1091 and 1093 dated January 11 of the same year, addressed by the Chief of the Technical Petroleum Agency in Tampico to the representative of the aforesaid Company, notifying him that, because of non-compliance with the requirement contained in the Regulatory Law of Art. 27 of the Constitution in the branch of petroleum (i. e. The Petroleum Law promulgated December 31, 1925), making it necessary to ask for confirmation of subsoil rights acquired prior to May 1, 1917, the said Agency, acting upon express instructions from the Department of Industry revokes the permits granted by official communications Nos. 82, of Jan. 3 of the current year, 11 of the same date, and 21, likewise of the same date, to drill wells: “Mendez No. 27”, “Chijol No. 63” and “Dicha No. 104”, respectively, in lands of the former Hacienda de Chapacao, Municipality of Panuco, State of Veracruz. These acts are considered as violative of the guarantees established in the Constitutional articles before mentioned, and, to support its complaint, the complainant company sets forth the following allegations:

That in the city of Mexico, in the month of January of last year (i. e. 1926) it sought amparo against the provisions of articles 2, 4, 14 and 15 of the Regulatory Law of Art. 27 of the Constitution in the branch of petroleum, in so far as those provisions deprived said company of the rights to explore and exploit the oil-bearing subsoil acquired prior to May 1, 1917; that the District Judge dismissed the complaint as not having a legal basis (improcedente), the Supreme Court having confirmed this decision; that the complainant company considered that the said provisions modified to its prejudice, in respect to its properties and rights, a legal status existing before May 1, 1917, the date on which Art. 27 of the Constitution became effective; that the Supreme Court took the contrary view declaring that the law did not at that time deprive (the complainant) of its rights and possessions, adding that articles 14 and 15 of the Regulatory Law, in designating in connection with Art. 12 the period of one year within which it would be possible, if possible at all, to ask for confirmation of the rights, showed conclusively that the legal provisions cited were not immediately obligatory in character, stating in conclusion that, as yet, no specific act of enforcement could be pointed out; that such a specific act having now taken place, the (present) suit of amparo was being brought on the following grounds:

Prior to May 1, 1917, the complainant, a foreign company organized under the laws of the State of California, U. S. A., domiciled in the Republic of Mexico and qualified to do business therein by [Page 199]reason of having complied with the legal requirements, acquired in the State of Veracruz various lots of land that form part of the former Hacienda de “Tampalache, Chila y sus Llanos”, known also by the name of Chapacao, acquisitions which it has been exploiting for petroleum, and which date back for more than 25 years, as do also the operations undertaken; that the Department of Industry recognized in the fullest manner its rights by official communications of September 2, 1926 and October 16 of the same year; that said recognitions were granted after examination of the title documents proving its rights, of which (title documents) photostatic copies are attached (hereto),19 and the right reserved to present the originals if it should be necessary; that the fundamental object of the Company is the exploitation of petroleum, wherefore, in acquiring the various tracts, it did so with the definite purpose of extracting and utilizing the petroleum, a purpose which is corroborated by positive acts of exploitation which it has been performing for twenty-five years; that the official communications by which the drilling permits are cancelled, attack its rights in violation of the individual guarantees invoked,

  • because article 2 of the Petroleum Law declares in absolute terms that only with the express authorization of the Federal Executive, granted in accordance with the provisions of the law and its regulations,20 may the operations required in the petroleum industry be conducted;
  • because Art. 4 declares that only Mexicans, companies organized in conformity with Mexican laws and alien individuals (the latter under specified conditions) may obtain petroleum concessions, thus excluding foreign companies such as the complainant;
  • because Art. 14 provides that there shall be confirmed by means of concessions granted in conformity with said law, the rights derived from lands upon which exploitation operations had been begun prior to May 1, 1917, to the exclusion of any other (lands), subject to the understanding that the life of such confirmations may not exceed fifty years computed from the time the exploitation operations were begun;
  • because Art. 15, according to which the period of one year is granted for applying for concessions of confirmation, fixes the penalty that, if this is not done, the respective rights shall be considered as renounced, and shall have no effect whatever against the Federal Government.

In the points of law set forth in the complaint it is said specifically that, as regards the lands which complainant acquired in fee (en pleno dominio) prior to May 1, 1917, its rights over the subsoil [Page 200]are merged (se confunden) with those over the surface which, according to general law (derecho común) such as existed prior to the date named, formed a whole with the underlying strata, without other limitations than those established by the Mining Laws, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 731 of the Civil Code,—the discussion as to whether coal, petroleum and other mineral fuels did or did not belong to the owner of the land having been definitely settled by the Mining Code of 1884, which declared in article 10 that those substances were of the exclusive ownership of the owner of the soil, which was also declared by the Mining Law of November 25, 1909, and the acquisition made by the Mexican Petroleum Company having been under the protection of those laws, the company’s rights to the subsoil, as regards the tracts obtained prior to the effective date of the Constitution, are of indefinite duration as is the right of ownership itself. Wherefore, since the Petroleum Law does not accord recognition to those rights in articles 2, 4, 14 and 15, the individual guarantees before mentioned are violated to its (i. e. the complainant’s) prejudice,

  • because its rights to exploit the subsoil cannot be derived from a future concession or from a permit or authorization which the Executive may grant to it, but are born from the titles themselves;
  • because it is excluded, as a foreign company, from the right of exploiting the subsoil, since it cannot obtain a concession, nor have its rights confirmed;
  • because, even supposing that a concession could be granted to it, that (concession) could refer only and exclusively to lands on which exploitation operations were begun prior to May 1, 1917, thereby excluding those lands on which it had performed no operations;
  • because the right to exploit the subsoil is limited as to time, without taking into consideration the fact that, with respect to tracts held in fee (poseidos a titulo de dorminio), that right is of unlimited (indefinido) duration;
  • and, finally, because it is established as a condition for obtaining concessions that these be applied for within the period of one year, under penalty of loss of all rights now existing, or what amounts to the same thing, that the titles of acquisition be cancelled, every right definitely lost, and the interests of the company confiscated.

The violations specified in the complaint are seven in number:

I.
That of Art. 4 of the Constitution, in that Art. 15 of the Petroleum Law deprives the complainant company of the accumulation of capital bound up with the subsoil which the said article confiscates, taking from the Company mentioned the products of its labor and the fruit of its efforts,
II.
That of Art. 14 of the Constitution, in that Art. 27 of the Constitution is applied retroactively since the Petroleum Law fails to [Page 201]recognize the significance, as established in unequivocal terms by the Supreme Court in five decisions (i. e. The Texas Company and other amparo cases decided in 1921 and 1922),21 of that provision (i. e. Article 27), as it relates to the particular case which gives rise to the amparo;
III.
Art. 14, also, in that the official communications of revocation deprive the Mexican Petroleum Company of its properties, possessions and rights, without due process of law (sin que haya mediado juicio), and without compliance with the other requirements set forth in Par. 2 of the said article, since by applying to it Art. 15 of the Petroleum Law, the right which the Company holds over the subsoil of its lands is disregarded, (thus) despoiling it of the right to exploit them, acquired by virtue of former laws;
IV.
That of Art. 16 of the Constitution, in that, without legal justification, the responsible authorities are disturbing the complainant company in its possessions, obstructing it in the exercise of its rights and depriving it of them;
V.
That of Art. 22 of the Constitution, in that Art. 15 (of the Law) punishes with the penalty of confiscation any one who, as in the case of the complainant, may not have consented to receive new titles in exchange for its old titles to the subsoil, for on the supposition that the exchange of titles could have been made, as it cannot in this case since the Company is a foreign one, the confiscation is absolute and inevitable;
VI.
That of Art. 27 of the Constitution, in that retroactive effects are given to Articles 14 and 15 of the Petroleum Law, whereas neither in letter nor in spirit, according to the declaration of the Supreme Court (i. e. in The Texas Company case), does Art. 27 of the Constitution have that attribute, as regards rights to the oil-bearing subsoil acquired prior to May 1, 1917; and
VII.
That of Art. 27, in the sense that no one may be despoiled of his properties, save by expropriation for reasons of public utility and by means of compensation.

Second. The complaint having been admitted by the District Judge of Villa Cuauhtemoc before whom it was presented, the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor set up:

  • that the drilling permits granted were expressly and distinctly provisional in nature, that is to say, precarious, subject to the provisions of the Petroleum Law, so that they did not imply any recognition of subsoil rights, and still less did they themselves confer such recognition, wherefore, if the company did not comply with the fundamental condition upon which the subsistence of those permits depended, that is to say, if it did not comply with the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of the said Petroleum Law, renouncing voluntarily the rights which it may have held in the subsoil, it cannot now claim that its rights were violated by the ordering of the cancellation of the permits;
  • that as regards the application of certain articles of the said Petroleum Law, it should be pointed out that a law is being dealt [Page 202]with which in general terms considers that the bona fide rights, the confirmation of which was not applied for within the specified period, are renounced, but so long as it is not proved that such rights exist and that the Petroleum Law results in harm or injury to them, there is no ground for the amparo;
  • that the jurisprudence invoked does not declare that the persons under consideration have rights which were legally acquired and must be respected, but establishes only that their rights be respected if and when they are proved;
  • and that, as a matter of fact, the ruling by the President of the Republic which ordered that such companies as had not applied for confirmation of the rights which they claimed to hold, should be brought to the attention of the Attorney General of the Nation in order that he might bring action to vindicate (revindicar) the subsoil rights of the Nation, gives the Companies an opportunity to prove their rights and that the Petroleum Law undertakes to despoil them thereof; and it will be against such final judgment as may be rendered in that case that amparo may be brought for the violation of such constitutional guarantees as may be violated and particularly that contained in Article 14, but in the present amparo proceeding it is impossible to prove that acquired rights are legally involved, and therefore it is not possible to decide that those rights are being taken away.

The Petroleum Agency in Tampico failed to submit its brief; and the hearing having been held at which the complainant company put in evidence various certified copies of the documents by virtue of which it claims to have acquired its rights, and testimony to show that it had performed petroleum exploration and exploitation operations prior to May 1, 1917, the District Judge, in disagreement with the view of the District Attorney, granted the amparo, on the ground that the Mexican Petroleum Company has been deprived of its rights to explore and exploit the subsoil of Chapacao, without any court proceedings having intervened as required by law, and in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, since nationalization of petroleum, according to Art. 27 of the Federal Constitution, should be carried into effect against private individuals through the Judicial Tribunals.

Third. The Department of Industry, its Agency in Tampico, the District Attorney and the complainant company appealed. The first two alleged the same errors (agravios), saying:

  • that there is a contradiction between that part of the decision in which the court announces its judgment and that part which contains the reasoning on which the judgment is based, since (the Court) grants the amparo, and at the same time declares that neither Art. 27 of the Constitution nor the provisions of the Petroleum Law violate any individual guarantees because it is not the authorities that apply said laws retroactively, but the legislator;
  • that the said decision is contrary to the letter and spirit of Art. 27 already mentioned, and the Petroleum Law, inasmuch as the complainant can only be the owner of petroleum which it may cause to flow or which may flow naturally (into its possession), but not of that which in a merely potential sense it may be able to obtain, for this latter has not as yet been acquired;
  • that the decision overlooks the relevancy of Art. 15 of the Petroleum Law, which in express terms provides that all rights, the confirmation of which may not have been applied for, shall be considered as renounced;
  • that Point Six in the opinion is based upon an erroneous interpretation of Art. 27 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the cancellation of the permits does not imply the doing of any affirmative act on the part of the Department, but purely and simply a compliance with Art. 15 already mentioned; and
  • that the Judge ignored the clause which specifically states that the permits are of a provisional nature and subject to the Petroleum Law.

The District Attorney says:

  • that there is a contradiction between the third and sixth points in the opinion;
  • that the judgment is in conflict with others rendered by the same Court in similar cases;
  • that the right to drill has not become part of the estate of the complainant company in such a way as to make its withdrawal dependent upon any legal proceedings, for rights that impose obligations (perentorios) and are conditional, granted as an act of favor (a titulo de gracia), for the utilization of natural resources, are of no effect whatever when there has been a failure to comply with the conditions set out in the title under which the favor was obtained; and
  • that while a real and perpetual right over the subsoil is assumed as if such a right had been proved, that is something which has not been proved.

The complainant company agreed with the judgment, and appealed only in order that the Supreme Court might confirm the granting of the amparo, taking the ground,—

  • that it is prohibited from exploiting the oil deposits, in violation of Art. 4 of the Constitution;
  • that it is not true that Par. IV of Art. 27 of the Constitution is retroactive, either in letter or in spirit, because the Supreme Court has established jurisprudence (to the contrary);
  • neither is it true, as the decision asserts, that the cancellation of the permits is not a penalty or a confiscation;
  • [Page 204]
  • that the violation of Art. 27 of the Constitution as it relates to expropriation was not taken into account, since it is held that deprivation of rights could be made legally, by resorting to the judicial authorities and following the procedure set out in Art. 27;and
  • that the proofs submitted to show the right of ownership, and the use of that right, were disregarded.

Fourth: The records came to this Supreme Court of Justice, and the appeal having been admitted, they were brought to the attention of the parties and the file was sent to the Attorney General for him to formulate his brief, which he did, to the effect that the judgment under review be reversed, and the amparo denied, taking the ground that as the permits granted were of a provisional nature and subject to the provisions of the Law Regulatory of Art. 27 of the Constitution in the branch of petroleum, those permits could be revoked if the Company failed to (submit to) the provisions of the law; and since it failed voluntarily to apply for confirmation of the rights it claims to hold, the revocation was in accordance with law, no judicial proceeding being necessary, because said formality is unnecessary in revoking administrative permits.

The Opinion of the Court

The opinion of the Court is as follows (considerando):

First:—The errors alleged by those designated as the responsible authorities, are so closely related to those set up by the District Attorney, that the study of the former includes the latter, so that there is no need of making special mention of either. Therefore, with the exception of the error relating to the existence of the rights which the complainant company claims to hold not having been proved, an error which was alleged by the District Attorney and will be dealt with in a later part of this opinion, the other errors, as has been said before, will all be analyzed together.

Second:—It is objected that the part of the decision containing the judgment of the Court is inconsistent with some of its reasoning, because notwithstanding it is maintained in the Court’s reasoning that it was the legislator and not the responsible authorities who gave retroactive effects to the law, wherefore, in applying it (i. e. the law), there is no violation of guarantees in this respect, nevertheless an amparo is granted. The error does not exist; for even admitting the correctness of this premise, it would not in itself be a sufficient cause for reversing the judgment, unless the reasoning directly governed the judgment part; and quite on the contrary, it appears from the decision that the reason for which the amparo was granted was not the retroactivity which the complainant company [Page 205]alleges to be a feature of the Petroleum Law, but the fact that the Judge took the point of view,—a point of view which the Supreme Court does not undertake to analyze,—that there had been deprivation of rights without due process of law as required by articles 14, 16 and 27 of the Constitution.

It is asserted also that the decision recognizes that the existence of a potential right, namely, the right of the company to exploit the subsoil, is violated. It is not true that there are involved here rights merely in expectancy; for in addition to the fact that the District Judge has referred only to the rights to explore and exploit which had been granted to the complainant, the said rights exist by virtue of the operations which the said (complainant) has conducted under the respective permits, under the protection of former general provisions (of law), and not merely potentially; and because of that fact (i. e. the actual conduct of operations), there is, to say the least, no simple expectancy involved here, and all the more since the said Petroleum Law, the application of which is under consideration, recognizes in an express manner (both the) possible and real existence of those rights by enumerating them in article 14, and does not withhold recognition of said rights for an alleged failure to exercise the same or utilize them. The Department of Industry, when it maintains the contrary in its corresponding error, goes so far as to put itself in conflict with the very Petroleum Law with the enforcement of which it is charged.

The contention made to the effect that the rights of the Company respecting which no confirmation was applied for, should be considered as legally renounced, in accordance with the provisions of article 15 of the Petroleum Law, is not tenable. In fact, the law allows a period of one year in which to present the application for confirmation of rights, and that period could not have run as against the complainant company, because if that confirmation cannot be granted for more than fifty years, as provided in the final paragraph of fraction 2 of article 14 of the Law, and if this limitation implies a partial restriction or partial loss of the rights which its titles, granted prior to May 1, 1917, may confer (upon the Company), it is evident that said application could not have been made by the complainant without curtailment of something which belongs to its estate, so long as such application would imply submission to the aforesaid limitation. And if it is indisputable that the confirmation of a right is the express recognition of the same, the restricting of it in the manner provided in said article 14 is to modify, and not to confirm, said right. Consequently, if the complainant company was not able to apply for the confirmation of its pre-existing rights, except with the limitation of them as to time, it is beyond doubt that it was imperative that this restriction should first disappear and, [Page 206]by the same token, the period of one year specified in this connection by article 15, could not have elapsed, there existing the impossibility mentioned; and as the Department of Industry and Commerce, contrary to the concepts expressed above, revoked the permits which it had granted to the complainant company, on the ground that the said period had expired, without taking into consideration the unconstitutionality of the limit of fifty years, a condition attaching to the confirmation, it is indisputable that the protested ruling violates in this respect the guarantees afforded the complainant by articles 14, 16 and 27 of the Federal Constitution.

Finally, it is said that the Judge failed to consider the clause contained in the revoked permits, relative to the provisional nature of the same, and (stipulating) that they shall be subject to the provisions of the Petroleum Law. In this connection it is to be observed that the decision does deal with this question,—the statement of the error being therefore incorrect; but even though this alone would be sufficient for dismissing it (i. e. the point raised in this assignment of error), it is well to point out that the revoked permits, although they were of a provisional nature, were granted upon the fundamental consideration that the applicant company had rights which it could allege, and of the kind covered by Article 14 of the Petroleum Law, and as yet there has been no legal examination of those rights that makes it possible to assert that they do not exist as set forth in said Article 14. Moreover, compliance with the Petroleum Law, however free, spontaneous and open we may assume it to be, can refer only to those provisions which are constitutional; for, otherwise, it would be necessary to accept the absurdity that personal guarantees may be renounced, something which it is settled law cannot be done, constituting as they do a basic precept of our Constitutional Law.

Third:—The District Attorney asserts that the rights which the complainant company claims to hold were not proved, and that, as the decision of the District Judge goes upon the theory that they were, this constitutes an error. At the hearing the Mexican Petroleum Company exhibited various certified copies referring to the acquisition of different lots of land for petroleum exploitation purposes, and furthermore, produced testimony proving the regular operations carried out in said land, which is sufficient ground for holding it (the Company) injured for the purposes of amparo, since it is not in this proceeding involving constitutional questions that alleged property rights should be discussed, and still less those of the complainant company refused recognition out of hand, inasmuch as precisely such an examination of rights must (deberá) be made when the application for confirmation is presented to the Department of Industry and Commerce. [Page 207]Consequently, if the Company has not had the opportunity of having the rights relied upon examined, the error assigned by the District Attorney is not to be admitted.

Fourth:—The errors alleged by the responsible authorities and the District Attorney having been analyzed, it is necessary to enter upon a study of the violations claimed in the demand for amparo, with the exception of that relating to the limitation as to time contained in Article 14, which has already been dealt with in earlier parts of this opinion. The complainant company maintains that the provision which imposes the obligation of applying for confirmation, constitutes in itself a violation (of its constitutional rights), since such confirmation cannot be accorded except in the form of a new concession which the said Company believes it is not called upon to apply for, because it is in the enjoyment of the rights in question by virtue of its titles and the perfectly valid authorization issued before the Petroleum Law (went into effect). Legally, this error cannot be upheld, because the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor violates no guarantee whatsoever in requiring that confirmation of the rights be applied for, since Article 14 of the Petroleum Law refers only to the recognition of acquired rights without any substantial alteration; so that, the requirement of confirmation is only a formality (modalidad) imposed by the Legislator upon the use and exercise of the said rights for reasons of a public nature, and for the very purpose of safeguarding them. If such rights were confirmed by operation of the law and no report (manifestación) had to be made, it would be extremely difficult and impossible in many cases to determine whether the specified rights continued to exist in their original form (estado) or had changed for any reason.

There are procedures similar to this in our legislation, and off hand we might mention the provisions of the Law relating to Waters of Federal Jurisdiction, requiring confirmation of rights for the use and utilization of said waters which until then had been under local jurisdiction and by the new law came under federal jurisdiction; but providing that such confirmation should be made under the procedure established therein, which required the water user to apply to the Department of Fomento, in order to obtain confirmation of his rights, as a means employed by the Legislator to secure knowledge regarding the utilization of public waters, the existing number of water users, and their location and boundaries, and thus be in a position to exercise the supervision and (perform) the other duties which the laws impose upon the authorities, to do which they would not be qualified if uninformed of the facts before mentioned; and similarly the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor must have some means of getting before it the various holders of titles to petroleum [Page 208]lands and be able to know the condition and the extent of their rights, confirming them without any cost in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph I of Article 14, by means of an act of recognition (mediante un reconocimiento), which is nothing but the use of a formula for expressing (expresión formulista) the confirmation of rights already acquired to which the very Petroleum Law refers. Consequently, the rights of the complainant company are not at all affected by a confirmation which does not modify them, but which recognizes them, provided that the requirements laid down by fractions 1 and 2 of Article 14 of the said Law, and the obligations set out in its (the Company’s) respective titles, are complied with.

Fifth:—To go further, there is no doubt in anybody’s mind that petroleum and its derivatives constitute one of the resources most coveted and sought after by industry and commerce, and that the zones in which they are produced are of limited and small area. Within an area which is often small there are mingled and developed many and varied industries; surface and underground transportation, industries of extracting and treating petroleum, and operations of exploration and exploitation. All these activities, instead of developing harmoniously, frequently come in contact, clash and enter into conflict, leading to interference and encroachments, which it is the unavoidable duty of the Public Power to prevent and regulate; and it is not humanly or reasonably possible to regulate this activity without having an exact knowledge of it, without knowing and harmonizing the conflicting interests, and the plan and conditions of their development; and the initial and primary road to this understanding is confirmatory registration which neither injures nor modifies substantially the rights, but tends merely to authenticate and make certain of them, thus enabling the Public Power to coordinate them in a wise and peaceable manner. The large concentration of human beings within the restricted area of centers of population has produced the common phenomenon observable in all large cities, of the land being utilized to the last millimeter for the erection of large buildings, formidable structures in which are sheltered hundreds and thousands of people, and notwithstanding the undeniable rights of the owner of the building to utilize his property and the rights of the tenants to enjoy the inviolability of their homes without being molested, the public authority establishes supervision within them,—police, sanitary and of other kinds, without that being considered by anybody as a transgression or a violation of the home or property; and in an analogous situation, the Legislator undoubtedly had a similar object in view regarding the petroleum zones, in which the crowding of persons, of activities, or interests openly or latently in conflict, makes it his duty to take opportune measures of social foresight [Page 209]looking toward better living conditions, aside from the fact that the essential purpose of issuing confirmatory concessions is to give to the State (the power of) regulation and supervision (interventión) which Article 27 of the Constitution recognizes in it.

Judgment of the Court

By reason of what has been stated, and upon the basis of Articles 103, fraction 1, and 107, fraction 9, of the Federal Constitution and Article 86 and other pertinent ones of the Regulatory Law of Amparo, it is resolved:

  • First:—The judgment pronounced by the District Judge in the amparo proceedings to which this record refers, is confirmed in the following terms:
  • Second:—The Justice of the Union protects and defends the Mexican Petroleum Company of California against the acts of which it complains and which consist in the revocation of the permits granted by the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor to drill wells: “Mendez No. 27”, “Chikol No. 63” and “Dicha No. 104”, in lands of the former Hacienda de Chapacao, Municipality of Panuco, State of Veracruz, basing such revocation on Articles 14 and 15 of the Petroleum Law, the organic law of Article 27 of the Federal Constitution, and imposing the penalty established by said Article 15.
  • Third:—Let notice be given . . . . . . .

  1. This translation was enclosed in a letter of Dec. 14, 1927, from Mr. Guy Stevens, director of the Association of Producers of Petroleum in Mexico, to the Under Secretary of State. A previous translation prepared by the Association in Mexico was transmitted with the Spanish text by the Ambassador in Mexico in despatch No. 115, Nov. 22, 1927; not printed (file No. 812.6363/2438).

    In despatch No. 148, Dec. 5, 1927, the Chargé in Mexico informed the Department that the formal opinion was signed on Dec. 2, 1927 (file No. 812.6363/2448).

  2. Not attached to translation.
  3. For text of petroleum law, see Diario Oficial, Dec. 31, 1925. For text of the regulations, see ibid., Apr. 8, 1926.
  4. See Foreign Relations, 1921, vol. ii, pp. 461 ff.; ibid., 1922, vol. ii, p. 680; and Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Semanario Judicial de la Federacion (México, Antigua Imprenta de Murguía, 1922), quinta época, tomo x, p. 1308.