721.2315/139
The Ambassador in Peru ( Poindexter ) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 3.]
Sir: Referring to the Department’s confidential instruction No. 127 of October 7, 1924, I beg to say, confirming my cablegram No. 61 of this date,76 that from a conversation which I have had today with Doctor Salomon, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, I have formed the conclusion that it is not likely that the Peruvian Congress will ratify the treaty which has been formulated and signed by the executive representatives of Colombia and Peru, fixing the boundary line between the two countries.
Doctor Salomón showed me a copy of a formal memorandum which had been submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil to the Peruvian Minister at Rio de Janeiro, supplementing a conversation which the Brazilian Minister had with the Peruvian representative. This memorandum raised two points of objection by Brazil to the ratification of the treaty:
First. It pointed out that in the agreement which Brazil had made with Perú,—fixing a line running due south from the Caquetá River to the Amazon River, as the boundary line, in that section, between Brazil and Peru,—Brazil did not contemplate that an area of land contiguous to this boundary line, and which, by the said agreement, came under the sovereignty of Peru, would be transferred voluntarily or at all by the latter country to an entirely new and different sovereignty. [Page 297] The memorandum also stated that in agreeing to the provision of the treaty between Brazil and Peru, that in case Colombia should be the winner in the controversy existing between that country and Perú in regard to the identical territory lying west of and contiguous to the said boundary line, then Brazil would negotiate with Colombia in regard to the respective rights of the two countries thereto,—it did not contemplate the cession of this territory by Perú to Colombia, by treaty stipulation, but did suppose that the controversy would be submitted to an arbitral or juridical decision by some impartial tribunal. In support of this last statement, the memorandum called attention to the fact that in the agreement between Perú and Brazil, in regard to this point, the language used was “ganar la causa”, which, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs argues, necessarily implied a cause to be tried before an arbitral or juridical tribunal. The Brazilian Minister further stated, in the memorandum, that Brazil was induced to make this agreement because of the implicit confidence which it had that any impartial arbitral or juridical tribunal to which the case might be submitted would necessarily decide in favor of Perú, because of the incontrovertible merits and justice of the latter’s claim to the territory in question;—the memorandum proceeding to state that it was never conceived by Brazil that Peru would voluntarily cede its jurisdiction over territory which was occupied by Peruvian citizens, and over which its actual jurisdiction was daily enforced without interruption or interference.
The memorandum then calls attention to the substantial interest which Brazil has in the question as to whether Perú or Colombia shall exercise sovereign jurisdiction over this strip of territory lying contiguous to her boundary line, and that while Brazil is entirely willing, and has agreed, that Peru should exercise sovereign jurisdiction over this territory, Brazil would be compelled to protest against the transfer of it to Colombia.
Second. The memorandum of the Brazilian Minister pointed out that the treaty between Colombia and Perú, which has just been submitted to the Peruvian Congress for ratification, would, by its distribution of territory, give Colombia access, to the main, navigable stream of the Amazon River; and proceeds to state that this is a vital point with Brazil,—and that Brazil would strenuously oppose the acquisition by a third sovereignty of territory bordering upon this great river, whose banks were now controlled exclusively by Brazil and Perú. The memorandum expressed surprise that the treaty had been submitted to the Peruvian Congress for ratification.
Doctor Salomón stated to me that, aside from the memorandum, the Peruvian Minister in Rio had been informed by the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Relations that the Government of the latter [Page 298] country had learned through its secret service that, if the pending treaty should be ratified before the approaching Centenary of the Battle of Ayacucho, Colombia would send a distinguished Mission to the Centenary; but that, on the contrary, if the treaty should not be ratified, Colombia would send no Mission. Vis-à-vis to this, the Brazilian Minister stated that, while Brazil expected to send a Mission to do honor to Peru in the Centenary of the Battle of Ayacucho; that in case the treaty referred to above, which concerns its interests so vitally, should be ratified by the Peruvian Congress, Brazil would be compelled to refrain from sending such a Mission. I judged from the tone and manner of Dr. Salomón in stating this latter circumstance that he regarded it as of the utmost importance and concern. The Peruvian Foreign Minister stated to me, in quite a lengthy conversation on the subject, that he himself had never approved of the terms of the treaty aforesaid, although he had signed it. Upon my questioning he stated that he had signed it because of its approval by President Leguía. He stated that Perú, by the unfortunate circumstances in which it had been involved, in order to bring an end to controversies with its neighbors and restore harmonious relations I with them, had been compelled to cede to Bolivia and Brazil large areas of land to which it had a clear right; that it had agreed to an arbitration with Ecuador of the dispute involving great areas of territory to which the Minister believed the title of Perú was indisputable; and that, for the same reason, Peru had formulated, signed, and submitted for ratification, to the Peruvian Congress, the pending treaty with Colombia. He stated, however, that if the ratification of this treaty, which had for its object the gaining of the friendship of Colombia, and the establishment of harmonious relations with that country, should have the result of alienating Brazil and “making an enemy while gaining a friend”, it would be of no profit to Peru. Throughout the conversation of the Foreign Minister I gained the impression that the protest of Brazil had been so pointed, and that either the hope of gaining favor with Brazil by refraining from the ratification of the treaty in question, or the fear of creating the enmity of that country by its ratification, had made such a lively impression upon the Peruvian Government that the latter would bring no pressure to bear upon Congress to secure favorable action. Doctor Salomon stated to me that he showed me the memorandum and gave me the information which I have related above under the direction of President Leguía, which I am apprehensive tends to indicate that the latter also regards both the circumstance and manner of the opposition and protest of Brazil as an insuperable obstacle to the ratification of the treaty. In forming this impression I have in mind also the significant intimations and inquiries of President Leguía on the subject of the opposition of Brazil to the ratification of the treaty, [Page 299] which I took occasion to report to the Department in Despatch No. 62 of August 25, 1923,78 Cablegram No. 46, Nov. 16, 12 m.,79 Despatch No. 88, December 1, 1923.78
In addition to the foregoing, Doctor Salomón informed me that the Administration was compelled to respect the independence, and jealousy of its rights, of the Peruvian Congress in the consideration of a treaty, and that the Congress, in his opinion, would vigorously oppose the cession to Colombia of land bordering upon the Amazon River. Dr. Salomón stated specifically that he, himself, was also opposed to this, and that it was upon this point that he had disagreed with President Leguía, and had disapproved of the treaty, although signing it.
He stated, nevertheless, that the treaty had been submitted to Congress with a recommendation for its ratification, and that, notwithstanding his personal objections to some of the terms of the treaty, he would be entirely content should Congress see fit to ratify it; but that, as Minister of Foreign Relations, he would be compelled to submit to Congress full information as to the protest of the Brazilian Government, and the grounds upon which it is based. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I expressed to Minister Salomón, as I have heretofore done to President Leguía, the lively interest of the United States as a friendly sister American nation, in the ratification of the treaty, and the profound regret which I knew would be felt by the Government and people of the United States, if this settlement of a long-standing controversy between two neighboring South American countries, which had come so near to a peaceable solution, should fail. I ventured to call the Minister’s attention to the fact that the entire trend of modern international policy was towards the opening of great navigable rivers to international navigation, and that a sound economic and international policy should promote the accessibility of the interior, for the purpose of its development and communication, to such a continental stream as the Amazon.
I suggested to the Minister that Peru had profited a great deal in prestige, as well as in economic stability, by the concessions which it had made in the settlement of its boundary disputes with Bolivia and Brazil, and in the prospective adjustment by arbitration, if necessary, of a similar dispute with Ecuador; and the immense benefit that would accrue to the country by the settlement of its dispute with Colombia,—a dispute which would undoubtedly be reopened in an intensified form if the treaty should be rejected.
From all I can learn, especially through conversations with the Minister of Colombia in Peru, the rejection of the treaty by the Peruvian [Page 300] Congress, or the failure of that body to ratify it, would cause very intense, hostile feeling in the former country.
I have [etc.]
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- Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. i, p. 353.↩
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