867.4016/730½
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the British Ambassador (Geddes), November 10, 1922
The British Ambassador left a memorandum27 referring to the information received by the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople from Admiral Bristol to the effect that the American High Commissioner had been informed that the Turkish Nationalist authorities were insisting upon the immediate departure of the Christian children in orphanages of the Near East Relief, and that the American High Commission also had an unconfirmed report from Samsoun that Greeks and Armenians must leave within thirty days or be deported. Reference was also made to the confirmation of these reports from the French High Commissioner and the Italian High Commissioner. Without detailing the full contents of the memorandum, the main point was the action of Admiral Bristol in suggesting protests to the Angora Government, this action being based on Admiral Bristol’s view that there appeared to be an intention on the part of the Turkish Nationalist authorities to evacuate the entire Christian population of Eastern Anatolia. The concluding paragraph of the British memorandum stated that His Majesty’s Government had information that the Turkish Government were preparing to expel the entire Christian population of Constantinople; that Armenians and Greeks were already being forced to leave in large numbers while all Christian men between 15 and 45 were being retained in Anatolia and deported to the interior where they could not long survive.
The Ambassador said that the British Government desired to know to what extent they could rely upon the United States Government for support in an ultimatum to the Turks that they would be held accountable if such procedure was followed.
The Ambassador said that it was apparent that the Turks would not be impressed by protests unless the Allies made it clear that they were ready to take forcible measures. The Ambassador said he did not know whether the British would decide to go it alone or not; that it was not unlikely that they would; that it was uncertain whether the French could be depended upon; that if the American Government stood with the British Government he thought the French would feel that they must join in taking the same position, but that if the American Government stood aloof the French might stand aloof also.
The Secretary said that this Government was desirous of doing all that it could in the interest of humanity and was deeply impressed [Page 953] by the exigency; that Admiral Bristol, as the Ambassador had said, was already using his influence to the utmost degree to prevent such atrocities as were feared, and that Admiral Bristol was in a position to be of great service as he had no little influence with the Turks. It was difficult to believe that the Turks, unless insensate, would enter upon a course which would arouse the entire civilized world against them. The Secretary said that there had evidently been a break in the cable communications, and that we had had no information for several days as to the situation in Constantinople but that we would communicate at once by radio, if possible, and ascertain from Admiral Bristol what the real condition was and whether such a serious catastrophe was threatened in Constantinople as the British memorandum contemplated.
The Secretary asked what sort of an ultimatum was contemplated. He said that the United States Government was ready to use diplomatic pressure to the utmost extent but that if it was desired to threaten war the American Government was not willing to do that unless it was ready to go to war. The Secretary pointed out that the populations to which the Ambassador had referred were not Americans and that the Executive would have no right to commit this country to war in their behalf, despite the humanitarian interests involved unless Congress authorized it. The Secretary pointed out that Congress was about to convene; that whatever might possibly be said of an emergency arising when Congress was not to convene in the near future, there was no such emergency now, and within a few days Congress would be here. The Secretary said that it would be idle for the Executive to take a position which would not have the support of Congress, as he would need in the event of hostilities to have a force raised and the necessary appropriations made.
The Ambassador said that he felt that if the Powers stood together and the Turks were convinced that they would not permit the threatened action to be taken it would not be taken. The Secretary again asked what form of ultimatum the Ambassador had in mind, pointing out that it evidently meant a demand after diplomatic pressure had been used in vain. The Ambassador endeavored to explain and as the ultimatum he suggested was nothing but a threat of war the Secretary said again that what the Ambassador really wanted to know was whether the American Government was ready to go to war with the Turks and support the British in such a war. The Secretary said that he felt that he could not answer such a question in the affirmative without assuming that Congress when it convened would authorize or approve such a course and at present he had no basis for such an assumption. The Secretary said that he would take the matter up with the President as the [Page 954] President was the best judge of the political situation and of the attitude of the people as it would be reflected in Congress. The Secretary pointed out that events might occur which would have an immediate effect upon American sentiment, but that he could say nothing more until he had further reports from Admiral Bristol and the Secretary had had an opportunity to obtain the President’s views.
The Ambassador then referred to the relation of the United States representatives to Turkish matters at the peace conference. He said that the Secretary had no idea of the influential position that President Wilson had occupied; that it was in deference to his wishes, who was the spokesman for the United States, that the Allies had deferred making settlement with Turkey; that the Allies had desired to go ahead, but that they had delayed for months, because of hope of American support; that the present difficulties were largely the result of that delay. The Ambassador said that the British public had the feeling that they were being deserted by America, and that this was a very important factor in the situation; that it would be very unfortunate if at this time the British public got the idea that Great Britain was left alone. The Ambassador said that the British had not desired mandates. The whole mandate idea was Mr. Wilson’s idea and that the British had deferred to his views in the hope of American cooperation. The Secretary asked, if they did not wish the mandates, whether they desired the territories or whether the Ambassador meant to imply that they did not wish any territories at all as a result of the war. The Ambassador did not directly meet this question. He said he was in the Cabinet at the time and knew that these territories would be a burden and that the British had taken up their share of the burden in the expectation that America would take its share and now they feared that they were being left alone.
The Ambassador said that if the Secretary would look into the records of the Department of State he would find that the statements were fully borne out.
The Secretary said he had no desire to engage in any controversial discussion of what took place at the peace conference; that it was quite evident to those who knew American opinion that this Government would never consent to accept a mandate over the Near East; that the American conception of the situation was quite different from what the Ambassador had stated the British conception to be; that the American Government had never sought for any territories and if it had desired that whatever territories were taken as a result of the war should be administered with special reference to the needs of the inhabitants and should be accepted in the nature [Page 955] of a trust, it was not at all because the American Government desired any aggrandizement or failed to understand that the other Powers did desire acquisition of territory.
The Secretary said that while he preferred not to enter into a discussion of the general subject, he would say that he could not for a moment assent to the view that this Government was in any way responsible for the existing conditions. The Secretary said that the United States had not sought to parcel out spheres of influence in Anatolia; that the United States had not engaged in intrigues at Constantinople; that the United States was not responsible for the catastrophe of the Greek armies during the last year and a half, and that diplomacy in Europe for the last year and a half was responsible for the late disaster. The Secretary said that that was the American point of view and that he was quite ready, if the Ambassador desired, to elaborate and substantiate it at any time. The Secretary said that what troubled the dreams of the British statesmen was their maintenance of their imperial power, the question of India, the question of Egypt, of the Suez Canal, and their relations to the Near East in connection with their vast imperial domain. The Secretary said he did not criticise this attitude. He was quite ready to admit that the British Empire was a supporter of civilization. The Secretary said he must point out, however, that whatever these imperial ambitions and difficulties were, that the American Government was not associated with these imperial aspirations and difficulties. The Secretary said that we were dealing with an existing situation and it would not be to any advantage to discuss the past. The Ambassador said he did not care to discuss the matter further at this time, but he felt that if the Secretary examined the records of the Department he would see that the Ambassador’s statements were well founded. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that the Secretary of War had cancelled the engagement for Mr. Fortescue, President of the Royal Historical Society, to lecture at West Point because of certain statements reflecting upon American honor which had appeared in Mr. Fortescue’s published works.
The interview then ended with an appointment for Monday, November 13, at noon.
- Not printed.↩