862t.01/497
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of an Interview with the British Ambassador (Geddes), December 18, 1922
The British Ambassador stated that he had received a direct message from Mr. Bonar Law, a message which had not gone through the Foreign Office, to inform the Secretary as to the Premier’s view of the present situation. The Ambassador did not read the message but gave what he said was the substance of it orally. He described Mr. Bonar Law as taking a “most gloomy” view of the prospect. … It seemed that France was determined to go ahead in a military way. Just what the extent of their action would be, the Premier did not know. Probably they would send their forces into the Ruhr; but to what extent, or what eventual measures they would adopt, could not be said. Mr. Bonar Law felt that such action would be attended by the gravest consequences in Germany. He could not tell precisely what would happen, but he looked upon the situation as most serious.
Mr. Bonar Law did not know what the Government of the United States could do and did not wish to make any suggestion, but, the condition of affairs was so grave, that if there was anything that occurred to the Secretary that could be done to relieve it, it would be very welcome.
The Ambassador said that he was sure Mr. Bonar Law appreciated the situation here and the difficulties that the American Government had to face. Mr. Bonar Law was not sanguine that any action that the American Government might take would change the French attitude. He merely wished the Secretary to know what the situation was and to say that he would be glad if any assistance could be given.
In particular the Premier had inquired whether the American Government would be disposed to be represented at the meeting to [Page 193] be held in Paris on January 2nd. He was not submitting a formal invitation, but he merely wished to inquire informally whether it would be possible for the Government of the United States to be represented at the meeting in Paris in much the same way as it was now represented at Lausanne.
The Secretary expressed his appreciation of the kindness of Mr. Bonar Law in giving him this information.
The Secretary said that there had been a disposition in other quarters to minimize the differences that had developed at the London conversations and to give the impression that a deadlock had not occurred. The Secretary said that he of course had had the direct message which the Ambassador had given him a few days ago27 and felt that he understood the difficulty. With respect to the representation of the American Government at Paris, the Secretary said that much could happen between now and January 2nd and it was impossible now to say whether such a step would be advisable. The Secretary said that he had heard rumors—he had nothing official on the subject,—that the French Government had not desired to have the American Government invited to participate in the London conversations. It had been stated in the press that the French Government did not desire this for the reason that it might be expected that the American Government would not view with favor the proposal of the French to occupy the Ruhr. The Secretary asked the Ambassador if he knew whether there had been opposition to such an invitation. The Ambassador said that he did not, but indicated that it was not unlikely that some such view was taken. The Secretary pointed out that, of course, in any event the American Government could not consider being represented at the Paris conversations even in an informal way unless the participating governments desired it.
The Ambassador referred to the current discussions in the press and the Secretary remarked at the absurd lengths to which some of the correspondents had gone in developing a plan out of their imagination and then finding defects in it. The Secretary said that of course anyone would know that there was no prospect of a loan of any sort until the reparation question was adjusted. The Ambassador said, of course, he knew that and it was for this reason that much of what had been written had been discounted.
The Ambassador indicated that he would like to know whether the American Government felt that it could be of any assistance so that he could advise Mr. Bonar Law. The Secretary said that he did not [Page 194] feel at liberty to discuss the matter with the Ambassador at this time; that the Secretary had made certain suggestions, in an informal way, to the French Government; that he was quite sure that these suggestions did not involve any action which would not be viewed with entire favor by the British Government and that he was not at all sure that they would come to anything and was not disposed, therefore, to attach an undue importance to them. The Secretary felt that in this grave emergency when so much depended upon the political difficulties in which M. Poincaré found himself, that an opportunity should be given to him to take any suggestion and make it his own and find a way of escape from the present impasse.
The Secretary said that while the matter was in this situation he would prefer not to discuss it at all. The Ambassador said he appreciated that and could easily, he thought, conjecture what was in the Secretary’s mind, that is, with regard to some effort at an impartial inquiry.
The Ambassador wondered whether it would not be possible for the American Government publicly to indicate its attitude with regard to the occupation of the Ruhr. The Secretary said that French Government had no reason to doubt the attitude of the American Government or the American people with respect to that question; that the futility of expecting an economic return from such an occupation was quite clear and that the dangerous consequences which might ensue were fairly obvious. The Secretary said that he did not desire at the moment to make any public statement; that each step must have its sufficient reason at the time it was taken. The Secretary said that he doubted very much whether any suggestion the American Government could make at this time would bring about any change but if there were one chance in ten, room ought to be given for it.
The Ambassador, referring again to American participation at the meeting in Paris, the Secretary said that of course the Ambassador would understand that this Government could not enter into any discussion as to its own debt. The Secretary did not think that this was a matter vital to the settlement of the reparation problem; that no one was asking France to forego what it could get and that it could not get any more or less from Germany because of what France owed the United States. While this was so, of course if it was desired to press a different view, the United States could not, under the present limitations fixed by the Act of Congress, undertake to join in such a discussion.
The Secretary said he felt that at this time it was very important that the views of the American Government should not be presented at London or Berlin or anywhere else but at Washington. The [Page 195] Ambassador said he fully understood and that what he would say as to this interview would go directly to Mr. Bonar Law and in a cautious manner.
- Evidently refers to interview of Dec. 11, the memorandum of which is not printed (file no. 462.00R29/2248½).↩