Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/22

Supreme Economic Council: Twenty-second Meeting Held at the Ministry of Commerce [on 10th June, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.]

The Supreme Economic Council held its Twenty-second Meeting on Tuesday 10th June 1919, at 3:30 p.m. under the Chairmanship of Lord Robert Cecil.

The Associated Governments were represented as follows:—

United Kingdom Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith
Mr. Wise
Sir Wm. Mitchell Thomson
Mr. Barrie
United States Mr. Hoover
Mr. McCormick
Mr. Norman Davis
Mr. Baruch
Mr. Gordon
France M. Clémentel
M. Claveille
M. Vilgrain
M. Seydoux
Italy Signor Crespi
Commendatore Attolico
Comm. Ferraris
Captain Lazzerini
Belgium M. Jaspar
M. de Cartier de Marchienne
Lieut. Col. Theunis

202.

The Minutes of the Twenty-First Meeting were approved.

203. Restriction of Trade With Hungary and Bolshevik Russia.

With reference to Minute 196 it was reported that a memorandum agreed by all the Delegates of the Allied and Associated Governments on the Blockade Section had been prepared and submitted to the Council of Heads of States.1

204. Italian Coal Position.

A letter from the Italian Delegates dated 4th June (182) reporting upon the situation of Italy as regards coal supplies, at present and during the period following on peace, was submitted.

[Page 345]

The Italian Delegates drew particular attention to the terms of the reparation clauses of the Peace Treaty as regards coal from Germany which, as agreed by the Council of Three, gives priority to the delivery of coal to replace that from destroyed mines.

This would mean that, if the German output should prove sufficient only to cover the coal required for replacement, Italy would receive none during the period when it would be of the most use to her.

They stated, further, that on behalf of the Italian Government the fullest reserves had been made on this and all other points in the Peace Treaty which had been changed during the absence of the Italian Representatives from the Conference.

It was agreed:—

(a)
that it was of the greatest importance that the supply of coal to Italy should be facilitated to the utmost;
(b)
to recommend that the French and Italian Governments should confer as soon as possible with a view to coming to some arrangement for safeguarding the Italian interests in the above respect.

205. Reported Violation of Blockade of Hungary.

The Chairman referred to reports received by the British Delegates of the passage of commodities from the Adriatic to Hungarian Bolsheviks in contravention of the Blockade restrictions on Hungary and requested that these reports might be carefully examined.

The Italian Delegates stated that they had no information regarding the matter but they undertook to make enquiries and report to the Council as soon as possible.

206. Transfer of Shares of Austrian Shipping Companies.

A letter from the Allied Maritime Transport Executive dated 31st May (183) was read, reporting that certain Italian interests have acquired shares and holdings in large Austrian and Hungarian Shipping Companies contrary to the resolutions of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.

The Italian Delegates stated that the communiqué regarding the use and management of enemy ships referred to in the above letter had been published in Italy and that they understood that the shares which Italian interests had acquired related to shipyards rather than actual shipping and had been purchased at the risk of the buyers.

They agreed, however to make enquiries and report to the Council as soon as possible.

207. Work and Organisation of the Council.

With reference to Minute 201 the following documents were submitted:—

(a)
A memorandum from the Director General of Relief dated 10th June (184) reporting on further steps taken as regards the liquidation [Page 346] of Inter-Allied Food Control, the continuation of the United States Relief Measures and the measures being taken for child welfare.
(b)
Resolutions from the British Delegates (185) regarding the future of the Council.

The Chairman reported that the Sub-Committee appointed by the Council at the last Meeting to consider the future organisation of the Council had met but had not yet been able to prepare an agreed report.

The American Delegates pointed out that the Supreme Economic Council had been created to deal with matters arising during the armistice, and transitory measures, and that most of these problems, such as these dealing with blockade, relief and foodstuffs until the next harvest, had already been solved.

Because of the fact that the present personnel of the American Delegation are purely war officials of the Government and all retire from Office at the signing of Peace, the American Delegates feel that they are not in a position to bind their Government to the suggested continuation of this Council, as outlined in the proposed resolution. They continued that, while the United States not only took a sympathetic interest in the position of Europe, but would bear her share in the various economic measures necessary for the restoration of free and normal commercial life, the present Delegation were not authorised to accept definite proposals because the Government Departments and the Public Agencies that would have to entertain these matters subsequent to Peace would no doubt wish to set up organisations corresponding to their own views on this question and that at this date it was impossible to determine what these Agencies would be or their authority.

They further suggested that the Sub-Committee should reconsider the matter and prepare a report for consideration by the Council at a subsequent Meeting.

The French, Italian and Belgian Delegates supported the view expressed in the resolutions proposed by the British Delegates.

After some further discussion the following resolutions were adopted:—

1.
In view of the changing economic world conditions and the importance of re-establishing as soon and as completely as possible the economic life and energy of Europe, the Council directs the Committee on Policy appointed at the last meeting to report within a fortnight what changes in the Constitution, Powers and Objects of the Council are desirable. Until one week after the receipt of that Report the Council should continue as at present.
2.
This report should be communicated to the Council of Four for their action.

[Page 347]

It was further agreed that each Delegation should also prepare a report setting forth their views as to the constitution, scope and activities of the Council after Peace.

208. Finance of German Coal Supplied to France.

An extract from the Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Finance Section held on 5th June (186) reporting that a request received from the German Finance Commission to the effect that a Centralised Accounting Bureau might be established at Rotterdam had been refused, was submitted and approved.

With reference to Minute 200 the following verbal report was made by the French Delegates:—

(i)
that the price fixed by arbitration for coal and coke purchased by France from Germany namely—35 francs per ton for coal and 45 francs per ton for coal [coke?], had been accepted by the French Government.
(ii)
that the French Ministry of Finance had agreed that the German food account
(a)
should be credited with the total value of all the coal received by France from Germany, whether from the Ruhr or Saar Coalfields, since the date of the Armistice.
(b)
should be debited with the value of all food supplies delivered by the French Food Administration at Rotterdam, or supplied to the Left-Bank of the Rhine or the Saar Basin.
(c)
should further be debited with the loss incurred by the French Government in operating German vessels.
(iii)
that it was estimated that after an adjustment of these accounts up to 31st May the German Government would still owe to France approximately, 1,100,000 francs.

The American Financial Delegate stated that the German Financial Delegates at Versailles were pressing for an adjustment of outstanding accounts and enquired whether the information given by the French Delegates could be introduced at the Meeting with the German Financial Delegates to be held on the 11th June.

It was agreed that unless the French Delegates made a statement to the contrary before 10 p.m. the information given verbally as recorded above should be considered as final.

Enquiry was also made as to whether the French Government had agreed that the profit on any German coal sold by France to Neutral Countries should also be credited to the German food account as this had been an essential factor in the American arbitration as regards price.

The French Delegates undertook that a reply should be given before the meeting with the German Financial Delegates.

[Page 348]

209. Finance of Austrian Food Supplies.

(a) With reference to Minute 193 the French Delegates reported that the French Budget Committee had withdrawn their objection to the establishment of a revolving fund, the balance of which is to be kept below one hundred million francs, for the financing of relief supplies to Europe, including Austria.

It was agreed that the 160,000 tons of ex-Austrian tonnage available for transport of supplies from North American ports for Austrian relief should be loaded for French account, within the limits of the finance referred to in the first paragraph of Minute 191.

The Italian Delegates referred to the fact that the value of the foodstuffs supplied by the Italian Government acting as a mandatory for England and France exceeded by $8,000,000 the value of the loan made to Italy.

It was agreed that the Italian position as regards this matter should be referred to the Committee of the Directors of Relief, in consultation with the Financial Delegates, for detailed consideration and final adjustment.

210. Navigation on the Danube.

A telegram from Admiral Troubridge to the Communications Section dated 28th May (187) was submitted, reporting that the only obstacle to the complete and immediate use of the Danube and its existing transport equipment for the distribution of relief and commerce on the river is the closure of the river by the authorities in control at Budapest.

It was agreed that there was no action which the Council could take regarding this matter, for the present.

211. Allied Economic Policy in Connection With the Rhineland Republic.

Note from the Sub-Committee on Germany for the Council of Heads of States dated 3rd June (188) regarding the economic problems which would arise if an independent Rhineland Republic were set up, was submitted for the information of the Council.

It was noted that no reply had yet been received from the Council of Heads of States.

212. Allied Economic Policy in Russia.

A Memorandum from the British Delegates dated 3rd June (189) and a Note from the American Delegates dated 10th June (190) regarding the economic policy to be adopted as regards Russia in the event of the re-establishment of a stable Government, were submitted.

It was agreed that the Sections of the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to consider to what extent they would be affected in the event of a decision to include Russia in the sphere of operations of the Supreme Economic Council as and when that country becomes [Page 349] available, and to submit preliminary reports giving an outline of the measures they would propose, including a rough estimate of the cost.

213. German Imports of Raw Materials.

Extracts from the Minutes of the Meeting of the Raw Materials Section held on 7th June (191) recommending that the importation of Raw Materials into Germany should be permitted in so far as they can be financed on credits of not less than one year’s term, were submitted.

It was noted:—

(a)
that this matter had previously been placed before the Blockade Section in the form of a draft resolution (192) but that it had been decided to defer action upon it.
(b)
that the German Government had so far made no effort to avail themselves of the concession granted by the Council whereby they were at liberty to take delivery of such stocks of raw materials as were held for their account in Neutral Countries and which had been bought and paid for prior to 7th May. (See Minute 152 of S. E. C.)

It was agreed that, in view of the information given above, the Council should take no action regarding the proposal put forward by the Raw Materials Section.

Appendix 182

[Letter From the Italian Delegate to] the Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, Chairman, Supreme Economic Council, Paris

Dear Sir: The war has shown what a grave economic and political peril it is for Italy to be entirely tributary to abroad for her coal supplies.

I feel it therefore incumbent upon me at this stage of our international co-operation, as Italian representative on the Economic Council, to put before you, and through you to the Council, in a comprehensive form, the situation of Italy as regards coal supplies, with respect also to the period following on Peace.

I. The privations and torments to which Italy was exposed throughout the war owing to shortage of coal constitutes one of the noblest forms of national sacrifice, and one of Italy’s finest contributions—though a silent one—to Victory.

Italy is a country in which the use of coal is not widely diffused. In order to reduce the consumption thereof she was thus compelled to restrict not so much its non-essential uses, as those of primary necessity. Italy went short of coal for her trenches; her hospitals were [Page 350] often left entirely unheated. At a time when the closing of the Adriatic required her to redouble her transports by rail, Italy cut these down by nearly one-half. In this manner national consumption—including that of food—was compressed even beyond the limits which the alarming fall in imports imposed. The peoples’ sufferings were consequently much severer here than elsewhere, and the cost of living rose in a manner unparalleled in any Allied country. National industries, no less than the people, have all along been living from hand to mouth, in a state of continuous uncertainty and apprehensive of the morrow—often in a state of complete paralysis. The consequences of all this on commerce and exchange are too well known to require any emphasis.

II. Italy’s hardships have shown no signs of abatement with the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, whereas national requirements, following on the Armistice, were augmented by the liberation of invaded provinces and the addition of new territories, and Italian imports ought consequently to have been proportionately increased, these have, on the contrary, fallen since that date to an incredibly low figure. The following data may be worthy of consideration:

Tons
Minimum agreed monthly requirements during the war* 600,000
Minimum agreed monthly requirements during the Armistice peroid 800,000
Pre-war monthly importation 900,000
Minimum monthly requirement after Peace 1,000,000
Importation per month during 1915 697,000
1916 697,000
1917 440,000
1918 567,000
“ January 1919 426,191
“ February 518,989
“ March 413,432
“ April 448,000
“ May 612,000

Wretched as they are, the above figures are the result of the highest political pressure and of very strenuous efforts on the part of everybody concerned.

The modesty of the results and the prolonged state of distress after the cessation of hostilities, afford us evidence that the situation is not dependent on altogether transitory causes. It must also be remembered [Page 351] that Italy has been, and still is, backed up by agreements in regard to both tonnage and finance. These Conventions will lapse in a few weeks. What fate awaits Italy after that?

Italy cannot be abandoned in such a position. Every other Allied country either provides entirely for its own needs of combustibles from home resources (United States, Great Britain, Belgium), or, as in the case of France, at least does so in considerable measure. While France, moreover, as a consequence of the war, has acquired the coal resources of the Saar Valley, and other countries are acquiring territory rich in natural combustibles (oils), Italy does not come in for any such corresponding acquisitions. Is Italy to be the only one among the Allied Nations left to the hazards of chance?

Furthermore, being compelled, in the most favourable hypothesis, to import the whole of her coal by sea, and from distant sources of supply, under conditions of heavier freights and with exchange rates greatly to her disadvantage, Italy would—I repeat in the most favourable hypothesis—find herself precluded from competitive production and from export trade on any considerable scale.

IV [sic]. The situation is as critical and pressing as it can be for the following reasons:

a)
While Governmental financial agreements have practically come to an end, no private arrangements of any kind have, up to the present, been made for coal.
b)
A personal investigation which I have recently conducted in London convinces me of two impending facts to be reckoned with:—
1.
The output of British mines is going to decrease, thereby further restricting exports to Italy.
2.
The price of British coal is bound considerably to rise.
c)
Italy is practically precluded from a share in the German coal which would, in the natural course of things, become in the near future, a very important asset to her.

V. This last point is deserving of particular consideration. The reparation clauses as regards coal from Germany had been agreed among the Allies (Italy included) with regard to Italy as follows:—

“The German Government undertakes to accord to the French and Italian Governments the following options for the delivery of coal to France and Italy respectively and to provide the necessary means of transport.…,1a

For the delivery to Italy, during the ten years specified in the preceding paragraph, of not more than 75 million tons of coal, the amount to be delivered in any of those years being not more than 9 million tons.”

[Page 352]

What a change the text has undergone in the hands of the Council of Three can be seen by reading paragraphs 4 and 10 of the Annex V on Reparations of the Peace Treaty with Germany. The most material alteration is the addition made in paragraph 10 of the following proviso:—

“If the Commission (Reparations) shall determine that the full exercise of the foregoing options would interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany, the Commission is authorised to postpone or to cancel deliveries and in so doing to settle all questions of priority; but the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines shall receive priority over other deliveries.”

This practically means that Italy will receive coal only when plenty for everybody is assured. If, on the contrary, the German output should prove sufficient only to cover coal in replacement of the output of destroyed mines in the period immediately following on peace—that is to say in the most critical period of world production—Italy will receive none. This would be a great injustice, and it is always wise to prevent an injustice while there is still time.

VI. To meet the situation, the following ways suggest themselves:—

a)
If the Heads of States are reluctant to alter the terms of the Peace Treaty by striking out the concluding lines of the paragraph above quoted, an interallied agreement might be come to whereby a fair proportion of the German coal would, in any case, be secured to Italy, on the same financial terms, of course, as to the other nations.
b)
A system of cooperation on broad and liberal lines might be involved [evolved?] for the operation of some of the mines of the Saar Valley, whereby Italian capital and labour would be associated in the commercial exploitation of same, guaranteeing a fair proportion of the output to Italy. Ample guarantees ought to be given with respect to the treatment of Italian labour, which would be consonant with the times, and such as to avoid even the remotest appearance of any exploitation of our labour.
c)
The Allied Governments as such ought to give an undertaking for the finance of a minimum supply of coal to Italy up to the end of 1920. Coal is so essential a key import that it cannot be left to hazard. It will certainly pay in the long run to make such an exception. Private enterprise in this field has accomplished almost nothing, and indeed it will be easily seen that its task is fully cut out in taking care of the importation of other raw material.

I am honestly convinced that the Allies do want to help Italy in her recovery. From the knowledge I have of the situation and of the circumstances of the case, I also honestly believe that the above requests represent the minimum requisite to enable Italy to recover.

I am [etc.]

A. Holin
[Page 353]

Appendix 183

[Letter From the Allied Maritime Transport Executive Regarding Transfer of Shares of Austrian Shipping Companies]

Sir: I am directed by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive to request that you will be so good as to bring before the Supreme Economic Council the question of the purchase of shares in Austro-Hungarian Shipping Companies by Italian interests. The matter was dealt with by the Executive at their seventh meeting on May 24th (see Minute 152 which has already been forwarded to you.)

It will be remembered that at the fifth session of the Allied Maritime Transport Council held in Paris in February last a resolution (No. 13) was passed in the following terms:—

“In view of the extreme importance of the principle being maintained that the allocation of enemy tonnage for management and use shall in no way prejudice the ultimate disposition of the vessels in accordance with Resolution 1, the Council recommend that the Associated Governments take the necessary steps to prevent and formally announce that they will hold as null and void any action (such as the transfer of shares in enemy shipping) likely to render the said principles more difficult of application.”

At the fourth meeting of the Shipping Section held in Paris on April 8th, it was agreed to publish a communiqué subject to the approval of the respective Governments dealing with the question of the use and management of enemy ships. The draft communiqué stated that in the discussion of the ultimate disposition of enemy ships no argument would be founded on their allocation for management and service in the meantime, and that the Associated Governments would hold as null and void from the standpoint of the final disposition any action such as the transfer of shares in enemy shipping which is likely to render it more difficult to apply the principle that the interim allocation of enemy tonnage for management and use shall in no way prejudice its ultimate disposition.

In pursuance of this resolution a notice was published, in the terms agreed by the Shipping Section, in the Times of April 12th, and it is understood that a similar publication was made in the French press. No information has been supplied to the Executive as to whether a similar notice has been published by the Italian or American Government.

During the course of April, letters were received by the Ministry of Shipping from London business houses enquiring on behalf of Italian clients as to the position of certain ex-Austrian steamers [Page 354] which it was stated had been the property of Austrian Companies, but were not transferred to Italian concerns. Replies were sent by direction of the Executive that the desired information could not be supplied and attention was called to the declaration which has been published in the Times on April 12th, it being added that the Italian Government had been requested to arrange for a similar publication in Italy, if such publication had not already been made.

No information has been supplied by the Italian Delegate to the Executive as to the real position in Italy in this matter, but substantial reports have now been received from British Representatives in Italy to the effect that it is the case that, acting under the protection of the Italian Government, certain Italian interests have now definitely acquired shares and holdings in the large late Austrian Companies, lately held by Austrian and Hungarian Banks, on behalf of the holders, mainly German. The Companies whose shares have been acquired are the Austrian Lloyd Company, the Austro-American (Cosulich) and probably the situation is the same in regard to the Adria Co. and Libera Triestina.

An advertisement of the Cosulich line is enclosed,2 which has been received from Rome and which shows that an enemy line of commercial steamers is being openly advertised.

The Executive desire to call the attention of the Supreme Economic Council to this matter for such action as the Council think proper.

I am [etc.]

J. F. Henderson

Secretary

Appendix 1843

Memorandum From Director-General of Relief

With respect to my memorandum of the 31st May,* the following further steps have been taken:—

I. Inter-Allied Food Controls

The British Government has notified the other Governments who are parties to the Wheat Contract of 1916 that it will be terminated on the 31st of August. This necessarily terminates the Inter-Allied joint purchase and shipment of grains.

The only other remaining Inter-Allied food activity engaged in active commercial operations is that relating to sugar, which is founded [Page 355] entirely upon the joint purchase of the Cuban harvest of 1919.4 This contract will have been fulfilled by the end of November, and it seems to me extremely improbable that any of the European Governments concerned would want to join in the purchase of the Cuban crop.

II. Relief Measures

We are notifying the various Governments that while American intervention in the distribution of overseas foodstuffs in the present form will cease with harvest, we will be glad to receive an estimate from each of the Governments under relief in respect to the assistance which they will need during the coming year from the United States. Further that we consider it desirable that these estimates should be presented in the United States by a Commission fully empowered to handle credit, shipping, and collateral questions. Under this arrangement there will therefore be no break in American interest and helpfulness, and, on the other hand, a definite step will have been attained in advancement from sheer relief to economic measures in co-operation with the countries concerned.

We cannot assume that these States so lack the foundations of initiative and government as not to be able to administer these affairs; if we assume this we must agree that the political rearrangement of Europe is a failure.

All these arrangements are premised upon continuation of relief until harvest and of protective measures (transport, coal, communications, &c.), until such a short period after Peace as will allow resumption of Peace relationships in these matters.

III

In the matter of charity in support of the 3,500,000 sub-normal children now under special relief, I am instituting measures that will afford continuous support to the organisations already established in each country for this purpose and providing for the continuance of expert staff in their assistance in this and food matters generally.

Herbert Hoover

Appendix 1855

Resolution From British Delegates Regarding Future Work and Organisation of the Council

1.
The period of transition from war to peace conditions will continue even after Peace is signed, and during that period the continuance [Page 356] of Allied consultation and co-operation in economic matters is desirable.
2.
In view of the changing economic world conditions and the importance of establishing as soon and as completely as possible the economic life and energy of Europe, the Council directs the Committee on Policy appointed at the last meeting to report as to what changes in the constitution, powers, and objects of the Council are desirable. Pending the consideration of that report, the Council should continue as at present, except that its headquarters should be removed to London as soon as possible and not later than the signature of Peace with Germany.
3.
These resolutions should be communicated to the Council of Four for their sanction.
Robert Cecil

Appendix 186

[Extract From the Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Finance Section Held on 5th June, 1919, Regarding] Establishment of a Centralised Accounting Bureau at Rotterdam

At their 16th Meeting held on 5th June the Finance Section considered the attached letter from the German Finance Commission regarding the formation of a Centralised Accounting Bureau at Rotterdam and agreed [to] the following resolution for submission to the Supreme Economic Council:—

It was resolved further that a copy of the German note should be transmitted to the S. E. C. with the information that this request had been refused on the grounds that each of the Governments supplying food to Germany was concerned with its own buying and selling only and because the Finance Section was of opinion that the object of the German proposal was to make the Allied & Associated Governments as a whole responsible for all credits due to the Food Account, e.g. the credit due by France to the Food Account for the sale of coal from the Saar Valley, estimated by the German Government at 135,000,000 francs. The Finance Section desires to draw the attention of the Supreme Economic Council to the fact that they feel they are put in a position in which they may be accused of bad faith by the German Government owing to the failure of the French Government to credit the Food Account with the proceeds of the sale of Saar Coal, especially as even at the lowest price payable for the coal there is still a large balance in favour of the German Government.

[Page 357]
[Enclosure]

The Chairman of the German Finance Commission to the Chairman of the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council, Paris

On the basis of the Agreement concluded in Brussels on 14 March 1919, an extensive settlement of accounts is to take place, which concerns, on the one hand, the food deliveries of the Allied and Associated Governments, and on the other hand, the payments, deposits and other transactions on the part of Germany. In order to provide and maintain the necessary clearness and perspective in this settlement of accounts, it seems desirable to the German Finance Commission to centralize the settlement in one place through some agency of the Allied and Associated Governments and of the German Government. Through a direct settlement by these two agencies, all the matters concerning the “food account” would be dealt with according to the books. In view of the Brussels Agreement, the German Government established such an agency in Rotterdam under the direction of Herr Rabbow, and the German Government has the honour to suggest that the Allied and Associated Governments also authorize their representatives in Rotterdam to make a practical execution of the whole settlement of accounts.

In our opinion, the following accounts would come under the jurisdiction of these agencies for the present:

(1)
Goods accounts with—
(a)
The Food Administration Grain Corporation.
(b)
His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
(c)
The Commission for Relief in Belgium.
(d)
The Agencies of the French Government.
(2)
Payments in Germany to the representatives of the Food Administration Grain Corporation.
(3)
Payments in Germany by direction of the American Relief Commission.
(4)
Payments and deposits of the German Government to the favour of the Allied and Associated Governments.
(5)
Creditings of the Allied and Associated Governments to the favour of Germany for incidental goods received, creditings which are to be placed to the favour of the “food account.”
(6)
Settlement of the balances of the Navigation Treaty concluded in Brussels.

The decision of the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council is requested as soon as possible.

Melchior
[Page 358]

Appendix 187

[Translation]6

[Telegram From Admiral Troubridge to the Communications Section]

(No. 665)

Problems of relief distribution and of traffic on the Danube were discussed at my headquarters to-day, 25th May, at a meeting at which the following were present: Captain Gregory, United States of America; C. K. Butler, Great Britain; Colonel Olivari, France; Captain Trivati, Italy; all four belonging to Inter-Allied Food Commission; also Henry James and myself, representing Inter-Allied Danube River Commission. At this meeting it appeared clearly that the only present obstacle to the complete and immediate use of the Danube and its existing transport equipment for the distribution of relief and for commerce on the river is the closure of the river by the authorities in control at Budapest. The Supreme Economic Council is urged to realise that all other obstacles to navigation from the South to above Vienna would disappear if Budapest could be passed.—Admiral Troubridge.

Communications Section,
Supreme Economic Council, Paris.

For Admiral, President of the Inter-Allied Danube River Commission.
A. Stead, C. V. S.

Appendix 188

Note for the Supreme Economic Council by the Sub-Committee on Germany [Regarding the] Formation of a Rhineland Republic

The reported attempts in the Palatinate to set up an independent Rhineland Republic will inevitably raise both political and economic issues of considerable difficulty in the near future.

The Sub-Committee on Germany expresses of course no opinion on the political issues involved, but it is certain that, almost at once, difficulties will arise with regard to the interchange of food and other (commodities between the rest of Germany and the revolting territories. Under the existing economic arrangements for the provision of finance for food supplies, Germany is treated as a whole and, consequently, negotiations with regard to food supplies for the Rhine-land and the Palatinate are conducted with the representatives of [Page 359] the German Government at Versailles and Rotterdam. It is expedient, therefore, that the Sub-Committee should receive directions as to the policy which is to be adopted in dealing with the representatives of the German Government in respect of the occupied territories and as to the degree of recognition, if any, which is to be given to the Republican Government if and when it succeeds in establishing itself. It should of course be pointed out that in present circumstances recognition in matters economic would probably suffice to enable the Republican Government to establish itself, if this is thought to be desirable.

The Sub-Committee on Germany, therefore, requests the Council of the Heads of States to give a ruling on the questions of political policy involved, and forwards this note for the information of the Supreme Economic Council.

Appendix 189

[Memorandum From British Delegates Regarding] Future Work of the Supreme Economic Council [as Regards Russia]

It is submitted that the time has come to consider seriously the relation of the Supreme Economic Council to allied policy in Russia. During the last few days an important decision has been arrived at regarding Allied political and military policy in Russia.7

Briefly summarised, our political objects are to secure peace, liberty and self-government to the Russian people with the minimum of interference in the internal affairs of Russia. As this cannot be obtained by dealing with the Soviet Government at Moscow, the Allies will continue their military assistance to the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia with a view to the Government of Admiral Koltchak establishing itself as the Government of All Russia. This assistance is subject to Admiral Koltchak agreeing to the formation of a freely-elected constituent assembly as early as possible and to the settlement of the boundaries of the Russian State and its relations with neighbouring States through the instrumentality of the League of Nations.

The above decision makes it possible for the Allies to consider a comprehensive policy for the re-establishment of normal conditions in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. To have the greatest chance of success and to economise effort, this policy should combine in the most effective manner military, political, relief and economic action. It is no good if the results of military action in one direction are undone by the failure to take relief or economic action in another direction. [Page 360] The economic side of the question has been qualitatively dealt with by a note submitted by Lord Robert Cecil dated the 5th of April,8 on the general economic position. This Note equally applies to Russia. If we do not succeed in averting complete collapse in Central and Eastern Europe we will suffer immeasurable loss or utter disaster. Millions of people who are only supported by an intensive industrial system will die and it will take many years and millions of money to restore even moderate conditions of prosperity in Europe. It is generally agreed that we should try and straighten out the situation. A great deal has been done by utilising resources which happened to be available in various directions. It is time the extent of the problem, the measures necessary to solve it, the cost and the distribution of effort among the Allies should be squarely faced and funds definitely allotted to correspond with the decisions arrived at. The sooner we organise the more likely are we to stem the flood and the less effort it will cost us.

In order to carry out the combined policy indicated above, it is submitted that, in addition to completing the food relief and assuring the re-establishment of communications and the restoration of industries in Central Europe, we should at once push forward with relief and with economic assistance towards the re-establishment of normal conditions and the resumption of trade with anti-Bolshevik Russia and with the Border States, thereby,

(a)
immensely contributing to their stability:
(b)
provoking a desire for similar conditions in adjoining Bolshevik territory:
(c)
facilitating the reconstruction which will inevitably have to be undertaken of what is now Bolshevik Russia.

Sufficient funds should at once be allotted to the Supreme Economic Council for this purpose. The money could not be spent more effectively and for lack of it precious time is being lost.

It is suggested that the Sections of the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to consider to what extent they would be affected in the event of a decision to include Russia in the sphere of operations of the Supreme Economic Council as and when that country becomes available, and to submit preliminary reports giving an outline of the measures they would propose, including a rough estimate of finance.

[Page 361]

Appendix 1909

Note From American Delegates on Proposition in British Memorandum on Allied Economic Policy in Russia

The programme in this memorandum implies:—

(a)
“The Allies will continue their military assistance to the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia.”
(b)
That a definite economic offensive be entered upon against Bolshevik Russia.

It appears to the American Delegates that these premises and so extensive a programme require ratification—

(a)
By the Heads of State.
(b)
So far as the United States is concerned, probably by Congress.
(c)
Definite appropriations by the various Governments.

If such premises and procedure are determined upon sequently, step by step, by each of the Allied and Associated Governments, then it appears to the American Delegates that a special Commission of limited members should be set up to deal with the entire matter.

Appendix 191

Extracts From Minutes of the Meeting of the Raw Materials Section [Regarding] German Imports of Raw Materials

With reference to Minute 206 of the minutes of the Blockade Council of the 28th May, to the effect that action had been deferred upon a draft resolution proposing the importation by Germany of raw materials, which could be financed on credit of not less than one year’s term,

It was agreed that the matter should be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council, pointing out the decision of the Blockade Council, and stating the Raw Materials Section were in agreement with the proposal contained in the draft resolution referred to.

It was further agreed that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to decide what policy should be adopted regarding this matter.

[Page 362]

Appendix 192

Resolution Submitted by the British Delegation Regarding German Imports of Raw Materials

That this Council recommends to the Supreme Economic Council that, within the rations already fixed, importations of raw material into Germany should now be permitted in so far as they can be financed on credits of not less than one year’s term.

In order to give effect to this proposal, it is intended, subject to the approval of the Supreme Economic Council, to request the Sub-Committee on Germany to make arrangements whereby the agents of neutral firms may get into touch with German importers at Cologne, or other convenient place, under suitable Inter-Allied supervision; and that this arrangement should apply equally to the agents of firms in Allied and Associated countries in so far as such transactions may be permitted by their respective Governments.

  1. See CF–74, minute 5, vol. vi, p. 530. For text of memorandum dated June 7, 1919, see telegram No. 2659, June 20, 1919, 10 a.m., to the Acting Secretary of State from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 149.
  2. Allied Maritime Transport Council, 1918. [Footnote in the original.]
  3. Special Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council on Italian coal, 1919. [Footnote in the original.]
  4. The addition of new territory alone is more than sufficient to justify the increase from the pre-war 900,000 tons per month to 1,000,000. This latter quantity is of course to be considered as a fair minimum for the immediate reconstruction period only. If Italy is to make any serious industrial development, and in view of her new territorial acquisitions, she will certainly in due course require some 1,500,000 tons per month. [Footnote in the original.]
  5. Omission indicated in the original.
  6. Not printed.
  7. Appendix 184 is filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/35.
  8. See Appendix No. 181. [Footnote in the original.]
  9. See Foreign Relations, 1918, pp. 349350, 353354, 357n .
  10. Appendix 185 is filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/35.
  11. Translation is filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/35.
  12. See appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.
  13. See appendix 51, p. 110.
  14. Appendixes 190 to 192 are filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/35.