Paris Peace Conf. 180.0501/11
Supreme Economic Council: Eleventh Meeting Held at the Ministry of
Commerce [on 7th April and 9th April, 1919, at 10 a.m.]
April 7, 1919, 10 a.m. and April 9, 1919, 10 a.m.
The Supreme Economic Council held its Eleventh Meeting on Monday, 7th.
April, & Wednesday 9th April 1919, at 10 a.m. under the Chairmanship
of Lord Robert Cecil.
The Associated Governments were represented as follows:—
Great Britain
|
Lord Robert Cecil. |
|
Sir W. Mitchell Thomson. |
|
Mr. Keynes. |
|
Mr. E. F Wise. |
U. S. A. |
Mr. McCormick, |
|
Mr. Hoover, |
|
Mr. Norman Davis, |
|
Mr. Robinson. |
France
|
M. Clémentel, |
|
M. Boret, |
Italy
|
Signor Crespi. |
|
Signor Paratore, |
|
Prof. Attolico. |
|
Count di Cellere, |
|
Signor Pirelli. |
66.
With reference to Minute 49 (Ninth Meeting) a declaration by the French
Delegates appearing in the attached memorandum (50) was submitted, and
it was agreed that Minute 49 should be amended to include it.
With reference to Minute 55 (Tenth Meeting) it was stated that the
Finance Section were of the opinion that the points raised by the French
Delegates had not been agreed by the Council. The French Delegates
stated it was their distinct understanding that the first and third
points had been agreed and observed that they had only agreed to the
despatch of the telegram on this understanding.
It was agreed that the matter should be referred to the Finance Section
for report within the next twenty-four hours regarding the questions
involved.
With reference to Minute 58, it was noted that no report had been
received regarding the financial responsibilities involved in meeting
the requirements of allied, liberated and enemy territories.
It was agreed that in view of the importance of the matter the Finance
Section should be instructed to report at the next Meeting.
[Page 103]
With the exceptions noted, the Minutes of the 9th and 10th Meetings were
approved.
67. The General Economic
Position.
Following discussion of the note submitted by Lord Robert Cecil (51), the
following resolution was adopted:—
“This Council regards the present economic position of Europe as
one of the utmost gravity and ventures to draw the attention of
the Associated Governments to the extreme urgency of the
situation.”
68. Communications From Supreme War
Council.
A memorandum on the decisions reached by the Supreme War Council on 28th.
March, 1919 (52) was considered.
- (a)
-
Raising of Blockade on German Austria
(Minute 44). It was noted that the necessary action had been
taken.
- (b)
-
Hungary (Minute 44). The Chairman reported
that General Smuts had enquired whether in the event of his finding
it desirable to offer a relaxation of the blockade of Hungary the
Supreme Economic Council would agree. The Chairman mentioned that he
had informed General Smuts that he personally would support such a
proposal.
- (c)
-
Re-opening of Trade with Esthonia (Minute
61.ii). It was noted that the necessary action had been
taken.
-
Re-opening of Trade with Latvia and
Lithuania. The resolution of the Blockade Section adopted
at its special meeting of 20th. [29th?] March
(53) was accepted subject to confirmation by the Naval and Military
Authorities which should be obtained, if possible, within 24
hours.
- (d)
-
Removal of Restriction on Trade with Poland
(Minute 61.i.). It was noted that the necessary action had been
taken.
- (e)
-
Re-opening of Rhine Traffic. It was stated
that the Military Authorities had no objection to the proposal and
that the necessary action had been taken.
69. Foodstuffs for Bavaria.
The following reference from the Supreme War Council was considered:—
“Whether, having regard to the terms of the Brussels Agreement,
it is economically possible to send food independently to
Bavaria apart altogether from the political expediency of doing
so.”
It was, agreed that the following reply should be made:—
“Without expressing any opinion on the political aspects of this
question, the Supreme Economic Council is of opinion that the
course proposed would not, from the point of view of food and
finance, be desirable nor so far as they can see possible. If,
however, any definite proposal for carrying it out is placed
before them, they will be ready to give it their
consideration.”
[Page 104]
70. Transport of Polish Troops to
Dantzig.
A report from the Shipping Section (54) regarding the transport of Polish
troops to Dantzig was considered.
It was agreed that, having heard the message from General Weigand [Weygand] to the effect that the land routes would
be used for the time being, it was unnecessary to take any action.
It was reported that the boats originally designated by the British
Ministry of Shipping for this service, had been released.
71. Tonnage Requirements for Allied,
Liberated and Enemy Territories.
A report from members of the Statistical Section of the Allied Maritime
Transport Council dated 28th March (55) and an analysis of this report
dated 3rd April (56) submitted by the American Delegates were
considered.
- (a)
- It was stated that the Shipping Section had agreed not to consider
the observations on the 1st and 2nd pages of the report first
mentioned. The American Delegates expressed the view that the
function of the statisticians was only to provide statistical data
from which the Section itself might draw conclusions.
- (b)
- The Director-General of Relief reported that no reply had been
received from the Shipping Section to the requests for the provision
of tonnage for the several programmes. He stated that the critical
necessity was to procure tonnage for May delivery; that he had
obtained 400,000 tons of relief loading from the United States
Shipping Board, but that even a part of the German programme could
not be maintained in May unless arrangements were made for diverting
100,000 tons for relief purposes out of the 900,000 tons now
designated by the Wheat Executive to load in the United
States.
The following resolution was adopted:—
“The Council is of opinion that the ordinary demands of the
countries represented on the Wheat Executive should be reduced
to the lowest possible point for arrival before the end of May
and that any balance of cargoes so made available should be
diverted to general relief, including Germany, subject to
replacement as early as possible by German vessels later in the
year.”
72. German Coastal Traffic.
- (a)
- A Resolution of the Blockade Section respecting the limitation of
cargoes to be carried in German vessels to and from Northern
Neutrals (57) was noted and approved.
- (b)
- A communication from the Allied Maritime Transport Council
regarding Black List of Neutral Ships (58) was submitted.
The British Delegates suggested that, in view of the additional
information now available, this matter should be referred back to the
Shipping Section for further consideration.
Agreed.
[Page 105]
It was further agreed:—
- (a)
- That the Section should take into consideration the
desirability of securing the use of small ships now available in
the Baltic.
- (b)
- That the Section should be authorised to take the necessary
action and report to the Council at the next meeting.
73. Ships in the Adriatic Claimed by
Jugo-Slavs.
A memorandum dated 26th March 1919 (59) reporting a request from the
Serbian representatives in Paris for the appointment of a Commission to
act with reference to Paragraph V of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice
with Austria-Hungary,1 and a letter from Mr.
Pashitch to the Peace Conference, dated 25th March (60), were
considered.
It was agreed that the question should be considered by a special
committee to be established composed of representatives of the four
Governments under the Chairmanship of a Representative of the Department
of State of the United States.
The Italian Delegates expressed the view that the question was purely
technical in character.
74. Organisation.
(a) A report of the Committee on organisation and
procedure of the Council and its Sections (61) was adopted and it was
agreed that a Committee composed of Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Hoover, M.
Clémentel, and Signor Crespi should consider the question of
personnel.
(b) A report dated 24th March (62) upon the
organisation of allied shipping work under the Supreme Economic Council
was adopted, it being noted that the Associated Governments concurred in
the proposal that the Allied Maritime Transport Council should terminate
its existence.
It was agreed, that the Shipping Section should immediately appoint a
Chairman and a Secretary.
(c) The recommendations regarding press
arrangements were adopted (63) and the following appointments were
made:—
United Kingdom |
Mr. Mair |
United States |
Mr. R. S. Baker |
France |
M. Comert |
Italy |
Count Zucchini |
75. Nitrates to Countries Contiguous
to Germany.
A communication from the Finance Section dated 31st March 1919 (64) was
considered.
It was agreed that the Nitrate Executive should be left to deal with the
matter.
[Page 106]
76. Private Remittances to
Germany.
A communication from the Finance Section dated 26th March (65) respecting
the collection of private remittances to Germany which might be utilised
in payment of German Food supplies, was considered and referred back to
the Finance Section for further consideration.
77. Report of Communications
Section.
A report from the Communications Section dated 5th April (66) was
submitted.
Need of Boiling Stock for Liberated Countries. The
Chairman of the Section reported that the liberated countries were in
need of rolling stock, the requirements for Poland being 250 locomotives
and 3000 wagons, of which 100 locomotives and 2000 wagons were urgently
required; that the Military Authorities had agreed to supply 30
locomotives for the transport of General Haller’s divisions to Poland
and 50 locomotives for Roumania, and that the present problem was that
of meeting the balance of the general needs.
In view of information received to the effect that a large surplus of
rolling stock was held by the Armies, the following resolution was
adopted:—
“The Council, being of opinion that the question of rolling stock
in Poland, Czecno-Slovakia and Roumania is of extreme urgency,
not only for relief and reconstruction, but for political and
military reasons, refers it to the Communications Section to
investigate with the Military Authorities what locomotives and
wagons are available in the different armies and elsewhere. The
Section shall report as soon as possible what are the exact
wants of the above countries and what steps can be taken to
supply them and the Section shall have power to take any action
they think desirable and possible.
The Council is further of opinion that if 300 locomotives and
3000 wagons, or any less number, are available for the economic
needs of these countries, they should be placed at the disposal
of the governments concerned in accordance with the distribution
recommended by the Communications Section and with the assent of
the Finance Section if any credits are
required.”
With reference to the concluding portion of the above resolution, it was
noted that under the present agreement between the Associated Powers
credits furnished for relief and reconstruction purposes shall be a
first charge upon reparation payments which may be received from enemy
countries.
Reference was made to the fact that the Roumanian Government is
purchasing railway equipment from different countries and private
companies, and it was agreed that, in order fully to co-ordinate the
work, the Communications Section should be informed in advance of all
such purchases, and they should notify the Finance Section of their
approval in all cases where credits are involved.
[Page 107]
The American Delegates submitted that it was very desirable to stimulate
private enterprise in the purchase of reconstruction material and also
to facilitate to the utmost mail and telegraphic communications to and
from the liberated countries.
Agreed.
78. German Exports.
1. Following a discussion on a draft reply to a German Note dated 2nd
April (67) regarding the conditions under which German commodities might
be exported—
It was agreed:—
I. That the following reply should be made:—
- [“] (i) The Allied and Associated Governments have noted
the Note presented by the members of the German Financial
Delegation at the Château de la Villette on April 2nd
1919.
- (ii) They point out that the arguments set forth therein
may have reference to peace conditions, but not to the
execution of the stipulations of the Armistice.
- (iii) The conditions which were set out in the Agreement
of Brussels,2 and which were
notified to the German Government in supplementary notes,
have for their aim the revictualling of Germany with
foodstuffs. The Allied and Associated Governments give the
following answer to the verbal questions put by Dr. Melchior
on April 2nd:—
- (a)
- The exports dealt with in Section 1 of the
telegram of 24th March,3 of which 2/3rds are to be offered
to the Allies under Section 4b & c are the
balance available after deducting the exports
permitted under Section 2.
- (b)
- Section 4a of the telegram
of 24th March should be interpreted as
follows:—
- Prices in their opinion fair and equitable will be
proposed by the Allies and if these prices are not
accepted by the German Government for any article,
the conditional relaxation of prohibition of export
of that article cannot come into effect.”
II. That a Committee composed of representatives of the Blockade and Raw
Materials Sections should meet immediately to fix the prices for exports
to be purchased by the Allies.
The correct interpretation of p. 4(c) of the telegram dated March 24th. sent to the
Germans (as to whether Germany might export 1/3 of her surplus if she
refused the prices established by the Allies for their purchases) was
discussed and as no agreement could be reached the point was reserved
for further consideration if necessary.
III. A report of the negotiations between the Interallied and German
Delegates at Cologne regarding the export of coal from Germany in
payment for food (68) was submitted.
[Page 108]
It was agreed:—
- (a)
- That the materials mentioned in Clause 2 as required for the
purpose of increasing the German coal output and exportable
surplus should be sold to the Germans notwithstanding the
interruptions of the negotiations at Compiègne upon the general
question of German exports.
- (b)
- That there was no objection to payment for such materials
being made out of German funds available for the payment of
food.
79. Communications From the Blockade
Section.
Resolutions and reports from the Blockade Section regarding:—
- (a)
- Transport of coals by the sea route from the Ruhr to East
Prussia (69)
- (b)
- Raising of blockade on the Adriatic (70)
- (c)
- Suspension of restrictions on import into Germany of fish
caught in European waters (71)
- (d)
- German correspondence in connection with the Brussels
Agreement (72 & 73)
were noted and approved.
In conjunction with the report regarding German Correspondence (72) a
note submitted by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith (74) was considered, and it was
agreed that, subject to the approval of the Military Authorities, the
negotiations regarding the German exports should be held at
Compiègne.
It was agreed, however, that this decision should not prejudice any
administrative arrangements already made or subsequently to be made.
80. Import of Vegetables From Neutral
Countries Into Germany.
The Director General of Relief reported that he had been advised that
imports of vegetables from Neutral Countries into Germany had been
delayed because of the failure of the Foreign Offices to notify the
Neutral Governments that the previously existing restrictions had been
removed.
It was agreed that the members of the Council should endeavour to arrange
that such action should be taken by their respective Governments as
would remedy the existing situation.
It was noted in this connection that the restrictions on the export of
vegetables from the Northern Neutrals should now apply only in the case
of Holland.
81. Suspension of Enemy Trade and
Black Lists.
A resolution dated 31st. March respecting suspension of all enemy trade
and black lists of the Associated Governments (75) was submitted by the
American Delegates on the Blockade Section.
[Page 109]
While the British and French Delegates were unable to accept the
resolution finally it was agreed that it should be adopted in the
following form, for submission to the respective Governments:—
[“] Resolved, That on and after April 1
on which date publication shall be made to this effect, all
Enemy Trade and Black Lists of the Associated Governments,
whether Official, Confidential or Cloak, shall be suspended
until further notice, it being understood that in case of need
the Associated Governments are prepared to put in force again
these Black Lists.”
82. Abolition of Telegraphic and Cable
Censorship.
A resolution regarding abolition of telegraphic and cable censorship (76)
was submitted by the American Delegates on the Blockade Section.
It was agreed that the memorandum should be deferred for further
consideration at a subsequent meeting to enable the Delegates to
endeavour to obtain the assent of their respective Governments.
The American Delegates stated that while concerted action was preferable,
the Government of the United States might find it necessary to take
independent action.
83. Relations With Germany.
The recommendations in the Memorandum by Mr. Wise on the Commission[s]
set up under the Armistice with Germany and their relations to the
Supreme Economic Council (77) were agreed and referred to a Committee of
four:—
U. K. |
Mr. E. F. Wise. |
Italy. |
Prof. Attolico. |
U. S. |
Mr. Legge. |
and a French Member to be appointed, with power to put
the recommendations into immediate action.
It was further agreed that the Memorandum should be presented to the
Council of 10, it being stated that the scheme so far as it concerned
economic matters has received the approval of the Supreme Economic
Council and was being put into immediate operation.
The American Delegates reserved the right to refer the scheme back to the
Supreme Economic Council at its next meeting if, after further
examination, they find themselves unable to come to an agreement with
the Committee on any detailed proposals.
84. Relief of Odessa.
Correspondence between Mr. Gorvin and Mr. Hoover (78 and 79) was
submitted and it was noted that under the present conditions the Council
was not required to take any action.
[Page 110]
85. Italian Coal Supply.
The French Delegates reported that it is at present impossible to supply
Italy with 150,000 tons of coal monthly from the Saar Basin, that at
present 1,500 tons are being shipped daily and it is expected that in a
short time this may be increased to 3,000 tons.
Appendix 504
Statements Made by the French
Delegates Regarding German Exports
The French Delegates stated:—
- 1.
- That, in agreement with the entire Council, they consider
it essential to supply Germany within the limits and
conditions fixed by the Supreme War Council.
- 2.
- That, when putting this work of supply into operation, it
is necessary:—
- (a)
- To preserve German reserves of gold, silver and
securities;
- (b)
- To urge the German population to restart
work;
- (c)
- To ensure to the devastated areas priority in the
supply of the necessary materials and
machinery;
- (d)
- To in no way prejudice the conditions of the
Preliminaries of Peace.
Consequently, they asked that it should be placed on record that,
although they had no intention of hindering the progress of economic
life in Germany, nor of weakening the engagements entered into by
the Associated Governments, they were obliged to insist on priority
being given to them by one means or another in the supply of the
various essential materials necessary for the reconstruction of the
devastated areas.
Appendix 51
Note Submitted by the British
Delegates on the General Economic Position in Europe
1. By far the most important task before the Allied Governments is to
get production and internal and external “exchange economy” working
again on something like normal lines. Before the war some
400,000,000 Europeans, by working their hardest just managed to
feed, clothe, and house themselves and perhaps amass six months
capital on which to live. That capital has vanished; the complicated
machinery of internal and external production is more or less
smashed; production [Page 111] has to
a great extent ceased. The largely increasing population of Europe
has only been maintained by the increasing development and
inter-connection of world industry and finance. If this is not only
checked, but for the time being destroyed, it is difficult to see
how the population can be maintained at any rate during the very
painful period of drastic readjustment. If free movement were
possible and other countries could absorb it, there would inevitably
be a vast immigration from Europe, until an equilibrium were
established between the numbers of the population and the means of
livelihood. As that is not possible this equilibrium must be reached
in some other way. In Russia it is being reached, it appears—
- (a)
- By reduction of population by starvation;
- (b)
- By drastic change of occupation, e. g., by the town
population being forced out on to the land as
labourers.
To what extent the same conditions spread over the rest of Europe
must depend largely on whether or not the obstacles to the
resumption of production can be overcome and overcome rapidly.
Certainly a population increasing as the German did by nearly
1,000,000 every year could not permanently be supported without an
intensive industrial system at full blast.
2. The obstacles to the resumption of production are numerous. The
main ones are the following:—
- (1)
- Destruction or disrepair of fixed plant and means of
transportation, i. e., railways, canals, factories.
- (2)
- Lack of raw materials, i. e., destruction by war of all
working capital.
- (3)
- Consequent loss of external purchasing power, i. e., lack
of exports.
- (4)
- Depreciation of currency; often chaos of currency
system.
- (5)
- Huge rise in prices, consequent loss of equilibrium
between internal prices and world prices rendering export
difficult.
- (6)
- Huge floating indebtedness to other countries.
- (7)
- Reduction of agricultural production owing to currency
troubles and lack of purchasing power on the part of the
industrial population.
- (8)
- Enormous taxation, acting as almost complete deterrent to
new enterprise.
(N.B.—System of double income-tax very great handicap
to investment of American capital in
England.)
- (9)
- Political obstacles such as tariffs and blockade between
different parts of old Austria-Hungary.
- (10)
- Government restrictions due to blockade and other
causes.
- (11)
- Labour difficulties.
- (12)
- General lack of confidence and uncertainty arising from
above conditions.
[Page 112]
All the difficulties are not present in all countries. But in general
they exist in all belligerent European countries. It is a question
of degree, shading down from England to France, France to Italy,
Italy to Germany, Germany to the Austro-Hungarian countries, and the
latter to Russia. The difference between the position in England and
the complete economic prostration of these latter countries is
enormous. Therefore our difficulties on getting the wheels of
industry really going may be some index to the problem in these
other countries.
3. It is obvious that there is no one remedy for existing evils. If
we are to help the prostrate countries of Europe, it is no good in
my opinion taking up the problem piecemeal, or acting on the lines
of poor relief. We are ourselves so exhausted that we cannot afford
to waste a single penny unnecessarily. We should either recognise
the problem is too big for us and abandon it or take it up
comprehensively.
It is useless merely to pour in food. That may be necessary as an
emergency measure. By itself it will never solve the problem. We
must induce these countries, as they no doubt can, to produce enough
food for themselves. We cannot be sure they will do this without
geting their industry going too. The difficulty is that their
economic balance is upset. In the main, a country’s agricultural
produce is exchanged against manufactured articles. If industry is
not producing, the farmer cannot exchange his produce against these
articles, and, on the other hand, the industrial community has no
purchasing power. It can only offer a currency which is, probably,
rapidly depreciating, and which the farmer will therefore refuse.
These evils are at their height in Russia. They are exerting more or
less force in the rest of Central Europe. Therefore, unless we are
to run the risk of having to supply these countries next year with
food, we must get their industry going.
That can only be done if—
- (a)
- Each country has a more or less stable currency;
- (b)
- The transportation system is working;
- (c)
- A sufficiency of working capital and raw materials is at
hand to commence work;
- (d)
- Fixed plant and machinery are restored as quickly as
possible.
In other words, a comprehensive policy covering the conditions of
each country is required. Since, owing to the size of the problem,
outside assistance must inevitably be reduced to a minimum, it is
important that the help given should go as far as possible, and that
therefore all the measures required should, as far as possible, be
taken simultaneously.
We may be too late, and the financial and political difficulties may
be too great. But if the task is to be attempted, it should be under
such conditions as to give us the best chance of success.
[Page 113]
4. By far the greatest difficulty is the financial one. The problem
is unparalleled. Europe is without working capital. Who is to
provide her with it? In the first place, can it be left to private
enterprise and private credit?
Every step in the direction of feeding private enterprise from
restriction and control is right. So far as possible, therefore,
Government borrowing inter se, and
consequently Government control should be abandoned. To whatever
extent private enterprise can meet the problem, it should be left to
do so. Every measure should have as its aim the restoration as soon
as possible of private enterprise. It is absolutely essential to
return to the condition where the normal play of economic forces
determines the conduct of the individual, where, in fact, it becomes
expensive for the individual to do wrong, and profitable to do
right. Where a country still has its head above water, like England,
the greatest possible freedom should be allowed. Until it is clearly
insufficient the same policy should be applied elsewhere.
5. Nevertheless, the problem of restoring Europe is almost certainly
too great for private enterprise alone, and everybody’s delay puts
this solution further out of court.
There are two main obstacles:—
- (a)
- The risks are too great.
- (b)
- The amounts are too big, and the credit required too
long.
The more prostrate a country is and the nearer to Bolshevism the
more, presumably, it requires assistance. But the less likely is
private enterprise to give it. Every day’s delay makes tha risks
greater. To a small extent and with a great margin some trade will
be done and some barter. But not enough to meet the situation.
The Government concerned might perhaps meet the question of risk by
some scheme of guarantee and insurance. If only short term credit
were required, the problem might then be met. But the great bulk of
credit will, in my opinion, be required for at least eighteen months
or two years. In other words, bankers and merchants would have to
face a lock-up for that period. Since they cannot trade at all with
most of Europe, except on these terms, they would do so to some
extent, but their resources in long terms credit must be
limited.
April 5, 1919.
Appendix 52
Communication of Supreme War
Council
The following decisions have been reached by the Supreme War Council
on March 28th 1919.5
[Page 114]
(a) Raising of Blockade on
German-Austria.—(re min. 44). It was
further resolved that all blockade and trade restrictions with
German-Austria should be abolished and that commerce should be free
with all parts thereof, as soon as the necessary machinery of
control against re-exportation to Germany had been set up, with the
exceptions and other provisions set out in detail in Annexure “A”
(doc. 30).6
(The Italian representative made reservation pending settlement of
certain pending matter with Yugo-slavs).
(b) Hungary.—In view of
the present situation, the question of Hungary should be referred
back to the Supreme Economic Council.
(c) Reopening of Trade with
Esthonia.—(re minute 61 (2) S. E.
C.)
Reopening of Trade with Latvia and
Lithuania.—With the above recommendation to extend the same
principle to Latvia and Lithuania when the political and military
situation became favourable, the resolution of the Supreme Economic
Council regarding the resumption of trade with Esthonia, as set
forth in Annexure “C” (doc. 47),7 was adopted.
As regards Latvia and Lithuania the Supreme Economic Council should
be requested to report on the advisability of the above mentioned
provision after obtaining evidence of military witnesses.
(d) Removal of Restrictions
on Trade with Poland.—Resolved that all blockade and trade
restrictions with Poland shall be abolished, and all commerce shall
be free with all parts thereof from April 1st, 1919, provided
satisfactory machinery is set up before that date for the proper
control at Dantzig.
Moreover, it was decided that the Polish National Committee should
not be invited to arrange for Commissioners to proceed to Dantzig,
but that the distribution of food within Poland should, as far as
possible, be performed by the Poles themselves.
(e) Reopening of Rhine
Traffic.—It was then resolved that there was no objection
from a blockade point of view to the re-opening of the Rhine to
traffic for the purpose of permitting the resumption of Swiss trade
with Holland, Scandinavia, and the Entente countries, subject to the
existing blockade agreements, and that the recommendation of the
Supreme Economic Council to this end was approved, subject to their
obtaining the consent of the military authorities.
[Page 115]
Appendix 53
Resolution of the Blockade Section
at the Special Meeting of March 29th, 1919 [Regarding] Re-establishment
of Trade Relations With Latvia and Lithuania
“Whereas, it is desirable that reasonable
quantities of commodities should be permitted to reach Latvia and
Lithuania, if and when the military and naval authorities should
find that the military situation would permit such action.
“Resolved That subject to guarantees being
given that no imported commodities and no articles manufactured
therefrom will be exported to Germany, Hungary, and Bolshevik
Russia:
- (1)
- Applications for permission to ship commodities to Latvia
and Lithuania shall be made to, and decided by, the Allied
Blockade Council in London, except in so far as such
shipments are made from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and
Holland.
- (2)
- The I. A. T. C.s8 in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and
Holland shall be authorized to endorse licences for the
export of commodities from these countries respectively to
Latvia or Lithuania, and shall notify the A. B. C. of the
exports effected under this arrangement in order that the
rations of the exporting countries may be credited to the
extent of the exports made.
- (3)
- The A. B. C. shall be requested to prepare at once an
estimate of the quarterly requirements of Latvia and
Lithuania in the matter of foodstuffs and most important raw
materials, based in the case of foodstuffs on the
instructions of the Food Section and in the case of other
commodities upon the best material available. Imports shall
not be authorized in excess of the estimated quarterly
requirements.
- (4)
- The I. A. T. C.s in the Northern Neutral Countries shall
be requested to authorize exports to their respective
countries from Latvia or Lithuania.
- (5)
- The A. B. C. shall be empowered if they consider it
necessary to set up an I. A. T. C. at Libau for both Latvia
and Lithuania.
- (6)
- The announcement of these arrangements to be made on the
7th of April, 1919.
“Further resolved, That the preceding
resolution be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for
appropriate action.”
[Page 116]
Appendix 54
Extract From Minutes of Meeting of
the Shipping Section Held on 26th March, 1919 [Regarding] Transport of
Polish Troops to Dantzig
Mr. Robinson stated that the United States had no enemy ships under
their control of suitable draft. He suggested that the ships which
the Germans claimed as exceptions which were to be used for
maintaining the German forces in the East against Bolchevism, might
be available for this purpose.
It was decided that M. de Lubersac would obtain from the Supreme
Economic Council a decision on the point raised by the Germans as to
whether the Germans were to be allowed to retain these ships.
Appendix 55
Report From Statistical Section,
Allied Maritime Transport Council
Subject: Tonnage for Food Supplies.
We have examined at your request Mr. Hoover’s memorandum of March 20
on Food Supplies for Europe.9
The tonnage figures appear to have been prepared from data not
altogether of the same date. With allowance for this fact, and for
differences in interpretation and methods of compilation, we are not
disposed to offer any essential criticism of the figures presented,
with a few exceptions which may be briefly mentioned.
- (1)
- The cargo tonnage required for French and American food
imports, in comparison with these imports, appears somewhat
overestimated in view of the nearness of certain important
sources of supply.
- (2)
- Not all of the British cereal tonnage unallocated (739,000
tons) should be deducted under the method adopted, since part of
it will discharge in U. K. and India. Furthermore, such part of
this tonnage as will be allocated to France and Italy should go
to increase the figures of total tonnage available for French
and Italian uses other than food.
- (3)
- The accepted requirements for French and Italian coal imports
would involve a materially larger tonnage than the figures
show.
- (4)
- The figures for American tonnage appear to be considerably
larger than the American national seagoing tonnage, but may be
correct if foreign tonnage chartered to the U. S. shipping board
be included.
- (5)
- It is perhaps misleading to class Austro-Hungarian tonnage
under French and Italian management as under French and Italian
[Page 117] control, since
this tonnage is explicitly subject to Allied control as
expressed by the General Economic Council, apart from exchange
arrangements.
Aside from these considerations, however, it is to be pointed out
that surpluses and deficiencies calculated by the method adopted are
somewhat distorted. The tonnage required for food imports has been
calculated on an assumption that such tonnage is confined to this
particular service. In fact, this tonnage is likely in the course of
its round voyage to carry food [and] other imports for other Allied
and neutral nations. This same is true of tonnage required for other
imports. This position can be clearly demonstrated if the tonnage
required for Allied imports is calculated separately for each group
of imports; and it will appear that the total tonnage required, as
ascertained by the addition of the tonnage estimates for each group
of imports, will largely exceed the tonnage actually found necessary
for the work.
Even if adjustments necessitated by this objection are made, it may
be questioned whether the tonnage balance shown as “available for
domestic use” affords any indication of the further contributions to
European Relief which may reasonably be expected from the respective
nations. This balance must be counted upon to provide for imports
and coasting services of varying degrees of magnitude and necessity,
and for bunker supplies as well, both for the home countries and for
other overseas dominions, aside from the margin available for other
ocean-carrying trade. Thus a large “balance” of the sort shown may
not indicate greater or less ability to contribute to the general
deficiency in relief tonnage. It would require a thorough and
somewhat prolonged investigation to ascertain fairly the relative
ability of the various nations to contribute further of their
reasonable shares in whatever tonnage burden exists.
While we have been unable to make any such thorough investigation,
such evidence as we have been able to consider points to the
conclusion that America’s considerable contributions to European
Supply and Relief have not imposed as heavy a strain upon American
and American controlled tonnage as the British support of France and
Italy has imposed upon British tonnage. It is important to add that
the question of fairness necessitates facing the fact that British
tonnage is not yet in a position to regain its pre-war position,
while American tonnage is necessarily seeking to establish a
position.
-
L. A. Bullwinkle
-
C. C. Wardlow
-
Jos. S. Davis
[Page 118]
Employment of American
Chartered Tonnage Chartered to U. S. Shipping Board or
Citizens, Oct. 31, 1918, and
Feb. 28, 1919
[Figures in deadweight tons.]
Service |
Oct. 31, 1918 |
Feb. 28, 1919 |
I. Unavailable for Merchant Service. |
|
|
Repairing,etc. |
93,000 |
59,000 |
In U. S. military service |
276,000 |
86,500 |
Total |
369,000 |
145,500 |
II. Employed for European Supply and Relief. |
|
|
Italian Service |
61,000 |
11,500 |
French Service |
7,000 |
9,000 |
Swiss Service |
29,500 |
65,000 |
Belgian Relief |
156,000 |
287,500 |
General European Relief |
|
59,000 |
Total |
264,000[sic] |
432,000 |
III. U. S. Import and Export Trades, etc |
|
|
North American Trades |
258,500 |
134,500 |
South American Trades |
367,000 |
189,500 |
Trans-Pacific Trades |
67,500 |
61,000 |
Other |
12,000 |
44,500 |
|
705,000 |
429,500 |
Grand Total |
1,338,000 |
1,007,000 |
Note: Included in the above are the
following vessels chartered to U. S. citizens:—
I. Regarding and unassigned |
14,000 |
|
II. Belgian Relief |
9,000 |
|
U. K. Services |
11,000 |
|
III. North American Trades |
102,000 |
61,000 |
South American Trades |
125,000 |
34,000 |
Trans-Pacific |
18,000 |
|
Other U. S. Import and Export Trades |
9,000 |
|
Total |
288,000 |
95,000 |
Total chartered to U. S. S. B |
1,050,000 |
912,000 |
Grand Total |
1,338,000 |
1,007,000 |
Note.—Data for February probably
incomplete with respect to tonnage chartered to American
Citizens.
Comparative Summary of
Employment of British and American Tonnage, Oct. 31,
1918, and Feb. 28th, 1919
Seagoing Merchant Steamers (Exclusive of Tankers) 500 Gross Tons
and Over
[In thousands of tons.]
|
British (D.W.) |
American (D.W.) |
Percentage Feb. 28 |
|
Oct. 31 |
Feb. 28 |
Oct. 31 |
Feb. 28 |
British |
American |
Total tonnage |
19,159 |
19,679 |
5,993 |
6,846 |
100% |
100% |
I.Unavailable for Merchant Service. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Repairing,etc |
1,385 |
2,278 |
536 |
871 |
11.6% |
12.7% |
In Military Service |
2,347 |
1,741 |
2,641 |
2,085 |
8.9% |
30.4% |
“ Naval “ |
1,985 |
1,595 |
200 |
361 |
8.1% |
5.3% |
“ Military or Naval Service of Allies |
884 |
265 |
24 |
|
1.3% |
|
“ Non-Merchant Service |
22 |
26 |
|
12 |
.1% |
.2% |
Total |
6,623 |
5,905 |
3,401 |
3,329 |
30.0% |
48.6% |
[Page 119]
II.Employed for National Commercial
Requirements. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Importing |
6,762 |
7,600* |
782 |
608 |
38.6% |
8.9% |
Coasting |
238 |
310 |
896 |
803 |
1.6% |
11.8% |
Colonial Importing or Coasting |
1,610 |
2,012* |
83 |
133 |
10.3% |
1.9% |
[Total] |
8,610 |
9,922 |
1,761 |
1,544 |
50.5% |
22.6% |
III.Employed for European Allies and Relief,
etc. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Italy |
1,556 |
1,302* |
128 |
162 |
6.6% |
2.4% |
France |
1,546 |
1,216* |
124 |
179 |
6.2% |
2.6% |
Greece |
57 |
21 |
|
7 |
.1% |
.1% |
Switzerland |
|
|
60 |
39 |
|
.6% |
General European relief |
|
43* |
|
544 |
.2% |
7.9% |
Total |
3,159 |
2,582 |
312 |
931 |
13.1% |
13.6% |
IV.Employed in other Merchant Service |
767 |
1,270 |
519 |
1,042 |
6.4% |
15.2% |
*Including approximate allocation of tonnage unallocated on
February 28.
Appendix 5610
Analysis of Report Regarding Tonnage
for European Food Requirements by United States Shipping Board
Statistical Section
Comparison of figures in statement presented by Mr.
Hoover║ setting forth the employment of the
Shipping of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy,
with figures in a statement circulated to the Members of the Supreme
Economic Council, signed by certain clerks in the Statistical
Section of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.¶ The comparison is limited to the tonnage of
the United States and Great Britain, because the second statement
only treats of those figures.
[All figures are in deadweight tons]
|
|
|
Mr. Hoover’s Figures. |
Clerks’ Figures. |
1.British Tonnage
|
|
|
(1,600 Tons and over.) |
(500 Tons and over.) |
Total merchant tonnage |
|
|
18,531,523 |
19,697,000* |
Repairs |
|
|
2,147,812 |
2,278,000† |
Total workable tonnage |
|
|
16,383,711 |
17,401,000 |
Non-merchant tonnage— |
|
|
|
|
Military and naval |
3,090,130 |
3,336,000 |
|
|
Other |
281,918 |
291,000 |
|
|
Total |
3,372,048 |
3,627,000 |
3,372,048 |
3,627,000 |
Net available merchant tonnage. |
|
|
13,011,663 |
13,774,000 |
[Page 120]
In European service— |
|
|
|
|
Italy |
|
|
932,059 |
1,302,000‡ |
France |
|
|
904,570 |
1,216,0001‡ |
Other (including cereal import service) |
|
|
823,360 |
64,000‡ |
Total |
|
|
2,659,989 |
2,582,000 |
Remaining British merchant tonnage— |
|
|
|
|
Net British merchant tonnage |
|
|
13,011,663 |
13,774,000 |
Less tonnage in supply and relief |
|
|
2,659,989 |
2,582,000 |
Total |
|
|
10,351,674 |
11,192,000§ |
2.United States Tonnage
|
|
|
|
|
Total merchant tonnage |
|
|
7,631,856 |
7,853,000 |
|
|
|
503,115 |
930,000 |
Total |
|
|
7,128,741 |
6,923,000 |
Non-merchant tonnage |
|
|
|
|
Military and naval |
|
|
2,744,413 |
2,532,500 |
Other |
|
|
103,645 |
12,000 |
Total |
|
|
2,847,858 |
2,544,500 |
Net available merchant tonnage. |
|
|
4,280,883 |
4,378,500 |
In European service— |
|
|
|
|
Italy |
|
|
182,407 |
173,500 |
France |
|
|
176,136 |
188,000 |
Other (including food administration) |
|
|
870,344 |
1,001,500 |
Total |
|
|
1,228,887 |
1,363,000 |
Remaining United States merchant tonnage |
|
|
3,061,996 |
3,015,500 |
Percentage of net available tonnage in European
supply and relief— |
Percent
|
Percent
|
British |
20.4 |
18.7 |
United States |
28.7 |
31.1 |
*Includes 1,147,130 deadweight tons, vessels 500 to 1,599.
†Includes repairs 130,393 deadweight tons, vessels 500 to 1,599.
‡Contains allocation since 28th February.
§Contains 456,822 deadweight tons, vessels 500 to 1,599.
Appendix 57
[Resolution of the Blockade Section
Regarding] Administration of Resolutions
on German Coastal and Fishing Trades (Minute 56)
In connection with the Resolution of the Supreme Economic Council
(contained in Minute No. 56 of the Tenth Meeting held March 24th),
[Page 121] to the effect that
there is no objection to German exempted vessels engaging in coastal
traffic and traffic to the Northern Neutrals, the following
Resolution was passed:
“Resolved, that cargoes carried in German
vessels from Northern Neutrals to Germany should be limited for the
present to:
- (a)
- Foodstuffs,
- (b)
- Articles whose export to Germany is permitted by agreement
with the Northern Neutrals within the limits of such
agreements, and that this arrangement can be altered when a
decision is come to as to what raw materials or other goods
Germany is to be allowed to import, and that any regulations
for the time being in force as to I. A. T. C. licenses must
be observed; and”
“Further resolved, that this resolution be
communicated to the A. B. C., London, for their information and
necessary action.”
Appendix 5811
Communication of the Allied Maritime
Transport Council [Regarding] Black List on Neutral Ships
At a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, held Wednesday
morning the 26th March, 1919, it was determined to recommend to the
Supreme Economic Council the suspension of the black list on neutral
ships on the following grounds:—
- 1.
- The black list was part of the blockade measures, and is
therefore no longer necessary.
- 2.
- While it has forced tonnage into Allied service, an
examination discloses the fact that only a small amount of
this tonnage now in Allied service will be released in the
next few months.
- 3.
- The balance under the black list is quite small.
It is thought best merely to suspend, because there is a possibility
that it might be necessary at some later date to employ this method
in the assistance of blockade; but no present reason exists for
maintaining the black list.
Appendix 59
[Memorandum From the Shipping Section
Regarding] Yugo-Slam Ships in the
Adriatic
Paragraph 5 of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice with Austria
Hungary provided that Austro-Hungarian ships found at sea should be
made subject to capture unless exceptions are made by a Commission
[Page 122] to be appointed by the
Allies and the U. S. A. It appears that this qualification was
intended to apply specially to ships owned by Yugoslavs and that
such ships, nominated by the Commission, would be released from the
provisions of the Armistice applying to enemy ships.
An appeal has been received from the Serbian representative in
Paris12 pointing out that no action
has been taken by the Commission of the four Admirals in the
Adriatic to except any Yugo-Slav ships, and requesting that a
Commission should be appointed to act in the spirit of Clause 5 of
the Armistice conditions.
Appendix 6013
delegation of the
kingdom
of the serbs, croates and slovenes
to the
peace conference,
Paris
, March 25, 1919.
To the Inter-Allied Supreme Economic
Council,
Ministry of Commerce, Paris.
Our Naval Section, under date of the 8th March, addressed a
memorandum to Mr. Henry Robinson, delegate of the United States of
America, to the Inter-Allied Supreme Economic Council, calling his
attention to the fact that paragraph 5 of the naval clauses of the
Armistice with Austria-Hungary had not yet been put into execution.
That is to say, the Special Commission, whose duty it is to lift the
blockade from the coast and vessels of the Yugo-Slavs, had not begun
these operations. On the contrary, a Commission of Four Admirals
authorised Italy to requisition all the fleet formerly belonging to
the merchant service of Austria-Hungary, and the blockade is still
rigorously enforced, causing great losses to the Yugo-Slovakian
countries, including Serbia. The latter, in fact, since the
destruction of the Salonika line, can only communicate with the
world by the port of Fiume and the Dalmatian ports.
In this memorandum, our Naval Section called Mr. Robinson’s attention
to the fact that Italy, profiting by the peculiar situation that has
been created by the occupation of Trieste and other Yugo-Slovakian
ports, brought pressure to bear on the owners of the former
Austria-Hungary merchant service to make them sell their boats to
their Italian interests.
[Page 123]
Our Naval Section, under date of the 14th March, communicated to M.
Clémentel, Minister of French Commerce, the contents of a telegram
from Trieste, appearing in the Times of the
13th March, 1919, according to which the “Lloyd Autrichien” would be
transformed into a new company called “Lloyd Triestino.”
Still graver news, confirmed elsewhere by the Neue
Freie Presse of Vienna of the 22nd February, 1919, reached
us from a reliable source. According to this information, a
syndicate of owners from Trieste and Venice, under the auspices of
the Commercial Bank of Milan, would have bought, at 1,000 lire each,
37,000 shares of the 72,000 which compose the capital of the “Lloyd
Autrichien.” Besides that, towards the end of the said month, it
would have bought the greater part of the shares of the
Austrian-American and of the “Navigazione Libera Triestina.” In this
manner, 111 ships, for the most part ocean going, and the rest cargo
vessels representing approximately a total of 465,000 tons, as well
as the twelve large cargo vessels of the “Navigazione Libera
Triestina,” which were under construction, and which form together
more than six-tenths of the merchant service of Austria-Hungary,
have become the property of the Italians, although in the
above-mentioned societies (especially in that of Austria-America and
the “Navigazione Libera Triestina”) there was a great minority of
Yugo-Slovakian shareholders.
These transfers of property took place under the auspices of the
Union Bank of Vienna and the Austrian-German Government.
In fact, the article in the Neue Freie Presse,
before mentioned, expressly states that the said Government has
received formal guarantees on the subject of the safeguarding of the
Austrian-German interests on the part of the new society “Lloyd
Triestino.”
We beg to draw your attention to these circumstances which affect
adversely our rights and our interests, and constitute besides an
obvious violation of the clauses established by the Armistice and
the Naval Inter-Allied Conference held at Paris on the 21st
December, 1919, in which it was decided not to admit, during the
duration of the Inter-Allied control, any change of ownership of the
old Austrian-Hungary tonnage.
N. P.
Pachitch
Chief
Delegate
Appendix 61
Report of Committee on
Organisation
The Committee appointed by the Council, March 21st, desire to call
the attention of the Council to certain intrinsic difficulties which
[Page 124] it is necessary to
overcome in order to produce a satisfactory and efficient
Secretariat.
The Council meets at least once, often thrice, a week, and it is
composed of seven Allied sections, as follows:
- (a)
- Food
- (b)
- Shipping
- (c)
- Finance
- (d)
- Blockade
- (e)
- Raw materials
- (f)
- Communications
- (g)
- Press
These sections meet once, often twice a week, and develop questions
requiring a circulation [of] papers to, and decisions by the
Council.
The personnels of the sections are large and often overlapping.
The Minutes of both the Council and the Sections have to be agreed to
by four countries, and the character of the discussions—particularly
at the Council, is often such as to render difficult an indisputable
record.
The Committee regard the following arrangement as essential in order
to secure a full and prompt circulation of papers.
(1) A fixed time-table: not to be varied
except in real emergency. This Time Table approved in principle, is:
-
Monday, 10 a.m. Council notes [meets?]: later minutes written, agreed, and
circulated.
-
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday (and
in case of necessity Friday morning).
Sections meet.
-
Friday. All papers for next Council
meeting to be sent to Agenda Officer.
-
Saturday. Preparations and
agreement of Agenda and circulation of all papers for
Monday’s meeting.
-
Council Meeting. It is of great
importance that the Council should meet, except in real
emergencies on Monday mornings only; that wherever possible
all business on the Agenda should be concluded at that
meeting; that if adjournment is inevitable it should be to
the earliest possible hour (preferably the same day), no new
business being admitted.
(2) Resolutions at Council. It would be of
very great assistance if the Chairman at the Council would conclude
the discussion on each subject by summarizing the result by a brief
statement as to the exact stage the discussion has reached.
If there is real identity of view as to the position reached this
will only take a moment; if not, the absence of such an agreed
resolution or statement leaves the officers responsible for drafting
the minutes with an impossible task.
(3) Council Officers: and Organisation.
Council officers should be appointed by the four countries for the
duties of [Page 125]
- (a)
- Preparing and agreeing the Minutes and issuing the
consequent notices.
- (b)
- Preparing the Agenda and circulating the relevant
documents.
Of these Officers one should be made responsible for drafting the
minutes.
The Minutes when drafted should be agreed with the other Council
officers, and when agreed circulated to the Sections (or extracts,
with notices as the case may be) and to other persons requiring
them.
In case of final inability to agree the drafting officer must be
empowered to circulate with a note against the disputed passage that
it is not agreed.
Similarly, another of the Council officers should have a similar
primary responsibility for preparing the Agenda and collecting and
circulating the relevant papers, subject to the same duty of
agreeing with the other Council officers.
It is important that the four countries should give their officers
authority to agree on Minutes and Agenda for circulation without
prior reference to members of the Council (which should only be
necessary in very rare and exceptional cases) before circulation. It
will be remembered that the minutes are circulated as draft minutes.
They can in case of necessity be corrected at the next meeting of
the Council for permanent record.
Any question on which a Section requires decision by the Council must
be sent by the Section Secretary to the Council Agenda Officer not
later than Friday evening.
Items for Agenda not received by 10 a.m. on Saturday morning will be
omitted from the Agenda, and can only then be raised as a matter of
special urgency by arrangement with the Chairman and by consent.
References of the Council to the Supreme War Council or to Sections
shall be remitted by Minute Council officer to the Supreme War
Council or to Allied Section Secretary for the body concerned not
later than Tuesday morning.
(4) Sections, Chairman and Secretary and
Organisation. Each Section should have a permanent Chairman
and a permanent Allied Secretary responsible for both Minutes and
Agenda. The Secretary would be responsible for calling the attention
of the Section to all decisions of the Council requiring action by
the Section.
Each country might appoint its own Section officer if it is desired
to agree Section Minutes with the Allied Secretary, doubtless this
will not be considered necessary in all cases, but it is important;
where the Secretary is English speaking there should also be a
French officer and where he is French speaking there should also be
an American or an English officer in addition.
[Page 126]
The officers would be responsible for translating documents so that
they are available (and sent to the Agenda officer of the Council)
in both French and English.
(5) Miscellaneous recommendations, (a) Each country should appoint one officer in
its own organisation who will be responsible for informing the
Secretaries and Council officers of all the persons in his country’s
organisation (whether members or officials) who require papers, and
which papers, and of their addresses. This officer would be
responsible to his own people for seeing that they did in fact get
their papers and all complaints would be made to him.
(b) It should be an absolute rule that all
minutes shall be prepared copies and circulated as draft minutes
(with extract and explanatory notes where necessary) within 24 hours
of the conclusion of the meeting; and that wherever possible they
should go out the same day.
The Sections which have not yet appointed Chairman and Secretaries
should at once do so.
Appendix 62
Memorandum as to Conference on March
24th on Organisation of Allied Shipping Work Under the Supreme
Economic Council
The Supreme Economic Council had under consideration at its meeting
on March 24th the question of the Allied organisation for dealing
with the shipping problems with which the Council is concerned. They
referred the question to a special conference to be convened by Lord
Robert Cecil. This conference took place on the afternoon of the
same day.
2. There were present:
Lord Robert Cecil. |
|
Chair[man]. |
Mr. H. M. Robinson. |
} |
America. |
Mr. E. E. Palen. |
|
M. Monnet. |
} |
France. |
M. de Lubersac. |
|
Professor Attolico. |
|
Italy. |
Mr. T. Lodge. |
} |
Great Britain. |
Mr. J. A. Salter. |
|
3. The following scheme of organization was after discussion agreed
by the Conference.
- (a)
- The Allied Maritime Transport Council, i. e. the actual
Council of Ministers should terminate its existence, the
Supreme Economic Council itself assuming the responsibility
for such decisions of major policy on shipping matters as
were formerly given by the Allied Maritime Transport
Council.
- (b)
- The Allied Maritime Transport Executive to be
reconstituted and to sit in London.
- (c)
- An Allied Shipping Committee to be formed and to sit in
Paris to advise the Supreme Economic Council on matters of
general policy requiring decision by that Council. This
Committee to have a permanent Chairman and Secretary and to
be the medium of communication for all shipping questions to
the Council. This Committee would not give directions under
its own authority to the Transport Executive in London, such
directions coming only from and with the authority of the
Supreme Economic Council.
- (d)
- The Transport Executive in London would thus be
responsible to the Supreme Economic Council, communications
being made through some person appointed by that
Executive.
4. It was recognised that the duties falling upon the Transport
Executive in London and upon the Allied Shipping Committee in Paris
would be primarily and mainly those of dealing with the
administration of enemy tonnage on the one hand and provision of
tonnage for the relief of liberated countries and the supply of
enemy countries on the other and that the provision of tonnage to
supplement the national tonnage of France and Italy for the
requirements of those countries would become (in view of the two
tonnage agreements concluded between Great Britain and (a) France and (b)
Italy) more and more a matter of direct dealing between the
Governments of the above countries and less a matter for an Allied
organisation. It was recognised however, that particularly during
the next few months occasions would arise on which either France or
Italy might legitimately raise questions of policy with regard to
the tonnage required by them at the Supreme Economic Council.
5. M. Monnet expressed the view that it would be a better arrangement
for the Ministry of Shipping to be asked by the Supreme Economic
Council to undertake the administrative responsibilities of dealing
with enemy tonnage with the assistance of an Allied Committee
working under a superior body, the Allied Maritime Transport
Executive, sitting in Paris, and responsible to the Supreme Economic
Council. He deferred, however, to the general preference of the
representatives and the other members of the Conference the scheme
described above.
6. It was decided to submit the above scheme for approval to the
Supreme Economic Council at its next meeting, subject to prior
communications to the members of the Allied Maritime Transport
Council.
[Page 128]
Appendix 63
Note on Allied Press
Arrangements
The following recommendations are submitted for the formation and
functions of a Press Committee.
- 1.
- It is desirable that the Press Committee already decided upon
in principle by the Council should now be at once appointed, and
that it should consist of one representative of each of the four
countries.
- 2.
- This Committee should meet on Monday after the Meeting of the
Supreme Economic Council and should discuss mainly what part of
the Council’s Work or what facts affecting the Council’s work it
should be desirable to give special prominence to in the ensuing
week. This would be the main work of the Committee. Any matter
for which secrecy was desirable would also be discussed and each
of the representatives would do his best to secure that secrecy
is observed. It is recognized, however, that it will probably
not be practicable to make the members of the Press Committee
the only medium of communication, and secrecy could not be
ensured by this method.
- 3.
- Within any general understanding arrived at by the above
meeting, each representative would at his own discretion and on
his own responsibility provide to the Press of his own
country.
- 4.
- It is desirable that an official communique in the name of the
Supreme Economic Council should be issued after each meeting of
the Council. For this purpose the Council officer responsible
for drafting the minutes should first draft a short official
communique and agree it with the other Council Officers before
proceeding to the drafting of the minutes. This communique would
at once be given to the meeting of the Press Committee and
subject to their concurrence would be given to the Press the
same evening.
Appendix 6414
Resolutions From the Finance
Section [Regarding] Nitrates for Countries Contiguous to
Germany
It was agreed that there is no objection to the proposals of the
Superior Blockade Council:
Resolved—
“That there is no objection from a blockade point of view to the
rations of the countries contiguous to Germany being raised to at
least 200,000 tons of nitrate, and to authorising the Nitrate
Executive to state that the Associated Governments will place no
difficulties [Page 129] in the way of
nitrate purchased for immediate delivery being re-exported to
Germany:
Provided—
- “(a) the use of the nitrate in
Germany is properly safeguarded and supervised; and
- “(b) there is no objection from the
Financial or Shipping Sections of the Supreme Economic
Council,”
seeing that any nitrates re-exported from contiguous
neutrals to Germany, though financed out of sums which might have
been made available for the payment of food, would in the long run
tend to an economy by reducing the necessity for food imports into
Germany.
The Italian Representative doubted whether the Germans would in fact
be able to raise the necessary credits for the importation of
nitrates from neutrals.
Appendix 65
Note From the Finance Section
Respecting the Collection of Private Remittances to
Germany
Mr. Norman Davis said that if the Supreme Economic Council would
suggest to the American Relief Association that they solicit
remittances in the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy to
parties in Germany, it was believed that a large sum of money could
in this way be accumulated in the currencies of the respective
countries and made available for the purchase of food in these
countries.
It would be necessary to secure in each country an enemy trade
licence in order [for?] such remittances to be made, and in
advertising that such remittances may be made, the American Relief
Administration would have to make it perfectly clear that the step
is taken at the request of the Supreme Economic Council.
It was agreed that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to
approve the suggestion made by Mr. Davis, on the understanding that
it would be referred to each individual Government for
consideration.
Appendix 66
Report on the Work of the
Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council
Object.
The work of the Communications Section consists in—
- (a)
- The organisation and co-ordination of the necessary urgent
assistance for the maintenance and improvement of the
existing port, railway, inland waterway and telegraphic
facilities in Eastern Europe, with a view to the earliest
possible return to normal conditions.
- (b)
- The apportioning of the necessary action between the
Allies, with a view to the most effective solution of the
above problem.
- (c)
- The organisation of the immediate despatch of the
necessary technical missions.
- (d)
- The expediting of supply of essential materials.
- (e)
- Arranging through the naval and military authorities for
the organisation of additional lines of communication
required for economic purposes.
- (f)
- Reporting on any technical communications question
referred to the Communications Section by the Supreme
Economic Council.
Note.—The Communications Section is not
responsible for the forwarding, custody or handling of any
consignments.
The Communications Section was formed as a result of the report,
dated the 22nd February, 1919, of a special Sub-Committee appointed
by the Supreme Economic Council,15 and which
met on the 20th and 22nd February.
In this report, which outlines the proposed functions of the
Communications Section, a credit of 20,000,000l. was recommended to enable the minimum assistance
necessary to be rendered until essential requirements could be met
through the ordinary trade channels, which it would be the object of
the Communications Section to encourage.
Although the functions of the Communications Section are economic
rather than military, it was agreed that the existing military
organisation alone possess the facilities for prompt and effective
action.
The Communications Section has since held ten meetings, making twelve
in all.
The Supreme Economic Council adopted the report of the Special
Sub-Committee on the 25th February, 1919, and authorised the
Communications Section to proceed as far as possible prior to the
allotment of funds. In this connection the British Treasury
representatives on the Supreme Economic Council arranged that the
Treasury should favourably consider proposals for British missions
submitted by the War Office.
The relations between any separate mission sent out by the Supreme
Economic Council and an existing Military Mission under the High
Command have been defined as follows:—
“When a Military Mission exists under the High Command its
relations with the Technical Mission of the Supreme Economic
Council will be the same as its relations with the civil
organisation concerned, to assist, which is the duty of the
proposed Mission.”
The Technical Mission will report to and receive instructions from
the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council through
the channel laid down by the Power responsible for executive
action.
[Page 131]
The Communications Section propose that Allied Missions should be
sent to every country assisted, but that in each case one Ally
should be charged with the necessary local action. The only
Inter-Allied Mission hitherto authorised is a Mission to control the
through railway service from the South for the relief of the States
of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. The responsibility for executive
action on this question has been allotted to the Americans, and the
head of the Mission is Colonel Causey, United States of America, the
instructions to whom were adopted on the 11th March. The powers of
the Mission were defined by a special decision of the Supreme War
Council.
Between the 7th and 20th March inclusive, 9,848 tons, or an average
of 703 tons per day, were evacuated from Trieste.
From the 21st to the 31st inclusive, there were evacuated 16,745
tons, or an average of 1,522 tons per day. During this latter period
occurred the strike of railroad operatives in Austria, which very
materially reduced the output for two days. The rate of evacuation
has practically doubled in the last ten days over that of the two
weeks preceding.
It will be noticed that the improvement in the situation, which began
before the arrival of the above Mission, is marked and
continuous.
Besides the Mission working with the Relief Mission at Trieste, there
are also:—
- 1.
- An Italian Railway Commission at Vienna, which forms part
of the Italian Armistice Mission situated in the same
place.
- 2.
- An Italian Directorate of Railway Movements at Trieste,
and one at Vienna for operating the lines in the new
territories included within the Armistice line.
- 3.
- A Technical Mission (now being formed) for Studies and
Works on the Reconstruction of Railways in
Austria-Hungary.
Pending decision as to the allocation of executive local action
between the Powers represented on the Supreme Economic Council, the
Council on the 17th March, 1919, authorised Technical Missions to be
sent by the following Powers to investigate and report on immediate
requirements:—
United States |
Tchecho-Slovakia, |
|
Jugo-Slavia, |
Great Britain |
Poland, |
|
Don and Caucasus, |
|
Baltic Provinces. |
France |
Greece, |
|
Turkey in Europe, |
|
Ukraine and Donetz. |
Italy |
Austria, |
|
Hungary. |
[Page 132]
The present situation is as follows:—
Roumania.
The British Railway Mission under Lieut.-Colonel Billinton left
England on the 26th November, 1918. On the 22nd March, 1919,
Treasury sanction was obtained for the allocation of 500,000l. for the purchase of urgent railway
material for Roumania, and a Roumanian representative was at once
sent to London with authority to submit indents on behalf of his
Government, and the first consignments should leave very shortly.
Owing to delay in sanctioning the necessary credits the railway
situation has now gone from bad to worse, and it has now become
necessary to dispatch at least 100 locomotives and 1,000 waggons in
good running order to tide over the time till materials for
repairing existing stock become available. The French Government are
sending 35 “Armistice” locomotives to meet the military requirements
of the High Command, and 15 American locomotives towards
reconstruction.
It is recommended that the special sanction of the Supreme War
Council should be obtained for the despatch of 50 additional
locomotives and 1,000 waggons to meet the above immediate economic
needs of Roumania out of the 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 waggons
surrendered under the conditions of the Armistice. It is submitted
that this demand is a legitimate one, as the likelihood of military
operations having to be undertaken to restore order will be reduced
by this supply to Roumania.
Poland.
Colonel Hammond, British Expert Adviser to the Peace Conference
Polish Mission, was instructed to report on the Polish situation
with the assistance of a Railway Officer attached to a temporary
British Economic Mission. A full report has been received with lists
of material of primary urgency, consisting chiefly of material and
tools for repairs to locomotives, of which about 50 per cent, are
under or awaiting repair. In spite of great difficulties the Poles
are showing a disposition to organise their railways, and Colonel
Hammond is of opinion that timely assistance in material would lead
to a substantial improvement in the situation. The list is now being
valued, but there is no doubt that it is very moderate and will have
to be supplemented later. This material should be despatched at
once. A British allotment of 500,000l. out of
the funds available for relief has been asked for. Arrangements are
being made to send out a Technical Mission as soon as the above
funds have been made available, to ensure the effective utilisation
of our assistance and to act as advisers as far as necessary to the
Polish and Baltic Provinces railways while encouraging them to stand
on their own legs. Meanwhile the despatch of 250 locomotives and
3,000 waggons is reported to be an urgent necessity, of which 100
loco [Page 133] motives and 2,000
waggons should be sent at once. These locomotives and waggons should
preferably be of German types as handed over at the Armistice, to
facilitate upkeep, as a first measure. Marshal Foch has been asked
to despatch sufficient locomotives and waggons to provide for
prospective military requirements and to prevent any further drain
on the existing civil resources, and a reply is awaited as to the
numbers he is willing to send. The arrangements for the despatch of
these locomotives and waggons will require carefully working
out.
Don and Caucasus.
A British Railway Expert has for some weeks been attached to the
British Military Mission with General Denikin and has telegraphed
recommendations with reference to a detailed list in the possession
of General Durnovo, who is now in London drawing up a revised list
of requirements based on the British report. The situation in the
Don and Caucasus needs immediate action. The railways have only 20
per cent, of their pre-war capacity; they have only stores for
another four months. The lines now under General Denikin’s control
serve areas which are rich in products. In addition to materials and
tools for locomotive repair, there are certain more general
requirements including clothing and boots for railway employees.
Enquiries are being made as to whether these latter requirements can
be met by an issue of part-worn uniforms from British military
stocks. The cost of the railway materials of immediate urgency is
roughly estimated at 500,000l., and the
equipment, clothing and medical stores for the railway staff, and
certain mechanical transport for railway deliveries are estimated to
cost a further 800,000l., the bulk of which
is for boots, clothing, &c. No further action can be taken
without credits, and an immediate grant of 1,000,000l. from British relief funds has been asked
for.
Major-General Cowie, Railway Adviser to the British Commander
in-chief at Constantinople, has been ordered to proceed to the Don
area to make a personal report on the situation.
Trans-Caucasus.
Railways are being controlled by a British Technical Mission under
General Brough. He is endeavouring to organise an efficient service
between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, in spite of the
difference between the various local Governments concerned, and the
corruption and inefficiency of the local managements. No specific
demand for stores has yet been received.
Tchecho-Slovakia and
Serbia.
Certain reports have been received from previous American Missions.
These are being examined, and the necessary American personnel for
[Page 134] special railway
missions is being collected. A British railway officer now attached
to an Economic Mission in Serbia will ultimately be attached to the
American Mission.
There is at present a special French Mission at Semlin under
Lieut.-Colonel Gérard.
The Mission have arranged for the utilisation of the Elbe as a means
of communication for the supply of relief to Tchecho-Slovakia. It is
hoped that the service will commence in the course of a few days,
and that it will be developed to a considerable capacity.
The possibility of utilising a line of communication via the Rhine to
Mannheim and thence by rail to Prague is also under consideration,
both from the point of view of a postal service and for the running
of relief trains. The principal difficulty is the provision of the
necessary locomotives and rolling stock and the reported difficulty
of securing an unimpeded passage of supplies.
Arrangements are in hand for the re-establishment of postal
communication with Tchecho-Slovakia and Poland by the existing train
services through Switzerland.
Special Clause.
The Communications Section has further arranged for the insertion in
the Railways and Waterways Clauses of the Preliminary Peace Terms of
an article securing the powers requisite for the functions of the
Supreme Economic Council after the signature of peace:—
“The enemy States will carry out the instructions which may
be given them as regards transportation by an authority
designated by the Allied and Associated Powers.
- “1. … (concerns military movements.)
- “2. As a transitory measure for the transport of the
relief traffic to various localities, and as regards the
re-establishment as quickly as possible of the normal
conditions of traffic and the organisation of the postal
and telegraphic services.”
April 5, 1919.
Appendix 67
Draft Reply to German Note of April
2, With Reference to the Prohibited List of Exports
- 1.
- The Allied and Associated Governments have noted the note
presented by the members of the German Financial Delegation at
the Chateau de la Villette, on 2nd April, 1919.
- 2.
- They point out that the arguments set forth therein may have
reference to peace conditions, but not to the execution of the
stipulations of the Armistice.
- 3.
- The conditions which were set out in the Agreement of
Brussels, and which were notified to the German Government in
supplementary notes, have for their aim the revictualling of
Germany with foodstuffs. The Allied and Associated Governments
give the following answer to the verbal questions put by Dr.
Melchior on the 2nd April:—
- (a)
- As regards the permission given to Germany “to export
to neutrals without restriction a third of her available
exportable surplus” (telegram of the 24th March, Clause
4 (c)), the word “exportable”
should be understood to refer to total German export,
that is to say, the export of Germany by land frontiers
as well as export by sea.
- (b)
- Clause 4 (a) of the telegram of
the 24th March, according to which “each of the Allied
and Associated Governments will have the right during
the Armistice to buy at fair and equitable prices
quantities of all the articles on the prohibited list
which Germany may have available for export,” should be
understood as follows: “Fair and equitable prices will
be fixed by the Allies ‘unilaterally,’ and not
‘established by a mutual agreement’ as the note of the
delegates demands.”
Appendix 68
Negotiations Between Inter-Allied
and German Delegates at Cologne With Regard to the Export of
Coal From Germany in Payment for Food
Summary of Proceedings
1. The German Delegates announced at the outset that the German
Government reserved its agreement with the principles laid down in
the telegram drawn up by the Sub-Committee of the Raw Materials
Committee on the 23rd March with regard to the prohibited list.16
2. They next referred to the note from the German Government dated
the 24th March, in which are set out certain requirements in the way
of supply of raw materials and the granting of transport facilities
necessary for the purpose of increasing German coal output and
exportable surplus. The full list of materials required for the next
two months is:—
- 1,500 tons cylinder oil.
- 2,000 tons tin.
- 30,000 tons petroleum.
- 500 tons cotton.
- 250 tons wool.
- 2 tons fish glue.
- 2 tons gelatine for industrial purposes.
[Page 136]
The cotton, wool, and fish glue are for the purpose of making
belting, and the German Delegates desire the materials rather than
the supply of manufactured belting, but there seems no reason why,
if her requirement is to be satisfied, the manufactured article
rather than the materials should not be furnished.
It will be seen below that Germany has been unable to offer any
additional coal for export, but the British Delegates desire to
recommend for the consideration of the Supreme Economic Council that
the materials should be furnished with a view to increasing German
output so that a substantial quantity of coal may be available for
export in the near future. The Germans stated that these quantities
would only suffice for two months’ consumption. It is difficult to
check this, but it is suggested that the Germans might be warned
that no undertaking can be given to renew the supplies at the end of
two months.
The facilities for which the German Delegates asked in the note of
the 24th March with regard to freedom of transport across the Rhine,
and transport by sea from North Sea harbours to German harbours in
the Baltic for consumption in Germany, might also be granted so far
as possible.
As Germany is unable to provide additional coal for export the
question of permission for export by sea to Sweden, Norway, and
Denmark does not arise.
3. The German Delegates stated explicitly that if they were required
to carry out in full the obligations imposed on them in the matter
of the supply of coal and coke to France under the Luxemburg
Protocol of the 25th December,16a it would be impossible for them to
provide further coal for export from the right bank of the
Rhine.
4. The German Delegates handed in a note on the Luxemburg Protocol,
in which complaint is made—
(a) That their economic position is
being seriously prejudiced by the fact that France is
demanding the full quantities of coal and coke specified in
the agreement, although she is not carrying out a promise
alleged to have been made by her in an annex to the Protocol
that she would do her best in the way of supplying certain
coal from the left to the right bank of the Rhine, and also
of supplying minette (iron ore) against the coke which the
Germans undertook to forward from the Ruhr to
Lorraine.
It is understood that the Germans have been forwarding about 7,000
tons of coke daily (against the quantity of 13,700 tons daily
mentioned in the Protocol), whereas the French have not sent a ton
of minette. It may be added that their failure to supply minette is
causing a serious danger of unemployment at certain steelworks in
British occupied [Page 137]
territory, which are dependent on their supplies of raw steel from
works in unoccupied territory.
It should be added that there is a difference of opinion between the
French and Germans as to the precise nature of the promise made by
the French in consideration of the signature of the Protocol by the
Germans.
(b) That the French are bound by
provisions affecting the prohibited list in the matter of
payment for supplies under the Luxemburg Protocol.
5. The German Delegates made a general claim that all exports of coal
from Germany included within the 1914 frontier should be paid for in
a form which would enable them to procure food. They made strong
complaint to the effect that coal was being exported by the French
from mines in the Saar valley to France, Italy, and Switzerland, and
that the French had fixed a price of 40 M. per ton for payment to
the mines, but were receiving a price as high as 120 fr. a ton from
the Swiss and, taking into account the exchange of the mark, were
thus making a profit of 100 fr. per ton. In the case of exports to
France the sale price was stated to be 60 fr. per ton. It was added
that no payment had actually been made to the Saar mines, and that
the French Government at present owed them 36 million M.
Appendix 69
[Report of the Blockade Section
Regarding] Application for Authorization
To Convey Coals Over the Sea Route From the Ruhr to Eastern
Prussia
The Blockade Section considered a letter from Marshal Foch (annexure
A) and the following resolution was carried:
Resolved. That there is no objection, from
the blockade point of view to the free navigation, from Leer on the
Ems to Elbing and Dantzig, of the colliers Elbing
II and Elbing III, now loaded with
coal for the firm of Schichau, provided these vessels come within
the category of “exempted vessels” mentioned in Minute No. 56 of the
Tenth Meeting of the Supreme Economic Council, held March 24th
and
Further resolved, That it is the opinion of
this Council that this question had been covered by the resolution
contained in Minute No. 56 of the Tenth Meeting of the Supreme
Economic Council held March 24th, respecting German coastal trade on
German coasts, and
Further resolved, That the Supreme Economic
Council be notified of this Resolution.
[Page 138]
[Annexure A]
Marshal Foch,
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (D. G. C. R. A.), to Minister of Commerce, Supreme Economic
Council
G. Q. G. A.,
March 18, 1919.
I beg to enclose herewith copy of correspondence relative to the
request made by the German Commission for coal repartition in view
of authorizing the transport by colliers of coal necessary for
Eastern Prussia, and coming from the Ruhr Mines.
This request raises two questions:
- The first, concerning maintaining at the disposal of
German authorities of certain colliers. This question seems
to be one of those taken under consideration at the Brussels
Conference of March 14th, and does not seem to raise any
particular difficulties.
- The second necessitates certain relaxations to the
blockade policy as concern the coast navigation of the
colliers.
I am of the opinion that, owing to the reasons stated by the General
Controller Gaillard, Allied Commissioner at Berlin, and particularly
in the interest of good and quick delivery of coal necessary for the
Left Bank of the Rhine, the above mentioned request of the German
Commission shall be taken in due consideration and I beg you to
submit it with favorable mention of [to?] the
Supreme Economic Council (Blockade Section).
P. O.
Major-General
Illegible
[Enclosure to Annexure
A]
Army Controller Gaillard, Allied Commissioner at Berlin, to
Marshal Foch,
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, Economic Section,
Luxemburg
I have the honor to send you herewith translation of a letter of
February 13th, and a note of February 15th, which have been handed
to me by the German National Commissioner of Coal.
In these documents, the German Government insists that certain
relaxation of the blockade be made concerning the coastwise
navigation of the colliers.
It seems evident:
- 1.
- —that the exploitation of the Silesian Mines produces
small quantity of coal.
- 2.
- —that the Ruhr Mines must furnish coal to Eastern
Prussia.
- 3.
- —that the transport by railway of this coal will
necessitate an important rolling stock.
- 4.
- —that, at least for the present, the deliveries of coal to
the Right and Left Banks of the Rhine are limited on account
of the shortage of transport material.
- 5.
- —that, consequently, the transport by colliers of the
necessary coal to Eastern Prussia would facilitate and
increase the delivery 01 coal, especially on the Left Bank
of the Rhine.
This last consideration is of real interest for us.
[Subenclosure 1]
[Letter From the German
National Commissioner of Coal
] to the Controller Gaillard
Berlin
, February 13,
1919.
A request addressed to Admiral Browning, in view of obtaining
authorization for German colliers to sail to Dantzig and Konigsberg
has not been granted.
As I have already explained in Note II of this month, the direct
railway traffic from Upper-Silesia to North-Eastern Germany are
hindered by Polish attacks.
On account of this, quantities of coal have to pass across the whole
of Germany towards Eastern and Western Prussia, and the consequence
of that is a very considerable increase in the want of means of
transport.
I again request that the question of raising of blockade be presented
and backed by the Allied High-Command. This will also eliminate one
of the impediments we encounter in increasing shipments of coal from
the Ruhr to Lorraine, the Sarre and Luxemburg.
[Subenclosure 2]
[Note From the German
National Commissioner for Coal Containing] Proposition for the Free Navigation of Colliers
“Elbing II” and “Elbing III” From Leer on the Ems to Elbing and Dantzig
Berlin
, February 15,
1919.
The firm of F. Schichau at Elbing and Dantzig, can no longer receive
sufficient coal, on account of the difficulties of transport and
troubles in Upper-Silesia. There is danger that its factories be
stopped in a very short time. The particular interest of the Allies
is to avoid this, as the firm of Schichau especially deals with the
manufacture and repairs of locomotives.
In consequence thereof, it is requested that the two colliers Elbing II and Elbing
III, which are at Leer on the Ems, loaded with coal for the
firm Schichau, be authorized to sail for Elbing and Dantzig.
On February 4th, 1919, a similar request was presented under No. VI
3037/17 by the Demobilmachungsamt to the Armistice Commission at
Spa, to be handed to the Allies and no decision has yet reached us
on this point as far as we know.
[Page 140]
Appendix 70
[Report of the Blockade Section
Regarding the Raising of the Blockade on the Adriatic]
At their meeting on the 26th March, the Blockade Section had before
them a letter from Prof. Attolico regarding the raising of the
blockade in the Adriatic:
[“]Delegazione Italiana al Congresso della
Pace,
Hôtel Edouard VII. Parigi, 24 March, 1919.
Dear Mr. McCormick,
I am directed to answer your letter to Signor Crespi
regarding the blockade in the Adriatic.
The slight misunderstanding to which you refer originates
from the ambiguous form in which the decision of the Supreme
War Council was framed.
In the circumstances, the Royal Decree of which you have
copy, and which was duly communicated to the Italian Naval
Authorities, instructing them to allow free passage to all
goods except those included in the prohibited list, was
sufficient to ensure the execution of the War Council’s
resolution while at the same time fully securing what was
really aimed at: that is to say liberty of trade in the
Adriatic.
Since receiving your letter, however, and in view of the
‘technical’ concern expressed as to the sufficiency of the
measures adopted, I have spoken to my Prime Minister, who
authorizes me to state that the naval blockade of the
Adriatic will forthwith be raised, without prejudice,
however, to the right of search, and to the exigencies of
the policing of the seas consequent on the state of war
which still exists.
I am, Sir,
Yours very truly
(Signed) B. Attolico.”
In connection with the foregoing the following resolution was
adopted:
“Resolved.—That acknowledgment
should be made of this letter and that its contents should
be transmitted to the Supreme Economic Council for its
information, and
“Further resolved.—That it should
be pointed out to the Supreme. Economic Council that the
essential step to be taken by the Italian Authorities was
the rescission of the two Italian Decrees by virtue of which
the blockade was first imposed.”
[Page 141]
Appendix 7117
[Report From the Blockade Section
Regarding] Suspension of Restrictions on
the Import Into Germany of Fish Caught in European
Waters
At the twelfth meeting of the Superior Blockade Council held at the
Ministry of Commerce on the 26th March, 1919, the following
resolution was adopted:—
Resolved—
“That, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Economic
Council, the A. B. C. be instructed to inform the I. A. T. C. in
Christiania, Stockholm, and Copenhagen that all quantitative
restrictions imposed by existing agreements upon the export of fish
from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark to Germany are temporarily
suspended, and that the respective Governments of Norway, Sweden,
and Denmark be so informed forthwith”; and
Further resolved—
“That it was not necessary for this Council to pass a special
resolution authorising the removal of all restrictions of the
import, into the liberated territories, of fish caught in European
waters, as requested in Minute 244 of the fifth meeting of the Food
Section of the Supreme Economic Council held on the 18th March,
1919, for the reason that all blockade and trade restrictions with
the liberated territories, with exception of Lithuania and Latvia,
had been recommended for removal by this Council, and that trade in
consequence with said regions would be free.”
Appendix 72
Report of Special Sub-Committee
[Regarding Correspondence With Germany in
Connection With the Brussels Agreement]
The Special Sub-Committee in charge of detail arrangements in
connection with the Council’s instructions regarding the
administration of the Brussels Agreement report that in accordance
with said instructions:
- (1)
- a telegram (annexure I) has been despatched whereby the
German Government has been made aware of the new regulations
regarding black list (with reference to minute 57).
- (2)
- a further telegram (annexure II) has been sent whereby
Germany has been informed that Allied experts are being sent
to Cologne to arrange for purchase of principal raw
materials.
- (3)
- instructions (annexure III) have been laid out to the said
delegates.
The above documents are hereto annexed.
Annex I
Telegram Despatched on March 26th
to Germans Through the International Armistice Commission, Spa,
From the Supreme Economic Council
With reference to communications already addressed to the German
Government regarding the import of foodstuffs and the export of
commodities in pursuance of the Brussels Agreement, the following
supplementary announcement is made:
That with a view to assisting Germany to obtain credits in
Neutral Countries for the purchase of food supplies in
accordance with the promise of consideration given by the
Delegates at Brussels, the Associated Governments state that
no firm in any Neutral Country will in the future incur the
penalty of blacklisting because it has:
- (a)
- exported foodstuffs to Germany within the limits
approved by and in accordance with the regulations
of the Associated Governments;
- (b)
- afforded credits to Germany for the purchase of
such foodstuffs;
- (c)
- imported goods permitted by the Associated
Governments to be exported from Germany.
Negotiations and trading by Germany with firms in Neutral Countries,
even though on the Black Lists, will be permitted, subject to the
approval of the Superior Blockade Council.
Annex II
Paris
, 26th March,
1919.
Telegram From the Supreme Economic
Council to General Nudant at Spa, for the German Government,
Berlin
Arising out of Clause 4 b. of the telegram of
24th March, 1919,17a the Associated
Governments inform the German Government that the technical
delegates for coal, for wood, for paper and for sugar are leaving
to-day for Cologne where they will be on Friday morning, March 28th.
The German Government is requested to nominate urgently with all
necessary powers its technical delegates who will come [Page 143] into contact with the Allied
delegates at the Economic Section of the British Military Governor
at Cologne.
Annex III
Paris
, 26th March,
1919.
Instructions for the Heads of the
Technical Delegations at Cologne
- 1.
- The Brussels Agreement.
- 2.
- Copy of a telegram addressed by the Supreme Economic Council
to the German Government on 24th March.
- 3.
- Copy of the telegram addressed by the Supreme Economic Council
to the German Government on 26th March.
- 4.
- Copy of the telegram addressed on the 26th March to the German
Government for the appointment of its technical delegate.
Instructions—
By application of Clause 4 b. of the telegram
addressed on the 24th March, 1919, by the Supreme Economic Council
to the German Government, the Supreme Economic Council has decided
that each country should send to Cologne technical delegates and
should nominate a head of the Delegation. The four heads of
Delegations shall have full powers to give their particular
instructions to their own delegates. The four heads of Delegations
will conduct negotiations by common agreement. In case a
disagreement should arise between the various Allied Missions, the
four Heads of Delegations shall have full powers to adjust it
without having to refer it back to the Supreme Economic Council at
Paris. They should keep strictly within the limits laid down by the
above telegrams and by the Brussels agreement of the 14th March,
1919, particularly in so far as concerns the financial
arrangements.
The heads of the Delegations will be:—
America |
Mr. Legge |
England |
Mr. Ronga |
France |
M. Gaillard |
Italy |
M. Dante Ferraris |
The meeting with the German Delegates is appointed at the Economic
Section of the British Military Governor at Cologne on Friday, March
28th. The technical Delegations who are already at Mayence or other
German towns engaged in negotiations for purchases of German
products in accordance with the Brussels agreement and the telegram
of the 24th March should put themselves in communication with the
head of their respective delegation at Cologne and receive from him
the necessary general instructions.
[Page 144]
Appendix 73
[Report From the Blockade Section
Regarding Regulations for Correspondence Between Germany and
Firms in Neutral Countries]
The following report of the Sub Committee to consider Rules for
Correspondence between Germany and firms in neutral countries, was
considered and approved by the superior blockade council at their
meeting of the 25th [29th] March.
The committee considered what rules might be laid down for
correspondence whether on the black list or not. The Committee
assumed that it was only intended to permit communications on the
subject of trade of the character authorised by the Associated
Governments.
The committee recommend unanimously that the Germans be allowed to
communicate by all available routes, subject to the following
rules:—
- 1.
- —Communications regarding German exports must refer only
to commodities other than gold, silver, securities or other
negotiable instruments, and material of war.
- 2.
- —Communications regarding German Imports must for the
present refer only to foodstuffs.
- 3.
- —Speculative transactions will not be permitted.
- 4.
- —Telegrams must be en clair, and
must be readily intelligible and contain no hidden meaning.
They must be in French or English, or in Italian in the case
of messages exchanged via Italy or Italian colonies. They
must be signed with the name of the sender, and addressed in
full, in the case of telegrams sent via Italy or Italian
colonies, Christian names must also be given. Registered
addresses, either in signature or address, will not be
permitted. The word “telegram” is understood to include
wireless messages.
- 5.
- —Postal correspondence will likewise be permitted with
regard to transactions of the character approved by the
Associated Governments. It must be expressed in clear and
unequivocal terms with the name and address of the writer
shown clearly on the envelope.
- 6.
- —Parcel post will not be permitted in either direction but
samples of the permitted commodities may be sent in postal
packets.
- 7.
- —The Associated Governments reserve power to detain any
communication whatever without reason being given. No claim
with regard to such detained correspondence will be
considered.
Until the interested interallied boards shall be established in
Rotterdam the associated consulships shall provide these boards with
copies of, or the substance of, all such relevant communications as
the boards shall require. When the interallied boards are
established at Rotterdam, the question of settling for the routing
of correspondence through Rotterdam will require careful
consideration in view of the practical difficulties.
If it is decided that correspondence shall be allowed to the Germans
not only with neutral countries but also with all foreign countries
the [Page 145] same rules shall
apply, but it should be noted that in this event existing
legislation will have to be modified.
C. Bigham
Lt. Col., General Staff Chairman
Appendix 7418
Note From the British
Delegates [Concerning] Arrangements for Meetings With German Delegates To
Arrange Purchases of German Products
1. In accordance with the terms of the telegram sent to the Germans
on the 24th March by the desire of the Supreme Economic Council,
representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, United States
of America, and Belgium are to meet representatives of the German
Government at Cologne at monthly intervals:—
- (a)
- To receive statements of the German goods of the classes
specified in the telegram which are available for export
during the thirty days next following.
- (b)
- To notify within four days what amounts of the goods thus
declared for export the Allies, or any of them, desire to
purchase, within the limit of two-thirds of the amounts
declared.
- (c)
- To arrange prices and other terms of purchase.
These arrangements having been completed, the Germans will be free to
export, of the goods declared, the balance which the Allies have not
selected for purchase.
2. The place fixed for these discussions, namely Cologne, is much
more conveniently situated for the German sellers than for the
Allied purchasers. For the latter, a journey of some length,
involving a certain degree of discomfort and a considerable
expenditure of time is required. Communication with headquarters,
whether in Paris or in other Allied capitals, though quite good,
cannot be effected without delays which may be of vital importance.
If any of the Allies find on meeting the Germans that, through
failure to anticipate correctly the nature of all the matters to be
discussed, the Delegates need to be reinforced by adding someone
having special knowledge on some point under consideration, the
short time available renders such reinforcement impossible in
practice while the meetings are held at a place so distant as
Cologne is from Paris and London.
3. A place of meeting which could be reached from Paris within an
hour or two would present great advantages over Cologne for the
conduct of those purchasing negotiations. Instead of the Germans [Page 146] being among their own
friends and having the readier means of communication with those on
whose behalf they act, while the Allies are among an alien
population and cut off effectively from communication with their
principals, the situation would be reversed.
4. The plan of appointing a representative for each of the Allies,
who should superintend all the purchase negotiations, presents the
difficulty that such a person could not be expert in all the matters
under negotiation, and would nevertheless have to decide matters of
difficulty without the opportunity of consulting anyone not actually
present if the meetings take place at Cologne. The resolution of
difficulties by conference between the four heads of Delegations
does not provide a solution for all cases, as has been already
illustrated by one misunderstanding referred from Cologne to
Paris.
5. The application of the same arrangement for Delegates dealing with
German exports as has been applied to the financial negotiations,
namely, to make Compiègne the place of meeting, if that were
possible, would solve most of the difficulties arising out of the
meetings. The representatives who dealt with different commodities
need not, if that course were more convenient, all meet at the same
time. A series of meetings spread conveniently over thirty days
would furnish a continuous occupation for the officials in whose
charge the general arrangements were placed, and would reduce to a
minimum the difficulties of housing the expert negotiators.
Appendix 75
[Resolution Dated March 31, 1919,
Submitted by the American Delegation on the Blockade Section
Regarding] Suspension of Enemy Trade and
Black Lists
The question raised by the following resolution is submitted by the
American Delegation on the Blockade Section to the Supreme Economic
Council for determination:—
“Whereas, the Supreme Economic
Council at its Tenth Meeting held March 24th, in Minute 57,
in accordance with the Brussels agreement of March 13/14th,
1919, passed the resolution that:
- (a)
- Immediate announcement should be made to the
German Government that no firm in any neutral
country would, in the future, incur the penalty of
blacklisting because it had dealings with Germany in
relief or permitted transactions and
- (b)
- Negotiations and trading with firms in neutral
countries even though upon the Black Lists will be
permitted subject to the approval of the Blockade
Section of the Supreme Economic Council
“Resolved That on and after April
9th, on which date publication shall be made to this effect,
all Enemy Trade and Black Lists of the [Page 147] Associated Governments,
whether Official, Confidential or Cloak, shall be suspended
until further notice.”
Appendix 7619
Resolutions Regarding the Abolition
of Telegraphic Censorship Submitted by the American Delegation
of the Blockade Section
- 1.
- All telegraphic and cable censorship of messages passing
between the four Associated countries: United States, Great
Britain, France, and Italy, be abolished as from the 15th
April.
- 2.
- All telegraphic and cable censorship of messages passing
between any of the above-mentioned Associated countries and
Central and South America and Cuba be abolished as from the 15th
April.
- 3.
- All telegraphic and cable censorship of messages passing
between any of the above-mentioned Associated countries and the
Orient via the Pacific, except messages to and from
Vladivostock, shall cease as from the 15th April.
- 4.
- All cables to or from Greece, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium shall be censored by
the Associated Governments in whose jurisdiction the message
shall originate or terminate. These messages shall be free of
any other censorship; that is to say, they shall be permitted to
pass without diversion to censorship except only by the
Government under whose jurisdiction the message originates or
terminates.
- 5.
- All cables to or from Tchecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Finland, Esthonia, and Poland shall be
censored by the Associated Governments in whose jurisdiction the
message shall originate or terminate. These messages shall be
free of any other censorship; that is to say, they shall be
permitted to pass without diversion to censorship except only by
the Government under whose jurisdiction the message originates
or terminates.
Appendix 7720
Memorandum on the Commissions Set Up
Under the Armistice With Germany and Their Relations to the
Supreme Economic Council
1. There exist various commissions and bodies set up directly or
indirectly under the armistice to handle relations with the Germans.
Clearly, so long as the state of war continues, and perhaps for some
time afterwards, these bodies must operate through and under the [Page 148] authority of the High
Command and they must look to the High Command for instructions and
policy on all matters of a military nature or concerned with the
maintenance of public order.
2. But many of the affairs with which they deal affect directly the
industrial and economic situation or are merely questions of civil
administration. It is clearly desirable that the policy followed by
them should be closely co-related with the general policy which the
Allies are pursuing with regard to Germany generally. For example,
the policy adopted in carrying out the armistice conditions, as to
the withdrawal of machinery stolen by the enemy from Northern
France, should be considered in its bearing on the problem of making
Germany work for her living, which is one of the most serious which
the Economic Council has now to face. It is similarly desirable that
the provision of food and the control of food distribution in the
occupied territories should be considered in its relation to the
problem of food supplies and administration in the rest of
Germany.
3. A list of the more important bodies and Commissions now in
existence is attached (see Appendix 1). Considerable difficulty has
been experiencd in ascertaining the functions of some of them and it
is possible that the list is not complete.
4. The Supreme Economic Council is not specially concerned with the
Commissions supervising road, rail, and water transport, save for
special problems, e. g. transport of supplies across Germany, Poland
and Austria. But the Communications Section should be furnished with
periodical reports by all such Commissions.
5. The other bodies fall into three groups:—
- (a)
- Those dealing with the actual execution of the Armistice
and with communications concerning the Armistice.
- (b)
- Those concerned with the administration of the occupied
territories.
- (c)
- Those set up directly under the responsibility of the
Supreme Economic Council and concerned with the whole of
Germany.
The International Armistice
Commission
6. The International Armistice Commission at Spa fulfils a double
function. It is a channel of communication with the Germans
performing in this respect the sort of duties which would in peace
be performed by the Embassies at Berlin, and it also supervises the
actual execution of provisions as to the return of machinery,
securities, etc.
7. The Armistice Commission is responsible to Marshal Foch, who is
charged with the execution of the Armistice. So far as economic
questions arise in respect of the Armistice they should be referred
by the Armistice Commission to the Supreme Economic Council. The
Council of Ten decided some time ago that economic delegates should
be attached to the staff of the Armistice Commission to deal with
such [Page 149] questions. The
arrival of German delegates at Port Saint Maxenceaura will probably
result in this being now unnecessary.
The Supreme Economic Council and
the Administration of the Occupied Areas
8. The administration of the occupied territories inevitably presents
difficulties on account of the mingling of military and civil
responsibilities. There can be no question that in matters of
military importance the authority of the Army Commander acting under
directions of the High Command must be supreme. But many of the
problems to be dealt with are of a civil, economic or industrial
rather than of a military nature and they must be considered in
their bearing on the general problem of economic relations with
Germany as a whole. The political, civil and economic questions
should be treated by an Inter-Allied Civil High Commission, whose
powers should, so far as necessary, be authorised by the Council of
Ten.
9. The importance of the occupied territories in restarting trade
with Germany must not be overlooked. The sooner the practical
difficulties and the inevitable prejudice which have blocked the
resumption of ordinary trade relations with Germany, are removed,
the better it will be not only for Germany, but for the whole world,
and especially for the United Kingdom. Four months have elapsed and
trade even with the occupied territories has not yet restarted. In
the meantime the paralysis of the whole commerce of the world—a by
no means unimportant cause of the prevailing industrial unrest—gets
more serious. The financial difficulties of trade with the occupied
territories are less and the prejudices against the trading with
them are less than with the rest of Germany. It is clearly then of
great importance that every effort should be made to re-open trade
with the occupied territories.
10. Whatever may be the decisions ultimately taken on the delicate
political issues involved, it is not possible to deal with the
administrative and the economic problems of the occupied territories
as other than part of the whole German problem. Under the terms of
the Armistice, the Germans claim in any case that the local
administration should continue. It would indeed be impossible at
present to administer the country through any other means. But of
course, the local civil administration is connected by many ties,
formal and otherwise, with the Government at Berlin and with the
administration of the rest of Germany.
11. It may be possible to break many of the formal relations between
the local administration and the rest of Germany. The fact that the
boundary of the occupied areas is quite arbitrary and corresponds to
no administrative division, renders this in some cases difficult.
The question of the economic relations between the occupied
territories [Page 150] and the rest
of Germany must obviously depend from time to time on decisions
taken with regard to the political status of the Left Bank. It is
clearly necessary, however, that problems of industry in the
occupied area as well as the problems of food control should be
considered with a close appreciation of their relations to the
general problem of Germany and to the policy to be adopted by the
Allies in respect of them.
12. The functions of the Inter-Allied Economic Committee of
Luxembourg should be more closely defined. At present it does not
concern itself with food questions, but it is mainly occupied with
giving licenses for commercial dealings with the enemy and
regulating the trade in raw materials and manufactured products
between the occupied territories and with the rest of Germany, with
neutrals and the Allies.
13. The Supreme Economic Council has agreed to the formation of an
Inter-Allied Military Committee independent of the Luxembourg
organisation to deal with the food problem in the occupied
territories. So far as the determination of the supplies is
necessary, having regard to the military situation, the transport of
these supplies and the enforcement of regulations and Orders and
policy, this Committee will be able to perform a very valuable
function. It has at present held only a preliminary meeting and save
for asking for information on many points it has not yet commenced
work.
14. But the food problem is so interlocked with the financial, the
administrative and the industrial problems with which the Luxembourg
Committee to a greater or less extent already deals, that the
co-ordination of food policy and administration should clearly be
handled at Luxembourg in close consultation with or by the same
persons as those who are responsible for the other economic
problems.
Further the whole elaborate machinery of maximum prices controlled
distribution through trade channels and centralised buying and
marketing set up during the war requires examination and perhaps
modification by experts familiar with the difficult agricultural and
economic problems involved.
At present the Luxembourg Committee has no direct relations with the
Supreme Economic Council. Monsieur Tirard, who has been appointed
Controller-General by Marshal Foch, is responsible only to the High
Command. The Committee does refer a certain number of questions to a
Paris Committee set up by the Ministers of Blockade, but the
relation of this Paris Committee to the Supreme Economic Council and
the various Sections of it has not been defined. It is clear that
the Luxembourg Committee should, on all matters not of a military
nature affecting the industry or economic life of the occupied
provinces, receive its directions from the Supreme Economic
Council.
[Page 151]
15. Subject, therefore, at all times to military necessity it is
suggested that the following arrangements should be adopted:—
Recommendations
(1) That the full responsibility for taking all necessary executive
action in accordance with any policy decided upon for the occupied
areas should rest on the Army Command in each Area, who will on
civil, political and economic affairs follow the instructions of the
Inter Allied Commissioners referred to below.
(2) That the Army Commands should so far as is considered necessary,
be assisted by the best available expert advisers on the particular
branches of administration or industry with which as the ultimate
executive authority in the occupied areas they have to deal, e. g.
finance, food, industry, fuel, labour, etc. These expert advisers
will receive directions direct from the Inter Allied
Commissioners.
(3) That the Committee Economique at Luxembourg should be formally
constituted under the joint responsibility of the High Command and
of the Supreme Economic Council with full authority as an
Inter-Allied Commission to co-ordinate the administration of the
four Army Commands on all economic, industrial and food questions in
accordance with the policy laid down from time to time by the
Supreme Economic Council. The decisions on Economic matters of the
Inter-Allied Commission of Luxembourg should have executive force
and should be observed by the Armies in the different zones.
(There appears to be no special reason why this Committee should
continue to have its headquarters at Luxembourg. Cologne, which is
the industrial and financial centre of the Rhineland, or Coblenz or
Mayence would appear to be the more accessible and convenient. For
convenience, however, it is referred to in this memorandum as the
Luxembourg Inter Allied Commission)
(4) The Luxembourg Inter Allied Commission should be composed of 4
High Commissioners, one from each Ally, who should be men of wide
administrative and official experience. They will have to be trusted
with wide discretionary powers. Monsieur Tirard, the French
Commissioner, should act as Chairman.
(5) The Luxembourg Inter Allied Commission should constitute expert
Sub-Committees on finance, food, raw materials, import and export
arrangements, labour, coal, etc., of each of which the Commissioners
should be ex-officio members, but which should be attended by the
senior officers actually responsible for each subject in each Army
area. These Committees should sit at frequent intervals.
(6) That any question directly involving military considerations or
affecting the military situation should be referred by the
Luxembourg [Page 152] Commission to
the High Command for directions. The Inter-Allied Military Food
Committee should from time to time consider the military aspect of
the food situation in the occupied territories, should co-ordinate
transport and other arrangements for handling food supplies and
should consider questions of discipline and public order arising
under the food control regulations.
(7) That the administrative policy to be followed by the Luxembourg
Commission in connection with economic industrial or food matters
should be laid down from time to time by the Supreme Economic
Council, and its constituent sections to which also questions of
difficulty as they arise would be referred. The Commissioner[s] will
refer to their Governments on general political questions.
(8) That in framing this policy the Supreme Economic Council whilst
paying proper attention to the special circumstances of the occupied
territories and to any political or other decisions of the Council
of 10, should endeavour to assure the necessary co-ordination in
Inter-Allied policy as regards the occupied and unoccupied
territories. The Supreme Economic Council should ascertain the views
of the Foreign Ministers in respect of any matters involving
political as well as economic considerations.
(9) That with a view to expediting decisions on questions concerning
occupied or unoccupied Germany, involving more than one section of
the Supreme Economic Council, there should be constituted in Paris a
Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council of one Delegate only
of each Ally whose duty it would be to consider current and pending
economic negotiations with Germany as a whole to ascertain the views
of the various Sections and so far as possible to embody proposed
decisions in draft resolutions for the Council. One or more of the
Commissioners or a representative of the Commissioners will attend
all meetings of the Sub-Committee on Germany at which questions
affecting the Left Bank of the Rhine are considered. A Belgian
delegate will also be invited to attend on all matters affecting
Belgium.
(10) The Delegate of each country on this Sub-Committee should be
responsible for securing that any decisions or any action necessary
before a joint policy can be formulated should be taken with the
least delay by the appropriate department and that all necessary
steps are taken to bring into effect the decisions of the
Council.
(11) This Sub-Committee should also be responsible for securing
proper co-ordination and liaison between the various Commissions and
Missions brought into existence by the various Sections of the
Supreme Economic Council and for centralising and rendering
available all reports, statistics, or memoranda bearing on the
economic negotiations with Germany.
(12) All questions submitted by the Luxembourg Commission or by the
International Armistice Commission at Spa should first be [Page 153] considered by this
Sub-Committee and referred by it when necessary to the proper
section or to the Council itself for decision.
The proposals set out above of course only concern the economic
problems of the occupied territories. The scope of the Luxembourg
Commission will include not only matters of economic importance but
also matters purely of civil and political importance. So far as the
civil and political side of the work of the Commission is concerned,
it will clearly be necessary to secure covering approval from the
Council of 10.
E. F. Wise
April 5, 1919.
Appendix I
List of Commissions, etc.
Name |
Functions |
Inter-Allied Permanent Armistice Commission (Spa). |
General supervision of execution of Armistice conditions,
formal communications with German Government. |
Sub-Commission dealing with Clause 9 of Armistice
(Entretien). |
Recovery from Germany of costs of maintaining troops in
occupied areas. |
Sub-Commission dealing with Clauses 2 & 4 of Trèves
Financial Agreement. |
Restitution of stolen and sequestrated securities. |
Sub-Commission dealing with Clause 6 of the January
Armistice renewal (Wiesbaden). |
Restitution of stolen French and Belgian Industrial
Machinery. |
Sub-Commission dealing with the handing over of
agricultural machinery. |
Receiving from Germany Agricultural machinery instead of
rolling stock. |
Commissions de Réception (Brussels and Metz). |
Receiving from Germany rolling stock and raw materials
handed over under the Armistice. |
Calais Railway Commission |
Control of Belgian railway system. |
Field Railway Commission |
Control of Luxembourg and German Rhineland
Railways. |
Calais Navigable Waterways Commission. |
Control of Belgian Navigable waterways. |
Field Navigation Commission |
Control of the Rhine, Moselle, and Sarre
Navigation. |
Commission for postal control (Luxembourg). |
Control of correspondence, telegraphs and telephones in
occupied areas. |
Commission économique (Luxembourg) |
Supervises distribution of raw materials to factories in
the occupied area and output of goods and regulates economic
relations in occupied territories and the rest of
Germany. |
Paris Left Bank Committee |
To deal with blockade trade and other questions referred
to it by the Army Command or by Luxembourg. |
Shipping Commission (Rotterdam?) not yet appointed. |
To provide channel of communication for settling practical
details in handing over German ships. |
Rotterdam Food Commission |
To settle the commercial and other details arising out of
the sale of foodstuffs to Germany by the Allies. |
Compiègne Finance Commission |
To settle details of the financial arrangements between
the Allies and Germany. |
[Page 154]
[Page 155]
Appendix 7821
Food
Section, 26, Rue de
Bassano,
Paris
, April 4,
1919.
Dear Mr. Hoover: The Admiralty here has
just received the following urgent telegram with regard to the
position in Odessa:—
“Unless flour is sent at once Odessa must be evacuated as
food situation is critical, local supplies are enough till
April 9th. Until at least one month’s supply of 15,000 tons
is on its way British vessels with goods for Odessa should
be detained in England or elsewhere.”
As I write this the following further message has been received from
Mr. Picton Bagge, British Consul at Odessa:—
“Food situation is most critical and if flour is not sent in
by Allies immediately Odessa will
have to be evacuated. In consequence I am of opinion now
that British vessels with goods for Odessa should be
detained unless for political reasons H. M. G. assume risks
of goods until you know at least one month’s supply of
15,000 tons is on the way here. Local supplies are
sufficient until April 9th.”
I am to ask whether there is any possibility of America being able to
put supplies into this port. In the meantime, I am enquiring of
London as to the possibility of our putting in any supplies.
Yours sincerely,
(For British Director of Relief Mission)
J. H. Gorvin
The Hon. Herbert Hoover,
Hotel Crillon, Paris.
Appendix 7922
51, Avenue Montaigne, Paris
, 5 April
1919.
[Letter From Mr. Hoover to Mr. Gorvin
Regarding Relief of Odessa]
My Dear Mr. Gorvin: I am in receipt of your
note this morning with regard to Odessa. I also have a telegram from
the American Consul much to the same effect. The only cargoes that
could be got into Odessa anything like in time are those of the
Wheat Executive at Port Said, and it would seem to me, therefore,
critically necessary that these cargoes should be diverted. Not only
are they nearer to Odessa but for us to divert cargoes that are
passing Gibraltar en route to Trieste and Roumania simply means that
Vienna, Tchecho-Slovakia and Roumania will absolutely starve.
[Page 156]
Would it not also be desirable to use the U. K. tonnage that is
apparently available for merchandise for Odessa for the
transportation of food supplies. It must be evident that food is the
first necessity in these situations. I have taken similar action
with regard to American mercantile shipments intended for the Near
East in order that we may maintain Roumanian supplies—and greatly to
the prejudice of our merchants.
Faithfully yours,
J. H. Gorvin, Esq.,
26, Rue de Bassano, Paris.