Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/50
HD–50
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 9, 1919, at 11 a.m.
-
Present
-
United States of America
- Hon. F. L. Polk.
-
Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison.
-
British Empire
- Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
-
Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Mr. P. Kerr.
-
France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
-
Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de Saint-Quentin.
-
Italy
- M. Tittoni.
-
Secretaries
- M. Paterno.
- M. Barone Russo.
-
Japan
- M. Matsui.
-
Secretary
- M. Kawai.
-
United States of America
| Joint Secretariat | |
| United States of America | Mr. C. Russell. |
| British Empire | Lt-Commander Bell. |
| France | M. de Percin. |
| Italy | Captain Rossi. |
| Interpreter—M. Camerlynck | |
The following were also present for the items with which they were concerned.
-
United States of America
- Dr. Scott.
- Mr. Woolsey.
- Mr. A. Dulles.
-
British Empire
- Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
- Brig-General Groves.
- Captain Fuller.
-
France
- M. Tardieu.
- M. Jules Cambon.
- M. de Peretti de la Rocca.
- M. Fromageot.
- M. Laroche.
- M. Kammerer.
-
Italy
- Colonel Castoldi.
- M. Ricci-Busatti.
- M. Brambilla.
-
Japan
- M. Nagaoka.
1. The Council took note of Mr. Polk’s draft reply to the German Government’s letter of 5th September.1 (Appendix “A”.)
Mr. Polk said that he had referred the matter to Dr. Scott, who had consulted with the legal experts of the Drafting Committee, and prepared the note. It appeared that, in the opinion of these highly qualified jurists, the German answer had been technically correct. It therefore seemed to him that, before a further contention were raised with the German Government in a subsequent letter, the cooperation of the legal experts should be called for, in order to avoid making a legal mistake. He understood that the letter drafted by him had not been agreed to by M. Fromageot, although the other jurists of the Drafting Committee had been satisfied with it. He therefore requested that the Drafting Committee should be called in to advise the Council. He had only been given his draft a few minutes before entering the Council Chamber, and had, therefore, not had time to study it closely. He was not entirely satisfied with the form of the letter. Violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles by Virtue of Certain Articles in the German Constitution
(At this point, M. Fromageot, Mr. Hurst, Dr. Scott, M. Ricci-Busatti and M. Nagaoka entered the room.)
M. Clemenceau explained to the Drafting Committee the problem before the Council, and briefly recited the events that had led up to the problem now before the Conference. He further explained the main points in the Notes of the Allied and Associated Governments, and of the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty. Drawing attention to the proposed extension of military occupation on the right bank of the Rhine, and to the legal arguments that had been brought forward against such a measure, he said that he would rather resign his post than consent to France being left by the American and British Governments to enforce unassisted the provisions of the Peace Treaty. America, Great Britain and France had all demobilised and that was inevitable, but, if Great Britain and America refused to support France at the present juncture, the whole weight of enforcing the Peace Treaty would be thrown on his country, and a position would result which would be quite intolerable to him.
M. Fromageot said that he had not agreed with the opinion of his colleagues on the legal issue for the following reasons. In a letter, dated 2nd September,2 Germany had been called upon by the Allied Council to make special enactments by the Entente Governments whereby Article 61 of the Constitution, inviting Austria to participate in the legislation, and administration, of the German Reich, should be [Page 156] rendered null and void. The demand of the Allied and Associated Powers had been clear; they had insisted upon the abrogation and nullification of Article 61. In their reply, dated 5th September, the German Government, whether knowingly or not he could not say, had repeated the request of the Allied and Associated Governments, but had repeated it in such a way as to introduce into it certain modifications. Instead of undertaking to make Article 61 of the German Constitution null and void, they had proposed to make it non-applicable and to give it no legal force. This was not meeting the Allied demand; for the Article in question remained part of the German Constitution, and could be made applicable, and given force later on. A mere admission of non-applicability was not what had been desired. In their letter, the German Government had given a special interpretation to Article 61 by virtue of a later Article in the same Constitution, (No. 178), which latter Article enacted, that no provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles was affected by anything in the German Constitution. Now, the argument brought forward in this respect by the German Government might be good or might be bad. It did not appear to him to be acceptable. The conclusion could not be avoided that, if Article 61 were made non-applicable by virtue of Article 178, the argument could be reversed, and Article 178 be cancelled by Article 61. The Allied and Associated Governments had demanded the nullification of Article 61, and had threatened to take the necessary steps to force the German Government to make the necessary enactments. They had received, in reply, an interpretation, both of their original request, and of the Article at issue, by virtue of which it was alleged, that the measures foreshadowed by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be necessary. The Council might well repeat their original request, and state clearly that they were not concerned with the interpretation of the German Constitution, given in the German Government’s letter of the 5th September. He suggested, in conclusion, that the demand for nullification should be repeated in the strongest and clearest terms in any letter that might be subsequently sent to the German Government; who should also be informed that the Allies would feel themselves to be absolutely justified in taking any measures necessary to enforce their demands.
M. Clemenceau asked Mr. Hurst to explain his standpoint to the Council.
Mr. Hurst said that he could only express a personal opinion, because the matter had merely been the subject of conversation and discussion in the Drafting Committee, and had never been officially referred to them. He quite felt that the prestige of the Allied and Associated Governments demanded that the German Government [Page 157] should be told that steps would be taken to enforce compliance with the demands that had been made to them. But a further question arose, which was whether the admission of the German Government, in their letter of 5th September, was not sufficient to afford the necessary satisfaction to the Council. The German Government had clearly admitted that Article 61 of their Constitution had no legal force. He asked whether there was a sufficient difference between this admission and the demands of the Council to justify further action. Would it not be enough to tell the German Government, that their admission of the non-validity of Article 61 had been noted and put on record. Another point arose, which was that, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, Austria could be admitted into the German Reich, subject to the consent of the League of Nations. This showed that the Peace Treaty itself did actually leave a means open to Austria, whereby she might eventually become incorporated into Germany. It might be argued that the Allied demand for the nullification of Article 61 was in contradiction to the terms of the Peace Treaty, which they themselves had drawn up. The real protection of the Allied and Associated Powers against an increase of strength to Germany, by virtue of the incorporation of Austria, came from the terms of the Austrian Peace Treaty. After signature, Austria would bind herself not to participate in the affairs of another State and to regard her independence as inalienable. This undertaking by Austria, combined with the admission contained in the German note, would, in his opinion, sufficiently protect the prestige of the Council, and the interests of the Allied and Associated Governments.
M. Clemenceau said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to three points, which he regarded as of primary importance. (1) He did not see why an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria, preventing that country from joining Germany, was of any protection, unless the analogous article in the German Peace Treaty were upheld and enforced. What was good for one Treaty was good for another Treaty. Why should an Article in the Austrian Treaty be of any greater protection than an Article in the German Treaty? (2) The German Government was not qualified to interpret the German Constitution. In his opinion, no Government had such a right. (3) He wished to draw attention to a further Article in the German Constitution (No. 112), by virtue of which it had been enacted that no German citizen should be surrendered to a foreign government for trial or punishment. This article, taken in conjunction with No. 61, seemed to him to show a deliberate plan to violate the Peace Treaty; and this raised at once a very grave issue. He desired to assure the Council, that he had no wish to force quarrels; it was not in his character to do so. He was none the less deeply convinced, that the German [Page 158] Government would use every means in its power to avoid carrying out the Peace Treaty fully. This was, after all, only to be expected; since such a line of conduct was conformable to the dictates of human nature. The Allied and Associated Governments were in danger, by the fact that demobilisation had been forced upon them irresistibly by public opinion in their own countries. But Germany was attempting to reassemble her forces, and would certainly continue to try to do so. He felt that he was, at that moment, testing the spirit of the Entente. If, after making a specific demand, the Council were to allow their orders not to be complied with, a succession of events would take place, which would bring about a very grave state of affairs. By trying to avoid a small crisis at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments would inevitably provoke a much graver one later on, at a date which the Germans themselves would choose.
Mr. Baufour said that the decision, which the Council was called upon to take was one of the utmost gravity and importance. He agreed with much that the President had said; but had a few remarks to offer, and a separate suggestion of his own to add. He had listened to M. Fromageot’s contention with interest, although he could not quite agree with it. He had understood him to say that it lay with the Allied and Associated Powers to say exactly what the Peace Treaty of Versailles meant. But it appeared to him (the speaker) that although the Allied and Associated Powers had a perfect right, originally, to insert whatever clauses they chose into the Peace Treaty, and to disregard, if they wished to do so, any complaint that the German Government might have to make upon the projected provisions, this original liberty of action did not so extend itself, after signature, as to give freedom of interpretation to the Allied and Associated Powers. Once the Treaty was signed, it seemed to him that it became a bi-lateral agreement, and that each separate signatory to the document could argue with other signatories on equal terms. It was none the less clear to him that the persons who had framed the German Constitution had deliberately attempted to draw it up in such a way as openly to challenge and possibly to violate, the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Their intentions might be described in English slang as a “try on”. Article 112, to which the President had just called the attention of the Council, appeared to be a far worse violation of the Peace Treaty, than the Article upon which there had just been an exchange of notes. He felt amazed that not one of the Entente Governments had been told earlier that the new German Constitution was violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles, both in letter and in spirit.
He fully agreed with the President of the Council, that a moment would arise, when the issue between the Entente and the German [Page 159] Government would be quite clear, and would have to be fought out by argument, or, possibly, by arms, or by the re-imposition of a blockade. But he did not know whether the Entente Powers were choosing a judicious ground for a dispute with Germany, if they forced a crisis on the debatable subject of the extent to which an invitation to Austria to join the German Reich, had violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Two most able and qualified men had just given divergent opinions on the legal issue. The differences of opinion, of which the Council had just taken note, would be repeated in the press of all European countries; if the present litigation between the Entente and Germany resulted in the forcible occupation of Frankfort. As soon as that important German base had been occupied by Entente troops, the press of Europe would pour out cataracts of legal and quasi-legal arguments; public opinion would take sides for and against the Entente, and, though some sections of public opinion would doubtless approve the action taken, there would be others which would bitterly dispute it. He suggested, therefore, that the conflict should be deferred, not because the Allied and Associated Governments doubted the justice of their contentions, but simply because they were not opening the conflict from an absolutely advantageous position. He proposed that a letter should be sent to the German Government, telling them, that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, two articles of the German Constitution violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and that, although Article 178 of the same Constitution, declaring that no provisions contained therein violated the Peace Treaty might absolve them, any argument based on such ground appeared wholly unsatisfactory to the Entente Governments. The time would soon arrive when the intentions of Germany with regard to the Peace Treaty would be absolutely clear. But so long as the Council were only concerned with a prospective agreement between Germany and Austria, requiring the active co-operation of the latter power, before it could be effected, the issue before it was doubtful and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, Article 112 of the German Constitution, declaring that no German citizen could be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, would, in a very few days, bring about a decisive issue. If this article were quoted in reply to a demand for the surrender of officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, there would be no disagreement amongst jurists, who would be unanimous in thinking that the provisions of the Treaty were being defied and violated. As soon as the German Government should refuse to surrender military criminals, the Entente Governments would say that Article 178 had been drafted in order to throw dust in their eyes and deceive them as to the real intentions of the German Government and the German people. If Frankfort [Page 160] were occupied as a reply to such an open act of defiance, no argument would be possible, and the action of the Entente Governments would receive the moral support of all mankind. He therefore suggested, in conclusion, that a letter of warning, couched in the sternest language, should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, Article 178 of the German Constitution was binding upon them, and that they were expected to carry out, to the letter, the terms of the Peace Treaty signed by their plenipotentiaries, ratified by their Parliament, and agreed to, by the express provisions of their own Constitution.
Mr. Polk said that he agreed, that a struggle with Germany for the enforcement of the Peace Treaty was inevitable. The Germans would, some time or another, make an effort to avoid its provisions; but he thought that the Council ought to choose its ground, so as to be quite certain that it was technically, that is to say legally, right. In view of the legal argument advanced by the German Government, to the effect that Article 178 of the German Constitution made Article 61 of no effect, he thought that any further reply sent by the Council ought to be carefully studied by jurists before dispatch. Until such an examination could be made he felt bound to withhold his final opinion.
M. Tardieu said that attention had been called to the divergence of opinion amongst the jurists. He had, however, been struck by the fact that Mr. Hurst had advanced arguments far more political than legal in character. Would it not be possible to deal with the question on purely political grounds? Mr. Balfour had suggested that another basis should be chosen for the conflict, but by virtue of their letter of the 2nd September, the Allied and Associated Governments had joined with the German Government on a definite issue. Would it not be possible to adhere to the line previously adopted, more particularly as the new Article to which attention had been drawn (No. 112), showed clearly that the German Government wished, and intended, to violate the Peace Treaty as far as it could?
M. Cambon said he had had a long experience of German methods, and of the mental attitude of the German people. He was convinced that, if the Council allowed itself to be entrapped in the meshes of legal argument, it would be giving encouragement to the German Government to advance more arguments of the same kind; and to obscure the issue, whilst they themselves pursued a persistent policy of violation, behind the cloud of dust they were throwing in the eyes of the Council. By allowing doubtful legal arguments to weigh with them, the Council would be entering on dangerous ground, and would inevitably lose its authority in the eyes of the German Government.
[Page 161]Dr. Scott said that as Mr. Hurst’s opinion did not seem to be very popular, he desired, from motives of loyalty, to say that he agreed with his colleague.
M. Clemenceau said that he had fully understood Mr. Hurst’s argument, but that it did not weigh with him strongly, as he had asked for a legal, and not a political expression of opinion from him. But the main question before the Council, a question which should not in any way be obscured, was whether the Peace Treaty was violated by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution. If the Council allowed itself to be blinded by the German argument on the subject of Article 178, it would very soon lose all its authority. When the Treaty was violated by one signatory, then, inevitably, the other signatory was no longer bound. He, personally, had no doubt that the German Constitution did actually violate the Treaty of Versailles. The Council had forwarded certain definite demands to the Germans, who had replied by an interpretation of the Treaty, and of their own Constitution. There was no country in the world where the Government had a right to interpret the Constitution. He wished to propose an immediate measure. Mr. Balfour had said that, by waiting two or three weeks, an issue would inevitably arise. His present proposal was to demand the surrender of certain Germans guilty of breaches of the laws of war, immediately and without delay. He desired to send a letter stating: that the reply of the German Government of the 5th September was not acceptable; that the Allied and Associated Governments had taken note of another Article in the German Constitution explicitly violating the Peace Treaty; and that the immediate surrender of certain persons, mentioned by name, should be effected. He agreed with Mr. Balfour that the position of the Council would be more advantageous if the conflict occurred on the subject of Article 112.
Mr. Polk asked whether the surrender of certain German criminals could be demanded before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.
M. Pichon said that no steps could be taken before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.
A considerable discussion then followed as to the probable date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty by France and Italy, and it was thought that this could not take place in less than a fortnight.
Mr. Polk asked whether an examination of the German Constitution could not be made, with a view to ascertaining all violation of the Peace Treaty that it might contain.
M. Clemenceau said that no clearer instance of violation than that now before the Council was likely to occur again. He agreed with every word of what M. Cambon had said. The Council had made a demand which had virtually been refused. He noticed that all his [Page 162] colleagues, with the possible exception of M. Tittoni, who had not yet expressed himself, were agreed that the demands of the Allies should be enforced. He therefore suggested that the whole question should be considered by every delegate, during the next twenty-four hours, and re-discussed at St. Germain, after the signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the following day. If any means could be devised whereby Mr. Balfour’s proposals could be connected with the present demand on the German Government, he would think such a line of action absolutely perfect.
M. Tardieu drew attention to the necessity of making the Germans nullify the two Articles violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The best means of connecting Mr. Balfour’s proposals with the demands previously made probably consisted in insisting on the nullification of the two Articles objected to.
Mr. Polk said that certain political demands had been made to Germany, and it was evident that the German Government must be compelled to comply. He proposed to refer the question to the Drafting Committee, to see whether the legal and political sides of the question could not be reconciled. The Committee could prepare a report and submit it to the Council at their meeting at St. Germain on the following day. In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of being absolutely sure of the legal justification for any argument that might be brought forward in the next note to the German Government.
M. Clemenceau said that he could not see any legal difficulty, since the German Government had no right to interpret its own Constitution.
Mr. Balfour said that doubtless the President of the Council was a better judge of that matter than he was himself. Great Britain was protected against interpretations of her Constitution, by the fact that it had never been defined in writing. On the other hand, the Council had been interpreting the German Constitution in the notes sent to the German Government, and it seemed to him, in consequence, that the Germans had an equal right to do what the Allies themselves were doing.
M. Tittoni said that in view of the fact that the Council was called upon to take action, on account of the violation of the Peace Treaty with Germany by Articles 61 and 112 of the Constitution of that country, he wished to draw attention to two points. Firstly, he agreed that Article 61 of the German Constitution absolutely violated the Peace Treaty. Secondly, with regard to Article 112, he thought that a reply that might possibly be made later on by the German Government ought to be considered before-hand. The Germans might quite well admit that the Allies had a right to demand the surrender of certain persons guilty of offences defined in the Peace Treaty. But such an admission on their part might be made without abrogating [Page 163] Article 112 of their Constitution. When once the surrender of certain specified criminals had been made by the Germans, these latter might be justified in maintaining, that they had complied with the special provisions of the Peace Treaty, and could, from then onwards, give Article 112 full legal validity.
M. Cambon said that it was not sufficient for the present German Government to say that Article 178 of the Constitution made Article 61 of no effect. The present Government might be followed by another, which would very likely maintain an opposite point of view, if it thought the circumstances favourable for doing so.
M. Clemenceau said that whilst everybody would be free to take opinions from whatever quarter they chose during the next 24 hours, he did not think that his own was likely to alter.
(It was decided that the question of the violation of the Peace Treaty by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution should be discussed on the following day at St. Germain after the signature of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and that the Drafting Committee should give their opinion on the legal issues involved, to the Council.)
2. The Council took note of the draft letter to the Roumanian Delegation prepared by Mr. Balfour. (See Appendix “B”.) Reply to the Note of the Roumanian Delegation on the Subject of the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Austria3
(The draft, submitted by Mr. Balfour was accepted. See Appendix “B”.)
3. Mr. Polk said that he had been informed by M. Vesnitch, that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates did not intend to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, on account of their objection to the Minorities Clauses contained in it. Possible Refusal of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation To Sign the Peace Treaty With Austria
M. Berthelot said that he had interviewed M. Vesnitch at 8 p.m. on the preceding day. M. Vesnitch had said that it was impossible for him to sign the Austrian Peace Treaty without the express permission of his Government, and had added that he had previously interviewed Mr. Balfour. He had said that, if the Treaty on Minorities were to be applicable to the territories acquired in the first Balkan War, his Government would not allow him to sign. An agreement had been reached between them, whereby the Treaty in question might be made to apply to the whole of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State. This would avoid mentioning either Macedonia, or the date 1913, in specific terms. M. Vesnitch had promised to telegraph this proposal to his Government, and hoped to have a reply by Wednesday morning. He had told M. Vesnitch of the grave responsibility that he would incur by not signing the Peace Treaty with Austria. Such a refusal might result in the [Page 164] Serb-Croat-Slovene State losing all the advantages which it stood to gain from the Peace Treaty. He had told him that it seemed hardly reasonable to resign these great advantages on account of a question of “amour propre”. It was possible that, even when the reply came from Belgrade, it would be in the negative. The obstinacy of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates in the matter was very great.
(A long discussion then followed as to whether the signing of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be postponed to Thursday or Friday, and it was finally decided that the signature should take place at 10.0 o’clock on Wednesday as arranged.
It was further decided that a protocol should be drafted, by virtue of which any of the high contracting parties might be allowed to sign the Peace Treaty within a period of three days.)
M. Berthelot said that M. Vesnitch had asserted, that he might be able to persuade his Government to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, if the Council sent a letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, expressing confidence in their liberal views, and telling them explicitly, that the Article on the subject of minorities in the Austrian Peace Treaty would be an end to their engagements in the matter. M. Vesnitch had alleged that Mr. Polk had given his approval to such a line of action.
Mr. Polk said that he had interviewed M. Vesnitch, who had explained that a letter on the lines described by M. Berthelot, had been sent to the Polish Government, when they had objected to the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany.
M. Berthelot said that no such letter had ever been sent to the Polish Government.
Mr. Polk said that he had no objection, in principle, to sending a letter of the kind, although he had not suggested any such measure or expressed approval.
M. Tittoni said that he had no objection to such a letter being sent, so long as nothing contained in it could possibly modify the obligations imposed on Serbia by virtue of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and by the Minorities Treaty.
4. M. Berthelot said that certain alterations in the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had been agreed upon by the members of the Committee in New States. Treaty between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Allied and Associated Powers
(It was decided that the Report of the Committee on New States (see Appendix “C”) on the subject of certain modifications to be introduced into the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, should be accepted.)
[Page 165]5. M. Tittoni said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the contents of a telegram received by him from General Mombelli. This officer stated that three-quarters of the Hungarian people were asking for the dispatch of an Inter-Allied body of troops (who would be very well received), in order to ensure that the elections in Hungary should be carried out without intervention or disturbance. Such a measure was necessary if a stable Government, with which the Allies could treat, was ever to be set up in Hungary. The Allied troops would, moreover, be very well received. Hungarian Affairs
M. Clemenceau said that he could not employ French troops on electoral business in Hungary or anywhere else. He did not think that Mr. Balfour or Mr. Polk could persuade their Governments to send British or American troops for such a purpose.
M. Tittoni said that he had merely wished to draw attention to the question, and was quite content that every delegate, on being duly informed, should assume whatever responsibility he thought fit.
6. (It was decided that the General Act revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26th, 1885,4 and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, July 2nd, 1890,5 should be accepted, with the following modification. Convention Replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels. (See Appendix D)
Article 11, Page 8. The words “public order and good government” should be changed to “public security and order.”)
The Meeting then adjourned.
- Appendix B to HD–49, p. 138.↩
- Appendix A to HD–45, p. 62.↩
- Appendix F to HD–49, p. 152.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxxvi, p. 4.↩
- Malloy, Treaties, 1776–1909, vol. ii, p. 1964.↩
- Appendix A to HD–45, p. 62.↩
- Appendix B to HD–49, p. 138.↩
- Appendix F to HD–49, p. 152.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Appendix D to HD–49, p. 141.↩
- Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 181.4101/14.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- FM–27, minute 3, vol. iv, p. 856.↩
- M. Galopin participated only in the consideration of the convention for the control of the trade in arms. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Sir Herbert Read was able to be present only at the preliminary meeting. [Footnote in the original.]↩