Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/48
HD–48
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, September 5, 1919, at 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- Hon. F. L. Polk.
- Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison.
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Mr. P. Kerr.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de Saint-Quentin.
- Italy
- M. Tittoni.
- Secretary
- M. Paterno.
- M. Barone Russo.
- Japan
- M. Matsui.
- Secretary
- M. Kawai.
- United States of America
| Joint Secretariat | |
| America, United States of | Mr. C. Russell. |
| British Empire | Capt. E. Abraham. |
| France | M. dePercin. |
| Italy | Captain Rossi. |
| Interpreter—M. Camerlynck | |
The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:
- America, United States of
- The Hon. H. Gibson.
- Mr. Johnson.
- Professor Coolidge.
- Dr. Lord.
- Mr. A. Dulles.
- Great Britain
- Mr. A. Leeper.
- Colonel F. H. Kisch.
- Mr. Carr.
- France
- M. Tardieu.
- M. J. Cambon.
- General Le Rond.
- M. Laroche.
- Mi Hermite.
- Italy
- Colonel Castoldi.
- M. Stranieri.
- Czecho-Slovakia
- Dr. Benes.
- Poland
- M. Paderewski.
- M. Dmowski.
1. M. Clemenceau said he had received a telegram from General Dupont, regarding the situation, in Silesia, which was reported as being very bad. (Appendix “A”.) He had nothing to propose, but only wished to communicate the news to his colleagues. Situation in Silesia
Mr. Balfour observed that nothing could be done until the Treaty was ratified. He hoped that this would take place in about 10 days.
Mr. Polk said that according to Mr. Hoover, there was a prospect of the situation in Silesia improving.
2. The Council had before it a draft Article for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria, proposed by the American Delegation. (Appendix “B”.) Question of the Dobrudja
Mr. Polk said that, as his colleagues would remember, he had deferred his reply to the question of the frontier between Bulgaria and Roumania in the Dobrudja, at a previous meeting.1 He had realised that there were many reasons against the insertion of any clause such as that suggested, in the Treaty itself. The American Delegation would be satisfied if a sentence to the same effect were inserted in the covering letter to the Bulgarian Delegation. It might then be suggested that the ultimate settlement should be in the hands, either of the Allied and Associated Powers or of the League of Nations.
Mr. Balfour pointed out that the covering letter would only be sent to the Bulgarians after all their Notes regarding the Treaty had been received. In other words, several weeks would elapse before the letter was sent.
Mr. Polk said that the Bulgarians would certainly raise the point in their comments on the Treaty. This would give an opportunity for making a statement on the subject.
Mr. Balfour suggested that the Council should resolve to take up the subject again when the covering letter was considered. He was ready, himself, to state that the attribution of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria would be conducive to a lasting peace in the Balkans. Secondly, he thought that it was impossible, as long as Roumania remained an Allied Power, or, at the worst, a neutral, to insert any clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria, requiring a surrender of Roumanian territory. Thirdly, he thought that it would be well to consider the matter again at the time of drafting the final covering letter. By that time, the attitude of Roumania towards the Conference would be defined. The Council would then know what advice could be given to the Roumanians and what methods it was right to employ. In any case, it would not be possible to make Roumania yield territory unless she became an enemy State.
[Page 117]Mr. Polk said that he agreed. He pointed out, however, that according to the future provisions of the Treaty with Hungary, Roumania stood a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Transylvania and Bukovina. Her acquisition of these territories might be made contingent on her yielding ground in the Dobrudja.
Mr. Balfour said that this might be difficult, as the frontiers in Transylvania and Bukovina had been drawn on ethnological lines. It would be difficult to alter these frontiers, without violating the principles of the Conference.
Mr. Polk said that a close examination of the boundaries would probably reveal some instances on which the ethnological principle had not been strictly followed.
M. Pichon said that a serious question of principle was involved. The Conference, hitherto, had never attempted to revise Treaties anterior to the war.
M. Clemenceau said that he thought that dealing with the matter in a covering letter was not very practical. A promise to Bulgaria, by the Conference, that Roumania would be invited to yield territory, would amount to nothing. An invitation to Roumania to do so would equally amount to this. He wondered whether the basis of a bargain existed anywhere. Without a bargain, he thought nothing could be achieved.
M. Tittoni said that he did not think the question of the Dobrudja could be made corollary to the question of Transylvania or Bukovina. The matter of Bessarabia, however, remained. He would be inclined to ask Roumania to make a concession in the Dobrudja, as a condition of obtaining what the Commission recommended in Bessarabia.
Mr. Polk observed that he had not suggested making any promises at present.
M. Clemenceau said the case would be the same in three weeks time.
M. Tardleu observed that the advantage of the procedure suggested by Mr. Polk was that the Bulgarian Treaty could be proceeded with.
M. Tittoni said that he understood that the question of the Dobrudja would be considered at a later stage in connection with the question of Bessarabia.
Mr. Polk said that he was ready to adopt Mr. Balfour’s plan; namely, first, that in principle, it was accepted as desirable that Roumania should yield a part of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria; second, that no clause to this effect should be inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria; third, that the means of obtaining this result should be considered at the time of sending the covering letter to the Bulgarians. He wished it to be understood that nothing he had said [Page 118] committed him to an offer of Bessarabia to Roumania in exchange for Southern Dobrudja.
(It was agreed that, for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria, no change should be made in the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria, as existing at the outbreak of War.)
3. At this point, M. Dmowski and later M. Benes, and still later M. Paderewski entered the room. Question of Teschen
M. Dmowski said that it, was extremely painful to him to have to defend his cause against his friends, the Czecho-Slovaks. He had hoped that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would always stand together throughout the Conference. Now they appeared as rival litigants before the Council. He thought that the independence of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia was not yet achieved, though the Conference had given a basis for both. In return Poland and Czecho-Slovakia owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers to be the defenders of peace in Eastern Europe. He himself had always defended the Czecho-Slovak cause as if he had been a Czecho-Slovak himself. He would continue to do so. He would always endeavour to secure a friendly agreement between the two neighbouring countries. He thought that the worst cause of conflict between neighbours was the subjection of one nationality to another. Should this take place, as between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, friendship between the two countries would never be possible. M. Benes had said that full rights would be accorded to the Poles in Teschen under Czecho-Slovak sovereignty. The first right of the Poles in Teschen was to belong to Poland. M. Benes had further said that the Polish claim was based on ethnographical reasons. This was not the case. He was prepared to leave ethnography to savants and philologists. Statesmen established their claims on the wishes of peoples. The Polish claim was based on the national sentiment of the populations in question. The population of Teschen was literate. It could not be treated like an inarticulate mass. Each man knew what his national feelings were. In the first Slav Congress at Prague in 1848, the representative of Teschen had joined the Poles, and the first newspaper published in Teschen during the nineteenth century had been Written in Polish and not in Czech or in German. His thesis was that the country was not so much ethnically Polish as sentimentally and culturally Polish. The proof of this was that the Polish Delegation had suggested holding a plebiscite and this had been refused by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation. On the 5th of November of the preceding year, when the Austrian Monarchy broke up, the population of Teschen had, on its own initiative, made a provisional Settlement of the country.2 They had [Page 119] divided the country into two parts, and the line thus obtained had not aroused any protest either in Poland or in Bohemia. Both nations, therefore, seemed inclined to accept it. Difficulties had been made by the political leaders. The Czech people had been led to suppose that they could obtain the whole of Teschen from the Conference. When the decision of the Commission had been communicated in vague terms to the press in Bohemia, an organised protest by means of strikes was decided on. The Czech authorities had stopped trains running from Warsaw to Paris, had used troops to force the workmen to strike, and had even threatened to flood the mines should the men go to work; A German owner, whose Polish Workmen wished to work in the mines had told them he could not guarantee their lives. In spite of pressure, nevertheless the miners had continued work. This indicated that the country was undoubtedly Polish, and unwilling to collaborate in the plan of solving the fate of the country by strikes. Mr. Benes had impugned the Austrian official statistics of the population in Teschen. He had said that the figures had been falsified in favour of the Poles, because of the consistent opposition of the Czechs. This was really not the case. The Austrian Government had been more anti-Polish in Teschen than anti-Czech, because their strongest adversaries in the area were the Poles. In 1900 the census showed 60% Poles, 23% Czechs, 15% Germans. In 1910 the proportion was, 54% Poles, 27% Czechs, 18% Germans. From these figures it followed that the Polish percentage was shown as diminished, just as the Czech and German percentage rose. It might be inferred that a pro-German policy tended to minimise the Polish element, and to increase the Czechs. Mr. Benes had introduced a number of economic reasons. These were very strong. Bohemia, being a highly industrialised country, needed coal and therefore desired to possess the mines, but it could not be laid down that need makes ownership. The Polish Delegation maintained that the balance should be in favour of the national sentiment of the population. By a very strict application of this principle, Poland had been deprived of Danzig, which was the lungs of Poland. Danzig represented far more for Poland than the mines of Teschen for Bohemia. It would not be possible to deprive the Poles of the advantage of a rule which had been made to operate against them in favour of defeated Germany. He wished to remain the friend of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Poland would desire to sell her coal to her neighbours. In this instance it was the quality of the coal that mattered. The coal derived from the Karwin Basin was convertible into coke. In Poland there was no coal of this character. Should Upper Silesia as a result of the plebiscite go to Poland, there, would be some such coal in Poland, but not much. The gas works in Warsaw employed coal from the Karwin Basin. The Poles needed it [Page 120] more than Bohemia, which had coke producing coal in other parts of the country. Bohemia needed ordinary coal. This could not be obtained from the Karwin Basin. Bohemia had always imported some of her coal from Upper Silesia. Should this country go to the Poles, Poland would now become her supplier. But the fact that Bohemia required coal from Upper Silesia was a poor reason for giving her the Karwin Basin. Bohemia would buy rather more coal than she used to, and Poland in return would import her industrial products. Poland was very ready to sign a Convention to supply Bohemia with enough coal for her industries. It would be far easier to settle the matter in this way, than by making an unfair settlement in Teschen. If the true national line were adopted, Poland would receive 51% of ordinary coal and 44% of coke-out of the production of Teschen. The Polish Delegation was ready to yield a certain number of mining communes in which the population was not clearly Polish. This would reduce the Polish proportion to 29% of ordinary coal, and 22% of coke.
Polish ambitions were therefore not excessive. Poland required coke perhaps in a less degree than Bohemia because less industrial, but, nevertheless, she did need some. He thought the whole coal situation could be solved on these lines and by means of a Convention between the two countries. This would be far easier than by committing an injustice in Teschen, against which Poland would always protest and which would always disturb the peace. As to the railways, M. Benes had said that the Oderberg–Kaschau line was the principal communication between Bohemia and Slovakia. He begged to point out that this line had never served such a purpose before. It was the main line between Berlin and Buda-Pest. It carried coal from Upper Silesia to Hungary and to the Balkans. It was necessary not for Bohemia, but for Poland, when Upper Silesia became Polish. There were four other lines connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. Two of these needed small connecting tracks of 8 kilometres in one case and 12 kilometres in the other. If these tracks had not been laid, geography was not the culprit. It had been Hungarian policy to stifle the development of Slovakia. Now that Bohemia and Slovakia were united in one State, no such reasons existed. The Czecho-Slovak Republic would easily construct what was required and he undertook to prophesy that, in 20 years, Bohemia would be connected with Slovakia by at least 8 lines of railway. On the other hand, Poland required the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau to export coal from Upper Silesia. The map prepared by the Commission, which he had seen on the previous day for the first time, had somewhat alarmed him. In order to attribute to Czechoslovakia the southern portion of this railway, the Commission had handed over to Czecho-Slovakia the most Polish of the Polish areas in Teschen,—he might almost say the most Polish population in Poland. [Page 121] There were few parts of Poland in which the population was 100 per cent Polish: in this area it was. The population had another characteristic. It was protestant in religion. These protestant Poles had always taken a very prominent part in the Polish national movement and it was these very people whom the Commission attributed to Czechoslovakia on the pretext that Bohemia required the southern part of the Oderberg–Kaschau railway, which, in reality, she did not require. It had been pointed out to him by a military authority that the line suggested by the Commission would give the Czechs a dominant position over the Polish part of the country. He put such considerations aside, as he did not wish even to contemplate the thought of war between the two countries. On national and economic grounds, he considered the Polish claim was right and he would only repeat what he had said at the beginning, that the essential condition for good relations between two neighbouring States, whose independence was not yet achieved and whose function was to be guardians of the peace in Central Europe, was to avoid the subjection of the population of either to the other. All he asked for was the application of the national principle which had been applied with considerable severity against Poland in favour of Germany.
M. Benes said that the local agreement referred to by M. Dmowski between the Czech and Polish population in Teschen had really been made according to the administrative districts which previously existed. It had not been intended that the question of ultimate sovereignty should, in any way, be pre-judged by this provisional settlement. In Bohemia, protests had not arisen, until the Polish Government had ordered mobilisation in the Polish part of the territory, as if the provisional settlement had established Polish sovereignty in the area. M. Dmowski had referred to various acts of Czech officials. He did not wish, himself, to go into such details, though he had numberless reports containing equivalent allegations against Poles. At Oderberg and Bogumin, Polish troops had forced the Czech workmen to sign a petition in favour of annexation to Poland. However, recriminations of this kind would be endless and he preferred to avoid the subject. M. Dmowski had argued that the census had been falsified against the Poles. In fact, the Czechs and Germans had never united against the Poles; the Poles and Germans had always combined against the Czechs. He had previously pointed out that the mines in Teschen only exported 25 wagon loads of coke to Poland. Bohemia, on the other hand, had to import coal from Upper Silesia, which was to become Polish. Upper Silesia contained quantities of coke producing coal. M. Dmowski had pointed out that Bohemia would always depend on Upper Silesia, that is to say, on Poland, for coal. This was too true, and Czecho-Slovakia only asked for what was strictly necessary, in order not to be at the mercy of every eventuality. M. Dmowski [Page 122] had made use of the percentage of coal Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would obtain from Teschen should it be divided between them, but had made no mention of the immense resources in Poland. But Czecho-Slovakia required 30 million tons a year and only produced 26 million tons. Moreover, the Treaty forced Czecho-Slovakia to supply Austria with coal. This would leave the industries of the country entirely dependent on Poland.
As to the railways, it was true that there were communications between Bohemia and Czecho-Slovakia [Slovakia?], but M. Dmowski had omitted to state that the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau was the only line going through Slovakia from west to east. The hills in Slovakia went from north to south and-no other railway could be built across the country. The Teschen question for Czecho-Slovakia was analogous to the question of Alsace-Lorraine for France. The culture of the country was Czech. This was evidenced by the habits of the people, their dress and the architecture of their houses. AH these resembled what prevailed in Moravia. A large part of the admittedly Polish population of Teschen had declared in favour of union with Czecho-Slovakia; in case of a plebiscite, this population would vote in the same sense.
M. Paderewski said that he was almost ashamed to join M. Dmowski against M. Benes. M. Benes however was a champion who would, he felt sure, be equal to both of them. In any case, he did not mean to be aggressive. No one more than himself desired good relations with Czecho-Slovakia. It was the destiny of the two countries to live in peace and it was also their duty. They owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers who had given them independence, to humanity and to their own exhausted peoples. Discord would not prevail between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia if M. Benes and he could make mutual concessions. The Teschen area interested Czecho-Slovakia because of its coal. It interested Poland because of its population. The arguments on one side were economic and on the other side national. M. Benes, taking as his model the judgment of Solomon, suggested cutting the country in two. Poland protested. It might be inferred on which side was real maternity. In any case, the child had reached the age of discretion and was able to say to which country it belonged. There were, in addition, impartial observers, among whom he quoted the work of two Bohemian savants. It was true that there were some villages in Teschen with a Czech majority. M. Dmowski had told the Council that Poland did not claim them. As the Polish Delegation had good reason to know, States were better off without alien minorities. M. Benes’ remarks about coal might lead the Council to suppose that his country was in dire peril. Was coal so important a matter as to justify the subjugation of an unwilling population and the estrangement of a country nearly four times as big as Czecho-Slovakia? [Page 123] On the same lines, what should Italy do, seeing that she had neither coal, oil nor forests? In reality, was Czecho-Slovakia so poor in coal? Out of a production of 26¼ million tons of lignite throughout the former monarchy, 83 per cent had been produced in Bohemia and 86 per cent of Austrian and Hungarian coal came from Bohemia. These figures proved Bohemia to be one of the richest coal-producing countries in the world, after Great Britain, America, and Germany. These figures were derived from an authority who would not be denied by M. Benes; they were derived from the work of President Masaryk. M. Benes had stated that Czecho-Slovakia needed 30 million tons of coal and had only 26 million. If President Masaryk’s figures were not accepted, he would refer to statistics. In 1913, 34 million tons of brown and black coal (23 million brown and 11 million black), had been produced in Bohemia; divided among 13 million inhabitants, this represented two thousand kilos, per head of brown and 900 kilos, per head of black coal. Poland, in the same year, had produced 11,814,000 tons of black coal and 952,000 tons of coke for a population now amounting to 29 millions. This represented not even 400 kilos, per head. In view of the tragic situation in Upper Silesia, the Council could judge whether Poland could lightly abandon the coal of Teschen. If Upper Silesia became Polish, the situation would be different and Poland would make every concession in order to supply Czechoslovakia with the coal she required. This matter could be settled between the experts of the two countries. As to the railways, M. Dmowski had pointed out that all Czecho-Slovakia need do to perfect her communications was to build two lines measuring 8 and 12 kilometres. Poland wished to be a good neighbour to Czecho-Slovakia and was ready to bear half the cost of construction. Before concluding, he would like to quote an incident of his last journey to Poland. At the first frontier station in Teschen in an open field were gathered some 3,000 persons, mostly workmen, women and children. It was raining hard but he was received with songs, music and speeches. Several speeches were made. The one which struck him most was made by a workman, who said that the quarrel between the Poles and Czechs should be put an end to as soon as possible. The Czechs and Poles were both Slavs and cousins. The Czechs ought to have all the coal that could be spared, but no Polish land should be given to them and no Czech land to the Poles. The speaker might now be dead, as the place he lived in had been much oppressed by the Germans, who were shooting the Poles like rabbits. The moral of his speech had been understood in Warsaw. He hoped that it might be understood in Prague.
M. Benes said that Czecho-Slovakia was not only interested in Teschen for its coal. The country was connected with the rest of Czecho-Slovakia by history, culture and administrative bonds. Mere [Page 124] figures could not determine the question. The future needs of Czechoslovakia must be taken into consideration. The statistics quoted by M. Paderewski were not conclusive. Production had been far more intensive in Bohemia than in Poland. On the other hand, the possibilities of production in Poland were infinitely greater than in Czecho-Slovakia. He had been himself as conciliatory as possible, but it must be remembered that he was not alone and that the peoples in both countries were passionate and excitable. It was better that each should be self-sufficient, as if either depended for vital necessities upon the other, there would be no solid peace. In other cases the Conference had sacrificed small minorities in order to establish lasting arrangements. This was a case in which this method should be put in practice, as had been done in the case of Ratibor against Czecho-Slovakia. Perfection could not be attained. If Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were independent of one another in respect of their vital needs, agreement between them would be easy. In any case, whatever the decision of the Conference, he would faithfully observe it and, in so doing, continue the policy he had consistently followed from the start, that of seeking friendship with Poland.
4. The letter contained in Appendix “C” was approved and signed by M. Clemenceau.
The note to the Roumanian Government (See H. D. 47, Minute 3 & Appendix “E”)3 was signed by all the delegates. Instructions to Sir George Clerk on His Mission to Bucharest
5. The draft of Article 48 for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (Appendix “D”) was accepted, subject to the approval of Mr. Polk to be communicated later in the day to the Secretariat-General. Access of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea
(The meeting then adjourned.)
- HD–46, minute 7, p. 83.↩
- For text, see Delegation polonaise, a la conference de la paix, Memoir’e con-cernant la delimitation des frontieres entre les 6tats polonais et tclieco-slovaque en Silesie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz (Paris, 1919), Annex B4.↩
- Ante, pp. 98 and 111.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Appendix E to HD–47, p. 111.↩
- Appendix C to HD–23, vol. vii, p. 517; appendix A to HD–24, ibid., p. 541; HD–25, ibid., p. 555; appendix B to HD–26, ibid., p. 615; HD–30, ibid., p. 682; appendix C to HD–31, ibid., p. 691; appendix A to HD–37, ibid., p. 819; appendix C to HD–38, ibid., p. 857.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩