Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/47

HD–47

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, September 4, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, September 4, 1919, 11 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
  • Secretaries
    • Mr. H. Norman.
    • Sir George Clerk.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta.
    • M. Berthelot.
    • M. de Saint-Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni.
  • Secretary
    • M. Paterno.
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui.
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Captain Chapin.
British Empire	Commander Bell.
France	M. de Percin.
Italy	Captain Rossi.
Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Mr. Coolidge.
  • Dr. Lord.
  • Mr. A. W. Dulles.
• British Empire
  • Mr. Leeper.
  • Mr. Carr.
  • Colonel Kisch.
• France
  • M. Cambon.
  • General Desticker.
  • General Le Rond.
  • M. Laroche.
  • M. Kammerer.
  • M. Hermite.
• Italy
  • Colonel Castoldi.
  • Comm. Stranieri.
  • M. Brambilla.
  • Barone Russo.

1. M. Clemenceau drew the Council’s attention to the objections of the German Government to the advanced Commissions of Control being sent at once. (See H. D. 36.8 and Appx. G.[J],¹ (and also see Appendix A.) He added that in his opinion it would be better to postpone sending out the advance Commissions of Control for a certain time. This was the opinion of General Nollet, although Marshal Foch was of another opinion. In conclusion, he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers had no positive right to send out these advance Commissions of Control if the Germans now objected. Allied Commissions of control in Germany

General Desticker said that the despatch of the full personnel of the Commissions of Control depended upon the date of the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Marshal Foch had been of the opinion that an advance detachment of the Inter-Allied Commissions should be sent forward at least ten days before the full Commissions arrived. This preliminary measure was necessary in order to prepare the work with which the Commissions would be concerned later on. The whole question, therefore, hinged upon the probable date of the final ratification of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M. Clemenceau said that Marshal Foch had thought that the Peace Treaty would be ratified by three Great Powers by 15th September.

M. Tittoni said that as far as Italy was concerned that would not be possible.

Mr. Balfour then suggested that the German objections appeared to be based on the very large number of officers who were to be sent under present proposals. Would it not be possible to adhere to Marshal Foch’s proposal, and, at the same time, reduce the number of Commissions despatched, by making one nation responsible for one particular department, another nation for another branch, and so on. The large number of the personnel was due to the fact that each Department contained Inter-Allied Representatives.

General Desticker said that he did not think that Mr. Balfour’s proposal was practicable, and thought that it would be better to delay sending out the Commissions of Control for a few days in order to adhere to the original programme.

Mr. Polk drew attention to the fact that the United States could not, for the moment, be represented upon the Commissions of Control.

(After some further discussion it was decided that no advance Delegation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany for the present.)

2. (It was agreed that the Austrian request for a prolongation of two days of the time allowed for the consideration of the Allied, reply (see Appendix B.) should be granted.) Demand of the Austrian Delegation for prolongation of the Time Allowed for the consideration of the Allied Reply

3. The Council took note of M. Misu’s letter (see Appendix C.) to the President of the Peace Conference, stating that the telegrams of the Council to the Rumanian Government had, to a large extent, not been received in Bucharest. Rumanian Affairs

M. Clemenceau said that the situation was rather changed by virtue of M. Bratiano’s plea. He had hardly credited it at first, but had, later on, come to the conclusion that there might be a certain degree of truth in the statement made.

M. Tittoni said that M. Bratiano’s statements were to a certain extent borne out by notices appearing in the French press, to the effect that wireless telegraphic communication from Paris was somewhat interrupted.

Mr. Polk said he understood that the French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches for transmission to the Rumanian Government by telegram.

M. Berthelot said that this was not the case. The French Minister had not acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches under discussion, nor had he stated that they had been communicated by him to the Rumanians. In confirmation of this he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that a batch of telegrams received that morning by the French Foreign Office, from Bucharest, made no reference to the previous communications of the Council.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not understand how the nonreceipt by the Rumanian Government of previous dispatches of the Council could be explained in any credible manner.

Mr. Polk said that the Queen of Rumania had written a letter to Mr. Hoover, wherein she protested in the strongest terms against the United States’ attitude towards her country. This was surely evidence that the Council’s dispatches had been received.

M. Pichon said that the information on which the Queen of Rumania’s letter had been based, might have been obtained from the public press.

M. Tittoni said that it would possibly be better to make use of the military organisation for the transmission of telegrams. He drew the Council’s attention to the fact, that, according to Mr. Misu’s letter (See Appendix C.), the Rumanian Government was now considering the possibility of withdrawing their armies from Hungary. This was the first occasion on which they had made any statement of the kind.

Mr. Polk then read a letter from an American officer, who had had an interview with one of the Rumanian authorities in Bucharest. The conversation recorded in the letter was to the effect, that the Rumanians had occupied Budapest, and intended to stay there; that they intended to settle, and manage, their own affairs in their own way; that they had received an insulting letter from the Council, which they had answered in the most suitable way, by ignoring it; and that the Rumanians had nothing to fear from the Allies, who did not intend to follow their menaces, up by effective action. This, letter showed clearly that the Rumanians were conscious that they were treating the Council with contempt, and that they intended to continue to do so.

M. Pichon drew the Council’s attention to a telegram received that morning from M. de Saint Aulaire,² and remarked that the information it contained somewhat contradicted that received by Mr. Polk. (See Appendix D.)

Mr. Polk, commenting upon the telegram circulated by M. Pichon, said he thought it was the most amazing attempt to avoid the real issue that he had ever read. In view of the act that the Allied generals in Budapest had been urging the Rumanian Government to form a gendarmerie for the maintenance of order, and had been positively opposed by them in any such measure, the statement contained in the telegram from M. de St. Aulaire that the Rumanians were anxious to restore order, was little short of ridiculous.

Mr. Balfour said that he found it very difficult to believe, that the Rumanian Government was not playing with the Conference. The Roumanian authorities at Budapest, and the Roumanian representatives in the Allied capitals, knew by the papers, and from the Allied Generals at Budapest, what were the wishes of the Council. The Military Representatives at Budapest, in particular, had continually explained the wishes of the Council. It was folly to suppose that communications made to the Rumanians at Budapest were not sent on to the Central Government at Bucharest. The present complaint of the Rumanian Government, that they were in ignorance of the real wishes of the Conference, seemed well nigh incredible. He had not had time to weigh the evidence in support of their plea carefully; but it seemed to him that their present arguments were only advanced as part of an elaborate scheme of ignoring the wishes of the Allies, and of acting in whatever manner they themselves thought best. There was a remarkable agreement between the conversation of the American officer, communicated to the Council through Mr. Polk’s kindness, and the actual facts of the case. He was far more inclined to believe the statements made by the Rumanian official to Mr. Polk’s correspondent, than he was to give credence to Mr. Bratiano’s assurances, that the Rumanian Government was still waiting for the instructions of the Council.

Mr. Polk then communicated a further extract from the same letter, in which his correspondent stated that he had been informed by the Rumanian official, that the Allies had made a peace which was unfair to small nations; and that the Rumanians, therefore, intended to take the matter into their own hands, and to settle the matter equitably in their section of the world.

M. Tittoni said that the difficulties were increased by the fact that there was no properly constituted government at Budapest; if there had been one it would have been possible to collaborate with it, in setting up a force sufficient to maintain order, and, when this had been done, to ask the Rumanians to go.

Mr. Polk said that M. Tittoni did not seem to have realised the exact nature of the difficulty. The Allied generals at Budapest had frequently urged the Rumanians to allow the Hungarians to form a police force. The Rumanians had positively obstructed any such measure. The Rumanian authorities had been asked, by the Council, not to devastate Hungary. The Council had been told in reply, that it was incumbent upon Rumania to get back the material taken from her at an earlier period of the war. The requisitions far exceeded anything that might have [been?] done under such a plea. About 4,000 sealed cars had gone across the Rumanian frontiers from Hungary, carrying everything that could possibly be requisitioned. He felt very strongly in the matter for a particular reason. There was, at the present moment, an American general officer in Budapest, who was being flouted by the Rumanian authorities. The situation was, therefore, so humiliating, that he felt the President ought to be advised to withdraw the United States general officer from Budapest.

M. Clemenceau said that he agreed, in the main, with Mr. Polk, but thought it was difficult to act as though the Council were absolutely certain that the Roumanian Authorities were acting in bad faith.

Mr. Balfour said, that, although some doubt might exist as to whether the Roumanian Government had received the telegrams of the Council, it was none the less certain that they were fully aware of the policy of the Allies.

Mr. Polk said that a despatch had been agreed upon at the Meeting of the Council on the 23rd August (see H. D. 37, Minute 1);³ it had been published in the papers in Paris on the 26th August, and transmitted to the Generals in Budapest on the 27th. It must, therefore, have been sent on to Bucharest. If the Roumanian representative at each of the Allied capitals were summoned to the Foreign Office, and told that the Council was in earnest, he was certain that the situation in Roumania would improve. All information received through the United States Secret Service was to the effect, that the opinion prevailed among the Roumanian Authorities, that the Council was not serious in its intentions.

Mr. Balfour then read the letter which he had drafted for communication to the Roumanian Government at Bucharest (See Appendix “E”).

M. Tittoni said that the letter had been very well drafted. He suggested that in the first sentence of the second paragraph the words “rightly” or “wrongly” (not now shown in Appendix “E”) should be deleted. The sentence as corrected would be a more impartial expression of opinion.

A long discussion then followed as to the method of communicating the letter to the Roumanian Government and

(It was decided that the letter drafted by Mr. Balfour should be taken by Sir George Clerk personally to Bucharest, and be presented by him to the Roumanian Government.)

(It was further decided that Sir George Clerk should also take copies of all telegrams previously sent by the Conference to the Roumanian Government⁴ and should communicate them with the aforesaid letter.)

4. M. Berthelot commented on the report contained in Appendix “F” on the subject of the immigration clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. He said, in conclusion, that, in his opinion, M. Venizelos’ proposals were too complicated to be put into effect, and that it would be better for the States affected to set up mixed Commissions to settle the matter between themselves. He did not think that any clause ought to go into the Bulgarian Treaty. Clauses Relative to Immigration for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria

Mr. Coolidge said that the opinions expressed by M. Berthelot were not those incorporated in the report of the Commission on New States.

M. Berthelot said that the original report of the Commission on New States had been made more than a month previously. It was too late for the Council to enter into negotiations with the States concerned, as proposed by M. Venizelos. In the meanwhile, the Drafting Committee were asking that a decision should be given, since they could not carry on with the work of drafting the Bulgarian Treaty unless the point was settled.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed:—

(1) That no clause on the subject of reciprocal immigration in the Balkans should be insetted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(2) That the report of the Commission on New States (see Appendix “F”) should be accepted, and that this Commission should be authorised to consult with M. Venizelos as to the best method of putting his proposals into effect.

5. At this point, Dr. Benes and MM. Paderewski and Dmowski entered the Council.

M. Benes explained the question of Teschen to the Council with the aid of maps. He said that the problem should be looked at from four points of view, namely, the ethnographical, the historical, the economic and the political. Question of Teschen

According to the latest statistics, there were in the Teschen area, 230,000 Poles, 150,000 Czechs, and 60,000 Germans. This Polish majority was questioned by the Czechs, who doubted the accuracy of the statistics. Owing to the policy of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the resistance of the Czechs to Austrian rule had been combated by every administrative measure that could be brought against them; and in consequence, the Austrian policy had been systematically to weaken any ethnographical statistics favourable to the Czecho-Slovak population. This could be seen from the fact that the figures given varied from one census to another. The German and Polish elements were generally grouped together; because these two sections of the population were always able to agree in their opposition to the Czechs. There were, in the mining district of the Teschen area, a large percentage of workmen, who were not, properly speaking, inhabitants of Teschen. The Austrian Authorities had assisted the Polish agitation in Teschen since the year 1873, when the centralising tendencies of the Viennese government began to be put into effect. Since that date, Polish schools had multiplied, and a continuous effort had been made to replace the local Czech, administration by Polish or German Authorities. The result of all this had been that the statistics of the Polish population had increased, but the Czecho-Slovak Government thought that false classifications had deliberately been introduced into the data on which the statistics were based. The population in Teschen did not speak the proper Polish language, but a dialectic mixture of Czecho-Slovak and Polish. It was even declared that there were no villages in which separate Polish and Czech inhabitants lived side by side. There were, none the less, centres where the Czecho-Polish dialect was universally spoken. This showed that the population of Teschen, from an ethnographical point of view, was in a transitional state. There was further to be taken into consideration the tendency of the population towards a particular form of culture, and it was certain that the tendency of the population in the area was towards the adoption of Czech customs. All these facts combined to show that the Austrian, statistics could not be trusted, or at least, that they presented only one side of the question. The Czech Government maintained that there were not more than 45 per cent of Poles in the Teschen area. (a) Ethnographical Considerations

The situation of Czecho-Slovakia in the past, was of importance. That country had always identified itself with the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia, formed out of Moravia, Bohemia, and that Potion of Silesia which included Teschen. The strife of the sixteenth century had almost exterminated the Bohemian population. A revival of Bohemian national sentiment had occurred later, but the moral sentiment sustaining it had been based upon the historical status of the Bohemian Kingdom, and the national unity of that country. Basing itself upon these feelings, Bohemia had always resisted the attempts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to force their country into a Central European Federation. They had never, in the past, abandoned their standpoint that the old Kingdom constituted a historic unit, and ought never to be divided. This sentiment was very deep, and existed at the present moment; the population could not understand the projected division of Teschen, at a moment when the ethnographical problem had not been finally resolved. (b) Historical Considerations

The coal question affected Czecho-Slovakia very deeply. There were large masses of coal in Poland, and in those parts of Upper Silesia which would undoubtedly be ceded to that country. Statistics showed that the total capacity of the Polish coalpits amounted to 86 billion tons; the pits in Czecho-Slovakia, including Teschen, only had a capacity of 9 billion tons. Czecho-Slovakia was essentially an industrial country. It had produced 70 per cent of the metal work of the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom, 93 per cent of the sugar products of that country, and had worked a preponderating proportion of the blast furnaces employed in Austro-Hungarian industries. All this showed how much the Czecho-Slovak State was dependent upon a continuous supply of coal, and how little they were asking for themselves. The mines in Czecho-Slovakia were only capable of supplying the needs of the country for 250 years. Poland imported very little coal from Teschen, and statistics showed that in the past, only 25 trucks were sent into Poland every day. The industrial character of Czecho-Slovakia obliged her to import coal from Silesia. (c) Economic Considerations

Mr. Polk then asked whether some of the coal imported by Czechoslovakia did not go to Austria.

Mr. Balfour also asked whether M. Benes’ figures included the importation of lignite.

M. Benes, replying to Mr. Polk, said that a certain quantity of coal was transmitted to Austria through Czecho-Slovakia, but that two-thirds of the total importation remained in the last named country.

Replying to Mr. Balfour, he said that there was enough lignite in Czecho-Slovakia for the domestic needs of the country.

Passing to the Railway question, he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the most important railway line, maintaining communication between Slovakia and the disputed coal districts, ran through Teschen. This railway was absolutely necessary for the transport of the products of Czecho-Slovakia. (M. Benes here illustrated his statement by a reference to a diagrammatic map, showing the great proportion of Czecho-Slovakian goods carried over the Oderberg-Kaschau line.) It was impossible for the new Czechoslovak Republic to build a new railway line on its own resources.

If the supply of coal upon which Czecho-Slovakia depended so greatly were taken from her, that country would have to rely upon Poland for the essential elements of her existence. Czecho-Slovakia was a more industrial country than Poland. Her sugar industries, her metallurgical works, and her blast furnaces could only be developed and continued by having a continuous supply of coal. If a decision were made unfavourable to Czecho-Slovakia, it would cause a great revulsion of feeling in that country. He had been surprised how deeply Czech feeling had been roused by the question. During the long negotiations of the past months, he had done everything in his power to calm the population of his country, but he had only been able to do so because his countrymen were hoping for a solution favourable to themselves. They now saw themselves faced with the possibility of a situation arising in which they would be deprived of these things which were necessary for the reconstruction of their country. He had always attempted to advocate moderate views, but he doubted whether his influence would prevail over the growing excitement in his country. (d) Political Considerations

He would like to draw attention to the economic effects of diplomatic friction between his country and Poland. In a period of strained relations, Poland would only have to hold up the railway traffic into Czecho-Slovakia, to paralyse that country in 24 hours. He would like the Polish representatives to understand that Czechoslovakia was not demanding rights over Polish populations, but merely putting forward a claim for things necessary for her very life. Czecho-Slovakia was surrounded by countries in a state of ferment, and the supply of materials necessary for her reconstruction was an absolute necessity to her, if she were to remain free of the existing political confusion in Central Europe. He had desired to see his country reconstituted on a firm economic basis as rapidly as possible, in order that he might make it a sort of rallying point for the political aims of western European policy. By doing so, he had hoped that her neighbours would gather round her, and that the western Powers would find a support for their policies in Czecho-Slovakia. Poland was necessarily involved in the politics of Eastern Europe. She was faced with all the difficulties of the Russian situation, in which she would be involved for a long time to come. For this reason, Poland would require the collaboration of Czecho-Slovakia, but this could not be given if the last named country were deprived of Teschen, which was regarded as essential to her economic existence. During the war, the Czech population had adhered to their wish for the integrity of their country. They had had the deepest faith in the policy of the Entente. He feared that if a decision unfavourable to Czechoslovakia were given on the Teschen question, there would be a deep and general reversion of feeling. He feared that the proposed solution of the Teschen question would give rise to a deeply hostile feeling towards Poland, which might be seen from the fact that the Radical Parties in Czecho-Slovakia were now adopting an inimical attitude towards Poland. In order to counteract this unfortunate sentiment amongst his countrymen, he had proposed a compromise, which he had hoped would satisfy both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. He had originally suggested that the line of the Vistula should be the boundary between the two countries. It had been pointed out to him that larger concessions were necessary, and he had endeavoured, with success, to make popular opinion in his country, favour the concession of the whole of the Bielitz district to Poland. His own opinions had been regarded as heretical by his countrymen: notwithstanding this, he had accepted a solution, which he hoped would have satisfied both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. More than this, he had always wished to advance conciliatory proposals in the case of Glatz. He had accepted a frontier between his country and Hungary, which placed 132,000 more Slovaks under Hungarian rule than there were Hungarians under Czech administration. He was now faced by a frontier line, proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees, which divided the mining district into two portions. Such a solution could not possibly be accepted. The artificial nature of the division proposed, could be seen by the well known fact that there was constant communication between the districts which it was proposed to separate: large numbers of workmen were continually moving from one area to another, and back. The new frontier line would interrupt free communication with Slovakia, and would oblige the Czech Government to construct a special railway line, which would practically run through one continuous tunnel. The German population were all in favour of maintaining the economic unity of the Teschen area. He did not wish to lay emphasis on this argument, which none the less, could not be completely neglected. He had recently received a Delegation, largely composed of miners and workmen, from the Teschen district. On the news being received that the Teschen Basin was going to be divided, large numbers of Polish workmen had protested against such a measure. It was to be noted, that many of the Delegates belonged to political parties quite averse to chauvinistic feeling (Socialists, Socialist Democrats, etc). None the less, they had expressed themselves strongly on the point, and had stated that they feared for the future. He did not think he was exaggerating when he said that this population now so profoundly disturbed, would act against the wishes both of the Polish and of the Czecho-Slovak Governments, and deal with the problem by independent action on their own account. At the present moment, strikes of a political character were occurring, in which Polish workmen were taking part. He had tried to keep the population quiet, but he had begun to feel that a conciliatory policy on his part was more and more difficult in face of a general movement of protest and indignation. Teschen would always be of secondary importance to Poland. The Poles had complained that an economic argument was being brought against their ethnographical claims. The Poles, themselves, had not hesitated to do the same when they thought that such arguments would be favourable to them. He desired, in conclusion, to ask the Conference to consider with the utmost care, all the arguments that he had brought forward, to weigh the grave political consequences which might follow a decision contrary to the wishes of the Czecho-Slovak population, and to take into account the immense sacrifices which Czecho-Slovakia had made in supporting the Entente throughout the war.

(It was agreed that the Polish Delegates should be heard on the following day, and the meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Astoria, Paris , 4 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–47

[Translation⁵]

commander in chief
of the allied armies
general staff
4243

Allied General Headquarters September 3, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

To the President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference (Secretariat).

I have the honor to send you herewith a copy of the report of Captain Laperche, Chief of Liaison with the German Delegation, transmitting the request made by M. von Lersner, on behalf of the German Government, to have the personnel of the delegations of the Commissions of Control reduced, or at least to postpone the date of their departure for Berlin.

I think I should, in this regard, make the following observations:

(1) It was at the express request of the German Government (letter of August 11, from M. von Lersner to the President of the Peace Conference) that the Supreme Council of the Allies took the resolution to send “… as soon as possible to Berlin, a reduced delegation composed of the president and the most important members of each Commission, in such manner that each power participating in the control would be represented … in order to fix, in agreement with the German Government, the methods of carrying out the provisions of part V of the treaty of peace.”⁶

(2) The composition of the delegations of the three Commissions (60 officers, 12 interpreters, 77 men, 13 automobiles) was determined upon by the presidents of the Commissions in consideration of the duties devolving upon them and the necessity for having in each of them representatives of each power participating in the control.

It is not possible, therefore, to reduce their composition.

(3) The date of departure of September 5 was fixed, assuming on one hand that the delegations would require about 10 days to prepare the work of their Commissions, and on the other hand that the treaty of peace would come into force about the 15th of September.

I consider it indispensable that the Commissions of Control should be able to function upon the coming into force of the peace treaty.

The date for the departure of the delegations cannot be delayed, therefore, unless the ratification of the treaty of peace should take place at a date definitely later than September 15.

I have the honor to request that you will be good enough to inform me of the reply which I am to make to M. von Lersner.

By order, Chief of Staff

Desticker

[Enclosure]

Report by Captain Laperche, Chief of Liaison With the German Delegation

Versailles, September 3, 1919.

This morning, in the course of an interview which he had asked to have with me, M. von Lersner communicated to me a despatch which he had received from Berlin on the subject of the approaching arrival of an Interallied military mission, announced in letter No. 4198, of August 31, 1919, from the Marshal, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

This mission, which is expected to leave Paris on September 5, is composed of 60 officers, 12 interpreters, 77 men, and 13 automobiles.

M. von Lersner begged me to transmit informally to the Secretariat of the Peace Conference, the remarks formulated on the subject by his Government:

The German Government points out that since this mission has only to prepare for the installation and to organize the work of the military commissions, which will not assume their function until after the coming into force of the peace treaty, the number of its members seems too great.

The German Government sees a serious disadvantage in the immediate dispatch of so large a mission, and earnestly requests that:

(1) In case it is deemed necessary to send a mission at once, the size of its membership be reduced.

(2) In case it is not deemed possible to diminish its membership, its departure be delayed for some time.

M. von Lersner was urgent in pointing out to me that the present arrival of such a mission would increase further the grave difficulties of internal politics which the German Government now has to eon-front. Public opinion in Germany would be surprised at the arrival of so large a military mission, since the work of the Interallied military commissions intended to supervise the carrying out of the provisions of the treaty, is not to begin until after the coming into force of the peace treaty, and the opposing political parties would find in this fact new grounds for conflict with the Government.

Laperche

Appendix B to HD–47

[Translation⁸[

delegation of
the republic of german austria
1162

Saint Germain-en-Laye, September 3, 1919.

[The President of the Austrian Delegation (Renner) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

Mr. President: With regard to the notification which Your Excellency was good enough to give me in your note of the second of September,⁹ according to which a limit of five days would be fixed within which German Austria is to declare whether it is prepared to sign the treaty of peace, of which the text has been transmitted to it, I request the Supreme Council to grant me an extension of this limit until September 9.

The burdens which will have to be laid upon German Austria in virtue of the proposed text are such that no government could assume responsibility for them without submitting them to a vote of the National Assembly. With that in mind, I find myself obliged to go to Vienna to explain in person to the representatives of the people the situation in which we find ourselves and the serious consequences which the attitude of the young Republic will entail, whether it resigns itself to signing or refuses to sign.

The means of travel between Paris and Vienna are, at the moment, in such a state that the journey alone, going and coming, requires nearly five days.

Adding the time necessary for parliamentary action, the Conference will admit that a period of about eight days is the indispensable minimum of time required for deciding upon a grave problem on which hangs the existence of a whole people. I am confident, therefore, that I can look forward to having my request taken under sympathetic consideration by the Supreme Council.

I have the honor to add that, during my absence, I shall be represented by the Commissaire Général of the German Austrian Delegation and director in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Jean André Eichhoff.

Accept [etc.]

Renner

H. E. the President of the Peace Conference,

Georges Clemenceau,

Paris.

Appendix C to HD–47

[Translation¹⁰]

roumanian delegation
to the peace conference

Paris, September 3, 1919.

[The Roumanian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

Mr. President: I have just received a telegram from M. Bratiano, President of the Council in Roumania, informing me that, up to the morning of August 31 last, he had not received the note which was sent by the Conference and of which mention was made in the radiograms forwarded to Roumania by the telegraphic agencies.

M. Bratiano has received my telegrams announcing to him the prohibition of all military transports for Roumania, and he begs me to draw the special attention of the Conference to the dangerous and pernicious character of the policy adopted regarding Roumania.

As regards the affairs of Hungary, Roumania had the conviction that by the occupation of Budapest and the destruction of bolshevism she had rendered a great service to the general cause.

In consequence of the conditions which it is intended to create for Roumania, without any account taken of her sacrifices in men and supplies, the Roumanian Government is considering what interest it might have in withdrawing its troops beyond the Tisza, while declining all responsibility for the state of chaos into which would be plunged again that region of Europe which has been contended for by the Bolsheviks and the monarchistic reactionaries.

Accept [etc.]

N. Misu

H. E. Monsieur G. Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference,
and of the Supreme Council.

Appendix D to HD–47

[Translation¹⁰]

August 30, 1919.
[Received September 3—6:40 p.m.]

[Telegram From the French Minister in Roumania (Saint-Aulaire) to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has told me that the Roumanian troops would evacuate Hungarian territory as soon as Hungary should have been disarmed and the Roumanians should have entered again partially into possession of the railway equipment which had been taken from them and with which they cannot dispense in safeguarding the economic interests of the country. As soon as this double objective shall have been attained, M. Bratiano told me, Roumania will withdraw its troops. The Hungarian question seemed to him, however, to be full of danger. The general impression is that after the departure of the Roumanian troops, Hungary will founder in bolshevism, at any rate that she will not develop toward the monarchical form, the only form capable, it seems, of maintaining itself without outside support. A democratic government could not make itself accepted unless the country continued to be occupied by Roumanian troops during the period of time necessary to enable it to organize itself and to create an armed force competent to ensure its defense and to maintain order.

M. Bratiano added that this was a general question, and that all the powers had the same interest in preventing Budapest from becoming once more a hotbed of anarchy which would soon spread to Vienna and perhaps even beyond. Roumania has no intention, nevertheless, of playing the role of policeman for the Entente against their wishes, and will not persist in maintaining its troops at Budapest, inasmuch as their presence has earned nothing so far from its Allies except reproaches which it considers it has not deserved.

Saint-Aulaire

Appendix E to HD–47

[Note From the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government]

The Associated Powers have watched with the deepest concern the recent developments of Roumanian policy in Hungary, which seem to indicate a deliberate resolve of her rulers to separate themselves from their Allies and pursue an independent course of their own.

So long as the Soviet Government of Bela Kun were attacking or threatening to attack the Roumanian Army with forces in excess of those permitted by the Armistice, the Roumanian Government were able to allege that self-preservation required them to occupy a strong defensive line on Hungarian soil, notwithstanding that the Conference had requested them to retire within their own newly drawn frontier. Whatever apparent force this argument may have once possessed it has none now. Events have demonstrated the military impotence of Bela Kun as clearly as his political bankruptcy: and assuredly no considerations of national security can any longer be urged by the Roumanian Government in defence of their recent action. Even if Hungary under its Soviet Government, did not completely carry out the provisions of the Armistice, it was for the Associated Governments, by their collective action, to deal with the situation thus created, not for one of them in isolation to pursue a policy of its own devising. This however is exactly what Roumania has done, and in a manner which seems wholly without excuse. Hungary, suing for peace, already partially disarmed, in the throes of revolution, without allies and without food, has been overrun by troops, who under order from Bucharest, systematically strip it of every species of movable wealth, alive or dead, which seems worth the labour of transportation. Cattle, horses, agricultural implements, raw material, machinery, railway equipment, even the outfit of a children’s hospital, choke the lines which lead from Buda-Pesth to Roumania. Wherever there are Roumanian soldiers, and Hungarian prisoners to work for them, everything is being taken that can be taken, however necessary it may be to provide employment in the towns or to raise food in the country. The economic problem presented by Hungary, in any case difficult of solution, is thus becoming rapidly impossible.

The Associated Powers are well aware of the provocation which Roumania has received. They make no excuses for her enemies. She was abominably treated by Hungary and the Allies of Hungary in their hour of triumph; and if she is now plundering on her own account, she has been herself most cruelly plundered. Doubtless the majority of her soldiers genuinely believe that, since they are only taking back what was once their own, their conduct needs no defence.

But though this may be true of the Roumanian soldiers, it cannot be true of the Roumanian Government. They must be well aware that this rough and ready method of exacting reparation is neither just to their allies nor expedient in the common interests. If indeed it did no more than impoverish Hungary and enrich Roumania it might be said, with truth, that both countries got what they deserved. But none knew better than the Roumanian Government that the policy of the Associated Powers takes account of far wider issues and far more complicated interests: for in the framing of that policy Roumanian delegates took their share.

The decisions then arrived at assume the truth of two principles, both of which are violated by the action of the Roumanian authorities in Hungary. The first is that while enemy countries are justly liable for all and more than all they are able to pay, this amount will be diminished not increased if they are made the victims of exactions which utterly destroy their powers of production. The second is that as the war was a common undertaking, the funds obtained for reparations should be divided on a fixed scheme among the allies who suffered loss.

Now the Roumanian Government, when they organised the plundering of Hungary must have been well aware that they were violating both these principles. They must have known that they were reducing Hungary to a condition in which she was much more likely to be a charge upon Allied charity than to contribute to the reparation of Allied losses; and they must have known that what was taken from Hungary, belonged as of right to the general reparation fund and not to any single one among the belligerent Powers.

These considerations are so obvious in themselves, and have been so earnestly pressed upon the Roumanian Government, that the Associated Powers are reluctantly compelled to ask themselves whether Roumania still counts herself among their number. None of the events that have occurred during the last few weeks are of a nature to reassure them. Remonstrances addressed to Bucharest have remained without reply. Remonstrances addressed to Roumanian representatives at Paris have been of no effect. Remonstrances made in the name of the Conference by the Allied generals at Buda Pesth have been met with fair promises. But the promises have not been kept. Roumania has persistently treated Hungary as a conquered province, and herself as its conqueror, sole and irresponsible. There is no sign that she still deems herself a member of an Alliance, or that in her judgment the Five Great Powers who mainly won the war have any predominant claim to settle the terms of peace.

These are facts which the Conference note with the greatest regret. They acclaimed the entry of Roumania into the war: they rejoiced that after a succession of calamities which the Western belligerents were powerless to prevent, she was about to share to the full the fruits of their victory: they never doubted that she was to be counted among their Allies. Unhappily, they are forced against their will to doubt it now: and, in one way or the other, for good or for evil, their doubts must be resolved without delay.

They desire therefore a clear reply to the following questions:

• Is Roumania prepared on a date to be fixed by the Conference to withdraw her troops from Hungary?
• Is she prepared at once to cease appropriating to her use Hungarian property?
• Is she prepared to surrender to the Reparation Commission the property already appropriated?
• Is she prepared to co-operate loyally with the Associated Powers, and under their direction, in the task, of so restoring order in Hungary as to enable a responsible Government to negotiate terms of peace?

The Conference are most unwilling to believe that the Roumanian Government will hesitate to return an affirmative answer to all these questions. Their refusal would be an immeasurable misfortune. It would shatter the hopes of those who see in the unbroken co-operation of the Associated Powers the surest security for future peace; only those would be content who hold that in the hour of victory no alliance can stand the strain of competing national interests. Whether Roumania would gain by a severance of friendly relations with her Western Associates, it is for Roumanian statesmen to determine. But the Conference must know, and know without delay, where they stand, and how they are henceforward to look upon a state they have been proud to call their Ally.

A. J. B[alfour]

4. 9.19.

Appendix F to HD–47

Report on the Subject of the Special Clauses Proposed by M. Venizelos

[Same as appendix F to HD–25, printed in volume VII, page 590.]

1. Vol. vii, pp. 792, 806.
2. French Minister at Bucharest.
3. Vol. vii, p. 811.
4. Appendix C to HD–23, ibid., p. 517; appendix A to HD–24, ibid., p. 541; HD–25, ibid., p. 555; appendix B to HD–26, ibid., p. 615; HD–30, ibid., p. 682; appendix G to HD–31, ibid., p. 691; appendix A to HD–37, ibid., p. 819; appendix C to HD–38, ibid., p. 857.
5. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
6. HD–36, minute 8, and appendix J, vol. vii, pp. 792, 806.
8. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
9. Appendix A to HD–43, p. 19.
10. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
10. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.