Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/46
HD–46
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, September 3, 1919, at 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- Hon. F. L. Polk.
- Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison.
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Mr. P. Kerr.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de Saint-Quentin.
- Italy
- M. Tittoni.
- Secretary
- M. Paterno.
- Japan
- M. Matsui.
- Secretary
- M. Kawai.
- United States of America
Joint Secretariat | |
America, United States of | Mr. C. Russell |
British Empire | Capt. E. Abraham |
France | M. de Percin |
Italy | Capt. Rossi |
Interpreter—M. Camerlynck |
The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—
- America, United States of
- The Hon. H. Gibson.
- Dr. Lord.
- Mr. A. Dulles.
- Mr. Nielsen.
- British Empire
- Mr. A. Leeper.
- Mr. Carr.
- Col. Kisch.
- France
- M. Cambon.
- M. Fromageot.
- M. Serruys.
- General Le Rond.
- M. Cheysson.
- M. Hermite.
- M. Massigli.
- Italy
- M. Brambilla.
- M. Ricci-Busatti.
- M. Nagara.
1. M. Tittoni said that before beginning the business of the day, he wished to draw attention to a matter of considerable importance.
The American Delegation had received news that on the evacuation of Koritza by French troops, General Franchet d’Esperey had ordered their replacement by Greek troops. He thought this would lead to great trouble. Evacuation of Albania
M. Clemenceau said that he had not seen any report to that effect. Moreover, he did not think it likely that the information was correct. General Franchet d’Esperey had asked what he was to do after the evacuation. No orders had as yet been given.
M. Tittoni said that it was very necessary to give orders that Greek troops should not occupy Koritza when the place was evacuated by the French. The Mussulman population was preparing partly to emigrate and partly to form armed bands to resist the Greeks. He understood that the French evacuation was imminent and whether or not the news to which he had alluded was correct, he thought the question should be examined.
M. Clemenceau said that French troops would certainly not stay in Koritza, but that on their departure it would be arranged that the place should not be occupied.
Mr. Polk said that the news he had received was merely a rumour. He had written to M. Clemenceau to inform him.
M. Pichon said that the French Government agreed with M. Tittoni and had already informed the Greeks that they should not occupy Koritza.
M. Berthelot observed that Pogradek was also to be evacuated. It was common agreement that both Koritza and Pogradek belonged to Albania. It was also an agreed policy that no occupation of contested territories should take place without an order from the Council.
M. Clemenceau asked that all documents on the subject be supplied to him in order that he should be able to give an opinion on the following day.
Mr. Balfour asked that a note on the subject be prepared as he had not been given any information.
(The question was then adjourned to the following day.)
2. M. Clemenceau said that on the previous day, Mr. Balfour had asked for an adjournment of 24 hours. He asked whether Mr. Balfour was able to give an opinion. Roumanian Affairs
Mr. Balfour said that he agreed with the policy of sending a representative of the Council to Bucharest. He no longer thought, however, that Admiral Troubridge would be the best representative, as he had very rightly taken strong [Page 78] action against the Roumanians. He thought a civilian representative would be better. The person selected should be ready to represent the views of the Council very strongly, but he should not have been previously identified with any controversial action. He begged to suggest M. Jonnart, who had carried out very difficult negotiations in Greece with conspicuous success. Should he agree to go, Mr. Balfour thought he would be the best possible representative.
M. Pichon said that he was convinced that M. Jonnart would not accept the mission. He had resigned the Governorship of Algeria in order to take up the work of reconstructing the devastated districts. He would not be ready to abandon this work.
M. Tittoni agreed that M. Jonnart would be an excellent appointment.
M. Clemenceau said that he would ask M. Jonnart whether he was willing to go, but he did not expect him to accept. He asked whether Mr. Balfour could not make a British appointment in this alternative.
Mr. Balfour said that another plan suggested to him was that in each capital the Roumanian diplomatic representative should be summoned and that the views of the Allied and Associated Powers should be clearly explained to him.
M. Clemenceau said that he did not think this course would be sufficient to meet the case. He wished to send a single individual to represent the Council in Bucharest and who would return with the answer of the Roumanian Government.
Mr. Balfour observed that the Council required more than an answer. It would be necessary for their representative to make public in Roumania the point of view of the Allied and Associated Powers. This point of view appeared to be much misunderstood in Roumania.
Mr. Polk said that the Roumanians regarded America as their one enemy. A distinguished Roumanian had informed an American of this. When told that all the communications sent to the Roumanian Government had been sent collectively from all the Allied and Associated Powers, he had, in reply, drawn attention to the views expressed in the French Press.
M. Clemenceau pointed out that during the incidents between France and Italy, the French Press had been consistently pro-Italian. The pro-Roumanian attitude of the French Press at the present time was, in the main, due to the activities of M. Robert de Flers. On the other hand, M. Bratiano had said that M. Clemenceau was his worst foe. The Roumanians were certainly friendly with the Italians, but he trusted that the Italian Government was not offering them any encouragement.
[Page 79]M. Tittoni said that he occasionally saw M. Misu. On all occasions, he had impressed on him that the Conference took a very serious view of the Roumanian situation. He had warned him that Roumania was embarking on a very risky enterprise.
Mr. Polk said that on further reflection, he thought it would be & good thing to summon the Roumanian Minister at the four capitals.
M. Clemenceau said that the object might be attained by recalling the Allied Ministers from Bukarest.
M. Tittoni said that this step should be reserved for a later stage.
Mr. Balfour said that the results hitherto obtained by the discussion appeared to be (a) that a Commissioner must be found to represent the Council in Bucharest: (b) that M. Misu should be summoned to be present at the Council and that the Roumanian Ministers in Rome, London and Washington should be summoned by the Governments of those capitals. The Roumanian Ministers summoned should be warned that the Council regarded the actions of their Government with considerable disfavour and it should be explained to them that the Roumanian Government appeared to misapprehend the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers completely. (c) That they should be told that the Allied and Associated Powers were seriously considering the withdrawal of their representatives at Bucharest, as a token that they ceased to regard Roumania as one of the Allied and Associated Powers.
M. Clemenceau said that he would see M. Jonnart on that very day. He asked Mr. Balfour meanwhile to endeavour to find a suitable Englishman for the post. He further asked that Mr. Balfour should draft a document explaining the Allied policy towards Roumania. Should the Roumanian Government reject the ultimatum addressed to them, the representative of the Council, on leaving Roumania, should bring back with him all the Allied and Associated Ministers and officers in the country.
(It was agreed that Mr. Balfour should draft a document explaining the policy of the Council towards Roumania, and that this document should be submitted to the Council on the following day.
It was also agreed that both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour should endeavour to find a suitable representative of the Council to send to Bukarest.)
3. The interpreter read a letter from Mr. Hoover to M. Clemenceau (see Appendix A), stating that the amount of railway rolling stock in locomotives and wagons was much larger in Hungary than had keen originally surmised. The rolling stock included equipment: formerly belonging to the Galician railways, and therefore due to the Polish Government; belonging to the Bohemian railways and therefore due to [Page 80] the Czecho-Slovak Government; belonging to the East Prussian railways and therefore due to the Polish Government; belonging to the Alsace-Lorraine railways and therefore due to the French Government; a considerable number of wagons belonging to the Trentino railways and therefore due to the Italian Government, and a large number of locomotives and wagons formerly belonging to the Roumanian railways and therefore due to the Roumanian Government. It seemed imperative that the Peace Conference should direct that the distribution of this rolling stock be dealt with by the Governments concerned; and Mr. Hoover recommended that the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council be authorised to undertake an immediate control of this rolling stock and that a preliminary distribution be authorised on the basis of the actual identification of the material. Allotment of Rolling Stock Found in Hungary
Mr. Balfour asked whether it was proposed that the rolling-stock belonging to each country should be returned to that country, as, for example, former Polish rolling-stock to Poland, or whether the whole should be pooled.
Mr. Polk suggested that, as the principle was not accepted, the matter should be discussed by the Commission on Reparations.
(It was then decided to refer Mr. Hoover’s letter (Appendix “A”) regarding the allotment among the Allies of rolling-stock found in Hungary, to the Organising Committee of the Reparations Commission, for study and early report.)
4. Mr. Polk said that M. Paderewski was expected in Paris on the following day. He suggested that the consideration of this Treaty should be delayed until his presence could be obtained in the Council. Treaty With Poland Relating to Eastern Galicia
(It was agreed that the question should be discussed on the following Friday.)
5. The Council had before it the request from Dr. Benes contained in Appendix “B”.
Clemenceau said that he thought that this request should be accepted. Demand of the Czecho-Slovaks Delegation To BE Heard on the Subject of Teschen
Mr. Balfour said that if the Czecho-Slovaks were heard it would be impossible not to hear the Poles.
M. Cambon asked that a solution of the question be hastened, as delay, was causing great anxiety both in Prague and in Warsaw.
Mr. Polk thought it might perhaps be best that the experts be heard at once, in order that the Council should be prepared for the hearing of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates.
General Le Rond explained the report contained in Appendix “C”.
He said that on April 14th a report had been furnished by the joint Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees, in which four Delegations proposed [Page 81] a certain line, and the Italian Delegation suggested another line, more favourable to the Poles. This report had not been examined by the Council. The Inter-Allied Commission in Teschen had since unanimously adopted another line, and the matter had been referred by the Council to the united Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees. The matter was examined by sub-commissions. Three delegations agreed on a line very similar to that recommended by the Inter-Allied Commission in Teschen. The French and British Delegations made certain objections. They thought that the line proposed involved certain political and economic difficulties. This was implicity admitted by the other Delegations, as they regarded as necessary supplementary agreements between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to regulate the railway and coal situation between the two countries.
When the question had been studied in the joint meeting of the two Committees, the British and French Delegations had withdrawn their objections, and adhered to the views of the majority. The report finally made deliberately set aside the political aspect of the question, which was reserved for the decision of the Council. He was bound to point out that if the line recommended were accepted by the Council, it would be necessary for the Council to arrange for the signature of Agreements between the two parties for the regulation of the economic relations and railway communications between the two parts of the territory of Teschen. It was only on these terms that the frontier could be made acceptable to Czecho-Slovakia.
It was suggested that the study of these agreements should be referred back to the Joint Committees.
M. Tittoni said that he thought the line should be adopted, and then the means of rendering it acceptable to the parties should be studied.
M. Clemenceau said he was unable to accept a line until he knew what was required to render it acceptable.
Mr. Polk said that the line formerly suggested would have required no such agreements as were now proposed. It gave a Polish population, however, to Czecho-Slovakia. The line now recommended broke up the economic unity of the country for ethnic reasons, and therefore required to be supplemented by economic agreements.
M. Clemenceau suggested that the Council should hear Dr. Benes and a Polish representative before deciding.
M. Tittoni said that any line suiting the Czecho-Slovaks would ipso facto not suit the Poles. The political effect in either case might endanger the existing Governments. Nevertheless, he thought that economic and ethnic reasons should prevail, and that the Council should not be unduly influenced by the prospects of any Government in power.
[Page 82](It was agreed that MM. Benes and Dmowski should be heard on the following day.)
6. M. Serruys said that, regarding Article 25, there had been in succession three proposals by Roumania. There was an Article in all the Treaties abrogating all Conventions made between the enemy Powers and Roumania, Russia or any portion of what had been the Russian Empire before or since the 1st August, 1914. Roumania had first wished to be excluded from these Articles, secondly, she had wished that the Articles should be identical in all the Treaties, thirdly, she had asked that the clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria should be so framed as not to affect the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913.1 The Economic Commission had, therefore, proposed the following text for Article 25:— Article 25 of the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria
“Bulgaria recognises as abrogated all Treaties, Conventions or Agreements concluded before the 1st August, 1914, or since that date up to the coming into force of the present Treaty, with Russia or with any State or Government the territory of which previously constituted any part of Russia as well as with Roumania, subsequent to the 15th August, 1916, up to the coming into force of the present Treaty.”
The Economic Commission had thought this text acceptable, as all the economic agreements it was desired to abolish had taken place since the war. It was unnecessary to touch the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. The Drafting Committee had been asked to examine the questions and had reached very similar conclusions. (See H. D. 31, Minute 2.)2 The Drafting Committee pointed out that the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest only affected States parties to that Treaty and no others. (For the report of the Drafting Committee, see Appendix “D”)
(At this point, the members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.)
Mr. Balfour asked why the Roumanians wished to maintain this Treaty.
M. Serruys said they wished it maintained because it affected Roumanian prestige and because Roumania did not wish to give up any rights it established in her favour. In any case, these considerations were not the concern of the Economic Commission.
Mr. Polk said that the Council had no reason to bind itself to recognise this Treaty, as the Roumanians had offered no satisfaction on the Dobrudja question.
M. Tittoni said that the questions before the Council were:—
- 1.
- Could the Conference annul the Bucharest Treaty of 1913. The answer to this was in the negative.
- 2.
- Could the Conference enact economic or territorial regulations out of conformity with the Bucharest Treaty. Seeing that the Allied and Associated Powers were not party to the Treaty of Bucharest, they had the right to do so.
Mr. Polk asked whether the clause, as at present framed, did not imply some recognition of the Treaty of 1913?
M. Serruys said that the clause implied no such recognition.!It only stipulated for the abrogation of Conventions made since August, 1916, and was silent on the subject of the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913.
M. Clemenceau said that, as the Conference had not yet settled whether Roumania was a friendly or hostile country, it might be as well to postpone the decision.
Mr. Balfour observed that this clause was necessary to complete the Treaty with Bulgaria.
M. Clemenceau said that he did not wish to help the Roumanians in any way, nor did he wish to take any action against them.
Mr. Hurst pointed out that the Treaty of 1913 was not only a bilateral agreement. It affected Roumania, Greece, Serbia, and, he thought, Montenegro. The Roumanians did not wish it abrogated as between themselves and the Bulgarians.
Mr. Balfour asked whether only the Roumanians had asked for the framing of the article as it was now proposed.
M. Serruys replied that Roumania alone had made the request, but that Greek and Serbian representatives had been present in the Economic Commission and had raised no objection to the framing of the article as now proposed.
Mr. Polk said that, if the Serbians and Greeks agreed, there appeared to be no reason why the Powers should not equally agree.
M. Tittoni said that, as, in his view, the Conference had no right to abrogate the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, he could not agree to any article tending to do so.
Mr. Polk said that, though he thought the Conference would have a right to abrogate the Treaty of Bucharest, he was ready to agree to the adoption of the article as proposed.
(It was decided to accept the drafting of Article 25 as proposed above.)
7. Mr. Balfour asked what remained before the completion of the Treaty with Bulgaria.
Mr. Hurst asked whether the Council had come to any conclusion regarding the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria in the Dobrudja. Completion of Treaty with Bulgaria
Mr. Balfour observed that the Council had decided that Roumania could not, as she was an Allied Power, be asked to yield any territory [Page 84] to Bulgaria. This decision had been taken some time ago and had never been cancelled. The Council, however, had not concealed its feeling that Roumania ought to give up a piece of the Dobrudja which was clearly not Roumanian. Strained relations with Roumania would not, he thought, justify a change in this policy. If the Powers were to go to war with Roumania, the situation would doubtless be altered. He thought that, for the purposes of the Treaty with Bulgaria, it might be assumed that the old frontier in the Dobrudja was maintained, though this might be neither equitable or conducive to peace in the Balkans.
M. Clemenceau said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour.
M. Tittoni also agreed.
Mr. Polk said that he would give his answer on the following day.
(The members of the Drafting Committee then withdrew.)
8. (At this point, M. Cheysson entered the room.)
M. Cheysson explained the report of the Financial Commission on Articles 38 and 67 proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria. The question had been referred to the Financial Commission by a resolution of the 12th August. (See H. D. 29, Minute 5.)4 He pointed out that the Greek Delegation asked for specially favourable terms in respect to properties in territory to be ceded by Bulgaria to Greece. In all other cases of ceded territories, the acquiring State gave credit for the value of property accompanying the territory in the Reparations account. The Financial Commission saw no reason for exceptional treatment in favor of Greece. (For the report of the Financial Commission see Appendix “E”.) Opinion of Financial Commission on Articles 38 & 67 of M. Venizelos’ Proposals for the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria. (See Appendix C to HD–22)3
Mr. Balfour asked what arguments were adduced by the Greek Delegation.
M. Cheysson said that no special arguments were put forward at all.
(It was decided to reject Article 38 proposed by the Greek Delegation for inclusion in the Treaty with Bulgaria.)
M. Cheysson observed that this decision carried the rejection of Article 67.
Mr. Balfour asked whether Italy paid Austria for the railway lines transferred to her.
M. Tittoni said that Italy paid for these lines in the Reparation Account.
(It was decided to reject Article 67 proposed by the Greek Delegation for inclusion in the Treaty with Bulgaria.)
[Page 85](The meeting then adjourned.)
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 658.↩
- Vol. vii, p. 686.↩
- Ibid., p. 673.↩
- Vol. vii, p. 491.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- The English text filed under Paris Peace Conf, 181.213302/2 has been substituted for the French text which accompanies the minutes as appendix C to HD–46.↩
- HD–6, minute 2, and HD–13, minute 2, vol. vii, pp. 117 and 257.↩
- These figures are based on the report of the Teschen Commission. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- HD–29, minute 5, vol. vii, p. 673.↩