Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/45


Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 2, 1919, at 11 a.m.

  • Present
    • United States of America
      • Hon. F. L. Polk.
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison.
    • British Empire
      • Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
    • Secretaries
      • Mr. H. Norman.
      • Sir George Clerk.
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau.
      • M. Pichon.
    • Secretaries
      • M. Dutasta.
      • M. Berthelot.
      • M. de Saint-Quentin.
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui.
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai.
    • Italy
      • M. Tittoni.
    • Secretary
      • M. Paterno.
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Captain Chapin.
British Empire Commander Bell.
France M. de Percin.
Italy Captain Rossi.
Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

  • America, United States of
    • Mr. Woolsey.
    • Professor Coolidge.
    • Dr. Johnson.
    • Dr. Scott.
    • Mr. Nielsen.
  • British Empire
    • Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
    • Mr. A. Leeper.
    • Hon. H. Nicolson.
  • France
    • M. Tardieu.
    • M. Fromageot.
    • General Le Bond.
    • M. Aubert.
    • M. de Montille.
  • Italy
    • Colonel Castoldi.
    • M. Ricci-Busatti.

[Page 55]

1. The Council took note of the new draft letter to the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty, by virtue of Article 61 of the German constitution (see Appendix A). Article 61 of the German Constitution and the Violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. (Reference HD–44, Minute 5)1

Mr. Balfour said that he noticed that the Germans were only given fifteen days in which to reply. It might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to answer within such a period. Their Parliament was not now in session, and he thought it doubtful whether their parliamentary procedure, of which he knew nothing, would permit them to accede to the wishes of the Council within the period stated.

M. Clemenceau said that he had foreseen the difficulty, but thought it was rather an advantage than otherwise, to give the Germans a short period within which to reply. They would be sure to object and to say that it was impossible, but the brief period imposed upon them in the letter would make it necessary for them to deal with the subject matter of the letter without delay.

(It was agreed that the draft letter, for communication to the German Government, calling their attention to the violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, by virtue of Article 61 of the new German constitution, should be accepted.)

2. Mr. Polk stated that he had received a telegram sent from Colonel Goodyear to Mr. Hoover. It was stated therein that Colonel Goodyear had been informed, by a telephonic message from General Dupont, that this latter officer had received no orders from M. Clemenceau to proceed to Silesia. The telephonic communication had been made on 31st August. Situation in Silesia

M. Clemenceau said that he had received a later telegram to the effect that General Dupont was ready to start.

Mr. Polk said that he would so inform Mr. Hoover.

3. M. Tardieu explained the frontier line which the Central Territorial Commission proposed for acceptance by the Council (See Appendix B), with the assistance of a map.

Mr. Polk remarked that the line drawn on the map differed from the frontier proposed by President Wilson. The United States were, none the less, prepared to adopt the frontier line now proposed by the Central Territorial Commission. Bulgarian Frontiers in Thrace. (a) Thracian Frontier

(It was decided that the frontier line presented to the Council by the Central Territorial Commission and adopted unanimously by them, should be accepted.)

[Page 56]

M. Tardieu explained the problem of the Bulgarian access to the Aegean, and said that the question had been dealt with by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, when it had discussed Article 24 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty. The central point of the problem was whether Dedeagatch should belong to Greece, or whether it should be part of an International State. This was a question which, of course, only the Council could settle. If it should be decided that it were to belong to Greece, the Central Territorial Commission was of the opinion that a general clause ought to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing to that country free access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway. The final allocation of Dedeagatch also raised the question of how the International Commission for that port ought to be constituted. The original proposal had been that the International Harbour Authority ought to be composed of a British, a Bulgarian and a Greek official. He considered that a French port officer should be added and, in addition, a representative of the United States, who would certainly act in a most impartial manner in all questions that came before him. His reason for suggesting a French representative was that France had been one of the Powers signatory to the Peace Treaty, assuring Greek independence.2 (b) Bulgarian Economic Access to the Aegean Sea

M. Tittoni said that whilst agreeing to M. Tardieu’s proposals, he did not quite understand why no Italian representative was suggested for the International Harbour Commission at Dedeagatch.

M. Clemenceau said that he would take note of M. Tittoni’s suggestion.

Mr. Polk said that it was important that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing free access to the Aegean Sea for that country; it was also important that Greece should have a free economic access to Eastern and Western Thrace.

M. Tardieu said that Greek troops ought to occupy such territory as was definitely to be assigned to them by common consent. With regard to the remaining portion, he had consulted with Marshal Foch’s staff and with that of General Alby. He had been told by these military experts, that one mixed Brigade, composed of six Battalions, and four Squadrons of Discussion Cavalry, would be necessary. There was, at the present moment at Dedeagatch, a force composed of two Battalions of French infantry and one Squadron of French cavalry: the French contribution could not be increased, except possibly by a small contingent of mountain artillery. The four Battalions and 3 squadrons of cavalry necessary to bring the force of occupation up to [Page 57] the strength required could be supplied by the other Allied Powers. If necessary, small reinforcements could be supplied by the Greek Government. He did not consider the situation to be disquieting, in view of the fact that troops were already in occupation, and others might be sent. (c) Military Occupation of the Areas in Thrace Now Under Discussion

Mr. Polk said that it would, in his opinion, be most unwise to send any Greek troops, for it would be absolutely impossible to get them out again. He thought it would be preferable to leave the Bulgarian forces in the area under discussion, since they would probably behave better under the threat of the eventual occupation of the territory by Greek troops. He added that no United States’ troops would be available for any Inter-Allied occupation of Thrace. He was sure that no trouble would occur so long as Inter-Allied troops were used for the occupation of the country.

M. Tittoni said that the Italians already had one battalion in Bulgaria, and that, if an Inter-Allied occupation of the areas now under discussion took place, the populations would remain in a state of tranquility, even though the military occupation were effected by small forces.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought Great Britain was in a position to make her contribution, but he did not like to make a definite statement without consulting his experts. He thought, however, that the British troops in Constantinople might be utilised.

(It was agreed that M. Tardieu should examine—

The question of assuring free economic access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway to Bulgaria, by means of general guaranteeing articles in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.
The question of an Inter-Allied Military occupation of the territories in Thrace now held by Bulgarian troops.
That his report on these subjects should be presented to the Council at an early date.

4. M. Tardieu explained the proposed Roumanian frontier in the Dobrudja with the assistance of a map. Roumanian Affairs

Mr. Balfour said that the original idea of the Council had been that the southern portion of Dobrudja was properly speaking, Bulgarian but that as it was Roumanian territory, and as Roumania was an Allied and friendly Power, she could not be forced to cede any portion of her territory to an enemy State. At the present moment, however, Roumania had almost ceased to have that character. He had just received a telegram from Admiral Troubridge showing the grave situation in Hungary caused by the action of the Roumanian authorities. (See Appendix “C”.)

Mr. Polk said that the American Delegation had received similar information from General Bandholtz on the previous day.

[Page 58]

M. Tittoni said that the four Generals were the scource of information from which the Council ought to draw. He did not know why reports were being received independently, whilst the Inter-Allied Committee of Generals was in session.

M. Clemenceau said that eight days had elapsed since a telegram had been sent to the Roumanian Government by the Council, and that no reply had been received.

M. Tittoni said that he thought the Council ought to receive a collective opinion on the situation from the four Generals. It was most important that the Council should be kept informed of their views, and he did not understand why they did not communicate their joint opinions more frequently. He thought that they ought to be called upon to do so.

Mr. Polk said that the Roumanians had now been defying the Conference for an entire three weeks, and had given no answer to the numerous communications sent to them. Every kind of Note had been sent to them. Some were couched in moderate terms—some in more forcible language, and others in a menacing style. Each style had failed to produce any result, and he thought that the time for sending Notes was now over. All information received combined to show that the Roumanians intended to make a separate Peace with Hungary. They were making requisitions on their own behalf, and acting in a completely independent manner. It was inconceivable to him that Roumania should defy the Council, which had behind it the support of three Great European Powers, without receiving encouragement from some quarter or another.

M. Berthelot said that he had recently received a visit from Mr. Antonescu, who, when asked why no reply had been given to the communications of the Council, had answered that they were couched in too violent terms.

Mr. Balfour then read a telegram from General Gorton and remarked that the last sentence contained in it did not seem to be connected with the first part (see Annex “D”).

At this point the Council took note of all the telegrams received by the French Foreign Office and signed by the Inter-Allied Military Mission, since August 26th, on the subject of the situation in Hungary. (See Appendix “E”.)

M. Clemenceau said that it appeared to him to be clear that the Allied Generals were not carrying out their original instructions, which had been that they should keep in communication with the Roumanian authorities, and report to the Council on what they discovered. Instead of doing this they were plunging themselves into political questions. He had come to the opinion that the Roumanian situation was now so grave that prompt measures were necessary in order to prevent it from developing further.

[Page 59]

Mr. Polk said that the Inter-Allied Generals at Budapest had originally attempted to carry out their instructions. They had got into communication with the Roumanian Authorities, as directed, but: had found that it was of no use receiving polite assurances from the Roumanians, and taking note of promises which these latter had no intention of fulfilling. The Military Mission had been at Budapest for three weeks, and, having found that it was impossible to carry out their instructions as originally drafted, had none the less attempted to make themselves useful to the Council, and had, in consequence, got involved in political questions.

M. Cubmenobau said that he thought the moment had come to send an ultimatum to the Roumanians. He thought it should be communicated to them by some well-known public man, whose nationality was not a point of any importance.

Mr. Balfour said that he had a plan which might be followed in conjunction with that of M. Clemenceau. It had for long been evident that the promises of the Roumanian authorities were of no use. The only success that the Council had obtained in its dealings with the Roumanians had occurred when the authorities of that country had been told that they must either accede to the wishes of the Council, or come into open conflict with the Allied troops. He gave as an example the action of Admiral Troubridge, who, when in charge of the monitors on the Danube, had resisted the Roumanian requisitions of barges, and the action of the Roumanian authorities in stopping the transit of food across the river. Admiral Troubridge’s attitude had been firm, and, as it was backed by force, the Roumanians had given way. At the present moment the Council was unable to get any reply to its communications to the Roumanian Government, but although this was the case, he was certain that no Roumanian Statesman would take the responsibility of bringing the troops of his country into conflict with the Allied Armies. His proposal therefore, was to occupy some place in Hungary with a small body of Allied troops. He was sure that the Roumanians would never fight them. It might possibly be easier to send a force of warships into the Black Sea.

Mr. Polk said that the only vessels belonging to the United States of America in the Mediterranean area were stationed at Fiume and Smyrna.

M. Tittoni said that, before taking the action proposed by M. Clemenceau, the Council ought to wait for a complete report from the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Budapest.

M. Clemenceau, commenting upon Mr. Balfour’s last remark, said that the Roumanians had recently got hold of the Paris press. He did not attach great importance to this, but, at the same time, he did not wish to let the French people think that he had performed a quasi-belligerent act against the Roumanians, without having previously [Page 60] communicated an ultimatum to them. He thought that Allied war vessels might be sent into the Black Sea, pending a reply from the Roumanian Government, but that they should not be called upon to act until an answer had been obtained.

The three demands which he proposed to make to the Roumanians were:—

that they should cease from making requisitions in Hungary, and should place all the material that they had seized at the disposal of the Council:
that they should promise definitely that they would make no separate peace with Hungary:
that they should withdraw their troops from Hungary!

M. Tittoni said that he thought that, before warships were sent to Roumania, a reply to M. Clemenceau’s ultimatum ought to be obtained. With regard to the three demands which M. Clemenceau proposed to make to the Roumanian authorities, he agreed that the Roumanian Armies should be ordered to cease their requisitions, and place the material seized at the disposal of the Allies; he agreed that they should be ordered to make no separate peace; but before he could consent to ordering the Roumanians to evacuate Hungary, he thought the Council ought to be sure that the Roumanian withdrawal would not open the door to a recrudescence of Bolshevism, and a revival of a new series of Bela Kuns. A police force, sufficient to maintain order in that country, should be raised.

M. Clemenceau said that the occupation of Budapest by Roumania, and the continued defiance of the Council, was a situation quite as grave as any produced by a Bolshevik Government in Hungary.

M. Tittoni said that it might possibly be best to make the Roumanians promise that they would retire on receiving orders from the Council.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought that a decision ought not to be taken finally until the following day.

(At this point a general discussion as to the most suitable person to be entrusted with the ultimatum to Roumania, ensued. The names of Sir Eyre Crowe and Admiral Troubridge were mentioned in this connection.)

M. Tittoni said that he could not for the moment promise Italian participation in any Naval action that might ensue. With regard to the person who should be entrusted with the communication of the ultimatum, he thought that sending an Admiral to Bucarest would be like making a Naval demonstration without ships. He preferred that a diplomat should convey the orders of the Conference.

Mr. Polk said that, in his opinion, the despatch of an ultimatum to Roumania did not bind the United States to subsequent Naval action.

[Page 61]

(It was decided that the question should be adjourned to the following day.)

5. M. Fromageot said that the Economic Commission had, on the previous day, presented the Drafting Committee with a clause, which it proposed should be added to Article 263 of the Peace Treaty with Austria (See Appendix “F”). Proposed Addition to Article 263 of Peace Treaty With Austria

The Drafting Committee could not do what it had been asked to, without the approbation of the Council, and was of the opinion that the proposed clause should not be added. In the first place there were difficulties, owing to the fact that, as the boundaries of the future Hungarian State had not been settled, it was hard to lay down rules as to the future status of all citizens now situated in the territorial area provisionally called Hungary. In the second place, Article 90 of the Peace Treaty with Austria clearly laid down that Austria should recognise the validity of all the provisions of the future Peace Treaty with Hungary. He therefore thought that the clause asked for by the Economic Commission should be added to the Hungarian Treaty, since it was obviously too late to put it into the Austrian Treaty.

(It was decided to reject the proposal of the Economic Commission to the effect that the special clause drafted in Appendix “E” [“F”]should be added to Article 263 of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

It was agreed that a clause effecting the results required should be added to the Hungarian Peace Treaty.)

6. Mr. Woolsey said that the reply to the Austrian Government on the subject of the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty, had referred to certain concessions made in a Note from the Council, dated, July 8th, 1919,3 and addressed to the Austrian Delegation. In view of the importance of the Note, and of the decision of the Council on August 28th,4 to refer the reply now being made to the Austrian Government, to the Drafting Committee, in order to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty were necessary, on account of interpretative passages in the proposed reply, he made the following suggestion:— Interpretations of the Austrian Peace Treaty Contained in the Replies to the Austrian Delegation

“That the Note of July 8th, 1919, as well as any other Notes to the Austrian Delegation, containing interpretative passages on the Treaty of Peace, should likewise be referred to the Drafting Committee, to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty might be necessary, on account of such interpretative passages.”

He had another point which he wished to bring before the notice of the Council. On August 28th, the Council had decided that a Clause should be inserted in the proposed covering letter to the replies [Page 62] to the Austrian Delegation, on the subject of the Peace Treaty, to the effect that the covering letter in question ought not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty. In view of the fact that the reply of July 8th, 1919, to the Austrian Delegation might be regarded as interpretative of the text of the Treaty, he suggested:—

“That the clause in the covering letter should be made to cover all replies made to the Austrian Delegation, and not only the covering letter under consideration.”

(These two proposals were referred to the Drafting Committee, who entered the room to report on them.)

M. Fromageot said that, in answer to the first point raised by Mr. Woolsey, he would draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that the first edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Austrians on June 6th. A long series of communications had followed; and the second edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented on July 20th. It was with this second edition that all replies to the Austrian Delegation were concerned, and it was therefore not necessary to discover whether replies of an earlier date than July 20th contained interpretative passages of a superseded text of the Peace Treaty.

(Mr. Woolsey’s first proposal was therefore rejected.)

He thought that Mr. Woolsey’s second suggestion ought to be adopted, and the phraseology of the covering letter altered, so as to meet the point.

(It was agreed that the wording of the general covering letter to the replies of the Austrian counter-proposals of the Peace Treaty should be so modified as to state that no passage in any of the replies should be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the Peace Treaty.)

The Meeting then adjourned for a discussion in camera.

Appendix A to HE–45


Draft of a Letter to the Germans

The Allied and Associated Powers have taken note of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919. They declare that the provisions in the second paragraph of article 61 constitute a formal violation [Page 63] of article 80 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.

This violation is twofold:

Article 61, in stipulating the admission of Austria to the Reichsrat, assimilates that Republic to the German territories (Deutsche Länder) which compose the German Empire, an assimilation which is incompatible with respect for the independence of Austria.
In admitting and regulating the participation of Austria in the Council of the Empire, article 61 creates a political bond and a common political activity between Germany and Austria, in absolute opposition to the independence of the latter.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers, after reminding the German Government that article 178 of the German Constitution declares that “the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles cannot be affected by the Constitution,” invite the German Government to take due measures to remove without delay this violation by declaring null article 61, second paragraph.

Without prejudice to any subsequent measures, in case of refusal, and by virtue of the treaty (particularly article 429), the Allied and Associated Powers inform the German Government that this violation of its pledges on an essential point will constrain them, if their just demand is not complied with, within fifteen days from the present elate, to order immediately an extension of their occupation of the right bank of the Rhine.

Appendix B to HD–45


Report by the Central Committee on Territorial Questions on the Southern Frontier of Bulgaria

In accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Council, the Central Territorial Committee has examined anew the question of the southern frontier of Bulgaria, and has been guided by the views contained in the despatch from President Wilson.7

It has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the following report, which it has adopted unanimously:

The present frontier between Bulgaria and Greece should be rectified in the region to the north of Buk in order to; deprive the Bulgarians of all facilities for attack on the town and bridge of [Page 64] Buk. This region is of small extent and has a sparse Mohammedan population, and the present frontier offers difficulties;
As regards the southern frontier of Bulgaria in Bulgarian Thrace, the Committee is unanimous in recommending the adoption of the frontier defined in the attached annex.8
This annex has been drawn up in such form that it may be immediately inserted in the conditions of peace with Bulgaria;
As regards the question of Bulgaria’s freedom of access to the Aegean Sea, that question has been dealt with by the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, in article 24 of the provisions to be inserted in the treaty of peace with Bulgaria.

This article having been drafted on June 21, and on the supposition that the port of Dedeagatch would belong to Greece, it is advisable to ask the Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways to make a new draft in accordance with present expectations.

The Committee believes that it should, on this occasion, draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the conclusions in the attached note from the French delegation,9 in the event that an international commission should be set up at Dédéagatch.

A similar note has been presented by the Italian delegation.10

It seems necessary to ask the Commission on Ports to take into account the considerations of the said note, because of the fact that that Commission has previously judged that it is not its province to take into consideration any political factors.

It seems to the Committee, moreover, needless to insert in the treaty with Bulgaria any provisions of detail which will be adopted by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to assure to Bulgaria free access to the Aegean Sea.

Annex I

Description of the Southern Frontier of Bulgaria in Thrace

From West to East:

The frontier of 1913–1915 betweeen Bulgaria and Greece up to the point where it leaves the line of the watershed between the basins of the Mesta–Karasu on the south and of the Marica on the north in the neighborhood of point 1587 (Dibikli.)

Thence eastward to point 1295 at 18 Km. to the west of Kuschuk–Derbend on this line of the watershed.

Thence eastward to the point where it meets the old frontier of 1913 on the river Kizildeli Suja (Cetakca).

[Page 65]

The line of the secondary ridge which closes on the south the basin of the Akcehisar (Dzuma) Suju.

Thence northward to the point where it meets the river Maritsa.

The frontier of 1913.

Thence to a point to be selected at about 3 Km. downstream from the station of Kadikoj.

The principal course of the Maritsa downstream.

Thence northward to a point to be selected at the tip of the salient which the frontier of the Treaty of Sofia of 191511 forms at about 10 Km. to the southeast of Mustafa Pascha.

A line to be determined on the spot.

Thence eastward to the Black Sea.

The frontier of the Treaty of Sofia of 1915, then the frontier of 1913.

Annex II

french delegation


The Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways has suggested a practical regime to guarantee; to the Bulgarians, in case they find themselves excluded from Bulgarian Thrace, access to a port on the Aegean Sea (Cavalla or Dédéagatch) and the use of a direct railway line.

The regime must be guaranteed and carried out, in the absence) of an agreement between the Greeks and Bulgarians, by an international commission. Having in mind only technical considerations, the Commission on Ports has proposed a commission of three members (a Greek, a Bulgarian, and an Englishman).

But the question is essentially political: It is necessary to prevent eventual recriminations, whether by Greeks or Bulgarians, if they are led to arbitrate under a single great power. Consideration should also be given to the fact that France, as well as England, is a guarantor of Greece, under the treaties of 1832 and 1863,12 and must be represented on the same footing. Finally, there would be evident advantages in giving such a guarantee of impartiality in the Commission as would bq represented by the presence not only of the delegates of qualified powers, but also of a power wholly disinterested in the question, such as the United States.

The projected commission, in accordance with these considerations (and in order to make sure always of a majority), should include five [Page 66] delegates: a Greek, a Bulgarian, an Englishman, a Frenchman, and an American.

Annex III

italian delegation
to the peace conference,
hotel edward vii

The Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways decided, on the occasion of an inquiry into the question of free access to the Aegean Sea for Bulgaria, that a special convention between Greece and Bulgaria should define the settlement of this matter. In case of a failure to agree, a commission composed of one delegate each from Greece, Bulgaria, and Great Britain should be charged with laying down the conditions of an agreement (article 24).

The French Delegation, by a note, of June 2513 addressed to the Secretariat General of the Conference, seemed to expect that this commission would receive certain powers in thej matter of guaranteeing and carrying out the regime to be set up, and it suggested, therefore, that a representative for France and one for the United States be added to the commission.

The Italian Delegation is of opinion that the commission as contemplated in article 24 has no functions but those relating to the concluding of a special convention between Greece and Bulgaria to settle the conditions of free access to the sea.

This decision appears to be of the same sort as that which was adopted by the regime for the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, and the Italian Delegation has not, therefore, any remark to make. But in the event that changes are to be introduced into the composition of the commission in question, or that powers to insure and carry out the conditions laid down by the convention are to be entrusted to it, an Italian representative should be added to it upon the same footing as the other representatives.

In fact, all the powers stand upon a basis of perfect equality in this matter, for the regime which was provided flows from decisions which all the powers took in common agreement.

At the same time, the Italian Delegation invites attention to the fact that article 24 mentions only the ports of Cavalla and Dédéagatch, whereas in the formal engagement taken by Mr. Venizelos before the commission for the study of territorial questions affecting Greece (page 5), there is also a question of Salonika. The choice of this port by Bulgaria cannot be eliminated beforehand, especially [Page 67] since the port of Cavalla, not being directly connected by railway with the Bulgarian system, is not immediately available, and since the port of Dédéagatch, according to the same commission on Greek questions, has no real commercial value for Bulgaria.

Annex IV


Access by Bulgaria to Cavalla or Dédéagatch

In providing for the attribution of Bulgarian Thrace to Greece, an arrangement which would separate Bulgaria from the Aegean Sea, the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways suggested the insertion, in the treaty with Bulgaria, of a clause of which the essential terms are the following:

Greece will give in lease to Bulgaria for 50 years a free zone reserved either in the port of Cavalla or in that of Dédéagatch, as Bulgaria may choose.
Bulgaria shall enjoy special facilities for transit.
A convention, which may be revised every ten years, will fix the conditions of this cession and the manner of its use.
If the port chosen is Cavalla, a railway shall be built and operated by Greece to connect the port with the Bulgarian frontier.

The questions referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 would be, in case of disagreement between Greece and Bulgaria, submitted to the decision of a commission composed of one Bulgarian representative, one Greek, and one British.

The Commission on ports in making this suggestion, has taken a merely technical point of view, and has not taken into account certain political considerations of great importance to the proper functioning of the instrumentality thus created. This instrumentality has a role essentially impartial and judicial. In having only a single great power to participate in it, there is a risk of being open to accusations either by the Greeks or by the Bulgarians, who, after decisions are rendered, will attribute them to the attitude or the political interests of that great power.

The French Delegation considers that in order to give proper authority to the commission which is to function at Cavalla or Dédéagatch, it is advisable to have several great powers participate in it.

It considers that Great Britain and France, who are both guarantors of Greece, are naturally indicated for this task, and moreover that their intervention will be received by the Bulgarians themselves as a guarantee of impartiality.

[Page 68]

Appendix C to HE–45


Decypher of Telegram From Admiral Troubridge, Buda-Pest, to Astoria

Forward to War Office.

Following for Admiralty, begins:

Situation here is critical for Europe. Roumanians demand immediate acceptance by Hungarian Government of following conditions.

Occupation of Hungary for one year giving opportunity for preparing country for personal (sic) (?commencement of) union with Roumania. Immediate customs union with Roumania. Cession of strategic points near Szegedin on mouth of Maros River and Bekes Csaba. No treaties to be made with Great Britain or Jugo-Slavs. They state to Hungarian Ministers they have already an alliance with Italy in which Hungary must join in order to assume policy of encirclement of Jugo-Slavs. I have urged Ministers to refuse any armistice or treaty with Roumania and to follow the counsels of the Supreme War Council at Paris. It is necessary to recognise at once any Government formed here and support them with energy.

Appendix D to HD–45

No. G 45

Paraphrase of Telegram From General Gorton, Budapest, Received Through U. JS. Naval Communication Service, Paris, to Astoria, Paris

Admiral Troubridge has been told by Diamandy that the telegraphic despatches of the Supreme Council, dated 23rd and 25th August15 had not been communicated to him.

The veracity of this is doubtful, but Rumania continues to make requisitions. There is no doubt that Rumania is striving to establish a separate Treaty with Hungary; telegrams of 23rd and 25th might therefore be transmitted privately to the Hungarian Government with advantage.

[Page 69]

Appendix E to HD–45


Telegram of August 26 From the Interallied Military Mission, Budapest, to the Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris

No. 191. Urgent. Situation of Government in Hungary without change. Two delegations, one representing the small tenants, and the other the factory workers, have asked to see the Mission in order to request that they be represented in the new government. Another delegation calling itself Christian Socialist has come to protest against the departure of the Archduke, declaring that the result will be to deliver their country to the Jews and that Budapest ought to be called Judapest. The reply was made to all the delegations that the Interallied Mission could not meddle in the internal affairs of Hungary. No change in the attitude of the Rumanians. One single improvement in the situation since the arrival of the Mission—a certain quantity of provisions has been allowed to enter Budapest. It is believed that the Rumanians have the intention of withdrawing suddenly as soon as they shall have satisfied all their instincts for plunder. Meanwhile, all their acts, intentional or not, tend to deliver Hungary to bolshevism and chaos. General Holban in Budapest promised last week to arm immediately, with revolvers and sabres, 4,000 men in the police; but, instead of doing so, and in disregard of the instructions of the Mission asking him to keep all Rumanian troops on the east of the Danube except the garrison of Budapest, it is believed that he intends to take possession of all Hungary, and to disarm and suppress the little Hungarian nucleus of Admiral Horthy which constitutes the sole defense of Hungary against bolshevism in the event that the Rumanians should abruptly evacuate the country. These measures being in contemplation at the same time that M. Diamandy made his recent declaration stating that a longer occupation of Hungary by the Rumanians could only injure their prestige, give the impression that if Rumania finds the conditions imposed by the. Supreme Council too harsh for her to accept, she will seize all she can and then hastily abandon Hungary, which because of the laxity of the Rumanian commanders, will be left without any means for defense against bolshevism and disorder. The Mission devoted the meeting of August 25 to matters of relatively small importance, excepting the report by the British officer sent to inspect trains entering Rumania by the Szolnok bridge. [Page 70] The British officer reports that the bridge will not be repaired for two or three weeks, but that he saw near the crossing 150 locomotives, 200 to 300 empty freight cars, 4 aeroplanes in cars, 200 to 300 cars of military supplies, 300 tank cars, and between Szolnok and Budapest several hundred freight cars.

Interallied Military Mission


Telegram of August 27, 1919, From Budapest to the Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Pans

No. 197. No change shown in the situation of the Hungarian Government. The following telegram from Count Sigray, who signs as commissioner of the Government for Western Hungary, was transmitted from Vienna:

“The Rumanian troops are advancing toward Western Hungary, proclaiming that they come to reestablish order. We beg you to hear our protest against the activities of the Rumanians. In Western Hungary perfect order reigns in all districts, and the Hungarian and German populations are pursuing the business of peaceful reconstruction, which can only be disturbed by the undisciplined soldiery of the Rumanians.”

A great procession of Christian Socialists filed past the office of the Mission and sent delegates to ask for the protection of the Allied Powers against the return of the regime of Jews and Bolshevists. The Mission stated that it could not intervene in domestic affairs, but that it would transmit the petition to the Supreme Council. No communication from the Rumanian Command, unless it be a report which is supposed to have emanated from the Hungarian Chief of Police. According to this report, four weeks will elapse before 4,000 men for the police can be enrolled. Only 40 men each day are being recruited. The reasons given are: the harvest, the number of prisoners detained in Rumania and Czechoslovakia, the bad train service. The total force of the police is 1,850, of which 205 are mounted. A report has reached us that yesterday the bridge which was repaired at Czonsgrade was tested: the trial locomotive fell into the stream.

Interallied Military Mission
11:20 a.m.
[Page 71]

Telegram of August 28–30, 1919, From Budapest to the Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris

No. 200. Since resignation of Archduke various deputations, two of several hundred persons each, have asked leave to present petitions to Mission.

Object of petitions generally is to prevent return of Jewish rule or bolshevism. It appears to Mission that in present plight of Hungary, with foreign occupation and absence of real government, it would be disheartening to people if no notice were taken of their appeal to Allied Powers. Consequently Mission proposes to receive deputations which cannot be avoided, to inform them it is expressly excluded from intervening in internal affairs of Hungary, but that it will forward their petitions to Supreme Council.

Interallied Military Mission
2:22 p.m.

Telegram of August 28–30, 1919, From Budapest to the Supreme Council, Paris

No. 206. The Commission has just received a letter from the new President of the Hungarian Council. It is addressed to the President of the Supreme Council and will be sent to you by the next courier. The following is the text of the letter:

“Mr. President: In accord with the action of the session of August 22 Prince Joseph, Governor of Hungary, and the government appointed by him, nave resigned. The members of the new Cabinet are as follows:

  • President of the Council, Minister of the Interior: Etienne Friedrich, manufacturer.
  • Minister of Foreign Affairs: Count Imre de Czaky (appointed, but temporarily absent).
  • Under Secretary of State for the Interior: Edmond de Benitzky, former official.
  • Minister of Agriculture: Jules Rubinek, director of the National Agricultural Society; Under Secretary of State: Etienne Scabo Sokorapatka, farmer.
  • Minister of Commerce: Franz de Henrich, merchant.
  • Minister of Finance: Jean Grunn, former official.
  • Minister of War: General Franz Schnitzer.
  • Minister of Food Control: Karol Ereky, engineer-merchant.
  • Minister of Public Worship and Industry: Karol Huszar, schoolmaster; Under Secretary of State: Julius Pokar, man of letters.
  • Minister of Justice: Georg Baloghy, judge.
  • Minister of National Minorities: Jakob Bleyer, university professor.
  • Minister of Public Hygiene: Andreas Czillery, physician.
  • Minister of Propaganda: Stephan Haller, man of letters.
  • Minister of Farmers: Gan Mayre, farmer.
  • Minister of Industrial Laborers: Daniel Olah, metal worker.

It has been and it will always be almost impossible to form a ministry that will at the same time satisfy the various military missions at Budapest and our numerous fragments of political parties and that will, besides, win the approval of the command of the royal troops of Rumania. One thing is, however, certain, that the Ministry as composed at present possesses the sympathy and absolute confidence of a large and decisive majority of the Hungarian people. The heads of the military missions have certainly had the chance to convince themselves of this. I have tried to consider and satisfy loyally all just desires as fast as they have come up for our consideration. Consequently there are represented in this Cabinet large and small manufacturers, merchants, officials, farmers and industrial laborers. Mr. President, during the time of the Bolshevist government of Bela Kun the party of Social Democrats amalgamated to form the party of Communists, which the Socialist leaders remaining here during the commune have always accentuated in all their speeches in the Soviet Congress, as well as in their official journal. For these Socialist leaders of the workers have not used their influence to defeat Bolshevism, but have either gone over to Bolshevism or have taken refuge abroad, and deserted the workingmen, who thus become the prey of the fatal idea of Bolshevism and of the terror of the Communist government. Their non-Bolshevik leaders who have gone abroad have put themselves in relation with the Entente, but have not come to the assistance of either the workingmen or the State. The Hungarian bourgeoisie does not wish to see the working class misled, a class to which it reserves an important place in its future policy; hence it is to the representatives of the real workingmen and not to the professional leaders of the Social Democrats that I addressed the invitation to join my Cabinet. Mr. President, in the interest of the possibility of productive work, I beg you to take measures to the end that the military missions at Budapest will refrain from trying to influence our internal politics, but will help to maintain order and to reestablish the economic equilibrium. My Cabinet has decided to hold the new elections to the National Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage (equal, secret vote, and by commune) as soon as possible, that is to say within three or four weeks. All Hungarians will recognize the legality of these elections. In order that no doubt may arise that the coming elections rest upon and express the free manifestation of the national will. I request you, Mr. President, to send us a commission of control for [Page 73] these elections. It would be desirable that the Social Democrats form part of this commission. The elections will be held in territories, concerning which it will be possible to come to an agreement with the command of the royal troops of Rumania. Mr. President, until such time as we shall be able to put the government in the hands of the National Assembly, our provisional government desires to carry out the following tasks: the complete annihilation of Bolshevism, the restoration of administration and jurisdiction, security of food and continuity of production, safety of person and property, restoration and protection of political equality, and the preparations for the elections to the National Assembly. Mr. President, we request your support in the accomplishment of our duty and in our firm desire to reestablish constitutional life.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my profound respect.

(Signed) Friedrich

The new President, Friedrich, was at the head of the former Cabinet, of which 11 out of 14 members figure in the new one. Information from several sources, as well as certain ascertained facts, have confirmed the impression that Herr Friedrich, supported by the Archduke, is working actively to remain at the head of the new Cabinet and to keep colleagues who will not hinder too seriously his political aims. Referring to the telegram of the Supreme Council of August 23,20 which brought about the fall of the Friedrich Cabinet, we retain our first impression that a Cabinet formed in the above manner and presided over by Friedrich does not meet the requirements of the Supreme Council.

Interallied Military Mission

From: The Inter-Allied Military Mission.

To: The Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris.

No. 215. A telegram received yesterday by a member of the Mission inquires why, if the Mission considers that the Hungarian army is reduced to the effectives stipulated by the Armistice of November 13,22 the Supreme Council has not been advised of it; the telegram adds that the Supreme Council can not exact the withdrawal of the Rumanian army behind the line fixed by the Peace Conference until it can prove that all menace of military action on the part of Hungary against her neighbors is removed. Numerous messages sent by the Mission to the Supreme Council have declared that, with the exception [Page 74] of a small contingent, ill-equipped and counting less than 8000 men under the orders of Admiral Horthy, west of the Danube, the Hungarian army as an army has ceased to exist, and that the Rumanian forces have not evacuated Hungary because their presence is necessary until a Hungarian army sufficiently strong to maintain order in the interior can be organized. As the messages in question may have been ambiguous or inaccurately interpreted we wish to add now that, in the opinion of the Mission, the Hungarian army has for some time been reduced below the effectives mentioned in the armistice of November 13.

Interallied Military Mission

[Telegram From the Interallied Military Mission in Hungary to the Supreme Council ]

To the Supreme Council, Paris.

No. 225. With regard to the telegram from the Supreme Council, sent under date of August 21,24 concerning the: establishment of control posts to prevent the export of goods into Rumania, the Interallied Mission has not sufficient personnel for that purpose, and requests that three additional officers be sent immediately to Budapest by each of the four Allied Powers, in order to establish control posts on the Theiss.

Interallied Mission

Appendix F to HD–45


treaty with austria

Addition to Article 263 Proposed by the Special Committee of the Economic Commission

All provisions of this section dealing with the relations between Austria or Austrian nationals and the nationals of the former Empire of Austria, apply also to the same relations between Austria or Austrian nationals and the nationals of the former Kingdom of Hungary who shall acquire of right, by application of the treaty [Page 75] of peace with Hungary, the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power.

  • Alphand
  • Hutchinson
  • H. Ashida
  • Fred K. Nielsen
  • M. Pilodi

Amendment to Article 265

At the beginning of Article 265, to read:

Questions concerning persons previously nationals of the former Empire …

  1. Ante, p. 38.
  2. Treaty of London, May 7, 1832, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xix, p. 33.
  3. Annex 2 to HD–2, vol. vii, p. 53.
  4. HD–41, ibid., p. 960.
  5. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  6. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  7. See appendix C to HD–44, p. 50.
  8. Annex I.
  9. Annex II.
  10. Annex III.
  11. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cix, p. 879.
  12. Treaty of London, May 7, 1832, ibid., vol. xix, p. 33; treaties of London, July 13, 1863, and November 14, 1863, ibid., vol. liii, pp. 28 and 19.
  13. Supra.
  14. Appendix A to HD–37, vol. vii, p. 819, and appendix C to HD–38, ibid., p. 857.
  15. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  16. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  17. Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/57.
  18. Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/58, revised by the editors.
  19. Appendix A to HD–37, vol. vii, p. 819.
  20. Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/61.
  21. Vol. ii, p. 183.
  22. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  23. HD–35, vol. vii, p. 776.
  24. HD–35, vol. vii, p. 776.