Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/80

HD–80

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 1, 1919, at 10 a.m.

Paris, November 1, 1919, 10:00 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Byre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau
    • M. Pichon
  • Secretaries
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Saint Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja
  • Secretary
    • M. Barone Russo
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Mr. B. Winthrop.
British Empire	Capt. G. Lothian Small.
France	M. Massigli.
Italy	M. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Dr. J. B. Scott
  • Rear Admiral McCully
  • Mr. A. W. Dulles
  • Dr. I. Bowman
  • Colonel J. A. Logan
  • Commander Koehler
  • Captain Gordon
• British Empire
  • General Sackville-West
  • Admiral Groves, R. N.
  • Hon. C. H. Tufton
  • Mr. A. W. Malkin
  • Mr. A. Leeper
  • Commander Smith, R. N.
  • Commander Dunne, R. N.
  • Captain Fuller, R. N.
  • Commander Macnamara, R. N.
• France
  • Marshal Foch
  • General Weygand
  • General Desticker
  • General Le Rond
  • M. H. Berenger
  • M. Laroche
  • Commandant Le Vavasseur
  • M. Fromageot
  • Capitaine Roper
• Italy
  • General Cavallero
  • Contre-Amiral Grassi
  • M. Ricci-Busatti
  • M. Vannutelli-Rey
  • M. Galli
  • M. Pilotti
  • Capitaine de Corvette Ruspoli
  • Prince Boncompagni
• Japan
  • M. Adatci
  • Commandant Ohsumi
  • M. Nagaoka
  • M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 28, 1919 (See Appendix “A”).) Powers of General Milne in AsiaMinor

Sir Eyre Crowe stated the question was a very simple one, and was summarized in the note from the British Delegation which had been circulated among in the members of the Council. The Council had appointed, at some prior time, General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Asia Minor: It seemed that neither the French nor the Italian authorities had been informed of the decision of the Council.¹

M. Pichon thought indeed that the question could not raise any difficulty so long as the beginning of the note, as submitted to the Council, was altered slightly: The British Delegation had said that the General Officer commanding the British troops at Constantinople and in Asia Minor (Syria excepted) had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in those regions. This assertion was correct, as far as Turkey in Asia was concerned, but the question of the command at Constantinople was the object of negotiations between the British and French Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe agreed with this remark, but asked, above all, that the French and Italian military authorities be informed of the decisions of the Supreme Council, which had recognized the authority of General Milne.

M. Berthelot thought that there could be no doubt whatsoever on this question, and added he could not understand the misunderstanding which had taken place, for the necessary information had been given at the same time to M. de France and to General Franchet d’Esperey.

M. Scialoja asked that the same instructions be repeated to the Italian military authorities.

M. Pichon agreed that this information should be reiterated.

(It was decided:

that the French and Italian Delegations take the necessary steps to inform their representatives in Turkey that the Supreme Council had appointed General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Asia Minor, Syria excepted. (See Appendix “A”.)

2. (The Council had before it a draft note prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix “B”).)² Draft Note to the German Government Relative to Putting the Treaty Into Force

M. Fromageot commented upon this draft note and remarked that the Drafting Committee had taken account of the observations made at the preceding meeting of the Supreme Council,³ and also that the new draft was presented by all the members of the Committee.

General Weygand said that the draft, as prepared by the Drafting Committee, invited the German Government to send representatives to Paris on November 6th. He would like to know whether on the 6th of November they could profitably discuss with the German delegates: would the Commissions be ready on that date?

M. Berthelot said that he had proposed November 6th to take into account the wish expressed by General Weygand himself that the conference should take place as soon as possible, but could easily be put off for a few days.

General Weygand thought that from a military standpoint they would certainly be ready on November 6th, but that perhaps that date might be a little early for the Commissions.

M. Pichon proposed the 10th instead of the 6th.

(This proposal was adopted)

(It was decided:

that the draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Drafting Committee, relative to putting the Treaty into force, be approved, and that the German Government be asked to send representatives to be in Paris on the 10th, and not on the 6th, of November, 1919. (See Appendix “B”).)

3. (The Council had before it a draft Protocol, prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix “C”).)⁴ Draft Protocol Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany Relative to Confirming the Obligations Imposed Upon the German Government by the Armistice

M. Fromageot read and commented upon the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee, and remarked that there was occasion to modify the draft on the following points:

(1) Page 1, point 3: Eliminate in the second line the word “immediately” and add after the words, “in Russian Territory” the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(2) Page 1, point 4: Substitute the word, “coercive” for the word, “consecutive.”

(3) Page 1, point 5: Substitute the word “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial.”

(4) Page 2, point 6: Add to the end of the paragraph, “destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(5) Page 3, point 11: Add to the end of the paragraph, “and various other merchant vessels.”

(6) Page 4: Add to the end of the second paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(7) Page 4, point 2: Add to the end of the paragraph “also the three submarine engines of U–146, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

He explained that in point 1 of Page 1 they had mentioned an interval of thirty-one days expiring December 11th, 1918. Was this exact?

Marshal Foch said it was not quite right; the time limit had been exceeded by mutual consent and in consequence of various agreements. There was no need to mention it. On the other hand, he considered that as regarded handing over of rolling stock, the Germans had not, properly speaking, committed any real violation of the Armistice. There had been certain slowness of execution. It would be a mistake therefore to treat as equally serious the nonfulfilment of that clause and specific violations of the Armistice like the Scapa Flow incident and the nonevacuation of the Baltic Provinces. It would perhaps be better to mention in the beginning of the note the more important questions, and to consider secondary violations in a final paragraph.

M. Fromageot said that they had followed the order of the clauses of the Armistice conventions; obviously that might be modified. From a legal point of view, on the other hand, he felt obliged to remark that the fact of an obligation being in course of fulfilment did not prevent their considering it unexecuted.

Marshal Foch thought that it would be sufficient to say that, on that point, the Allied and Associated Powers had not received full satisfaction. He wished to repeat, in that case, that there was no formal violation of the Armistice, and that it would be well not to confuse in the same category formal violations and incomplete execution.

M. Berthelot said it had seemed advantageous to make a complete enumeration, but he wished to remark that, in the last part, they had to take into account the arguments the Marshal had in mind, and that, doubtless, it would be sufficient to omit in that last part, paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of page 4.

M. Pichon summed up that they were agreed to modify the first paragraph of page 1 in the following manner: “The obligations, etc., have not been carried out, or have not received full satisfaction.”

(This suggestion was adopted)

Marshal Foch wished to remark that as for point 2, they could not reproach the Germans with not having made the reimbursement of the upkeep expenses of the troops of occupation, for the simple reason that they had not yet told them the total amount of these expenses. It would therefore be better to omit the paragraph.

M. Berthelot thought it was all the easier, as the obligation was covered by the Treaty.

M. Pichon concluded that the Council decided to omit this paragraph.

M. Fromageot stated that with regard to Germany’s obligation to deliver documents, specie, valuables carried away by her troops, they had not felt in a position to mention the valuables removed from the prisoners’ camps, as the Minister of Finance had demanded, because the Armistice did not speak of it.

Mr. Polk thought that, although he did not suppose that his Naval Experts would raise objections on the point, he wished to make a reservation on point 6 of the Committee’s draft. Similarly, he felt he must make a reservation on point 11 of the draft, concerning the handing over of the fourteen tank vessels which had been demanded. He believed, further, that on this point it might be possible to find a text which would satisfy at once the American Delegation on the one hand, and the British and the French on the other.

M. Berthelot stated they had already taken care to avoid a text which appeared to imply a decision by the American Government on property in these vessels.

Mr. Polk added that the American Government did not consider that the demand for the handing over of those tank vessels could be maintained.

M. Berthelot wished to remark that the Supreme Council had taken a decision on the subject,⁵ namely that a German obligation existed although, as between the Allies, the question might be examined anew.

Mr. Polk did not wish to raise, at that time, the question in its entirety, but could not help remarking that if the decision which M. Berthelot recalled, had not been taken, there would not have been a violation of the Armistice, in that case, on the part of the Germans. He was hoping that the Drafting Committee would prepare a text which would permit of an agreement.

M. Henry Berenger stated that they did not at that time have to examine the question of real property in the tank ships, nor what was the legal position of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. That was a question which belonged to the Reparations Commission; for the moment the question was: why had the ships which had been demanded in virtue of certain clauses of the Armistice, not been delivered, especially at a time when tonnage and fuel were everywhere the universal need. He thought the British Delegation believed, as he did, that there was there a real obstruction on the part of Germany.

Mr. Polk thought that the question before this meeting was to revise the protocol and not to discuss in its entirety the question of the tank ships which, however, he was ready to discuss. He simply wished to make a reservation, and he was convinced that the Drafting Committee would manage to agree on a text which would not bring up the whole question.

Mr. Berthelot said that a distinction should be made between the two points: 1st, the attitude of the Allies towards the Germans: the Germans had been asked to deliver the ships, they ought to do it. 2nd, if the Supreme Council had several times decided that the tank ships were to be sent to the Firth of Forth it was no longer a matter of settling the question in substance; and discussion remained possible as between the Allies and America. But it was important to introduce in the protocol a clause! If they were not to do so they would unintentionally be deciding the question in substance and to the advantage of Germany.

Mr. Polk thought that the remarks of M. Berthelot were probably true, but as time was short, he would for the moment confine himself to making a reservation.

M. Clemenceau concluded that it was understood, then, that the protocol would contain a clause on that subject, but for the moment the Council decided to reserve the text.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked with regard to point No. 12 of the Committee’s draft whether it would not be advisable to examine it at the same time as the draft reply to the German note of October 10th [12th]⁶ on the sale of Aeronautical materiel which figured on the agenda of that morning.

M. Fromageot thought that the question would present itself more profitably a little later. He would have some observations to make which would satisfy the technical experts; and at that time could also be examined the draft reply which Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned. He added that, following point No. 12, it would be right to alter the text of the paragraph beginning with the words, “A certain number of stipulations, etc”; it should read: “Unexecuted or incompletely executed stipulations” so as to take into account the observations offered some time before by Marshal Foch.

M. Clemenceau said that they then had to decide what reparations they were going to exact for the Scapa Flow incident.

Captain Fuller pointed out that the Naval Experts had not been able to come to an agreement. The Representative of the United States had made a reservation on the subject of floating docks that ought to be exacted.

Commandant Le Vavasseur stated that he for his part had submitted—and his British, Italian and Japanese colleagues were of the same opinion—that it was inadvisable to specify the percentage of large and small docks that ought to be demanded for the tonnage that was to be replaced. They had thought it sufficient to fix only the total, leaving it to the Commission of Naval Control to make the choice. The American Delegate alone had been of a different opinion.

Commandant Le Vavasseur repeated that they had all been agreed upon the principle that the handing over of Naval materiel ought to be demanded and agreed also upon the amount of tonnage that should be claimed as reparation. Their difference existed in the proportion as between large and small docks.

Captain Fuller agreed that was the situation.

Mr. Polk wished to ask for what reason they could not specify at this time the proportion of great docks and small docks to be delivered.

Captain Fuller replied that it was because this raised the question of the docks at Dantzig, for it was at Dantzig that two of the biggest docks Germany possessed were situated.

Mr. Polk said that, in the absence of his naval experts, it was difficult for him to take a decision. He felt, however, as he had already stated to the Council, that this question brought up the problem of the extent of Germany’s ability to make reparation, and for that reason came within the province of the Reparations Commission; he confined himself to making a reservation and proposed that the discussion be resumed that afternoon. (This proposal was adopted.)

M. Fromageot wished to draw the attention of the Council to the third obligation which the protocol imposed on Germany, to take into account the remarks which had been presented to the Committee by technical experts. They, therefore, proposed to alter the text which the Council had before it in the following manner:

“third—to make over to the Allied and Associated Governments the value of the Aeronautical materiel which had been exported, according to the decision that would be given, and the estimate made or notified by the President of the Commission on Aeronautical Control, as provided in article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, before the 31st January, 1920”.

It was the President of the Commission who would decide whether the exported materiel were civil or military, and who as a result of that decision, would determine the sum that Germany ought to pay.

M. Scialoja remarked that the notification to Germany would be made by the President, but that the decision would have to be taken by the Commission itself.

M. Fromageot explained that the technical experts had agreed that the President be trusted with the power of deciding whether the materiel in question were civil or military.

Captain Roper stated that the Supreme Council had had to make a decision on this point on the 29th September (H. D. 63),⁷ on the point being raised by the British Delegation. In the text prepared by the British Delegation the President had been mentioned, but in their minds it was clear that the President was merely the interpreter of the Commission.

M. Berthelot added that this meant the decision of the Commission as notified by the President.

M. Clemenceau explained that of course the Commission could always delegate its powers to the President.

M. Fromageot made the comment that the two following paragraphs, Nos. 4 and 5 on page 4, ought to be omitted in the light of the explanations just offered by Marshal Foch, but that the Drafting Committee thought that there was still ground for adding to the final paragraph the following phrase which was dictated by the analogous terms of paragraph 18 of the annex to part VIII of the Treaty; “Germany pledges itself not to consider these measures as acts of war.”

M. Clemenceau did not think this a very happy addition. What were they going to do if Germany should refuse to sign that phrase.

Marshal Foch announced himself quite hostile to that phrase.

M. Scialoja wished to raise another question. In his opinion it would be well to ask the Germans to come armed with full powers to sign the Protocol, but expressly on the understanding that that Protocol would not be still subject to ratification by the National Assembly. Were they not to take this precaution they would expose themselves to the anomaly that the Treaty would have come into force while the protocol was in the air; for certain articles of the German Constitution left it an open question whether the document that they wished to have the German representative sign would be valid without ratification by the legislative authorities.

M. Fromageot wished to point out that in their draft note it was stated on Page 2⁸ that the German representative who was to sign the protocol must be armed with full powers.

M. Scialoja explained that this meant full powers to sign, but it was necessary that this signature should hold Germany without ratification.

M. Fromageot thought it would be sufficient to modify the first paragraph on Page 2 of the draft note in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives, authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”

(It was decided:

to approve the draft Protocol prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix “C”) to be signed by a representative of the German Government upon the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace, with the following modifications:

(1) Page 1, paragraph 1: “The obligations have not been executed or have not been entirely fulfilled.”

(2) Page 1, paragraph 2: Eliminate the words, “within a period of thirty [-one] days ending on December 11, 1919 [1918]

(3) Page 1, paragraph 3: This paragraph to be entirely eliminated.

(4) Page 1, paragraph 4: Eliminate in the second line the word, “immediately” and add to the fourth line the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(5) Page 1, paragraph 6: In the third line substitute the word, “coercive” for “consecutive”.

(6) Page 1, paragraph 7: In the third line substitute the word, “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial”.

(7) Page 2, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph the words, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(8) Page 2, paragraph 3: This clause is provisionally reserved.

(9) Page 2, paragraph 4: line 1, substitute for, “Clauses of the Armistice, “Armistice Convention”.

(10) Page 3, paragraph 3: The first part of this paragraph is reserved, and at the end thereof are to be added the words, “and various other merchant vessels”.

(11) Page 3, paragraph 5: Between the words, “unexecuted” and “stipulations” insert the words, “or incompletely executed”.

(12) Page 4, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(13) The next paragraph was reserved provisionally.

(14) Page 4, paragraph 4: This paragraph to be modified so as to read: “To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the signature of the present Protocol, the machinery and engines of submarines U–137, U–138, and U–150 by way of reparation for the destruction of submarine UC–48, as well as of the three engines of submarine U–46, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for the submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

(15) Change paragraph 5 on Page 4, to read: “. … according to the decision that will be taken, the estimate made and modified [notified] by the Aeronautic Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace and before January 31, 1920.”

(16) To omit the two last paragraphs of the same page.

It was further decided:

that on account of the changes made in the Protocol, the first paragraph on page 2 of the draft note to the German Government should be modified in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”

4. (The Council had before it a draft reply prepared by the French Delegation (See Appendix “D”).) Draft Reply to the German Note Upon the Sale of Aeronautical Matériel

Sir Eyre Crowe proposed to refer this draft back to the Drafting Committee for examination, and also to state whether the text thereof agreed with the resolutions which had just been taken.

(This proposition was adopted)

(It was decided:

(1) to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the German Government dated October 12th.⁹ (See Appendix “D”.)

(2) that the Drafting Committee would decide whether the note and the protocol which the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to send, did not render superfluous the sending of that specific reply.)

5. (The Council had before it the report from the Central Territorial Committee concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier (See Appendix “E”), and a draft reply from the same Committee to the Bulgarian note concerning Thrace (See Appendix “F”).) Reply to the Bulgarian Counter-Propositions. (Questions of the Dobrudja and of the Serbo-Bulgarian Frontier

M. Laroche explained that the Committee had not been able to agree. Although it was unanimous, as far Thrace was concerned, in refusing the Bulgarian claims, on the contrary, a disagreement existed on two other points. Two delegations, the American and the Italian, were of the opinion that there should be a modification of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier line as it was defined in the conditions of Peace, in two places, namely in the region of Tsaribrod and in the region of Bossiligrad. On the contrary, the three other Delegations were of the opinion that the original conditions should remain. With regard to the Dobrudja, the Committee was equally divided. On September 5,¹⁰ the Supreme Council had decided to examine the question of the Dobrudja when it would reply to the Bulgarian propositions. At the preceding meeting,¹¹ Sir Eyre Crowe had proposed that they should confine themselves to answering the Bulgarians that the question should not come up in a Treaty between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers, but the American and Italian Delegations insisted that the question should be examined anew: As far as they were concerned, the question was bound up with that of the Serbian frontier. That was the opinion of the majority of the Commission. In justification of the changes which they proposed to make in the conditions of Peace, the American and Italian Delegations laid stress on arguments which were already known, and they also emphasized the feeling which was being shown in Bulgaria, they were afraid that the decision of the Conference would leave behind them lasting marks of resentment. These arguments were not of sufficient value for the majority. The Majority as a matter of fact, pointed out that the Serbian Delegation was familiar with the Peace conditions: Should the Council change them at the last minute, the Serbian Allies would be the ones to experience that feeling referred to by the minority Delegations. The majority was of the opinion that the reasons which had modified the line of the former Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were still good: they had wished to protect in the Vranje region the Belgrade–Salonika railroad from a Bulgarian aggression; indeed, it should not be forgotten that it was in that region, and by reason of the proximity of the railroad to the former frontier, the Bulgarian attack had begun in 1915.

Mr. Polk wished to remark that as far as the Dobrudja was concerned, he thought it might be sufficient to insert a phrase on the subject in the covering letter; that the Allied and Associated Powers would declare, for instance, that the time had not come to discuss the question. Should the majority insist, he would not oppose himself to that decision, but he wished to state that he would have to make a formal reservation in the name of the American Government. The Dobrudja might become a cause of future war in the Balkans, and America would have some difficulty in interfering in a conflict which might be brought about by that question. He therefore wished to ask that this reservation be set forth upon the record: that the American Delegation would prefer the insertion in the covering letter of a line stating that the matter would be taken up with Roumania. Was the Supreme Council hostile to this solution? He did not wish to hide the fact that it seemed to him a great pity, at a time when they were guaranteeing the protection of Minorities, to go against the rights of these Minorities in the Dobrudja.

M. Pichon remarked that the Treaty of 1913¹² which had decided the future of the Dobrudja was prior to the war; there was no reason why they should change it as far as Roumania was concerned.

M. Scialoja did not wish to insist that the question of the Dobrudja should be taken up, but he, however, thought that it could very well be said that it did not concern the Treaty with Bulgaria.

Mr. Polk reiterated the fact that he did not ask for the insertion of a disposition to that effect in the Treaty itself, nor even for the addition of a phrase in their reply to the Bulgarian counter-propositions; he was only asking that some words to that effect might be put in the covering letter.

M. Clemenceau thought this amounted to the same thing; such a phrase would be offering a pretext for war.

M. Laroche continued his comment, and said that in the region of Tsaribrod, the Serbians had asked for a rectification of frontiers as far as the Dragoman Pass which protected Sofia. The Conference did not wish to go so far, but they had to point out that there was a series of mountain railways which in that region converged on Pirot and which consequently were the roads leading to Nisch; that was the traditional road of the Bulgarian invasions. It had appeared to them that there was reason for giving to the Serbians the strategic key of that road: indeed Serbia did not have any more claims to set up against Bulgaria, and therefore it was right to believe that there would be no further ambition to satisfy in that direction. On the contrary, Bulgaria would not cease to claim Serbian territories and on that side, the reasons for aggression subsisted. As a matter of fact the rectification of frontiers in question would only have the effect of passing approximately 20,000 inhabitants under Serbian authority.

M. Laroche stated that the report of the Minority had been distributed and that he was ready to read it.

Mr. Polk wished to bring out certain points: first, should they consider the text of their first Peace conditions as intangible? Secondly, when the question had come up for the first time, M. Tardieu had told them that it was only a matter of 7,000 Bulgarians being turned over to Serbian authority. On verifying these figures, it was found that as a matter of fact, it was a total of nearly 42,000 Bulgarians being turned over as against 93 Serbian inhabitants. The only possible justification for this proposed change was to give the Serbians the means to attack Sofia without being stopped by any intermediary obstacles. He, therefore urged the Supreme Council to think over the consequences entailed in a decision which meant the handing over of 40,000 Bulgarians to the Serbians, so as to facilitate a Serbian attack upon Sofia. Even in Serbia the wisest people had seen that this would be a mistake which would make more difficult their mission of conciliation. He did not wish, however, to retard in any way the hour of Peace, but he felt it was his duty to express a very definite protest on this question.

M. Laroche wished to answer Mr. Polk’s arguments by stating briefly that 40,000 Bulgarians in a total population of 4,000,000 inhabitants did not represent a very large figure. They had not left Sofia without protection since they had let the Bulgarians keep the Dragoman Pass which formed a defensive strategic position of the greatest value; and should it be found correct that they had ensured advantages to the Serbians, the reason was that they were convinced it was the Bulgarians who would attack. A concession at Tsaribrod would not make the Bulgarians forget either Stroumitza or Monastir.

M. Scialoja agreed with the American thesis. The arguments of the majority, as a matter of fact, did not seem convincing in the least. The ethnographic question was a clear one: This was a question of a population purely Bulgarian, of a territory which was Bulgarian by its nature and history. The only argument which had been invoked was that of the railway; on this point, he wished to bring their attention to the fact that there were other points on which the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier came nearer thereto than in the Bossiligrad region. Why then base upon the existence of a railroad the determination of a frontier? From the military standpoint, they could no more give Serbia the means of invading Bulgaria than give Bulgaria the means of invading Serbia. If Serbia had legitimate fears, one might, to allay these impose on Bulgaria the disarmament of the entrenched camp of Slivnitza. The truth was that Serbia wished to have an open door on Sofia. They ought to be working to insure equilibrium; they should not admit the violation of those very principles of peace which they were striving to establish. There would always be causes for war, it was not for them to try and bring them about. It was clear that Bulgaria would never admit that the Serbs get an open road to Sofia. Lastly, he wished to remark that the text which they had communicated to the Serbs was only a draft, and that they had a perfect right to change it.

M. Laroche stated that at the present time, from a strategic point of view, the Serbs were in a position of clear inferiority. It was the line of the present frontier which had allowed in 1915 the Bulgarian invasion. The Peace conditions which they had handed to Bulgaria, at the same time as to all their Allies, were more than a simple draft. They would be taking a very serious responsibility should they modify these conditions. As for the disarmament of Slivnitza, which M. Scialoja proposed, this would appear to the Bulgarians as much more serious than the loss of Tsaribrod.

Mr. Bowman resumed the arguments of the minority as follows: First, he thought it was useless to reinforce the feelings of reciprocal hostility between the Bulgarians and the Serbs; secondly, the minority did not consider that reasons existed to foresee an invasion of Serbia by the Bulgarians. Bulgaria was vanquished, and the Treaty disarmed her as well on land as on sea. Precautions had been taken to prevent her reorganizing an army; under these conditions she could not think of starting a new war for a long time. It was correct that in the Bossiligrad region, the railroad was at a distance of about ten miles from the frontier. It was proposed to withdraw this frontier to twice this distance, although the population was entirely Bulgarian; the minority would consent to accept this modification, but the case of Tsaribrod was entirely different. The frontier on that point formed a salient which protected the railroad, and on the other hand, in the southwest, on a point where they had been asked to rectify the line, the frontier came much nearer to the railroad. The American and Italian Delegations were aware of the fact that if one wished to modify the frontier line, the new line as proposed was a good one, but the question was whether such modification was necessary. They still thought that no sufficient reasons were adduced to justify such a change; and when, on the other hand, they pointed out that this was the question of greatest interest to Bulgarian opinion, that it would likewise in itself be sufficient to prevent a rapprochement between Serbia and Bulgaria; that further the draft proposed to them was even opposed by influential men in Serbia, they deemed it their duty to maintain their conclusions.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that Mr. Polk was perfectly right in saying that the Peace conditions which they had handed to the Bulgarians were not inalterable. Any modification was difficult when it bore upon a question which had been discussed for many months and which had been the result of compromise. As a matter of fact the only new point brought up at this meeting was more complete statistical information. All the other arguments had already been discussed, and he admitted that in the first Commission, all the military experts had agreed that the proposed frontier did not give the Serbians offensive military advantages, but only defensive. They were now told that the idea of protecting a railroad had no sense, and that a strategical argument could never be adduced as against an ethnical one; he would point out that the Yugo-Slavs had said the same thing about the line proposed for the new Italo-Slav frontier. In preparing the treaties, they had had to make compromises on all points. Why maintain that in this question particularly principles were sacred? Would it not be wiser to stand by the clauses on which they had agreed? They were as a matter of fact assured that the Bulgarian Delegation would sign the Treaty in any event: on the contrary the conversations he had had with the Serbs had convinced him that if they were to make concessions to Bulgaria so as to facilitate in Sofia a signature which appeared certain, they were running the risk of having the whole treaty jeopardised at Belgrade. The Serbian Delegation which had arrived in Paris was in a difficult situation: it was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria. If this new sacrifice were imposed on Serbia, would the delegation still be able to sign? Their common desire was to sign Peace as soon as possible. They were sure to have the Bulgarian signature; ought they to jeopardise the Serbian signature?

M. Pichon wished only to add one word to Sir Eyre Crowe’s statement. The Serbian Delegates had told him that a concession would mean for certain political men a decisive argument in favor of the refusal of Serbia’s signature. On the other hand, the intentions of Mr. Trumbic were conciliatory. Had the Bulgarians deserved that the Allies should bully the Serbs? He did not think so.

Mr. Polk wished to rectify on one point the statements of Sir Eyre Crowe: the American and Italian experts had never accepted the new line of frontier, they had always pointed out its dangers. The new line was not the work of the Commission, the Supreme Council alone had decided in its favor.¹³ He did not wish to complicate a difficult situation and he accepted that the Council should maintain its former decision, but in that case he felt it his duty to protest, to point out once more the dangers of such a decision, and to repeat that this decision was made against the advice of the American Delegation. The American Delegation did not wish to assume any responsibility whatsoever in the event of future conflicts which this decision might bring about.

M. Scialoja wished to associate himself with Mr. Polk’s declaration.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Crillon, Paris , November 1, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–80

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

On July 18th the Council of Five passed certain resolutions.¹⁴ (Attached Appendix A.) From these resolutions it will be seen that the General Officer Commanding the British troops in Constantinople and Asia Minor, other than Syria, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in those parts. As Commander-in-Chief, he was given the specific duty of demarcating a line beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops were to be permitted to move. It would appear that the fact of this officer’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief was not communicated to the Allied troops, as will be seen from the following telegrams:—

1. The British Commander-in-Chief, Constantinople, reported to the War Office on September 23rd that the Chief of the French Staff had informed his British liaison officer that no intimation had been received from the French Government that General Milne had been appointed to the command of the Allied troops in Asia Minor.

2. On the 26th October General Milne reported that for the last two months he had been endeavouring to obtain from the General commanding the Italian troops in Asia Minor a line of demarcation between the Italian and Turkish troops as directed in the instructions referred to above. In a letter to General Milne, dated September 30th, the Italian General definitely states that he has no knowledge of instructions in the above quoted telegram regarding a line of demarcation between the Italian and Turkish Forces.

General Milne therefore states that so long as the Italian General declines to acknowledge his authority, he is unable to take any action in conformity with the orders of the Supreme Council, and that he cannot accept the responsibility put upon him.

The British Government, therefore, requests that General Milne’s status may be communicated by the respective Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to their subordinates in Constantinople and Asia Minor.

28/10/19

Appendix A

Following resolutions were passed by Council of Five on July 18th, 1919.

1. Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the Armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief.

The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3. Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.

The Council also approved on July 18th the following agreement between Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Venizelos which had been reached as a result of discussions between them authorised by Council of Five:—

The line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations in Asia Minor begins from the mouth of the river K. Menderez: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassoluk–Scala–Nova road: thence it will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayassoluk and old Ephesus.

From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 meters from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by the Greek and Italian Governments in order to allow the Greek troops to protect the railway from sudden attacks from Comitagis.

The line will then reach the river Muschluk-Deresi which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez.

Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuehk.

The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite regime for these regions being reserved to the Conference.

Each of the two Governments agrees to afford in the territory which it occupies full and complete protection to the co-nationals of the other.

Instructions will be given to the commands in order that the officers of the two armies may maintain towards each other most friendly relations.

Appendix B to HD–80

November 1, 1919.

Note to German Government

By the terms of the final provisions of the Treaty signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, it has been stipulated that:

“A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand.”

The President of the Peace Conference has the honor of calling to the attention of the Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy have ratified, and Germany on the other hand, having also ratified the Treaty, the condition referred to above has been fulfilled.

The other Allied and Associated Powers who have up to the present time made known their ratification are Belgium, Poland and Siam.

In compliance with the said provisions, and if the various acts necessary to the coming into force of the Treaty be fulfilled in time, there will take place in Paris, at a date which will be announced later and notification of which will be given five days in advance, a procès-verbal, of the deposit of these ratifications, at which the German Government is requested to participate.

The final provisions of the Treaty add:

“From the date of this first procès-verbal the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it. For the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present Treaty this date will be the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.”

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers have decided that the Treaty shall not go into force until the execution of the obligations which Germany had by the Armistice Convention and the additional agreements undertaken to fulfill and which have not received satisfaction, shall have been fully carried out.

The German Government is, therefore, asked to give to the German representative, authorized to sign the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications, also full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol, of which a copy is hereto annexed,¹⁵ and which provides without further delay for this settlement.

Furthermore, the entry into force of the Treaty involves certain consequences which, at the present time, it is important to consider:

1. The beginning of operations by the Inter-Allied High Commission of the Ehineland (Arrangement, Article 2);

2. The beginning of operations by military, naval and air delegations, at the present time in Germany, as military, naval and air commissions of control (Treaty, Article 203);

3. The beginning of operations by the Reparations Commission; (Treaty, Article 233 and Annex 11, Paragraph 5);

4. Transfer of sovereignty for Memel (Treaty, Article 99) and for Dantzig (Treaty, Article 100), resulting in the evacuation of the troops and German authorities and the taking possession of these territories by the Inter-Allied troops;

5. Transfer of Government in the Saar Basin (Treaty, Article 49 and Annex, Paragraph 16);

6. Transfer of temporary Government in the territory of Upper Silesia, submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, Article 88 and Ajinex, Paragraphs 1 and 2); resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities to be designated by the Commission, and the occupation by Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission, of Government and of Plebiscite in this territory;

7. Transfer of temporary administration in the territory of Schleswig submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, Article 109), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and the occupation by Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Administration and of Plebiscite in this territory;

8. Beginning of the 15-day period in which must be effected the evacuation and the transfer of temporary administrations in the territories submitted to a plebiscite; Eastern Prussia, Allenstein (Treaty, Article 95) and Eastern Prussia, Marienwerder (Treaty, Article 97), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and the occupation by Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commissions of Administration and of Plebiscite in these territories;

9. Beginning of the 15–day period in which the Delimitation Commissions must begin their operations.

The German Government therefore is now invited to send to Paris, for November 10th, 1919, duly qualified representatives for this purpose, to:

1. Arrange in agreement with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers the conditions for the setting up of the Commissions of Government, of Administration and of Plebiscite, the handing over of powers, the transfer of services, the entry of Inter-Allied troops, the evacuation of German troops, the replacement of the said German authorities and all other measures above provided for.

Attention is now called to the fact that the German authorities must leave intact, all service organizations and offices, as well as the documents required by the Inter-Allied authorities for the immediate entry on their duties; and that the German troops must also leave intact all the establishments which they occupy.

2. Agree with the Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Powers, as to the conditions of transport of Inter-Allied troops.

Appendix C to HD–80

Protocol

At the very time of proceeding to the first deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty, it was ascertained that the following obligations which Germany had agreed to execute, in the Armistice Conventions and the complementary agreements, have not been executed or have not received full satisfaction, viz:

1st. —Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918,¹⁶ Clause VII: Obligation of delivering 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars. Forty-two locomotives and 4,460 cars are still to be delivered.

2d. —Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XII: Obligation of withdrawing within the frontiers of Germany, the German troops which are in Russian territory, as soon as the Allies judge the time proper. This withdrawal of troops has not been as yet executed, in spite of the reiterated injunctions of August 27,¹⁷ September 27¹⁸ and October 10, 1919.¹⁹

3d. —Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIV: Obligation to discontinue immediately all requisitions, seizures or coercive measures in Russian territory. The German troops continue to use these methods.

4th. —Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIX: Obligation of immediately delivering all documents, specie, values (of property and finance, with all issuing apparatus),²⁰ concerning public or private interests in the invaded countries. The complete statement[s] of the specie and securities removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans in the invaded countries, have not been delivered.

5th. —Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXII: Obligation of delivering all German submarines. Destruction of the German submarine U. C. 48, off Ferrol, by order of her German Commander, and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines proceeding to England for delivery.

6th. —Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXIII: Obligation of maintaining in the Allied ports the German battleships designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, these ships being destined to be ulteriorly [subsequently?] delivered; Clause XXXI: Obligation of not destroying any ships before delivery—on June 21, 1919, destruction at Scapa Flow of the said ships.

7th. —Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the Armistice Convention of December 13, 1918: Obligation of restoring all works of art and artistic documents removed from France and Belgium. All works of art which were transported into unoccupied Germany have not been restored.

8th. —Armistice Convention of January 15 [16], 1919, Clause III and Protocol 392/1, additional Clause III, of July 25, 1919: Obligation of delivering agricultural implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material provided for in Tables 1 and 2 annexed to the Protocol of Spa, of December 17, 1918—The following were not delivered on the date fixed (October 1, 1919): 40 “Heucke” plowing outfits; all the personnel necessary to operate the apparati, all the spades; 1,500 shovels, 1,130 Plows T. M. 23/26; 1,765 plows T. F. 18/21; 1,512 plows T. F. 23/26; 629 Belgian plows T. F. 0,m20; 1,205 Belgian plows T. F. 0 m.26; 4,282 harrows of 2 k.500; 2,157 steel cultivators; 966 fertilizer spreaders 2m.50; 1,608 fertilizer spreaders 3m.50.

9th. —Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VI; Obligation of restoring the industrial material removed from French and Belgian territories. All this material has not been restored.

10th. —Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VIII; Obligation of placing the entire German Merchant Fleet at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. A certain number of ships, of which delivery had been requested by virtue of this clause, have not yet been delivered.

11th. —Protocols of the Brussels Conferences of March 13th and 14th, 1919: Obligation of not exporting any war material of any nature. Exportation of aerial material to Sweden, Holland and Denmark.

A certain number of the above unexecuted, or incompletely executed stipulations, were renewed by the Treaty of June 28, 1919, the going into force of which will of right render applicable the sanctions provided for. This applies in particular, to the various payments in kind stipulated as reparation.

On the other hand, the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces was the object of an exchange of notes and decisions, which are in course of execution. The Allied and Associated Powers expressly confirm the contents of their notes, the execution of which Germany, by the present protocol, agrees to carry out loyally and strictly.

Lastly, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot overlook, without sanction, the other infractions committed against the Armistice Conventions, and violations as serious as the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, the destruction of the submarine U. C. 48 off Ferrol, and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines proceeding to England for delivery.

Consequently, Germany agrees:

1st.—A) to deliver as reparation for the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow:

ent protocol and under the conditions provided for by paragraph

a) Within a period of sixty days from the signing of the pres-2, of Article 185, of the Treaty of Peace, the following five light cruisers:

• Königsberg
• Pillau
• Graudem
• Regensbwrg
• Strassburg

b) Within a period of ninety days from the signing of the present protocol, and in all respects in good condition and ready to function, such a number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs, and dredgers, equivalent to a total displacement of 400,000 tons, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers may demand.

As regards the docks, the lifting power will be considered as displacement. In the number of docks above provided for, there should be about seventy-five per cent of docks of over 10,000 tons. The totality of this material must be delivered in situ.

B) To be delivered within a period of ten days from the signing of the present protocol:

A complete list of all the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers which are German property. This list, which will be delivered to the Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission, provided for by Article 209 of the Peace Treaty, will include the material which on the 11th of November, 1918, belonged to the Gerjnan Government, or in which the German Government had an important interest at that date.

C) The officers and men who formed the crews of the battleships sunk at Scapa Flow, and who are actually detained by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with the exception of those who [whose?] surrender is provided for by Article 228 of the Peace Treaty, will be repatriated at the latest when Germany will have complied with the above, paragraphs A and B.

D) The destroyer B–98 will be considered as one of the 42 destroyers, the delivery of which is provided for by Article 185 of the Peace Treaty.

2nd.—To deliver within a period of ten days from the signing of the present protocol: The machinery and engines of the submarines U–137, U–138, and U–150, to offset the destruction of the submarine UC–48, as well as the three engines of the submarine U–146, which is still to be delivered, to offset the destruction of submarines in the North Sea.

3rd.—To pay to the Allied and Associated Governments: The value of the exported aerial material, according to the decision and the estimation which will be made and notified by the Aerial Control Commission, provided for by Article 210 of the Peace Treaty, and before the 31st of January, 1920.

In case Germany should not fulfill these obligations within the time above specified, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to have recourse to any coercive measures, military or other which they may deem appropriate.

Done in Paris . . . . . . . . . . 1919.

Appendix D to HD–80

the french delegation

Draft of Reply to a Note of the German Government of the 12th of October²²

(Wako No. 3639)

1. The refusal, expressed in paragraph one, to admit that the Allied and Associated Powers have the right to spontaneously make definite decisions, is in contradiction with the Terms of Article 204, paragraph 2, of the Peace Treaty, drawn up as follows:

“They (Inter-Allied Commissions of Control) will communicate to the German authorities the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (therefore the Supreme Council) have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the military, naval and air clauses may necessitate.”

2. The objection raised by the first alinea of paragraph 2 of the German note, has been considered by the Supreme Council in its meeting of the 23rd of August, 1919.²³ After having examined the text of the convention of Brussels and of the telegram from the Economic Supreme Council under date of the 25th of March, account being taken of the lifting of the blockade, the Supreme Council, considering that, the agreement made by Germany to execute the terms of Article 202 confers on the Allied and Associated Powers property rights over the material to be delivered, has decided that:

“The Allied and Associated Powers will inform Germany that they insist upon the principle established that Germany must not alienate her aeronautical material. However, the Allied and Associated Powers, making use of their property rights, upon this material, reserve …”

3. The assertion contained in the second alinea of paragraph 2, according to which “Article 169 of the Treaty provides for the delivery of the material, in order to be destroyed or rendered unserviceable”, is inaccurate in the particular case of the aeronautical material, because Article 159, chapter 2 of Section 1, “Military Clauses” only relates to the munitions and the war material referred to in this section of the Military Clauses “and does not provide at all for the fate of the aeronautical material, which is the object of Section 3 ‘clauses concerning the military and naval air service’”.

The fate of this material is decided by Article 202, which does not provide for any destruction, but “for the delivery, in a period of two months, to the places which will be indicated” with interdiction “to shift this material without special authorization of the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

4. According to Paragraph 3 of the German note, the Allied and Associated Powers refused to admit that there exists any German civilian aircraft. This assertion is not mentioned in any of the notes sent to the German Government but on the other hand this Government has been informed by telegram, communicating the decision taken by the Supreme Council on the 6th of August,²⁴ that:

“The Allies are aware that military aeroplanes are transformed into commercial aeroplanes. The President of the Inter-Allied Aerial Control Commission will be the only judge to declare whether an aeroplane is military or not.”

The reason for this is that the Supreme Council has admitted that “aircraft constructed since the Armistice according to entirely new plans, might be considered as civilian aircraft”. Therefore, there could only be in Germany a limited number of aircraft. Consequently, until the Inter-Allied Aerial Control Commission has given its opinion on the subject of this aircraft, which the German Government claims to be of a civilian nature, it has been decided (29th of September, 1919)²⁵ that:

“All aeronautical material existing in Germany must be considered as war material, and for this reason, can be neither exported nor alienated, nor loaned, nor utilized, nor destroyed, but must be stored until the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission of Control has decided upon its nature.”

5. It is true that concerning the execution of the aeronautical clauses of the Peace Treaty, a great number of details were settled by direct negotiations between the German Government and the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission, “especially appointed to supervise the execution of these clauses” (Article 203) and “Especially directed with the supervision of the execution of the deliveries provided by the obligations of the German Government (Article 204—Paragraph 1)”.

But this Commission cannot, in any case, definitely “settle the questions at stake” (German Note,—paragraph 4) but will often have to call for orders from the Supreme Council, and “to inform the German authorities of the decisions which the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the aeronautical clauses might necessitate.” (Article 204—paragraph 2.)

Appendix E to HD–80

central territorial committee

Report to the Supreme Council on the Bulgarian Demands Concerning the Serfto-Bulgaricm Frontier

On the question of the frontiers between Serbia and Bulgaria, the Central Territorial Committee has not succeeded in reaching a unanimous decision.

The British and French and Japanese Delegations are of the opinion that the line of the frontiers as described in the peace conditions with Bulgaria should be maintained.

This line was in fact adopted by the Supreme Council²⁷ after having been unanimously proposed by the Commission on Jugo-Slav Affairs, which took its decision only after having considered all the elements of the problem. None of the arguments stated by the Bulgarians has appeared of a nature to justify any changes in the line adopted.

In these circumstances, the British, French and Japanese Delegations do not believe that the only hope of facilitating for Bulgaria the accomplishment of the treaty which is imposed upon her can counterbalance the grave inconvenience which there would be in modifying a decision made with full knowledge of the facts and which has been notified not only to Bulgaria, but to the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene Government.

Report of American and Italian Delegations

The American and Italian Delegations propose that in the regions of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrad the rectifications in favor of Serbia be withdrawn and that the boundary in these districts be maintained at the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier of 1914.

In support of this proposition the two Delegations submit the following:—

1. The population concerned, numbering more than 40,000, is almost 100% Bulgarian—

(Tzaribrod	district	—	Bulgarians	20,384;	Serbs	79)
(Bossilegrad	“	—	“	21,839;	“	12)
(Bulgarian statistics—1910.)

2. The natural economic outlets of the districts are towards Sofia.

3. The proposed frontier would bring the Serbian frontier 10 kilometres nearer Sofia, leaving it only 54 kilometres from the Bulgarian capital.

4. The new frontier possesses no natural advantages over the former frontier, in general it follows lower ridges, and in the Bossilegrad district cuts two valley heads, which are apparently inaccessible by road from the Serbian side.

5. By the present Treaty the Allies have already made concessions to Serbia at the expense of Bulgaria in granting the districts of Strumitza and Roula (Vidin), where the population is overwhelmingly Bulgarian.

6. By accepting the new strategic frontiers the Allies may well expose themselves to the charge brought against Austria-Hungary, when in the second Treaty of Bucharest, 1918,²⁸ the latter advanced the Hungarian frontier in Transylvania, on purely strategic grounds, to include the valley heads of the Roumanian streams.

7. The cession of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrad will result in augmenting the large number of refugees already in Bulgaria (now some 400,000), who are a danger for the public security of the country and form centres of propaganda against Bulgaria’s neighbors.

In case the Serbians consider that the entrenched camp at Slivnitza is a danger for their own frontier, the Allied Powers can make provisions for its destruction.

In supporting the frontier proposed in the draft of the Bulgarian Treaty for the districts of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrad, the British and French Delegations emphasize strategic considerations and the inconvenience of modifying a frontier already notified.

In reply the American and Italian Delegations assert that strategic considerations should not outweigh clear ethnic considerations and the wishes of the people concerned. As regards the modification of a previous decision, in the cases of neither the German nor the Austrian Treaty, have the Allies hesitated to make rectifications where such appeared justified.

The American and Italian Delegations are firmly convinced that the maintenance of the proposed frontier, by its flagrant violation of ethnic considerations in favor of strategic frontiers, by its perpetual threat and humiliation to the Bulgarian capital, can only render more difficult the maintenance of peace in the Balkans.

The American and Italian Delegations contend that Bulgarian public and official opinion is more strongly opposed to the changes on the western frontier than to any other boundary alterations. We believe that so unexpected a blow, one which is peculiarly painful because it strikes at the security and pride of the national capital, will serve as the basis of protracted propaganda and eventually of war. That the blow was unexpected gives no assurance that its effects will soon pass. The deciding question is this: Does the act fall within the general rules or principles of the Conference? We assert that it does not.

Appendix F to HD–80

central territorial committee

Draft of Reply to the Bulgarian Note Relative to Thrace

The Allied and Associated Powers have examined the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation relative to the frontier of Thrace with most scrupulous attention. Before determining this frontier line, such as it is indicated in the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria, the Allied and Associated Powers did not fail to fully consider all reasons of an ethnical, geographical and even historic order having any influence on their decision. The same care has been exercised in studying all arguments presented by the Bulgarian Delegation. For these reasons, the Allied and Associated Powers see no reason to introduce modifications in the outline of the frontier.

The Allied and Associated Powers were, furthermore, particularly attentive to protect the economic interests of Bulgaria by guaranteeing, in particular, this country an outlet to the Aegean Sea. In numerous cases, the Powers were obliged to have recourse to the same procedure in order to reconcile the interests under debate, and they do not doubt, that if Bulgaria loyally accepts this solution, the future will show that the guarantees which have been given her will be in no manner illusory.

1. HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.
2. Appendix B is not the draft but the final text of the note.
3. HD–79, minute 1, p. 830.
4. Appendix O is the final text of the protocol. The English text of the draft protocol cannot be found in the Department files. A translation, by the editors, of the French text (Paris Peace Conf. 185.182/153) reads as follows (the page numbers of the original are given in brackets):

   [1]

   Draft Protocol

   At the very time of proceeding to the first deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty, it was ascertained that the following obligations which Germany had agreed to execute, in the Armistice Conventions and the complementary agreements, have not received full satisfaction, viz:

   1st. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause VII: Obligation of delivering within a period of thirty-one days ending on December 11, 1918, 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars. Forty-two locomotives and 4,460 cars are still to be delivered.

   2d. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause IX: Obligation of the cost of the troops of occupation. The reimbursements have not been made.

   3d. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XII: Obligation of withdrawing immediately within the frontiers of Germany, the German troops which are in Russian territory.

   This withdrawal of troops has not been as yet executed, in spite of the reiterated injunctions of August 27, September 27, and October 10, 1919.

   4th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIV: Obligation to discontinue immediately all requisitions, seizures or consecutive measures in Russian territory. The German troops continue to use these measures.

   5th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIX: Obligation of immediately delivering all documents, specie, securities (transferable and judicial, together with plant for issue thereof) concerning public

   [2]

   or private interests in the invaded countries. The complete statements of the specie and securities removed, collected, or confiscated by the Germans in the invaded countries, have not been delivered.

   • 6th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXII: Obligation of delivering all German submarines. Destruction of the German submarine UC–48, off Ferrol, by order of her German Commander.
   • 7th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXIII: Obligation of maintaining in the Allied ports the German battleships designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, these ships being destined to be subsequently delivered; Clause XXXI: Obligation of not destroying any ships before delivery—on June 21, 1919, destruction at Scapa Flow of the said ships.
   • 8th. Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the Clauses of the Armistice of December 13, 1919: Obligation of restoring all works of art and artistic documents removed from France and Belgium. All works of art which were transported into unoccupied Germany have not been restored.
   • 9th. Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause III and Protocol 392/1, additional Clause III, of July 25, 1919: Obligation of delivering agricultural implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material provided for in tables 1 and 2 annexed to the Protocol of Spa, of December 17, 1918. The following were not delivered on the date fixed (October 1, 1919): 40 “Heucke” plowing outfits; all the personnel necessary to operate the apparati, all the spades; 1,500 shovels, 1,130 plows T. M. 23/26; 1,765 plows T. F. 18/21; 1,512 plows T. F. 23/26; 629 Belgian plows T. F. Om 20; 1,205 Belgian plows T. F. Om 26; 4,282 harrows of 2k.500; 2,157

   [3]

   steel cultivators; 966 fertilizer spreaders 2m 50; 1,608 fertilizer spreaders 3m 50.

   10th. Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VI: Obligation of restoring the industrial material removed from French and Belgian territories. All this material has not been restored.

   11th. Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VIII: Obligation of placing the entire German Merchant Fleet at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. The following have not been delivered: 14 tankers, total tonnage of 63,143, lying at Hamburg; five steamers, total tonnage of 62,456, lying at Bremerhaven, Geestemunde, and Bremen; all of which were to be surrendered in the Firth of Forth.

   12th. Protocols of the Brussels Conference of March 13th and 14th, 1919: Obligation of not exporting any war material of any nature. Exportation of aerial material to Sweden, Holland, Denmark.

   A certain number of the above unexecuted stipulations were renewed by the Treaty of June 28, 1919, the going into force of which will of right render applicable the sanctions provided for. This applies, in particular, to the various payments in kind stipulated as reparation.

   On the other hand, the question of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces was the object of an exchange of notes and decisions, which are in course of execution. The Allied and Associated Powers expressly confirm the contents

   [4]

   of their notes, the execution of which Germany, by the present Protocol, agrees to carry out loyally and strictly.

   Lastly, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot overlook, without sanction, the other infractions committed against the Armistice Conventions, and violations as serious as the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow and the destruction of the submarine UC–48 off Ferrol.

   Consequently, Germany agrees:

   1st) To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the present protocol . . . . . . . . . as reparation for the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow.

   2d) To deliver witlxin the same period, the machinery and engines of the submarines U–137, UT–46 [sic], and U–150, as reparation for the destruction of the submarine UC–48.

   3d) To pay to the Allied and Associated Governments, the value of the exported aerial material, according to the estimate that will be made by the President of the Aerial Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, and within five days following the notification of this estimate.

   4th) To make within a period of 10 days from the date of the present protocol, reimbursement with 10 percent interest for the cost of the troops of occupation.

   5th) To effect, within the same period, the delivery of the 42 locomotives and 4,460 cars in accordance with clause VII of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918.

   [5]

   In case Germany should not fulfill these obligations within the time above specified, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to have recourse to any coercive measures, military or other, which they may deem appropriate.

   Done in Paris . . . . . . . . . . 1919.

5. HD-62, minute 1, p. 403.
6. Appendix A to HD–78, pp. 811, 816.
7. Minute 2, p. 430.
8. See final text of note, appendix B, p. 863.
9. Appendix A to HD–78, pp. 811, 816.
10. HD–48, minute 2, p. 116.
11. HD–79, minute 4, p. 837.
12. Treaty of peace between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia, July 28 (August 10), 1913, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 658.
13. FM–16, minute 1(d), vol. iv, pp. 716, 720.
14. HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.
15. Appendix C, infra.
16. Vol. ii, p. 1.
17. Not fonnd in Department files.
18. Appendix E to HD–62, p. 419.
19. HD–67, minute 4, and appendices D and E thereto, pp. 536, 546, and 547.
20. The English text of the Armistice reads: “documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof vol. ii, p. 5.
22. Appendix A to HD–78, pp. 811, 816.
23. HD–37, minute 5, and appendix C thereto, vol. vii, pp. 816 and 823.
24. HD–25, minute 14, ibid., p. 563.
25. HD–63, minute 2, p. 430.
27. FM–16, minute 1 (d), vol. iv, pp. 716, 720.
28. Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 771.