Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/78
HD–78
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great
Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday,
October 29, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.
Paris, October 29, 1919, 10:30 a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Secretary
- British Empire
- Secretary
- France
- Secretaries
- M. Berthelot
- M. de St. Quentin
- Italy
- Secretary
- Japan
- Secretary
| Joint Secretariat |
| America, United States of |
Capt. B. Winthrop |
| British Empire |
Capt. G. Lothian Small |
| France |
M. Massigli |
| Italy |
M. Zanchi |
| Interpreter—M. Mantoux |
The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:
- America, United States of
- General Tasker H. Bliss
- Mr. E. L. Dresel
- Colonel J. A. Logan
- Mr. A. W. Dulles
- British Empire
- General Groves
- Air Commander Smith
- Captain Fuller
- Lieut. Commander Dunne
- Lieut. Colonel Kisch
- France
- Marshal Foch
- General Weygand
- M. Henry Berenger
- M. Laroche
- Commandant Levavasseur
- M. de Celle
- Capitaine de Corvette Fabre
- M. Kammerer
- Capitaine Roper
- General Niessel
- Italy
- M. Stranieri
- Lieut. Col. Piccio
- Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli
- Japan
1. (The Council had before it a report from the Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies dated October 23, 1919 (See
Appendix “A”), a note in three parts from the British Delegation dated
October 23, 24 and 25, 19191 (See
Appendix “B”) and a letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (See Appendix “C”). Violations by the Germans of the Armistice
Clauses
General Weygand read and commented upon the
report dealing with the violations of the clauses of the Armistice, the
preparation of which had been entrusted to the Armistice Commission at
Cologne.
Captain Fuller read and commented upon the
notes from the British Delegation dealing with violations of the Naval
Clauses of the Armistice.
M. de Celle read and commented upon the letter
from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied Armies, and added thereto the following observations:
The Germans were to have supplied a complete list of the plunder and
thefts committed by them; there were numerous omissions in the lists
supplied. It had been indicated clearly to the Germans that in matters
of specie and personal property omission might occur only in exceptional
cases and that they should be made known within twenty-four hours of
their discovery. The despatch of a new truckload of property had just
been made known to them. They had to acknowledge that the German
delegates in Paris were actually doing their best to give
satisfaction.
Similarly, the documents which Clause 13 of the Protocol of Spa, dated
December 1st, 1918,1a had in mind,
concerning notes issued by towns during the German occupation (list of
printed notes, lists of notes whose issue had been authorized, list of
notes actually issued, list of water-marked paper stocks, etc.,) had not
so far been supplied, notwithstanding the formal promise made by Germany
to send them before December 10th, 1918. Those lists were of extreme
importance in order to discover and suppress possible forgery.
Lastly, as for the recovery of objets d’art, if
those that belonged to public museums had been restored this was not the
case with objets d’avt or furniture taken from
private houses. The Germans
[Page 803]
professed that there had been no official storage of these objects: they
knew, however, that the experts who had superintended their collection
had worked publicly and that furniture and pictures had been carefully
packed for transport. It was impossible to admit, as the Germans
pretended, that the vanished furniture had been used merely for
furnishing posts of command or dugouts.
M. Clemenceau asked whether a member of the
Council wished to make any remark.
Sir Eyre Crowe wished for the moment to leave
aside the two most serious violations of the Armistice, namely, the
question of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident, to which
he intended to return. As for the other violations it was important to
adhere to this: that obligations incurred by the terms of the Armistice
be retained when the Treaty came into force. Guarantees to this effect
were necessary. If their legal advisors were of the opinion that the
stipulations of the Armistice would no longer subsist with the coming
into force of the Peace Treaty, it was absolutely necessary to oblige
the Germans to sign a special Protocol assuring to the Powers every
possible guarantee corresponding to the guarantees of the Armistice.
Mr. Polk agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the
legal advisers should be consulted.
M. Scialoja found the difficulty to arise out
of the fact that the conventions of the Armistice, while constituting a
veritable treaty, had been imposed in military form. He thought there
were grounds for preparing a Protocol enumerating all the obligations
still to be fulfilled, but what sanctions would the Council still wield
since the coming into force of the Treaty would deprive it of the
sanctions which the Armistice afforded? It was necessary that the
Protocol itself incorporate sanctions.
Sir Eyre Crowe maintained that for the very
reason adduced by M. Scialoja, he had drawn the distinction between the
more important and the less important violations of the Armistice: was
not such sanction necessary for the less important violations?
M. Clemenceau thought that they did not wish to
commit themselves to a perfectly futile manifestation; a definite date
had to be fixed. As a matter of form it would be well to say that unless
the obligations undertaken were fulfilled they would have to demand
sanctions which, as it seemed to him, ought to be of a military nature
for in reality there were no others. Therefore, in the Protocol a list
of all the so-called secondary violations of the Armistice had to be
prepared. He thought it hardly possible to say to the Germans that they
would not have the Treaty come into force until after the execution of
those clauses: it would be sufficient to say that if the clauses were
not fulfilled, sanctions of military nature would be imposed. The
questions of Scapa Flow
[Page 804]
and of
the Baltic Provinces remained. In the former matter they had done
nothing; on the latter they had decided upon a course of action the
preceding day. Would it not be necessary to know what sanctions they
would employ if the mission of General Niessel arrived at no
success.
Mr. Polk asked whether it was intended to tell
the Germans what sanctions would ultimately be applied.
M. Clemenceau said there certainly was no such
intention. It would be sufficient to say that there would be some
sanction: but of course the Germans would have to sign the Protocol
before the Treaty would come into force.
Mr. Polk remarked that the Protocol should be
submitted first to the Council, which would then have to discuss the
question of sanctions.
M. Clemenceau agreed.
Mr. Polk inquired whether the Council had
communicated to the Dutch Government the note2
sent to Germany relative to the delivery of ships she had sold to
Holland.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Dutch Government
had been informed of such a note having been sent and told that if it
claimed property rights in the ships in question, it would have to
justify its claims before the Council.
Sir Eyre Crowe reverted to the violation of the
Armistice committed in the Scapa Flow incident. The Council had been
apprised some time ago of a British proposal on the subject. The sinking
of the ships could be considered either the individual act of the
officers and crews, or an act for which the German government was
responsible. The British Delegation believed that there were grounds for
holding the government responsible. In the latter case reparation was
due for the value of the sunken ships, cost of salvage of the ships,
cost of surveying the anchorage, buoying the wrecks and any subsequent
expenses incurred, e. g., in clearing the anchorage of wrecks, etc. It
was proposed further that reparation should be in kind, for example in
the surrender of the five light cruisers that Germany still possessed
and of floating docks, cranes, harbor craft, etc.; that the Germans
should be asked further to supply to the Armistice Commission a complete
list of this material, delivery of which the Armistice Commission would
be authorized to accept.
M. Clemenceau said that they were agreed in
considering the German Government responsible.
Mr. Polk stated that he did not yet have the
report of his naval experts on the question and asked that it be
adjourned.
Sir Eyre Crowe maintained that if they held the
German Government responsible, they could, as the British Delegation
believed,
[Page 805]
repatriate the
German officers and seamen of the crews which had been taken prisoner on
the destruction of the fleet.
M. Clemenceau proposed to discuss that question
on the following day.
Sir Eyre Crowe wished to remark further that in
the matter of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces the terms of the
Armistice were repeated in the body of the Treaty. In that respect,
therefore, they did have guarantees.
It was decided:
- (1)
- to ask the Drafting Committee to prepare a Protocol to be
signed by the Representative of the German government before the
Treaty came into force and to contain, along with the list of
the unfulfilled clauses of the Armistice, an undertaking by
Germany to fulfil those clauses within a prescribed time under
penalty of such measures which the Allied and Associated Powers
would reserve to themselves in the event of
noncompliance;
- (2)
- that the question whether the non-evacuation of the Baltic
Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident were to be explicitly
mentioned in this Protocol be provisionally reserved. (See
appendices “A”, “B” and “C”).
2. General Niessel wished to point out to the
Council that it would be difficult for his Mission to leave the Monday
or Wednesday following; his Italian colleague had not yet arrived and
General Turner’s officers would not be in Paris before the end of the
week. Lastly there would be difficulties from the point of view of
railroad transportation. Inter-Allied Baltic
Provinces Military Commission
M. Clemenceau said that General Niessel would
leave on Wednesday at the latest.
M. Clemenceau thought that they might agree
provisionally that the expenses of the Mission would be divided between
the Allies.
M. Berthelot explained that for the moment it
was only a question of the immediate expenses of maintenance and
voyage.
Mr. Polk said that it would be best that each
Power supply the expenses of its own representatives.
It was decided:
that, subject to later examination of the question by the Supreme
Council, each Power should pay the expenses of its
representatives on the Inter-Allied Baltic Provinces Military
Commission.
3. (The Council had before it a note from the New States Commission
asking the Supreme Council for instructions (See appendix “D”).) Request for Instructions from the New States
Commission Relative to the Bulgarian Counter-propositions
M. Kammerer read and commented upon the first
part of the note.
M. Scialoja thought it preferable to insert in
the Bulgarian Treaty a clause by which Serbia and Roumania would incur
the same obligations as those of article 46 of the Treaty with
Greece.
[Page 806]
M. Kammerer suggested that if, in the Treaty
with Bulgaria, the same terms were inserted which had prevented Serbia
from signing the Treaty with Austria, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would
not sign the Bulgarian Treaty; the result would correspond to the second
procedure suggested by the Commission.
Mr. Polk wondered, whether, if they made it
possible to sign the Bulgarian Treaty without inserting therein the same
terms as in the Austrian Treaty, they might not leave it optional to
certain powers to sign one Treaty and not the other. It was most
important, he thought, to tell the Roumanians and the Serbs that if they
did not sign the Austrian Treaty neither would they sign the Bulgarian
Treaty.
M. Kammerer agreed that the insertion of a new
article might be possible; he thought, however, that it would be
disagreeable to the states concerned for the Council to tell them that
they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty before signing the Austrian
Treaty.
Mr. Polk did not see that they had to modify a
treaty so as to satisfy a power that refused to sign.
M. Pichon considered the second method
preferable; they would inform the Roumanians and Serbs that they could
not sign the Bulgarian Treaty unless they signed the Austrian Treaty.
The Council would thus be in possession of a further means of bringing
pressure to bear upon them.
Sir Eyre Crowe considered that there should be
on the agenda of an early sitting of the Council, the question of the
signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Roumanians and Serbs.
M. Pichon said Mr. Trumbic had arrived and that
General Coanda had left Bucarest the previous day. According to a
telegram he had received that morning, he thought the signature
probable.
Sir Eyre Crowe’s information did not give him
the same impression.
Mr. Polk was in a similar situation. He had the
feeling that the Roumanians wished simply to gain time.
M. Kammerer read and commented upon the second
part of the report of the New States Commission.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked what right Bulgaria had to
set up as champion of the Turkish cause.
M. Kammerer explained that it was not Turks
properly speaking, but Turkish subjects who had taken refuge in
Bulgarian territory. The Italian Delegation was afraid that Serbia was
preventing their exercising that right of option which the 1913
treaty3 gave them, but which the outbreak of war had made
impossible. There was no doubt that the insertion of special clauses in
the Treaty would be unpleasant enough for Serbia.
[Page 807]
Sir Eyre Crowe maintained that it was always
dangerous to modify a treaty once it had been signed, and that the
Allied and Associated Powers had already signed the Minorities
Treaty.
M. Kammerer explained that it was the Italian
Delegation that insisted upon that solution.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked if there were any evidence
to show the Turks intended returning into Serbian territory?
Mr. Polk explained that it was a question of
Macedonian refugees.
M. Pichon asked whether, instead of changing
the text of the Treaty, a procedure which as Sir Eyre Crowe had pointed
out, presented serious disadvantages, they could not demand of Serbia
written declarations on the point?
M. Kammerer was of the opinion that Serbia
would prefer that solution.
M. Scialoja pointed out that in the Bulgarian
Treaty a clause could be inserted analogous to that in which Greece was
placed by Article IV of the proposed Greek Treaty.4
M. Kammerer said that the Commission had judged
that this involved difficulties and that there was no point in
concealing the fact that the insertion of a clause of such nature in the
Bulgarian Treaty would be extremely disagreeable to the Serbs.
M. Scialoja maintained that Serbia would have
to restore to its refugees the right of option which the outbreak of war
had prevented them from exercising in the prescribed time.
M. Pichon believed that Serbia should make the
declaration in a letter.
(It was decided:
- (1)
- that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make
known to the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that
these latter countries would not be allowed to sign the Treaty
with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and
the Minorities Treaty;
- (2)
- that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government be asked to make known
by written declaration that it would authorize its Ottoman
subjects who, owing to the war, had not been able to avail
themselves in the prescribed time of the right of option
envisaged by the Treaty of 1913, to take advantage of that
right. (See Appendix “D”).)
4. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated
October 27th (See Appendix “E”).)
(After a short discussion Request for instructions
From the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of
Control in Germany
It was decided:
to refer to the military representatives at Versailles, for
examination and report, the request for instructions addressed
to the Supreme Council by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied
Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany. (See Appendix
“E”.)
[Page 808]
5. (The Council had before it a draft note to the German Government,
prepared by the Polish Commission (See Appendix “F”).)
(It was decided: Note to the German Government on the
Municipal Elections in Upper Silesia
to approve the draft note to the German Government on the
question of municipal elections in Upper Silesia as prepared by
the Polish Commission. (See Appendix “F”).)
6. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated
October 27th (See Appendix “G”).) Salaries and
Allowances for the Administrator of Dantzig and His Staff and for
the Administrative Staff of Memel
M. Pichon considered it logical to adopt the
proposal, which conformed to previous decisions of the Supreme
Council.
Mr. Polk asked who would fix the salaries.
M. Pichon said it would be a matter for
deciding as in analogous cases.
(It was decided:
- (1)
- that the salaries and allowances of the temporary
Administrator of the Free City of Dantzig and his staff, and of
the Administrative Staff of Memel should be a charge upon local
revenues (See Appendix “G”);
- (2)
- that the rate of these salaries and allowances should be fixed
by the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with
Germany.)
7. (The Council had before it a report of the Commission entrusted with
examining the question of the repatriation of German and Austrian
prisoners from Siberia (See Appendix “H”).)
Captain de Corvette Fabre read and commented
upon the report of the Commission. Repatriation of
Allied Contingents and Enemy Prisoners From Siberia
Mr. Polk thought that the order of repatriation
could be modified by financial considerations. As regarded the Czechs,
an agreement had been arrived at, which placed the immediate expenses of
repatriation on Great Britain, the United States and France. No account
had been taken so far of the Poles, the Roumanians and the Serbs.
Perhaps the United States would be led to assume responsibility for this
repatriation. In any case, he was obliged to remark that the financial
rulings of the United States Treasury Department forbade his government
from participating in expenses of a provisional nature that might be
subject to a later readjustment among the Powers; the United States
could only make direct advances to the small nations concerned.
M. Pichon held that the thing to do at the
moment was for each Power to appoint a financial expert and a political
representative to be attached to the Commission actually existing.
Captain de Corvette Fabre remarked that the
Commission was qualified to deal only with prisoners. It was therefore
asking the
[Page 809]
Council to decide
whether it would be competent to deal likewise with the volunteers of
friendly nationalities who ought to be repatriated.
M. Kammerer insisted on the necessity of the
Commission being empowered to deal with volunteers as well as prisoners.
The two questions were bound together from the point of view both of
transport and of finance.
Sir Eyre Crowe did not think his Government
inclined to participate in the expenses of repatriating 250,000 German
and Austro-Hungarian prisoners; they had the repatriation of their
Allies to consider.
M. Berthelot held that distinction must be made
between repatriation of their Allies and of prisoners belonging to one
of the enemy powers: from the humane point of view these were alike;
politically, there were raised questions of quite different kinds. The
Council had already decided that the repatriation of enemy prisoners
should wait until after that of Allied volunteers.5 They were informed that the Germans had already
been trying to conclude private contracts with Japanese ship owners. If
they were to let Japanese shipping companies repatriate enemies who were
ready to pay a very high price, the effect would be disastrous, and it
was important that M. Matsui should draw the attention of his government
to the question.
M. Matsui stated that his government had
informed him that the statement that ships had been chartered on behalf
of Germany was incorrect. The Japanese government had no ships at its
disposal; and private ship owners had concluded agreements to charter
ships for the purpose of repatriating Czechs. Once the Treaty came into
force it would be for each government to get into direct touch with the
ship owners. He had already acquainted Tokio with that decision of the
Supreme Council, which had in mind giving priority to the repatriation
of the Allies.
M. Kammerer held that they could and, indeed,
ought to leave to the Germans the care of arranging the repatriation of
their prisoners. It was for the Commission only to make sure that that
repatriation should not precede the repatriation of volunteers of
friendly nationalities.
Captain de Corvette Fabre pointed out that it
was exactly for that reason that the Commission had asked enlargement of
its powers. It had been formed originally to organize the repatriation
of German and Austrian prisoners of war, but had found itself confronted
by a resolution of the Supreme Council which specified that the
repatriation of those prisoners should not take place until after the
repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities. So long as the
repatriation
[Page 810]
of those
volunteers had not been begun, the Commission could not work to any
purpose.
Mr. Polk thought that the Commission could
confine itself to examining the repatriation of prisoners without taking
any executive steps.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked why the Commission should
have to concern itself with German and Austrian prisoners of war at all.
Article 215 of the German Treaty envisaged the setting up of a special
commission, for the repatriation of prisoners. This question was its
peculiar concern, and he understood that it was forming a Sub-Commission
to take care of this particular case.
Captain de Corvette Fabre stated that the
Commission referred to in article 215 had to deal exclusively with enemy
prisoners taken by the Allied and Associated Powers; the repatriation of
prisoners from Siberia taken by the Russians did not concern it. Indeed
practically all the prisoners in Siberia had been taken by the Russians,
and it would be impossible to repatriate them without authorization of
the Government of Omsk which might wish to retain them as hostages.
M. Pichon acknowledged that they had no legal
obligation towards enemy prisoners who had been retained in Siberia.
It was decided:
- (1)
- that the Commission entrusted by the Supreme Council with
studying the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from
Siberia should examine at the same time the question of
repatriating the volunteers of friendly nationalities;
- (2)
- that, in view of the consequent extension of their powers and
because of the complexity of the problems raised by the question
of repatriation, each of the Allied and Associated Powers should
nominate to the Commission representatives for political and
financial questions. (See Appendix “H”.)
(The meeting then adjourned.)
Hotel de Crillon, Paris, October 29, 1919.
[Page 811]
Appendix A to HD–78
commander-in-chief
of the
allied armies
general
staff
1st section
5080
G. H. Q., October 23,
1919.
Translation
From: Marshal Foch.
To: President of the Council, President of the Peace
Conference. (Secretariat General)
In compliance with the prescriptions of a resolution of the Supreme
Council, under date of October 20th,6 I
have the honor to enclose herewith the list of the Armistice
clauses*
which have not yet been executed by Germany.
[Enclosure]
armistice convention of november 117
Delivery of Railroad
Material
Clause VII
This clause imposed on Germany the delivery of 5,000 locomotives and
150,000 cars.
At the present time there are still 42 locomotives and 4,460 cars to
be received.
But it cannot be said that at the present time the Germans have not
executed or are not executing the obligations imposed on them by
that clause, as certain obligations necessitate delays concerning
which the Germans advance explanations or excuses, and, furthermore,
certain delays are caused by the very nature of the operations and
differences of interpretation arising from the narrowness with which
the Germans wish to apply the Protocol.
[Page 812]
armistice convention of november
11
Provisions Relative to the Eastern
Frontiers of Germany (Clauses XII and
XIV)
Clause XII:
Clause XII stipulates that the German troops in territories which
before the war formed part of Russia must withdraw to Germany at
such time as the Allies judged proper, consistent with the interior
situation of these territories.
On June 18th the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers
ordered the German Government to evacuate Libau and Windau and to
expedite the evacuation of all territories which, before the war,
formed a part of the former Russian Empire.
In view of the procrastinations of Germany, the Supreme Council
successively renewed these injunctions on August 1st, Aug. 24th,
September 27th,8 and October 10th.9
In fact, the German Government continues to contend that it is
powerless to enforce its orders on the troops in the Baltic. The
orders for withdrawal supposed to have been given by the Government,
were not executed. On the other hand, the local German Command
favored the transfer of a large part of it[s] effectives into the
Germano-Russian corps constituted under its protection.
Reinforcements in men and material assistance continued to arrive
from Germany.
Clause XIV.
Furthermore, and in violation of Clause XIV, the German troops have
continued to exercise abusive requisitions in the Baltic countries;
to paralyze the economic life and the organization efforts of these
countries, disarming their contingents, mixing in their internal
affairs and even having recourse to abuse of authority (coup d’état) by enforcing a government in
Latvia, instrument to its cause (April 1919).
armistice convention of november
11
Financial Clauses
Clause XIX
Clause XIX provides, in particular, for “… the immediate delivery of
all documents, specie, values, (of property and finance with all
issuing apparatus) concerning public or private interests in the
invaded countries”.
[Page 813]
It has been impossible to obtain complete statements of the specie
and securities (bank values, property confiscated belonging to
persons repatriated, removal of specie qualified as fines, bail
funds, etc. …) removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans,
whether in the invaded territories or in the prison camps. These
lists are indispensable to the Restitution Service.
The Beaux Arts Protocol of December
17, 1918
The Beaux Arts Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the
Armistice Convention, enjoins Germany to restore all objects of art
and documents of an artistic character removed from France and
Belgium.
The restoration of the objects of art abandoned by the Germans in
France, in Belgium, or in the territories of the left bank of the
Rhine, at the time of their retreat, was effected without
difficulty.
The restoration of the objects of art which had been transported into
non-occupied Germany, on the contrary, is being operated with
slowness on account of the difficulties of such operation, and also
from lack of complacency [sic] on the part of
the Germans, who surrender such objects reluctantly.
It cannot be said, however, that they are not executing this clause:
its execution is being operated.
convention of january 16,
191910
(2nd renewal of the Armistice)
Clause III
Delivery by Germany of Agricultural
Implements to France and Belgium
This clause imposed on Germany the delivery of agricultural
implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material imposed by
virtue of the first Armistice renewal as a penalty for delay in
delivery.
The deficit of the material which Germany was to have delivered to
France by October 1, 1919, is actually as follows:
- 40 “Heucke” ploughing outfits.
- The personnel necessary to operate the apparatuses.
[Page 814]
All the tools which the German Government agreed to furnish before
October 1st, by virtue of additif 3 of the
Protocol 392/T, of July 25, 1919:
| 1,500 |
Spades |
| 1,130 |
Plows T.M. 23/26 |
| 1,765 |
Plows T.F. 18/21 |
| 1,512 |
Plows T.F. 23/26 |
| 1,629 |
Belgian Plows, T.F. 0 m. 20 |
| 1,205 |
Belgian Plows, T.F. 0 m. 26 |
| 4,282 |
Harrows of 2 k. 500 |
| 2,157 |
Cultivators, 11 teeth |
| 946 |
Steel Rollers |
| 966 |
Fertilizer Spreaders, 2 m. 50 |
| 1,608 |
Fertilizer Spreaders, 3 m. 50. |
convention of january 16,
1919
(2nd Renewal of the Armistice)
Clause VI
Restoration of the Industrial
Material Removed From Belgian and French Territory
It cannot be said that the Germans have not executed this clause; but
the restoration of the industrial material is being carried out very
slowly, due partially to the difficulties introduced by this
operation and partially to the numerous discussions to which an
interpretation of the text (the French word is “taxes”) of this
clause gave rise and still gives rise between the Allied Commissions
on one hand and Germany on the other.
brussels conferences of march 13
and 14
Annex V/c
List of Objects Which Germany Was
Forbidden to Export
The “Black list” of objects which Germany was forbidden to export
during the Armistice period was drawn up in the course of the
Conferences held in Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919.
This black list was headed as follows:
“War material of every nature, including the nawal
fleet”
In violation of this provision, the Germans have exported aerial
apparatus (whole airplanes, or detached parts) to neutral countries
(Sweden, Holland and Denmark).
[Page 815]
On four occasions* the
Supreme Council reminded the German Government “that it was
forbidden to export aeronautical material … that all such material
should be stored … that the German Government would have to
reimburse the Allies the value of all aeronautical material sold or
exported since the Armistice.”
The German Government has not complied with these decisions. It
simply replied concerning them by the two notes hereto annexed in
which reservations are cited concerning the interpretation of the
ruling made by the Supreme Council and requests that the questions
relative to aeronautic material be submitted to the Aerial
Supervision Commissions which are to operate in Germany upon the
entry into force of the Peace Treaty.
At the same time, the Government continued to authorize the
exportation or at least the utilization of its aeronautical
material. For example: on October 7th, that is to say, subsequent to
the notification of the resolution of the Supreme Council forbidding
the utilization of German aeronautical material and ordering that it
be stored,11 the German dirigible
Bodensee commenced a regular dirigible
service between Berlin and Stockholm, and on the same day German
planes took part in the offensive against Riga.
Dusseldorf, September 8,
1919.
Wako No. 641
Telegram
From: German Armistice Commission.
To: Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission.
Representative of the German Government’s Note No.
8401 dated Sept. 8, 1919.
I have the honor to reply as follows to your notes No. 1494/G,
1525/G† and 1622‡ of August 2 [, August
8,]12 and August 27th:13
“The German Government has, relative to the matters referred to in
the notes indicated, instituted the necessary investigations. The
Government, however, remarks that, in principle, it cannot agree on
all points with the interpretation of law as expressed in the notes
indicated, and that an opportunity to engage in verbal pourparlers concerning
[Page 816]
the execution of Part V of the Peace
Treaty will be presented in the near future with the Commissions of
the Allied and Associated Powers which are daily expected in Berlin.
The German Government deems it its duty to propose, for this reason,
that the final settlement of the questions in suspense be reserved
until after negotiations with these Commissions.”
I.P.A.C.
9/9/19
No. 2,294
Transmitted to Marshal Foch.
General
Nudant
President of the I. P. A. C. Assistant Chief
of Staff of the LP. A. C.
Dusseldorf
, [October 12,
1919,] Wako No. 3639.12.10.
Urgent Telegram
Note From the Representative of the
German Government A. A. I. 6061 roem, October 12, 1919
Replying to your note of October 1st, No. 1764/G (1), I have the
honor to communicate the following:
1st—The point of view exposed, by the Supreme Council of the Allies
in the note above indicated, is expressed as “final decision”. The
German Government must protest against a like declaration expressed
in this sense. It must be determined concerning the matters in
question: whether, at this time, they are actual obligations imposed
on Germany by the Peace Treaty. It cannot be admitted, that on
account of this, the Allied and Associated Powers have the exclusive
right to adopt a final decision.
2nd—As long as the Peace Treaty shall not have been ratified by the
Allied and Associated Powers, and for this reason, cannot be
considered as in force, the formal obligations imposed on Germany by
the Treaty cannot be exacted.
For this very reason, the point of view expressed by Marshal Foch in
his note No. 4111 dated August 27 [26?],
1919, according to which all German war material in excess of that
accorded to Germany by this Treaty, is already the property of the
Allies, cannot be admitted; even after the entry into force of the
Peace Treaty, a similar demand on the part of the Allied and
Associated Powers, concerning the delivery of war material which
would be in excess, would become useless, if according to Article
169 of the Peace Treaty it is provided that such material be
delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers
[Page 817]
to be destroyed or rendered useless,
this article would therefore mean that the employment of such
material for military ends should be excluded without reservation. A
like delivery of material to the Allied and Associated Governments
is in no sense necessary to them for such service, and is in no wise
justified by the text of the Convention.
3rd—Furthermore, the point of view of the Allied and Associated
Governments, according to which all aviation material in Germany
must be considered as military material without exception, without
even taking into consideration apparatus of certain type, could not
be admitted.
Among the aviation material now in Germany there exist machines whose
character leaves no doubt as to their civil construction, and which
from this fact, are not included under the conventions of Article
198. That there exists, beyond doubt, such civil material has been
already recognized by the verification of contracts concerning the
civil aerial circulation which emanate from a civil firm in Germany.
It is completely inconsistent to consider such aviation material as
military material at this time. On the contrary, Germany may legally
dispose, without hindrance, of such material, in so far as such
material shall not be considered, after the entry into force of the
Treaty, as material of aerial circulation by the rulings of the
Supervision Commission.
4th—The German Government, under every reservation and in
consideration of its point of view herein exposed, and guided by
this base is ready to commence at this time, and in so far as
possible, the execution of the military provisions of the Treaty
which it has ratified. It was upon this same basis that the German
Government proposes, in its note A.A. I. 5401, under date of
September 8 (2), to definitely settle the questions herein referred
to, by means of pourparlers with the
Commission now sitting in Berlin. Up to the present time no
discussions have taken place, but it seems desirable to reach a
solution in this way.
Appendix B to HD–78
Memo Submitted to the Supreme Council
by the British Delegation
Armistice Conditions
Outstanding
German Mercantile Marine
The following Armistice requirements in connection with the surrender
of the German Mercantile Marine have not yet been complied with by
the German Government:—
[Page 818]
- 1.
- 14 Tank Steamers, total tonnage 63,143 at Hamburg which
had been temporarily exempted from the surrender which was
agreed to in the Armistice terms, were directed, by the
decision of the Supreme Council of the 27th September,14 to proceed to
the Firth of Forth for delivery to the Allied and Associated
Governments’ representatives. These vessels have been
detained in Hamburg on the pretence of a sympathetic strike
in that port and have not yet sailed.
- 2.
- 5 steamers, total tonnage 62,456 lying at Bremerhaven,
Geestemünde and Bremen have not been handed over to the
Allied and Associated Powers, the German Government alleging
that these 5 vessels were sold to Dutch Shipping Companies
in 1915–16. On 15th October, 1919,15 the Supreme
Council ordered these vessels to be delivered, as the Allied
and Associated Governments have consistently refused to
recognize the validity of any transfers of enemy shipping to
neutral flags during hostilities. The German Government has
disregarded the orders of the Supreme Council for the
despatch of these 5 vessels to the Firth of Forth.
- 3.
- A certain number of merchant vessels which should have
been delivered under the Terms of the Armistice to the
Allied and Associated Powers have not yet been handed over.
These vessels are dealt with in detail as follows:—
- (a)
- The German Government has alleged that the
following ships have not been handed over owing to
the difficulty of obtaining labour and materials for
repairs or completion of construction:—
- Rugen
- Kaiser
- Kehrwider
- Columbus
- Tirpitz
- Berlin
- Wigbert
- Pungo (ex Moewe)
- J. L. Lassen
- Rickmer
Rickmers
- Ibbercury
- Ittajahy
- Hermonthes
- Bosnia
- Estland.
- (b)
- A large number of sailing vessels in German Waters
and also in Neutral Ports, mainly South American,
are still undelivered.
- (c)
- A certain number of German steamers in Dutch East
Indies and other Neutral Ports still remain to be
delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments’
representatives in spite of repeated demands for
their surrender.
- 4.
- The Roamanian Tank Steamer Arthur Von
Gwinner was ordered to be sent to the Firth of
Forth but has not yet been despatched.
- 5.
- S. S. Verus lying at Dordrecht,
which is one of the vessels to be surrendered under the
Armistice, has not yet been delivered to the Belgians
although repeated demands have been made to the German
authorities by the Sub-Commission of the A. N. A. C.
N. 19814
Memorandum Submitted to the Supreme
Council by the British Delegation
Naval Questions Affected by the
Ratification of the Treaty of Peace With Germany
Submarine engines to be
surrendered as reparation for submarine U. C. 48.
The German submarine U. C. 48 was interned in Spain at the date of
the armistice; under the terms of the armistice she was surrendered
to the allies. She escaped from custody at Ferrol and, on being
chased by a Spanish torpedo boat, she was sunk by her crew. Admiral
Goette has acknowledged that the sinking of the boat was the act of
her commanding officer. A. N. A. C. has demanded as reparation the
complete engines and motors of the submarines U. 137, U. 138 and U.
158, but in spite of repeated demands they have not been
delivered.
In addition to the above there are three motors exsubmarine U. 146
which remain to be delivered.
Reparation for the Scapa Flow
Sinkings.
In the opinion of the Admiralty the sinking of the German warships
interned at Scapa Flow constituted a direct violation of the terms
of the armistice, and it should be regarded in every way as a term
of the armistice which Germany has failed to fulfill. Reparation as
penalty for the breach of the armistice should Be obtained.
Appendix C to HD–78
From: Mr. Klotz.
To: Marshal Foch.
By despatch No. 5034 of the 20th inst., you asked me to indicate
those of the financial clauses, imposed on Germany [by?] the
Armistice Convention or the Protocols annexed, which have not yet
been entirely executed.
I have the honor to inform you that the execution of the Armistice
Convention, from a financial point of view, raises the following two
questions:
[Page 820]
- 1.
- The German Government refuses at the present time to
continue making payments, in Reichsbank bank bills, towards
the upkeep expenses of the Armies of Occupation, an
obligation imposed by virtue of clause IX of the Armistice
Convention of November 11th, 1918. The German Government
bases its refusal on the fact that the marks previously
remitted were used, not to apply towards occupation
expenses, but for the expenses of various civil
administrations. Now, the upkeep expenses of the Armies of
Occupation, except in cases of local purchases or
requisitions, which constitute the smallest share, are
payable, not in marks, but in francs, or any other legal
tender consistent with the origin of the products destined
as army supplies; consequently, it is evident that the marks
to be paid by Germany could not be considered as a
reimbursement unless they be freely placed at the
disposition of the French Government to be used for the
various needs for which they were intended. It appears,
therefore, indispensable, to have the claim of the German
Government, pretending to obtain justification of use,
repulsed purely and simply, and to insist on the immediate
resumption of the payments to be applied on the upkeep
expenses of the Armies of Occupation.
- 2.
- It has been impossible to obtain complete statements of
the specie and securities (bank values, property confiscated
belonging to persons repatriated, removal of specie
qualified as fines, bail funds, etc.) removed, collected or
confiscated by the Germans, whether in the invaded
territories or in the prison camps. These lists are
indispensable to the Restitution Service.
The documents provided for by Clause XIII of the Protocol of Spa,
under date of December 1st, 1918, (city bonds) have not reached me
either; however, according to the statements of the Germans, they
were enclosed with the bonds themselves which were restored and
deposited in the Bank of France in sacks. Until a verification of
these sacks, which will take a long time, it appears to me
unnecessary to insist further on this question.
Concerning the restitutions themselves, it is to be noted that the
cash of the Bank of France, and of the Credit du Nord Bank
especially, has not yet been restored; but owing to the present
state of the negotiations, I do not think it advisable to take these
delays into account.
I add that my remarks only refer to the strictly financial clauses
and relate neither to the industrial restitutions, agricultural and
railway materials, nor to archives or works of art.
[Page 821]
Appendix D to HD–78
Contents
Request for instructions from the Supreme Council by the Commission
on New States with regard to the response to the Bulgarian
observations on the Conditions of Peace.
Reply to the Bulgarian Observations.
Request for Instructions From the Supreme Council by the
Commission on the New States
The Commission on the new States has examined that part of the
Bulgarian reply concerning the protection of minorities (Part 3,
Section 4).
The Bulgarian Delegation accepts the provisions in Articles 49 to 57.
However, the Delegation calls attention to the following points:
1. Considering the principles of reciprocity between the different
Balkan States as necessary from the point of view of protection of
minorities, the Delegation points out:
- a)
- that the special provisions concerning the protection of
minorities in the Balkan States, other than Bulgaria, are
not included in the text of the Treaty;
- b)
- but while there is an Article (46) stipulating with regard
to Greece the acceptance of the principle of the protection
of minorities, no analogous clause was inserted with regard
to Serbia and Rumania.
2. The Delegation calls attention to the situation of persons
formerly residing in Macedonia, Dobrudja or Thrace and who, before
or during, or since the war, have taken refuge in Bulgaria, and
requests that these persons be given the right to opt for the
nationality of the State in which is now located the territory where
they were formerly domiciled.
The Commission on the new States considers:
1st—a) that it would not be opportune to
insert in the Treaty with Bulgaria provisions concerning the
protection of minorities in the other Balkan States;
b) The observation made by the Bulgarian
Delegation that no clause had been provided for in the Treaty which
obliges the Serb-Croat-Slovene State or Rumania to accept such
provisions, is founded.
There are two methods of complying with this request:
- a)
- To insert in the text of the Treaty with Bulgaria a
provision obligating Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene
State; a provision analogous with that taken concerning
Greece in Article 46.
- b)
- To insert no new Article in the Treaty with Bulgaria, but
to inform the Rumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations
that they will not be permitted to sign the Treaty with
Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and
the Treaty on Minorities.
[Page 822]
Although the case of Rumania is different from that of the
Serb-Croat-Slovene State, as, by the Treaty with Bulgaria, Rumania
does not acquire any territory, yet, considering the existence of an
important Bulgarian minority in the Dobrudja, it has occurred to the
Commission that an analogous solution could be applied in both
cases.
The Commission thinks that the Supreme Council should decide which of
these two methods should be adopted.
3. The Commission recognizes that the observations of the Bulgarian
Delegation are, in part, justified concerning the Ottoman subjects
who were unable to exercise the right of option provided for by the
Treaty of 1913, and took refuge in Bulgaria before or since the war.
It is true that among these refugees there is, according to
indications which have been received, an important proportion of
Bulgarian agitators whose return to Macedonia, Thrace or Dobrudja
might present serious dangers with regard to the pacification of
these territories.
By Article 4 of the Draft of Treaty with Greece, Ottoman subjects,
born on territory ceded to Greece, of parents actually domiciled
there, acquire Greek nationality. The corresponding article in the
Treaty with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes makes no mention of
Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationals.
With a view to harmonizing the provisions of these two treaties, the
Commission esteems that the words “or Ottoman” should be inserted in
Article 4 of the S. C. S. Treaty.
The Drafting Committee will have to study in what manner it will be
possible to carry out this modification. Perhaps it would be
advisable to establish a special protocol, which does not appear to
present serious difficulties, especially in case, as is probable,
further modifications may be judged necessary.
The Commission does not consider it possible to insert a provision
concerning this subject in the Treaty with Bulgaria.
Appendix E to HD–78
British
Delegation,
Paris, 27 October,
1919.
Contents
Note from the British Delegation requesting decisions of the Supreme
Council with regard to
- (a)
- distribution of airship sheds in occupied areas.
- (b)
- interpretation of phrase “no dirigibles shall be kept” (Art.
198 German Treaty).
- (c)
- interpretation of Art. 200 of German Treaty.
[Page 823]
(19781)
Note by the British Delegation for
Submission to the Supreme Council
The Chairman of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in
Germany has asked for decisions of the Supreme Council with regard
to the following points:—
1. The distribution of the airship sheds in the occupied areas.
Some members of the Commission have claimed that these sheds belong
to the Powers in occupation.
With regard to this claim, the British Delegation would observe that,
in its report on the distribution of the aeronautical material in
Germany,16 the Supreme War
Council recommended that the material should be distributed in the
following proportion:
- England and France, each 30%
- Italy and the United States each 15%
- Belgium and Japan each 5%
It was also agreed, as regards airship sheds that, for reasons of
geographical proximity and convenience, France should be permitted
to have the first choice from among the airship sheds in the area
occupied by her troops and in Belgium. This report was agreed to by
the Supreme Council. Throughout the discussions on this subject,
both at the Aeronautical Advisory Commission and at the Supreme War
Council, there has never been any question of the sheds in an
occupied area being the property of the Power in occupation.
2. The interpretation of the phrase occurring in Article 198 of the
Treaty of Peace with Germany,—”No dirigibles shall be kept.”
Does this mean no dirigibles whatever, or no dirigibles for military
or naval purposes?
It appears that when this Article was prepared by the Aeronautical
Commission, no clear decision was arrived at on this point. The
Commission put up a strong recommendation to the Supreme Council to
the effect that Germany should not be permitted to engage in civil
aviation for a period of years, but this recommendation was not
agreed to and the Supreme Council, by refusing to accept it,
permitted Germany to possess civil aircraft.17
Presumably, therefore, she is permitted to possess airships for
commercial work.
As a matter of fact, the airship is far less dangerous than the
aeroplane for war purposes, while its immediate commercial value is
probably far greater.
In view of these considerations, the British Delegation does not
think it possible to uphold the view that the phrase “No dirigibles
shall be kept” applies to civil airships.
[Page 824]
As regards the method of deciding whether any particular aircraft is
to be considered to belong to the military or the civil type, the
Supreme Council at its meeting on August 6th, 1919,18 passed the following
resolution:
“That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies
are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted
to commercial use, and that the President of the Interallied
Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge
as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or
otherwise.”
3. The question whether Article 200 of the Treaty of Peace with
Germany gives to the Allied and Associated Powers the right to send
military machines into unoccupied German territory, pending the
complete evacuation of German territory by the Allies.
The British Delegation is of opinion that this right, which is
disputed by the Germans is clearly established by the provisions of
the Article in question and that it should be maintained. The
Drafting Committee, moreover, have expressed the unanimous opinion
that this right is not confined to occupied German territory.
Appendix F to HD–78
polish affairs
commission
Note to the Supreme Council
- 1st)
- an overture made by Mr. Dmowsky,
- 2nd)
- a telegram issued by General Dupont,
represent the German Government as preparing to conduct municipal
elections in Upper Silesia very shortly.
For these reasons, the Polish Affairs Commission has the honor to
propose that the Supreme Council communicate the letter hereto
annexed to the German Delegation.
[Annex]
Draft of Letter for the German
Delegation
Mr. President: According to information
brought to the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments,
the German Government is preparing to conduct municipal elections in
Upper Silesia before the entry into force of the Treaty.
The Allied and Associated Powers request information as to whether
this news has any foundation.
The Allied and Associated Powers could not admit, in fact, that
elections be held in Upper Silesia before the Commission, which,
according
[Page 825]
to the terms of
the Treaty of Versailles, is directed to organize a plebiscite in
this region, has commenced its operations. This Commission alone,
should it judge necessary, will be authorized to conduct elections
during the period prior to the plebiscite. These elections would
take place under its supervision and under the proper conditions
requisite to the liberty of votes.
Appendix G to HD–78
British
Delegation,
Paris, 27 October,
1919.
Note by the British Delegation for
the Supreme Council
At its meeting of Thursday, October 23rd,19 the Supreme Council passed the following
resolution:—
“that the principle that the payment of troops of occupation
should be a charge upon the local revenues of the territories
occupied should apply to such troops as might be used as troops
of occupation in Danzig and Memel.”
In this connection a further question arises, namely, that of the
source from which shall be provided the salary and allowances of the
Administrator of the Free City of Danzig and his staff, and of the
persons who will be engaged in the administration of Memel during
the occupation of that place.
This question requires settlement because the British Treasury
insists that in no case shall the expenses incurred under these
heads become a charge on British revenues alone, and it is therefore
necessary to decide whether those expenses shall be borne by the
territories concerned or by the Allied and Associated Powers in
equal shares.
The British Delegation recommends to the favourable consideration of
the Supreme Council the former solution, which would appear the more
natural and proper one.
Appendix H to HD–78
conference on peace
preliminaries
commission to study the
repatriation of the german and Austrian prisoners in
siberia
In the course of a meeting held September 27, 1919,20 the Supreme Council of the Allied and
Associated Powers enacted the following resolution: Constitution of the Commission
It is decided that a Commission comprising an American, French,
British, Italian and Japanese Officer shall be constituted to
take charge
[Page 826]
of the
repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in
Siberia.
It is further decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak
troops now in Siberia shall be effected before that of the
German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.
By a resolution under date of October 2, 1919,21 the above text was modified in the
following manner:
It is decided to modify the second paragraph of the resolution of
September 27th, in the following manner:
It is further decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak,
Polish, Jugoslav and Rumanian troops now in Siberia shall be
effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian
prisoners.
The Commission was composed as follows: Composition of the Commission
| United States of America: |
Col. J. A. Logan |
| British Empire: |
Lt. Col. C. H. G. Black |
| France: |
Naval Captain Fabre |
| Italy: |
Major Scanagatta |
| Japan: |
Major Katsuki, or, as replacement, Col. Nagai. |
Report Presented to the Supreme
Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
The Commission constituted by the Supreme Council to study the
repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in
Siberia learned through a telegram from Gen. Janin on October
11th* that the personnel to be
repatriated from Siberia amounts to a minimum of 250,000 men and
comprises the following different categories:
- A)
- Contingents of volunteer friends, called allogene
contingents, recruited from among the Czecho-Slovak, Polish,
Rumanian, Serbian and Jugo-Slav prisoners, and who, under
the orders of General Janin, fought against the
Germano-Bolshevists in Siberia, or participated in the
maintenance of order: about 75,000 men, to whom will have to
be added, several thousand persons constituting the families
of these soldiers.
- B)
- Prisoners of war who belonged to the German or
Austro-Hungarian armies, but who, by their place of origin,
now belong to Allied Governments, Poland, Rumania and
Serbia.
- These men are to be distinguished from the preceding in
that they did not agree to accept service in the above cited
contingents; they are dispersed throughout various prison
camps, and their number is yet to be determined.†
- C)
- Deported civilians belonging to the same Allied
nationalities.
- D)
- German, Austrian and Magyar prisoners (belonging to German
[y], Austria and Hungary, according to their new
boundaries).
- E)
- Deported civilians belonging to the same enemy
nationalities under the same conditions.
The opinion of the Commission concerning the repatriation of these
different personnel categories may be resumed as follows:
Category A.—Contingents of volunteer friends (called allogene
contingents).
The Commission esteemed that it was not in its competency to examine
measures relative to the repatriation of these contingents; these
measures are studied by qualified authorities representing the
different Allied and Associated countries concerned.
However, the repatriation of the allogene contingents which, by the
terms of the resolutions of the Supreme Council of September 27 and
October 2, should be effected before that of the German, Austrian
and Hungarian prisoners, is a question which interests the
Commission.
According to information which the Commission has been able to
obtain, instructions have been sent to General Janin to concentrate
and maintain volunteer contingents of sufficient strength in the
Khar-bin and Vladivostock region to justify the commencement and
continuance of operations from the present time.
It would be advisable to have the question of sea transportation
regulated as soon as possible.
Categories B. C. D. E.—Non-incorporated prisoners and deported
civilians as indicated by General Janin, it is necessary:
1st—that Poland, Rumania and Serbia immediately send authorized
representatives to Siberia to distinguish between the prisoners or
deported civilians to be repatriated as friends (categories B and C)
and those destined for Germany, Austria and Hungary, according to
their new frontiers (Categories D and E).
2nd—that an immediate order be issued covering the repatriation of
these various categories in relation to each other, as well as
within each category with relation to the various nationalities.
General Janin states that he is not qualified to issue this immediate
order, the determining of which concerns questions of general policy
which are not within his competence; he proposes that the order be
issued by the Commission in Paris now studying the repatriation of
the Siberian prisoners.
3rd—it is necessary to establish relations with the Omsk Government,
where the greater part of the prisoners are in detention and which,
considering that it is in a state of war with Germany, Austria and
Hungary, might estimate that it was not obliged to hand over these
prisoners.
The question of evacuating the different personnel, friend[s] or
enemies, which shall still remain in Siberia after the departure of
the
[Page 828]
volunteer contingents,
is not merely a technical problem of transportation, but, on the
contrary, closely linked with numerous political questions and could
furthermore involve a study of financial questions.
The Commission, constituted by the resolutions of September 27 and
October 2, is composed exclusively of officers, and esteems that it
is not qualified to treat these questions. It asks that each Power
represented nominate to the Commission an expert in political and
financial matters.
