Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/76

HD–76

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, October 25, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, October 25, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Pichon
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Percin
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni
  • Secretaries
    • M. Paterno
    • M. Barone Russo
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. B. Winthrop
British Empire	Capt. G. Lothian Small
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Dr. J.B. Scott
  • Mr. A. W. Dulles
• British Empire
  • General Sackville-West
  • Commander Fuller
  • Mr. Palairat
  • Mr. Carr
  • Mr. Malkin
• France
  • M. Laroche
  • General Le Rond
  • M. Cheysson
  • M. Fromageot
• Italy
  • M. Ricci-Busatti
• Japan
  • M. Shigemitsu

1. M. Pichon stated that the Bulgarian counter-propositions had arrived; they had been distributed both to the delegations and to the Commissions concerned. He thought it advisable to specify to the Commissions the time they would have to prepare their answers; he considered eight days adequate. Answer to the Bulgarian Counter-Propositions

Mr. Polk asked whether such a long time was necessary. It was only the Bulgarian answer dealing with reparations that was difficult.

M. Tittoni supported Mr. Polk’s remarks, especially as the Commissions, as well as the Council itself, were familiar with the question concerned.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that on previous occasions time had been lost; the several Commissions had made partial answers which an ad hoc Commission had been appointed to collect and coordinate. He wished to know whether M. Tardieu’s Central Territorial Committee could not at once be asked to collate the answers of the Commissions and, without waiting any longer, prepare a final comprehensive answer.

Mr. Polk agreed with this suggestion: the sooner the answer would be ready, the better.

M. Pichon said that the Council might decide that the reply ought to be ready on Saturday next. He thought an earlier date would be difficult.

M. Laroche said that even now M. Tardieu’s Committee might get in touch with the several commissions. So far as affected points on which he did not consider himself qualified to submit a reply, he would ask the Commissions to do so.

It was decided:

(1) that the Central Territorial Committee should collect and coordinate the answers of the Commissions concerned to the observations presented by the Bulgarian Delegation;

(2) that the said Committee should present to the Supreme Council a draft of a final comprehensive answer to these observations by November 1st, 1919, at the latest.

2. Sir Eyre Crowe submitted to the Council two telegrams which he had just received from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission (See Appendices “A” and “B”). The second telegram partly rectified the first. He considered it might be suitable to discuss them when the general question of the violation of clauses of the Armistice by the Germans was being considered. Violation of Naval Clauses of the Armistice by the Germans

3. (The Council had before it the draft answer to the German Note of October 17th,¹ concerning the measures taken by the Allied Naval Authorities in the Baltic. (See Appendix “C”).) Situation in the Baltic Provinces. Measures Taken by the Naval Authorities Concerning Navigation in the Baltic

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that the Council had asked the Naval Experts to prepare a draft answer to the German Note of October 17th, concerning measures taken by the Allied Naval Authorities in the Baltic. He wished to know whether the Council would approve this draft reply.

M. Pichon said that, no comment having been made, the Council took the text as read.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that according to a telegram received from the British representative at Riga, the situation there was very grave; the attacks against Riga were still violent, to such a degree that the British Representative suggested the occupation of Memel, and if possible, of Tilsitt. The Representative had maintained that General Eberhardt was even worse than his predecessor, General von der Goltz. The Council had decided to send an Interallied Commission to the spot.² So far nothing had been done and the Commission had not departed. He wished to know how far preparations had advanced.

M. Pichon said that General Mangin, whose name had been suggested by Marshal Foch, had preferred not to be charged with this mission. Another General had been appointed and the publication of his name would not be delayed. He considered that to occupy Memel, without waiting for the Treaty to come into force, was a serious undertaking and he would like to know if the British Government completely adopted the opinion of its Representative at Riga.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that he was only repeating the opinion of the Chief of the British Mission to indicate how serious he considered the situation, but he was not asking the Council to decide immediately upon the occupation of Memel.

M. Pichon proposed that the suggestion of the British Representative at Riga be referred to the Military Experts for examination.

It was decided:

(1) to adopt the draft answer to the German note of October 17th prepared by the Naval Representatives (See appendix “C”);

(2) to refer to the Military Representatives for examination and report the question of whether the situation in the Baltic Provinces was such as to necessitate occupying Memel before the prescribed date.

4. M. Tittoni desired to draw the Council’s attention to the situation in Southern Russia. General Denikin, to whom the Council had in the past afforded moral and material support against the Bolshevists, appeared to be neglecting them and to be turning against the Ukrainians. Under the circumstances ought the Council to continue its support?Relations Between General Denikin and the Ukrainian Army of General Petlioura

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the information at his disposal did not quite accord with that of M. Tittoni.

M. Pichon felt in the same position: Denikin was fighting very vigorously against the Bolshevists, but to hope for an end to all difficulties between Russians and Ukrainians was asking too much. France had, for that matter, just sent a military mission to General Denikin with instructions to help him in organizing the fight against the Bolshevists and at the same time to work for the prevention of conflict with the Ukrainians.

M. Tittoni added that Italy likewise had sent a mission and for that very reason he considered it necessary to coordinate their activities.

Mr. Polk stated that General Jadwin³ who had just been investigating the situation with Denikin’s Army, as well as Petlioura’s, reported that it was Petlioura who was attacking Denikin: the Ukraine-Russian difficulties involved two fundamental questions, namely: the Jewish question and the question of the independence of Ukraine. General Jadwin had even brought forward one case at least in which Petlioura had facilitated Bolshevist action against Denikin. At any rate, should the Council wish to hear General Jadwin, he could give them a résumé of the situation.

M. Pichon thought that the Council might very well hear him.

M. Tittoni considered it might be well to instruct their representatives to prevent friction between Denikin and Petlioura.

M. Pichon stated that the representatives of France as well as those of Great Britain had already received such instructions: but there was no use hiding the fact that the situation was extremely difficult.

Mr. Polk added that General Jadwin had been informed by Petlioura that his best troops were Galician.

M. Tittoni stated that the Georgian representatives who had visited him represented General Denikin as making no secret of his intention to put an end to the Georgian Republic as soon as he had done with the Bolshevists.

It was decided:

to hear General Jadwin at a future meeting of the Council on the situation in Southern Russia.⁴

5. (The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation dated October 24, 1919 (See Appendix “D”).)

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that the British Government believed it to be very important that the Allies should agree among themselves in fixing the conditions under which diplomatic relations with Germany should be resumed. He proposed that a special Legal Committee be entrusted with this question. Diplonatic Representation of the Allied and Associated Power in Germany

Mr. Polk inquired whether it was essentially a question of protocols?

M. Tittoni considered that a political question must first be decided: namely; would the Allies be represented by Ambassadors or by Chargés d’Affaires?

M. Pichon said that that question had already been decided. It had been agreed to send first, Chargés d’Affaires and some months later, Ambassadors.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the Council could not fix a date by which at the latest Ambassadors should be accredited; and again, what were the intentions of the Powers as regards sending diplomatic representatives to Munich and Dresden. Certainly the British Government proposed to send them.

M. Tittoni wished to know whether special representatives would be sent to Munich and Dresden as before the war, and also what would be their title.

Mr. Polk stated that the United States had never had representatives in those two capitals.

M. Laroche said that as far as Munich and Dresden were concerned the question was as follows: Did they wish to be represented there, and what title would be given to their representatives? Might not the person who was actually Ambassador at Berlin be also the diplomatic representative in those places? In point of fact, before the war the French Ambassador at Berlin was also Chargé d’Affaires at the Court of Saxony.

M. Pichon stated that the Council was agreed to send to Berlin at present only Chargés d’Affaires, and he considered it difficult at this time to fix the date on which Ambassadors would be designated. That would depend on the situation in Germany and on the attitude of the German Government. On the other hand, they could decide at once not to send Ambassadors before having agreed on this subject.

M. Matsui asked what would be the rank of Chargés d’Affaires.

M. Pichon thought that this was not so important. It was the title of Chargé d’Affaires that mattered. The French representative would be a Consul-General, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

M. Matsui thought that Japan might have difficulty in sending first a Chargé d’Affaires and then an Ambassador, but he was perfectly willing to recommend such procedure to his Government.

M. Pichon stated that the French Government intended to have a representative at Munich under the same circumstances as formerly, and also to be represented at Dresden.

Mr. Polk asked whether there would be at Munich and Dresden autonomous Governments independent of Berlin.

Sir Eyre Crowe answered that he had read the German Constitution; that possibly the Central German Government might find arguments therein on which to oppose the sending of diplomatic representatives to State capitals; nevertheless there was nothing in the Constitution which explicitly said that such representatives could not be sent outside Berlin.

Mr. Polk asked whether the present German Government was not much more centralized than the former Imperial Government.

M. Laroche stated that the German Constitution had denied to particular States the right of accrediting representatives, but not of receiving diplomatic representatives.

M. Tittoni thought there might be opposition and that the Powers might, if they were to designate representatives without being assured in advance of their being accepted by Bavaria and Saxony, run the risk of not finding anyone with whom the representatives might deal.

M. Laroche thought that the Council might settle the question of principle and leave to the Commission that was to be appointed the task of deciding what procedure should be followed.

M. Tittoni agreed, on the condition that they keep to strictly legal grounds.

M. Laroche inquired whether they had agreed to recognize Germany as a more compact unit than it was in the past.

Mr. Polk was of the opinion that the Treaty did not prevent Germany from deciding this internal question whichever way she wished: the question of the unity of Germany was not under discussion.

M. Berthelot said that the unity of Germany was indeed not under discussion; what was certain was that Bavaria and Saxony had no longer the positive right of representation but had retained a negative right. The intention of the French Government was to be represented in each of these states by a Consul-General—a diplomatic agent.

M. Tittoni suggested that such arrangement would be similar to what obtained at Budapest before the war, but that the title of diplomatic agent could not be accorded to these Representatives without the consent of the Saxon and Bavarian Governments.

M. Berthelot maintained, however, that they had the right of being thus represented, which was the pre-war situation. The Treaty, however, had made no change in this respect, and Germany had not notified the Powers that she would forbid the exercise of the same prerogatives as they had before the war. They were taking into account the changes which had occurred in Germany by diminishing their representations at Munich and Dresden. It was certain that their representations would not be imposed, but at the same time would not be a matter of negotiation; he had in mind rather a courteous notification.

M. Pichon stated that as they were agreed upon the principles, they could entrust a special commission with drawing up the questions of procedure.

It was decided:

(1) that the Allied and Associated powers upon resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany, should be represented at Berlin by Chargés d’Affaires and that they should fix later a suitable date for sending Ambassadors;

(2) that such Allied and Associated Powers as before the war had had diplomatic representatives at Dresden and Munich, be qualified to continue their representation;

(3) that a special Committee should be charged with the study of the proper procedure to be followed in the resumption of diplomatic relations. This Committee would be composed of members as follows:

America, United States of	Mr. Grew
British Empire	Hon. C. Tufton
France	M. Berthelot
Italy	M. DeMartino
Japan	M. Shigemitsu

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions containing the draft instructions of the Supreme Council to the Plebiscite Commission of Teschen, Spisz and Orava (See Appendix “E”).) Plebiscite Procedure in the Duchy of Teschen and the Territories of Spisz and Orava

After a snort discussion, the Commission being unanimous,

It was decided:

to approve the draft instructions to the Plebiscite Commission in the Duchy of Teschen and in the territories of Spisz and Orava prepared by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions, (See Appendix “E”).

7. (The Council had before it a letter from the chairman of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference dated October 21st, 1919 (See Appendix “F”).) Proposed Municipal Elections in Upper Silesia

M. Laroche thought it would be wise for the Polish Commission to verify without delay the information transmitted by Mr. Dmowski. If the information were exact it would be well that the Commission prepare a draft note to the German Delegation demanding whether the alleged facts were true and stating that, if so, the Allies could not permit any such manoeuvre. The note would also state that the Municipal elections would take place after the Inter-Allied occupation and when the Plebiscite Commission should have assumed its functions.

Sir Eyre Crowe was in agreement provided it were not stated that the elections were to take place immediately after the Commission had taken up its duties.

M. Laroche thought they might say, “as soon as possible”, namely, when things had become quiet and those persons who had fled before the German repression had returned.

General Le Rond said the question had already been examined by the Commission which dealt with the Eastern Frontiers of Germany. It had been considered then that the German Government would be unable to hold any election before the Inter-Allied occupation and that it would be for the Plebiscite Commission to fix the date of the Municipal election. It would obviously be very grave to let the Germans proceed to elections at that time.

It was decided:

(1) to refer at once to the Polish Commission for examination and report the letter of Mr. Dmowski to the President of the Peace Conference showing the intention of the German Government to hold without delay municipal elections in Upper Silesia;

(2) to ask the Commission, should these facts be found exact, to prepare immediately a draft note to the German Government in which it would be pointed out that the Allied and Associated Powers would not tolerate such a manoeuvre and that the municipal elections should be held after the occupation of Upper Silesia by the Allied troops and at such a time as the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission should deem it possible. (See Appendix “F”.)

8. (The Council had before it a telegram from the Chairman of the Schleswig Commission, dated October 22nd, 1919 (See Appendix “G”), and a note transmitted by Baron von Lersner on October 23rd, 1919 (See Appendix “H”). Schleswig Situation

Mr. Laroche said that Sir Charles Marling’s telegram brought up a delicate question. In the note addressed to the German Delegation on July 29th, the Allied and Associated Powers had called the attention of the German authorities to arrests which had taken place shortly before, for political reasons, in the region adjoining the plebiscite zone. To this note the Germans replied on August 10th that they desired to avoid any action of a kind that might stir national passions and that they had released the publicist Wall,⁷ but Mr. Wall had been kept under observation. Did the Council still wish to go further and demand the setting at liberty of this person. It would, at any rate, be necessary that the German Government should be warned that, if arrests had been made in the plebiscite zone, the arrested persons must be released. As for the particular case of Wall, it had to be recognized that he resided in the zone not subject to plebiscite.

M. Tittoni said that the German authorities imputed to Wall an action tending to detach from Germany a country belonging to it under the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

M. Laroche agreed, but stated that at the time Wall came to Paris,—and this was the action for which he was reproached,—the intention of the Allies had been to extend the plebiscite to a third zone, namely, the one which Denmark had refused. Obviously, they could not do much from a legal point of view, but it was to be feared that the German agents would make capital of the Wall incident with half-hearted people in the second zone, and convince them that if the result of the plebiscite left this second zone to Germany, those who had voted for attachment to Denmark would be treated as the publicist in question had been.

Sir Eyre Crowe referred to a further point in Sir Charles Mar-ling’s telegram: the French representative on the Schleswig Commission believed that the German Government had been notified that it would be called upon to evacuate immediately the third zone if arrests of a political nature should occur there. As a matter of fact, it was not so, and the Council had modified on July 16th (H. D. 8),⁸ the proposal which had been submitted to it by the relevant Commission. He suggested therefore that the Schleswig Commission be informed accurately on this point, and was prepared, if the Council approved, to telegraph to Sir Charles to that effect.

M. Laroche told the Council that according to a telegram of the French representative at Copenhagen, as well as to the note from Baron von Lersner, the Germans had sent troops to Flensburg on the pretext of preventing incidents arising out of unemployment. It was clear that there was therein an attempt at bringing pressure to bear on the eve of the plebiscite. They could not oblige the Germans to withdraw their troops, but could they not send to the spot warships charged with watching what was taking place.

M. Pichon thought that it would be wrong to let this action of Germany pass without protest.

Sir Eyre Crowe agreed, but at the same time, thought that, up to the time, when the Treaty came into force the German Government had both the right and the duty to maintain order in these regions; and they were not in a position to say a priori that any such manoeuvre was intended.

M. Laroche drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Germans had deemed it their duty to advise it of this despatch of troops; doubtless their conscience was not perfectly at ease. The Council could reply recognizing the Germans’ right, but adding that they, on their side, were going to send ships to demonstrate the fact that when the moment arrived they were equally interested in the maintenance of order.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether they were in a position to send ships.

M. Laroche answered that a French ship must be on the eve of arriving at Copenhagen.

Sir Eyre Crowe also asked whether they had the right to send ships into German ports.

Mr. Polk thought that they were no more justified in that than in sending troops into Upper Silesia before the Treaty came into force.

M. Laroche thought it was exactly because that right was debatable that he proposed the formula he had just indicated.

General Le Rond reminded the Council that since the Armistice the cruiser Marseillaise had already been at Flensburg and Sonclerburg.

M. Laroche remarked that certainly the Germans had objected, but on the grounds of a particular incident which had arisen. The note might say that, in order to avoid any misinterpretation resulting from the despatch of warships to Flensburg, the Allies on their part would send ships into the harbor without disembarking.

Sir Eyre Crowe added that it would be well to make sure that they had ships available.

M. Pichon concluded that the naval representatives would come to an agreement.

It was decided:

(1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should make known to the Chairman of the Schleswig Commission in the name of the Supreme Council, the exact sense of the decisions taken by the Council at its meeting of July 8th [16th], 1919, with regard to Schleswig;

(2) that on account of recent events at Flensburg, and with the reservation that the naval representatives should deem it possible to send warships, a note should be sent to the German Delegation to inform it that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to send warships to Flensburg.

9. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 23rd, 1919 (See Appendix “I”).) German and Austrian Banks in Turkey

M. Cheysson said that in the draft telegram which the Financial Commission had already prepared it had been indicated to the High Commissioners at Constantinople that the Council supported them in such measures as they had taken.⁹ This indication did not appear in the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee. It would perhaps be wise to communicate to the High Commissioners the note of the Drafting Committee.

Mr. Polk asked what the Drafting Committee thought about it.

M. Fromageot said he could only reply for himself. It seemed to him preferable to send the telegram as it had been prepared by the Drafting Committee and to address also to the High Commissioners a copy of their note. They would thus have complete security for the past as well as for the future. The considerations developed in their report would give the High Commissioners all the arguments tending to justify, if that should be necessary, the attitude they had taken in the past. The Drafting Committee would further suggest to the Council the advantage of inserting in the Treaty with Turkey a clause which should give to the High Commissioners final discharge in respect of all operations carried out by them, and which should fix the allocation of sums accruing from liquidations carried out up to the time of the coming into force of the Treaty with Germany.

It was decided:

(1) to approve the note of the Drafting Committee dated October 23rd, 1919, relative to German and Austrian banks in Turkey;

(2) to send to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople the draft telegram enclosed in the above note and at the same time to send a copy of this note to the Allied High Commissioners (See Appendix “I”).

10. M. Pichon proposed at the next meeting, which at Mr. Tittoni’s request would be on Tuesday, to discuss the violations of the Armistice as well as the nominations for Chairmen of the different Government Commissions. Determination of Agenda for the Next Meeting

11. Mr. Polk asked whether the question of the boundaries of Albania could not be referred forthwith to the appropriate Commission for examination and report. Boundaries of Albania

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether this question could be detached from the whole Adriatic question.

M. Tittoni did not think one could separate from the Adriatic question that of the mandate claimed by Italy for Albania, but the specific question of boundaries might quite well be considered separately.

Mr. Polk thought that the boundary question was indeed a question apart. The line of the Albano-Greek frontier would be fixed shortly; elsewhere the problem of the Albanian frontiers involved Serbian and Montenegran questions, but nevertheless if the question were studied now, time would be saved. When the proper time arrived the Council would have a report before it.

Sir Eyre Crowe agreed but thought on the whole that in such a country as Albania the limitation of boundaries was largely a matter of political compromise: the solutions arrived at in neighboring regions should be known. He would like the matter discussed provided the problem was discussed in all its bearings.

M. Tittoni said that the Council was already in possession of a report on the subject of the line of boundary between Albania and Greece; why not prepare a report on the Albano-Serbian frontier? When the Council came to discuss the question there would be nothing to hinder its examining the matter as a whole. Then would be the time to introduce considerations of a political nature. For the moment let the Commission investigate the line guided by ethnographical considerations.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked if he might remark that the Territorial Commissions charged with the determination of frontiers were not guided in the work simply by ethnographical considerations.

M. Berthelot thought that so far as concerned Albanian frontiers, Treaties prior to this war supplied already a general basis. If they were to modify the frontiers which had then been traced it would be in virtue of essentially political considerations and these considerations were bound up with decisions still to be arrived at affecting the Adriatic.

M. Tittoni added that this bond existed particularly for Italians who had associated the question of the mandate in Albania with the concessions that they made in Dalmatia, the two problems being inseparable.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked why not then tackle the problem as a whole at once?

M. Pichon remarked that as Mr. Polk and M. Tittoni were to meet that day they might await the result of their conversation.

Mr. Polk then withdrew his proposal.

It was decided:

to adjourn the discussion of this question until a future meeting.

(The meeting then adjourned)

Hotel Crillon, Paris , October 25, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–76

Memorandum From the British Delegation

The following telegram, addressed to the Supreme Council, has been received from the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission:

“Considering that Admiral Goette persists in paying no attention to the orders emanating from the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, it is proposed to send Admiral Goette the following telegram tomorrow night:

(Beginning of the telegram):

Considering that you persist in paying no attention to the orders which are given you by the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, particularly as relates to:

I. —The delivery of tank vessels;

II. —The sending to the Firth of Forth of five ships, in execution of the order of the Supreme Council, which was the object of my telegram No. 1840 of October 16th;

III. —The sending of the ships Estonia or Estland (see my telegrams 1300 of October 17th, 1930 of October 17th and 1100 of October 18th);

IV. —The answer to my telegram No. 1200 of October 7th, asking for a statement on the measures taken on the occasion of the Claymore incident;

V. —The case of several merchant ships which have not been delivered;

You are informed by the present, that as long as the orders given by the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, are not executed, no German ship will be given freedom of the seas either Baltic waters, or elsewhere. (Here ends the telegram.)

The approval of the Supreme Council is requested.—1329.

Pending the arrival of instructions from London, the British Delegation is not able to discuss this question.

October 24, 1919.

Appendix B to HD–76

Memorandum From the British Delegation

The following telegram, addressed to the Supreme Council has been received from the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission:

I refer to telegram 319 from the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, dated October 22nd. On account of the decision of the Supreme Council¹⁰ on the subject of the German note,¹¹ asking that the embargo put on navigation in the Baltic be only applied when military reasons make it necessary, the telegram which it was proposed to send to Admiral Goette, has not been sent.

Since October 22nd requests Numbers 3 and 4 have been complied with, but the important points numbers 1, 2 and 5, have not yet begun to be executed.

October 25, 1919.

Appendix C to HD–76

(embargo on german shipping in the baltic)

Proposed Draft Reply to the German Delegation Note of 17 October, Prepared by the Allied Naval Advisers

The Allied and Associated Governments have examined the request contained in the Note of 17 October from the German Government,¹² concerning the restrictions placed on the sailings of German fishing vessels and other small craft in the Baltic, and have instructed A.N.A.C.¹³ to take whatever steps are possible to meet the requests of the German Government, in so far as these steps do not interfere with any military measures that are considered necessary.

24 October, 1919.

Appendix D to HD–76

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

The Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan have agreed on a uniform course of actions as regards the resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany and propose to be represented at Berlin at first by Chargés d’Affaires.

The British Government would be glad to know the views of the Supreme Council on the following points:—

1. How should the names of the representatives chosen and the dates of their arrival be notified to the German Government? Should this be done through the neutral Governments which now represent the five Powers at Berlin—in the case of Great Britain, the Nether-land Government?

2. Should the credentials of the five representatives be in the usual form?

3. Should the five representatives follow the procedure customary in the case of a newly arrived Head of a Mission as regards official calls, etc., while of course abstaining from any relations with the Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish Missions till the Treaties of Peace with their respective Governments have been ratified?

4. Should the procedure agreed on, whatever it may be, be also followed at Munich and Dresden?

5. When should the five representatives proceed to their posts?

October 24, 1919.

Appendix E to HD–76

Joint Note of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions Relative to the Plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and the Territories of Spisz and Orava

Note Presented to the Supreme Council by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions

plebiscite in the duchy of teschen and the territories of spisz and orava

A decision taken by the Supreme Council under date of September 27th last,¹⁴ established the method of carrying out the plebiscite to be instituted in the territories of Teschen, Spisz and Orava, and determined the powers of the Interallied Commission charged with the task of organizing the plebiscite and of supervising its execution.

The Commissions which elaborated the plebiscite plan consider it necessary that the instructions given to the Interallied Commission by virtue of the above cited decision be made clear on certain points, and that at the same time more latitude in interpretation be accorded the Commission in order that it may more easily cope with the difficulties which might be encountered locally on account of the difference of views of the Poles and of the Czecho-Slovaks.

To this end the Commissions have the honor to submit herewith, for the approval of the Council, the following resolution which, if it is adopted, should be communicated in the form of instructions to the members of the Plebiscite Commission.

The Supreme Council judges it desirable to define as follows the provisions of the resolution of September 27th, as well as the powers confided to the International Plebiscite Commission by this resolution.

As stated by the decision of September 27th, the of Commission alone shall have authority to interpret this decision, to decide just what are the administration and police powers which it appears to it necessary to exercise to insure the maintenance of order and the normal existence of the country. It may hear the Polish and Czecho-Slovak representatives, but merely in a consultative capacity. Competence of the Commission

Also, in its decisions, the Commission should not consider itself as bound by the various indications contained in the minutes of the sessions of the Paris Commissions, or in the other documents placed at its disposition. It should only consider them as indications facilitating the study of the problem: it shall be solely guided by the decision of September 27th and by the present instructions.

The Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations have requested modifications be introduced in the conditions governing the right of suffrage as fixed in article 5 of the resolution of September 27th. Conditions Governing the Right of Suffrage

The Poles consider that domicile ought to be taken as the sole basis of a right to vote, in order that this right may be refused to persons who have, for some time, ceased to inhabit the country. They consider, further, that domicile ought to entail a right to vote if it is prior to November 3rd, 1918.

The Czechs, on the contrary, desire that “indigénat” (heimatsrecht) alone be taken into consideration.

It is impossible to accede wholly to either one or the other of these propositions.

The Czecho-Slovak proposal refuses the right to vote to a number of inhabitants who, although not possessing “indigénat”, have none the less been located in the region for some time.

The modification of date proposed by the Poles tends to accord voting rights to elements too recently arrived in the country, and to the participation in the plebiscite of that part of the population whose floating character is difficult to contest and whose admission to voting rights could only be justified on political grounds and not by durable bonds of attachment to this region.

In establishing the list of voters, the Commission should not only conform to the letter of the provisions of Article 5, paragraph c, but be guided also by their spirit, in order fully to respond to the clear intention of the Supreme Council. The right to take part in the plebiscite should only be accorded to those who may be considered in good faith as meeting the conditions fixed by the Supreme Council, that is:

1. To those who possessed “indigénat” prior to August 1st, 1914.

2. To those who, without having fulfilled that formality, had their habitual residence in the region from a date which could not be subsequent to August 1st, 1914.

Thus, one could only accord the vote to persons who possessed “indigénat” previous to the 1st of August, 1914, if their behavior showed that they had not disinterested themselves from the region or allowed their connections with the region to be severed. On the other hand, the right to vote could only be based upon residence previous to the 1st of August, 1914, if that residence had been habitual, actual, residence prolonged until the date of the plebiscite. Persons could not be admitted to the vote who, after having resided outside of the region during this period, only returned to participate in the plebiscite. Force majeure (military service, etc) could only be invoked if the person in question has shown his attachment to the country by the fact that he had been there for a considerable period previous to 1914, or by other evidence of a nature to leave no doubt as to his intention of making that region the place of his habitual residence (property holding and the maintenance of his family in the country, etc.).

Within these limits, the Commission has full power without appeal to decide the conditions of the vote.

Appendix F to HD–76

polish delegation
to the
peace conference

Paris, October 21, 1919.

From: Roman Dmowski,

To: President Clemenceau.

The German Government has decided to take advantage of the short period remaining before the occupation of Upper-Silesia by Allied troops, to conduct communal elections in that province. Electoral lists have already been prepared and exposed to the public. The electoral colleges will be convoked in the very near future.

The purpose of this measure, put into operation in great haste, is clearly evident. Following the insurrection of the Polish population in Upper Silesia, provoked intentionally by the Germans, thousands of Poles were arrested and deported to German provinces; more numerous still are those who were obliged to take refuge in Polish territory already liberated. The amnesty recently discussed between the Polish and German Governments has not yet been realized. Under these conditions, an important number of electors are unable to take part in the election, thus the result of these preliminary elections must in no sense be considered as the true expression of opinion in the country. All electors subject to the exceptional regime still in force in Upper-Silesia, will be deprived of an opportunity to express their opinions. But this is exactly the reason why the German Government hastens to conduct the elections, it wishes to prove to the Inter-allied occupation authorities, and to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers that the universal suffrage as applied to the Communal elections gives Germany full justification and confirms her assertions regarding the German character of Upper-Silesia. Moreover, the communal authorities, elected under similar circumstances, will be docile instruments in the hands of the German Government, with which she intends to influence the result of the plebiscite. It is also certain that the German Government will do everything in its power to insure the election of persons who, by remaining in the country, would serve as supporters of her policy.

The Polish Delegation, in a note dated July 5th last, indicated that it is important to proceed with the communal elections, but under a regime of occupation by Allied troops, because this occupation alone could furnish sufficient impartiality guarantees concerning the organization and conduct of these elections.

Considering that the communal elections decreed for Upper Silesia are to be regarded as a manoeuvre on the part of the German Government tending [to influence?] the result of the plebiscite, the Polish Delegation has the honor to request the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to kindly take any measures it may deem necessary to cause a revocation of the communal elections in Upper-Silesia by the German Government, and to have these elections operated under the control of the Inter-Allied occupation authorities after a reasonable electoral period, and upon a basis of the lists which are to be prepared after the evacuation of the province by the German Authorities.

Accept, etc.

Roman Dmowski

Appendix G to HD–76

Copenhagen, October 22, 1919.

Telegram to the Supreme Council From Sir C. Marling, Chairman of the Slesvig Commission, Relative to Political Arrests in Slesvig

About July 20th the Slesvig Commission at Paris suggested to the Supreme Council that a request should be addressed to the German Government to give strict instructions to the German officials in the Third Zone to abstain from political arrests, on the understanding that the evacuation of that zone would be immediately required in case any instances of such arrests, which could not but vitiate the results of the plebiscite, were reported by the International Commission.

The Commission was never authoritatively informed whether the Supreme Council approved this proposal and addressed the necessary communication to the German Government on the subject, but my French colleague believes this to be the case.

A concrete instance has now occurred in the case of the publicist Wall. This man was arrested last July and released at the instance of the late French Minister, yet the German authorities have since confined him to his own house, and the Commission hereby requests authority to demand of the German Delegate that Mr. Wall shall be restored to complete liberty, and to quote in so doing, the above mentioned resolution of the Supreme Council.

Appendix H to HD–76

Note Delivered by Baron von Lersner, October 23, 1919

For several weeks Flensburg has been suffering from gross excesses committed by strikers and members of the seamen’s league. Crews who wish to work are threatened; provisioning is jeopardized. On the 16th instant the Hotel de Ville was taken by assault and impossible demands made on the magistrates. Consequently, we were obliged to comply with the urgent request of the authorities and of the citizens of Flensburg to take measures for military protection.

Appendix I to HD–76

Note for the Supreme Council Concerning German and Austrian Banks in Turkey

1st—The measures taken since the Turkish Armistice and until the entry into force of the German Treaty (and afterwards the Austrian Treaty) are protected from German or Austrian Claims:

1st—By virtue of Articles 19 and 23 of the Turkish Armistice¹⁵ which forbids the presence of Austrian or German subjects in Turkey or of any relations between Turkey and Germany (and Austria); and (2nd) by virtue of Article 439 of the German Treaty (Article 377 of the Austrian Treaty) by virtue of which Germany (and Austria) renounced any claims concerning measures taken by the Powers prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.

2nd. After the entry into force of the German Treaty (and afterwards the Austrian Treaty) the control measures taken or to be taken by the Powers are covered; 1st, by the articles of the Turkish Armistice above referred to; 2nd, by the right vested in Powers occupying a territory to supervise, for reasons of military security, any enterprise whatsoever situated in occupied country.

The Drafting Committee has no knowledge as to whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers intend to operate liquidations after the entry into force of the German Treaty (and of the Austrian Treaty), but if such liquidations are to be operated it would be advantageous to have these measures covered later in the Turkish Treaty.

In fact, the Allied and Associated Powers have, in relation to Germany, Article 155 of the German Treaty (and in relation to Austria, Article 86 of the Austrian Treaty) entire authority to fix the fate of the said German and Austrian Banks in the Turkish Treaty, and Germany and Austria agree at the present time to all stipulations of this nature between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey.

If these considerations are fully founded, it would be opportune to instruct the High Commissioners at Constantinople as follows:

Draft of Telegram to the! High Commissioners at Constantinople

Replying to your telegram 1.792 of September 23rd with regard to the attitude to be adopted concerning the German and Austrian banks in Turkey, the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agree to not proceed, after the entry into force of the German Treaty, and afterwards of the Austrian Treaty, with the operation of any liquidation measures, but they reserve the right to take, even after the entry into force of these Treaties, all supervision measures deemed necessary concerning the said banks. These measures will be justified: 1st, by Articles 19 and 23 of the Turkish Armistice; and 2nd, by the right vested in Powers occupying the territory to supervise, for reasons of military security, any enterprise whatsoever situated in said occupied territory.

It will be expedient to fix the fate of the said banks in the stipulations of the arrangements with Turkey, as Germany (Article 153 [155] of the German Treaty) and Austria (Article 86 of the Austrian Treaty), have already agreed to any stipulations of this nature between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey.

For the Drafting Committee

Henri Fromageot

October 23, 1919.

1. Appendix F to HD–74, p. 744.
2. HD–67, minute 4, and appendices D and E thereto, pp. 536, 546, and 547.
3. Brig. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, U. S. A., observer in the Ukraine, September 1919.
4. General Jadwin never appeared before the Council.
7. W. Wall, from Obdrup (Angel), representative at Paris of the Danes of the Third Zone.
8. Minute 3(b), vol. vii, p. 160.
9. Appendix A to HD–74, p. 738.
10. HD–74, minute 9, p. 736.
11. Appendix F to HD–74, p. 744.
12. Appendix F to HD–74, p. 744. “
13. Allied Naval Armistice Commission.
14. HD–62, minute 8, p. 412; see also HD–58, minute 2, p. 300.
15. See undated telegram No. 32 from the Special Representative (House), Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 441.