Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/73

HD–73

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, October 20, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, October 20, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Pichon
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Percin
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni
  • Secretaries
    • M. Paterno
    • Don Aseanio Oolonna
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. G. A. Gordon
British Empibe	Capt. G. Lothian Small
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • General Bliss
  • Dr. J. B. Scott
  • Capt. B. Winthrop
• British Empire
  • Gen. Sackville-West
  • Mr. Groves
  • Mr. Fuller
  • Mr. A. Leeper
  • Mr. Malkin
• France
  • General Belin
  • General Le Rond
  • M. Tirard
  • Colonel Roye
  • M. Fromageot
  • M. Escoffier
• Italy
  • M. Ricci-Busatti
  • Gen. Cavallero
• Japan
  • M. Shigemitsu

1. M. Pichon desired to refer to the minutes of the meeting of the Council of October 16th (See H. D. 71, Minute 1),¹ and read the following, question of Mr. Polk (English Text, page 5): Reference to HD–71, Minute 1, October 16, 1919

“Mr. Polk said that he hoped that the matter could be cleared up. He wished to ask whether the rifles were to be delivered to the Hungarian police at the present time and whether the Roumanian forces were to withdraw at the present time, whatever the Government in Hungary might be.

M. Pichon replied in the affirmative.”

He stated that he wished to make his position clear in this respect. He meant that he agreed that the rifles in question were to be delivered to the Hungarian gendarmerie at the present time, but with reference to the withdrawal of the Roumanians he felt that this matter should wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council’s note to the Roumanian Government² and upon the report to be made by Sir George Clerk. He felt that this was the sense of the whole discussion.

Mr. Polk said that he understood that the Council and the Allied Generals had already directed the Roumanians to withdraw and that, therefore, there was no reason to have their withdrawal wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council’s note to the Roumanian Government, or upon a report from Sir George Clerk.

M. Pichon said that he only wanted to make his own opinion clear.

Mr. Polk desired to ascertain the Council’s opinion. The Allied Generals had directed the Roumanians to withdraw and they had been supported in this action by the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that a demand for withdrawal was contained in the note sent to the Roumanian Government and that the Council were awaiting an answer thereto.

M. Pichon replied that this was so, but thought that it was important to receive the reply of the Roumanian Government in order to know what it would be most practical to do.

Mr. Polk pointed out that the Roumanians had been directed to withdraw prior to the sending of the note. He read from the minutes of the meeting the question asked by him, above referred to, and explained that what he meant was that it was the duty of the Roumanians to withdraw at once without waiting for any conference with Sir George Clerk.

2. (The Council had before it a draft communication of the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of Peace with Austria (See Appendix “A”).)

Mr. Polk stated that he wished to read the draft note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government in order satisfy himself as to questions of form only, and the he would communicate his conclusions thereupon to Sir Eyre Crowe later in the day. Communication to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government Relative to the Signature of Peace With Austria

It was decided:

to approve the draft communication from the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of peace with Austria (See Appendix “A”), subject to the reservation that Mr. Polk would examine this draft further with reference to questions of form and would communicate his conclusions to Sir Eyre Crowe.

3. Sir Eyre Crowe said that it had been reported to him that as a result of the situation at Kiga the Allied Naval Armistice Commission had decided temporarily to stop the movement of all German ships in the Baltic. Formerly it was necessary to obtain the Commission’s permission for German ships to navigate but the Commission now proposed to suspend the granting of all such permissions. He wished to know if the Supreme Council agreed to this action. Action of Allied Naval Armistice Commission Resulting From the Situation at Riga

M. Pichon said that the Council would take note of it.

Mr. Polk inquired whether this would apply to all German ships in the Baltic regardless of where they might be.

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that this was the case, the reason being that if ships were allowed to go out of the harbors where they now were there was no telling what their destination might be.

Mr. Polk felt that if the Armistice Commission had taken such action it was quite all right.

Sir Eyre Crowe added that a British ship had been fired on by the Germans and twice hit.

(The council noted with approval the action of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.)

4. (The Council had before it a report from the Supreme War Council relative to supplies to be furnished the Polish Army (See Appendix “B”).) Report From the Supreme War Council Relative to Aid To Be Given to Polish Army

General Belin stated that the Council had agreed on all the points embraced in this report, with the reservation by the American Representative to the effect that his Government could at the present moment not participate in any way in furnishing supplies to Poland.

M. Tittoni observed that a Polish Committee for the purchase of war material had been in contact with his Government and he hoped that the participation by Italy in the furnishing of supplies recommended under the terms of the War Council’s report would not interrupt the activities of this Polish Purchasing Committee in Italy.

General Belin observed that the same situation existed in France. General Le Rond called attention to the deficiency which would exist even if the recommendations contained in the report of the Supreme War Council were fully carried out. Marshal Foch had made it clear that 600,000 sets of warm clothing were urgently necessary for the Polish Army. The Marshal had hown that it was a political as well as a military necessity to furnish this clothing immediately to the Polish Army but it now appeared that only 200,000 sets of warm clothing could possibly be sent to the Polish Army; likewise, it waft evident that no Power could supply sufficient rolling stock to Poland in accordance with the recommendations of the report. Anything that any Power might be able to do over and above the contribution allotted to it by this report would be of the greatest possible benefit. The gravest problem necessarily was that of clothing; if the Polish Army did not receive partially adequate clothing before the setting in of a rigorous winter it was extremely liable to become imbued with the dangerous revolutionary doctrines by which they were surrounded.

Mr. Polk desired to ask the officers present if they thought that an army of the present size was a necessity to Poland.

General Le Bond agreed with Mr. Polk’s underlying idea that the Polish army should be reduced to such a size as would be consistent with military necessity, but a question of fact was presented in that the Polish Government was obliged to clothe even those men who were now under arms and who might later be demobilized.

M. Tittoni felt that a reduction in the size of the Polish army was inevitable. He recalled that when M. Paderewski was last heard before the Council he had made it very clear that it would be impossible for Poland to continue to pay an army of that size.³ The Council felt that no Power or Powers could undertake the financial burden necessary for the maintenance of the Polish army, and the examination of the question had been postponed. His immediate concern, however, was not Bolshevism, for he felt that this was rapidly tending to become less dangerous.

General Le Bond thought that it was somewhat premature to dismiss the question of the danger of Bolshevism thus lightly.

M. Tittoni reiterated that the size of the Polish army must be reduced as there was no way of paying it.

Mr. Polk called attention to the fact that according to a prior report on this question 100,000 new men were being called to the colors in November and 75,000 additional men would be called up in January and March.

General Le Rond inquired whether the number of men demobilized was also shown in this report. It was a fact that the Poles had released a considerable number of the older classes.

M. Pichon pointed out that in a recent debate in the Polish Diet the Minister of War had promised that a substantial number of men would shortly be demobilized: this, however, was dependent upon the situation in Russia, and according to latest advices, the end of the Soviet regime could hardly be predicted as likely to occur prior to the month of March. It would be highly imprudent therefore to cease taking serious precautions. Certainly every effort must be made to clothe the Polish army at once.

Mr. Polk said there was no doubt of that.

General Belin pointed out that the report of the Supreme War Council had taken account of the fact that an additional effort relative to the supply of the Polish army might have to be made; it was for this reason that the report had specified that the general basis of its recommendations was a momentary one.

Sir Eyre Crowe desired to point out that if the British were to be asked to make a further effort with respect to supplying the Polish army it should be remembered what had already been done by them; for instance, the British practically alone had undertaken the complete supply of the forces in southern Russia.

It was decided:

to accept the report submitted by the Supreme War Council relative to aid to be given to the Polish army and to transmit this report to Marshal Foch for execution.

5. (The Council had before it a draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Ehineland High Commission. (See Appendix “C”) Proclamation of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission

M. Tirarp explained that this proclamation would be Pulished on the day the Treaty entered into force. He pointed out that in the first and second paragraphs of this proclamation mention was made only of the Allied Powers; if the United States should decide to designate a representative on this Commission the words “and Associated” could be added to the words “the Allied Powers” at the last moment.

Mr. Polk said that the point could not be answered on that day. He would immediately transmit the draft of this document to his Government for its approval.

(It was decided:

to adopt the draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Ehineland High Commission, with the reservations that Mr. Polk would submit this document to his Government for approval, and that in case the United States Government should communicate a decision to designate a representative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, the words “and Associated” should be added in the first and second paragraphs to the words “The Allied Powers”.)

6. (The Council had before it a draft form of letter to be signed by the President of the United States calling the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (See Appendix “D”), a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris (See Appendix Nltion”E”), and a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the chief delegate of the United States of America, the British Empire, Japan, Belgium, Brazil and Greece. (See Appendix F”).) Summoning of the FirstMeeting of the Council of the League of Nations

M. Fromageot read and commented on these three draft letters and pointed out that it was most important to have the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations take place at the very hour when the Treaty came into effect and in the same place. Taking up the question of the Sarre territory, as an example, he showed that there was no obligation under the Treaty to appoint a Sarre Commission within any given time, but that if this were not done this district would be without any Government whatsoever, inasmuch as all German authority ceased the moment the Treaty came into force.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that the same thing applied to Dantzig.

M. Fromageot said that this was not quite so in form, although substantially it was so.

Mr. Polk stated that he had already cabled the draft of the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations to Washington.

Sir Eyre Crowe agreed to the necessity of having the first meeting take place at the moment the Treaty came into effect, but he was not so convinced of the necessity of having the first meeting in Paris. The essential machinery actually existed and was in London.

M. Tittoni stated that he had just received from the Secretary General at London the agenda for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. There were two alternative agenda possible: if the United States were not represented at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations this meeting should take place in Paris and could only concern itself with the nomination of members of the Commission of Delimitation of the Sarre Territory; whereas, if the United States should be represented at this meeting it should take place in London and the agenda would then comprise numerous questions which would necessitate protracted action.

M. Pichon pointed out that the agenda received by M. Tittoni could only be a draft. The question of the place where the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations should take place could only be decided here by the Supreme Council because Sir Eric Drummond could not act officially as General Secretary of the League of Nations before the Treaty came into force. Up to the present time all official meetings with reference to the organization of the League of Nations had taken place in Paris. M. Clemenceau and Colonel House had agreed that the first meeting should be in Paris.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that he was not aware of any such agreement.

M. Fromageot pointed out that it would be most unfortunate to have nothing but the question of the Sarre Delimitation Commission on the agenda of the first meeting.

M. Pichon said that President Wilson had agreed to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Paris.

Mr. Polk said that he was not objecting, but that he had never known that there was such an agreement. He thought, in fact, that it was better to have the first meeting here in Paris, but that he was quite unaware that there had been an agreement to that effect. He could recall nothing further than that at a meeting between MM. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Tittoni and the Japanese Ambassador the matter had been discussed. He had never seen the letter in question from Colonel House to M. Clemenceau, except insofar as he had seen press reports thereof, and he did not think that President Wilson was committed by this letter.

M. Pichon remarked that if Mr. Polk had already cabled to Washington, there was nothing to do but to await a reply.

It was decided:

(1) to adopt the draft form of letter, to be signed by President Wilson, convoking the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations;

(2) to adjourn the consideration of the question of an unofficial meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

7. Mr. Polk summarized a letter from the Commanding General of the American Forces in Germany recommending that the cost of transportation to and maintenance in the United States of German subjects convicted of serious offences, entailing a sentence of confinement of five years or more, against members of the American Forces or against the property or authority of the American Forces in Germany, be deemed a proper charge against the German Government as an item in the cost of maintenance of troops of occupation. Cost of Transportation to and Maintenance in the United States of German Subjests Convicted of Serious Offences Against Members of the American Forces or Against the Property or Authority of American Forces in Germany

It was decided:

to refer this question to the Drafting Committee.

8. (The Council had before it a report from the Drafting Committee relative to the enforcement of unfulfilled armistice clauses after the entrance into force of the Treaty and to affirmative means of action available to the Allied and Associated Powers (See appendix “G”).) Report of the Drafting Committee Relative to Enforcement of Unfulfilled Armistice Clauses After the Entrance Into Force of the Treaty, and To Affirmative Means of Action Available to the Allied and Associated Powers

M. Fromageot read and commented upon this report.

Mr. Polk asked whether a pacific blockade could be imposed by any other body than the League of Nations.

Fromageot said that the Covenant does provide means of pressure but his Committee was considering the question independently of the provisions with respect to the League of Nations and rather from the point of view of action to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr. Polk queried whether economic pressure could not be exerted by the Separation Commission? What he chiefly desired to ascertain was what was the quickest means of bringing pressure to bear on Germany?

M. Fromageot said that apart from a blockade there could be effective interdiction of commerce as well as financial measures. Furthermore there were additional means of bringing pressure to bear, for instance, it might be provided that German goods and German freights should be subjected to a severe surtax which could go towards the payment of Germany’s debt for reparations. He added that if certain Powers had objections to a pacific blockade these objections could only be valid in so far as they emanated from Powers that had ratified the Treaty. Powers who had not ratified could declare a blockade and could take measures amounting to interdiction of commerce while requesting that the Powers which had ratified the Treaty should coordinate with them.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that Mr. Polk’s question was not as to what measures might be taken but as to who might take them.

M. Fromageot replied that the principal Allied and Associated Powers could do so. He added that an additional means of exerting pressure was the occupation of German territory, for which there were clear precedents, for instance, the occupation of the Duchy of Schleswig and of Mitylene. Finally there remained the possibility of retaining prisoners until the Germans should fulfill all of their obligations arising out of the armistice.

Sir Eyre Crowe thought that there were a good many practical questions remaining to be settled. Certainly the various Commissions charged with the supervision of the execution of the terms of the armistice should report on the terms of the Armistice which still remained unfulfilled and submit these reports to the Council. He said that he knew offhand several unfulfilled clauses, for instance, the naval clauses.

M. Berthelot suggested that each Committee charged with the supervision of execution of the Armistice clauses should be asked to report within four days on any unfulfilled clauses coming within their jurisdiction.

It was decided:

(1) that Marshal Foch and the competent Commissions (The Allied Armistice Commission at Cologne, the Allied Naval Armistice Commission at London, the Financial Commission) should report to the Council within four days all clauses of the Armistice still remaining unfulfilled;

(2) that Sir Eyre Crowe should take the necessary measures to secure this report from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

9. (The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet to President Clemenceau, dated Berlin, October 9th, 1919 (See Appendix “H”).) Monthly Allowances To Be Assigned to General Officers, Members of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Germany Who Are Chairmen Neither of Commissions Nor Sub-Commissions

Colonel Roye stated the substance of this letter to the council.

M. Pichon asked if there were any objections to the recommendations contained in this letter.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Council already had certain officers fulfilling certain functions, and that according to these functions their allowances had been regulated. Now another principle was being introduced; that of payment according to military rank.

Colonel Rote stated that General Nollet recommended these allowances because he intended to use these two Generals on special missions.

M. Pichon thought that it was not a question of rank, as Sir Eyre Crowe had indicated. These two officers were to be given these allowances not because they were Generals but because they were heads of delegations.

Mr. Polk said that the whole theory of allowances was being brought up in this question and that the Council was not really competent now to decide this question. It should be referred to Versailles.

M. Tittoni asked if there were any other officers in this situation.

M. Pichon said that there probably were not.

M. Tittoni thought that in that case no precedent would be created.

Mr. Polk pointed out that anything done now would surely constitute a precedent with respect to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

M. Pichon thought that under the circumstances the best thing to do was to refer the matter back to General Nollet asking him for further information and recommendations, having in mind all the consequences that might result from the granting of allowances in these particular cases.

(It was decided:

to refer the question of monthly allowances to be assigned to General Officers, members of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Germany, who were Chairmen of neither Commissions nor Sub-Commissions to General Nollet for further information and recommendations.)

10. (The Council had before it a note of protest from the Greek Delegation against the decision taken by the British Command to transport to Constantinople Turkish heavy artillery and munitions left in the Greek zone of occupation in Asia Minor. (See Appendix “I”.) Protest of the Greek Delegation Against the Decision Taken by the British Command To Constantinople Turkish Heavy Arilllery and Munitions Left in the Greek Zone of Occupation in Asia Minor

M. Berthelot in commenting on the Greek protest, pointed out that the Greeks had no right to the matériel in question; they had only obtained the same by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Council which allowed them to occupy the Smyrna district to maintain order there.⁴ On the other hand, as the Turks were being disarmed, they should not have this matériel either. It belonged to the reparation fund. He thought it might be best to approve the decision of the British Command, with the understanding that this matériel should be received and held in the name of the Allied Powers.

(It was decided:

to approve the decision of the British Command to transport to Constantinople Turkish heavy artillery and munitions left in the Greek zone of occupation in Asia Minor, on the understanding that this materiel be received and held in the name of the Allied Powers.)

11. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the repatriation of troops from Siberia (See Appendix “J”). The Reparation substance of the note was stated to the Council.) Reparation [Repatriation] of Troops From Siberia

Mr. Polk asked if it was settled as to who should pay the expenses of reparation [repatriation].

M. Tittoni observed that that was a different question; the only thing now to be decided was the order in which the troops were to be repatriated.

Mr. Pole: thought he had no objection as to the order in which the troops were to be repatriated, but he did not wish the question to be decided on that day. He recalled that he had heard that local conditions in Siberia made it inadvisable, for instance, to repatriate all the Czecho-Slovak troops first.

M. Berthelot wished to add, for the information of the Council, that it was understood that the French would bear the expenses of repatriation arising in Siberia, and that the British would bear the expense of sea transportation; afterwards a division of expenses would be made. He added that after considerable discussion M. Benes had promised him that the Czecho-Slovak Government would pay at least half of the expenses of the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops, and, if possible, would do even better. There remained still unsettled the question of whether the United States would pay a part of the expenses.

Mr. Polk said that the difficulty now was that his Government was prepared to pay a lump sum, but there was a question whether France and England could contribute.

(It was decided:

to adjourn the discussion and decision of this question.)

(The meeting then adjourned)

Hotel Crillon, Paris , October 20, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–73

15 October, 1919.

[Draft Note to the Serb-Oroat-Slovene Government]

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference have the honour to address to the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State an urgent reminder that the Royal Government have not yet signed and adhered to the Treaty of Peace with the Republic of Austria concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 10th September last, together with the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on the other which was signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the same date.

The Supreme Council, anxious to accord to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State every opportunity for consideration of the many important questions at present before them, have hitherto refrained from addressing to the Royal Government any demand which might be felt to embarrass their position. The Supreme Council, however, cannot accord an indefinite delay to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government for the decision which must be taken as to whether these two Treaties already signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall also be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. The Supreme Council have always been animated by the warmest feelings of friendship for and sympathy with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State which they have been proud to consider a full ally and associate alike in the work of the Peace Conference and in the organization and future activities of the League of Nations. It is therefore the more surprising to the Supreme Council that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has hitherto refrained from adhering to the Treaty of Peace with Austria in which fullest and most sympathetic account has been taken of the aspirations and needs of the Yugo-Slav people. It is true that the difficulty made by the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to the signature of the Treaty was based on the fact that an integral part of the Treaty was Article 51. This Article expanded into the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State engages the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in the same way as all other Powers concerned or involved to the solemn acceptance of certain provisions for the protection of minorities and freedom of transit in conformity with the essential principles and under the high control of the League of Nations to which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has already adhered.

The Supreme Council, however, are loth to believe that the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government intend to persist in objections which could only be regarded as expressing intentions and foreshadowing a policy totally contrary to that on the basis of which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have accorded to the Yugo-Slav people as a whole their warm sympathy and support in their efforts towards the constitution and full international recognition of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

Such a complete contradiction of the fundamental principles of the League of Nations it would be impossible for the Supreme Council to approve or to tolerate. The Supreme Council, however, are certain that the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene Government can have no intention of persisting in such a point of view.

The Supreme Council, therefore, wish to remind the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government that it is impossible any further to prolong the delay to full acceptance of the Treaty. Confident in a friendly feeling and good intentions of the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene nation, the Supreme Council venture to express the hope that the Royal Government will be good enough to notify them forthwith that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State engages to sign the two Treaties without reservation. Failing receipt of this promise the Supreme Council will be forced to conclude that the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have decided to abandon the alliance and pursue an independent policy, hostile to the Peace Conference and the League of Nations. The Supreme Council feel that there is no need to dwell on the serious situation in which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would thereby be placed, forced without any co-operation and support from the Powers comprising the League of Nations, to pursue an entirely isolated policy without any international recognition of its new territorial frontiers and political status.

At a moment when similar stipulations have already been accepted in treaty form by other states concerned, the Supreme Council are unwilling to believe that the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State have the intention of pursuing a policy at variance with all the principles on the basis of which the Peace Conference have supported the constitution of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Convinced that the Royal Government, conscious of the Serb-Croat-Slovene people’s wholehearted desire to co-operate with their Allies, will not fail to take into account these serious considerations, the Supreme Council have the honour to ask from the Royal Government a positive and explicit reply within fifteen days from the present date.

Appendix B to HD–73

superior war council
military representatives

Versailles, October 15, 1919.

Report on Furnishing Material to the Polish Army

By a resolution under date of October 2, 1919,⁵ the Supreme Council decided:

1st —to submit the demands for material, received from the Polish Ministry of War, and approved by Marshal Foch, for examination by the military representatives of the Superior War Council at Versailles;

2nd —to invite the military representatives at Versailles to examine the question, and to present a report thereon as soon as possible.

It has been further decided that the execution of the measures, recommended by the military representatives at Versailles, after approval by the Supreme Council, shall be confided to the Staff of Marshal Foch.

The Military Representatives Considering:

1st —that Poland has been, from the beginning of the war, the theatre of active operations; and that from this fact, she has been deprived of a great part of existence necessities, foodstuffs, clothing, railroad material and factories, and that it appears that she has nothing in reserve at the present time;

2nd —that by utilizing all her resources, Poland was able to organize and keep up, with the aid of the allies, an army of 500,000 men, which forced the Russian Red Armies into a rapid and extensive retreat.

3rd —that the Polish army appears at the present time to be in complete destitution from every point of view (a great number of the men being clothed in denim (toile); linen, mantles, and blankets are completely lacking); that this destitution has already had a depressing influence on the health and morale of the troops, and that it might develop much more serious repercussions during the first cold weather in those regions where winter is early and terribly severe;

4th —that, by considering only the requests of the Polish Government touching their needs of immediate urgence, the Polish army in order to continue its existence, should receive:

• —about 600,000 outfits, particularly warm clothing and overcoats, one-half immediately and the other half before the middle of December;
• —Infantry and machine gun ammunition, shells and caissons;
• —100 locomotives and 1,500 cars for special army service;

5th —that the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers concerning furnishing of material to Poland was favorably considered by the Supreme Council on June 27th 1919;⁶

Esteem:

1st —that, as they had already recommended in their report of July 11, 1919,⁷ relative to the material to be furnished to Poland, it would be advisable that the Allied and Associated Powers adopt:

“all measures necessary to hasten the sending to Poland of the material asked for in the numerous requests of the Polish army.”

2nd —that it would be well, as a consequence, to confide to Marshal Foch the mission:

a) —of arranging with the Allied Staffs, the participation of each one of the Allied and Associated Powers in the furnishing of material to the Polish army, according to the general basis temporarily established by the Annex I hereto attached;

b) —to arrange for the transportation and delivery of this material to Poland, by utilizing insofar as possible:

• —the Italian and Austrian lines, the Swiss and Austrian lines and the Czecho-Slovakia roads;
• —or by sea route, with debarkation at Dantzig as soon as debarkation shall have become possible, and if sea transportation presents greater advantage than railroad transportation.

The Military Representatives wish to respectfully call the attention of the Supreme Council to the great urgency there is to take a decision in this matter, in order that the Polish army may receive warm clqthing before the commencement of winter.

Nota.—In accordance with the terms of a letter to his Colleagues, date of October 13, 1919, and attached hereto, as Annex 11, the American Military Representative makes a general reservation concerning the entire participation possible of the United States, now or later, in the furnishing of supplies of every kind destined for the Polish army.

Gen.

Belin

French Mil. Representative

Sackville-West

British Mil. Representative

Cavallero

Italian Mil. Representative

Bliss

American Mil. Representative

Annex No. I

superior war council
military representatives

Versailles, October 15, 1919.

Nature of the Supplies Which Can Be Disposed of at the Present Time by the Allied and Associated Powers, for the Provisioning of Poland

I.—Great Britain

• 10,000 rifles
• 1,400 machine guns
• 18 million cartridges.

II.—Italy

• 500,000 flannel vest belts
• 500,000 pairs of woolen gloves
• Several hundred thousand 75 mm. shells
• 10,000 shells of 155 mm.

III. —United States

Has no material available, at the present time, for the provisioning of Poland.

IV.—France

Important number of complete outfits and several hundreds of thousands of metres of German cloth available from the stocks recently ceded the French Government by the United States.

Miscellaneous winter effects to be deducted from the war supplies.

Annex No. II

superior war council
american section

Versailles, October 13, 1919.

From: The American Military Representative.

To: The French, British, and Italian Military Representatives.

Referring to the minutes of the Session of the Military Bepresentatives held in Versailles on October 26th, during which the Military Representatives examined Marshal Foch’s recommendation relative to the furnishing of material to the Polish army, I have the honor to communicate the following to you.

On October 7th, I telegraphed, to the Minister of War and to the Chief of Staff, the recommendation submitted by Marshal Foch to Mr. Clemenceau in a letter dated September 29th, concerning the shipping of supplies of all kinds to the Polish army. In the same telegram I informed the Washington Government of the extent of the needs of the Polish army, extent submitted by the Polish Minister of War and approved by Marshal Foch. In the telegram I posed the following questions:

1st —Will the United States participate in the furnishing of funds or material, or both, destined for the Polish army?

2nd —If the Government of the United States decides to participate, will it determine its own contribution or will it agree to furnish the same contribution as each one of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers which would also participate?

In reply to this telegram, the War Department at Washington directed me to communicate the following decision to my Colleagues:

1st —The Government of the United States has no authority, under the present legislation, to take part in the aid proposed, even by furnishing supplementary assistance;

2nd —The supplementary supplies of the United States in Europe have been extensively drawn from, and new sales to Poland on credit, outside of the supplementary supplies in the United States, cannot be approved;

3rd —As an act of Congress in the United States should precede all definite action, the Government and the War Department are not disposed to recommend such a measure, considering their present views on the interests of the United States.

Tasker H. Bliss

General, American Army American Military Representative

Appendix C to HD–73

Proclamation of the Interallied High Commission to the Rhineland

In execution of the Peace Treaty, the Interallied High Commission of the Rhineland assumes, from this date, the supreme representation of the Allied Governments in occupied territory.

Guided by the instructions of the Allied Governments, the Commission desires to make as light as possible, for the Rhenish population, the burden of occupation, under the single condition that the German Government fulfills its duties concerning the reparations due to the victims of the war.

The High Commission guarantees to the Rhenish populations the full execution, both in word and spirit, of the occupation statutes, the especially generous regime of which is unprecedented in history.

The Commission will see, moreover, in accord with the High Command of the Allied troops, that no prejudice is introduced concerning the safety of the troops. It will suppress, without needless severity but with firmness, any enterprise against the security of these troops, which in 1918 crossed the frontiers under the emotion of the spectacle of their devastated homes, the memory of the horror of the treatment inflicted on their wives, parents and children, and which, by their self control, winning the most noble of victories, have for ten months, furnished the Ehenish populations with the benefits of order, assistance from their own supplies, and their example of discipline.

The High Commission counts upon the collaboration of the German functionaries and magistrates, in order to assure, by complete harmony in this collaboration, a regime of order, labor and peace for the populations of the occupied territory, responsible for public order, the burden of which finally falls on the troops of occupation, the Commission intends to guarantee justice, the exercise of public and private liberty, the development of the legitimate aspirations and the prosperity of the Rhenish populations.

The High Commission hopes that the contact between the troops of the Allied and Associated Nations and the Rhenish population will be, not a cause of friction, but a means to establish better acquaintance and to develop a closer relationship between labor, order, and the future peace of a better humanity.

Appendix D to HD–73

drafting committee

Plan of Convocation

of the First Council of the League of Nations in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention.

(To be addressed to the Governments of the

• United States of America
• British Empire
• French Republic
• Italy
• Japan
• Belgium
• Brazil
• Spain
• Greece)

In compliance with Article 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the President of the United States of America has the honor to inform the Government of . . . . . . . . . . . that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held at the place, day and hour of the signature of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles, of June 28, 1919.

The date upon which this act will take place will be definitely determined later by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The President of the United States ventures to hope that the representative of the Government of . . . . . . . . . . will not fail to attend this meeting.

Appendix E to HD–73

drafting committee

Draft of Letter From the President of
the Conference to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris

A.S. of the Council of
the League of Nations

Mr. Ambassador: You were kind enough to communicate to the General Secretariat of the Conference, unofficially, the letter which you will address, at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty with Germany, to the President of the Conference, advising him of the adhesion of the Spanish Government to the League of Nations.

The near entry into force of the Treaty with Germany …

(the rest as in the collective letter addressed to the first Delegates.)⁸

Appendix F to HD–73

drafting committee

A.S. of the Council of
the League of Nations

Draft of a Letter from the President of the Conference

To: the First Delegate of	{	the United States of America
		British Empire
		Japan
		Belgium
		Brazil
		Greece

Mr. Delegate: The early entry into force of the Treaty with Germany involves, for the League of Nations, the obligation of certain immediate decisions.

These decisions should be taken by the Council of the League of Nations. Now, this Council will exist, legally, only upon the entry into force of the Treaty, according to the terms of the final clauses, and it is precisely at that time that the decisions in question should go into force as well.

It would be opportune, therefore, to consider the preparation of these decisions at the present time in a non-official meeting of the Council of the League.

The decisions in question would be subsequently recorded by the Council in an official meeting held in Paris simultaneously with the deposit of the Ratifications.

In order to have these meetings take place in due time, I would be grateful if you would kindly invite the Governments of

• the United States of America
• British Empire
• Japan
• Belgium
• Brazil
• Greece,

to designate their Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations, upon which the Representatives of France and Italy have already been nominated. The presence of this delegate in Paris is desirable with the least practicable delay.

Accept, etc.

Appendix G to HD–73

Note to the Supreme Council Relative to the Execution of the Obligations Imposed by the Armistice

1st —In principle, the stipulations of the Armistice are replaced by those of the Peace Treaty; but, the obligations imposed by the Armistice may remain in force, whether by virtue of their permanent character, or as a result of their remaining in force, as expressly or implicitly provided for by the Treaty itself. This applies in particular concerning the obligations of Germany referred to in Article 212, (Protection of Territories), 248 and 251 (Financial Obligations). It is under these conditions that the accomplishment of the non-executed clauses of the Armistice may be demanded by the Allied and Associated Powers.

2nd —Until the entry into force of the Treaty, the Powers have as a means of action the right to renounce the Armistice and resume hostilities (Rules of the Hague, Article 40;⁹ Armistice of November 11, 1918, Article 34).¹⁰ After the entry into force of the Treaty, the Powers will have no other means of action to insure the execution of the obligations incumbent on Germany than the guarantees stipulated in the Treaty itself, or resulting from the general principles of the rights of peoples.

The guarantees provided for by the Treaty are, it is known, particularly those contained in Article[s] 213, 428 to 432 of [and?] Par. 18 of Annex II of Article 244 (Reparations). Especially relative to the Baltic provinces, the Treaty contains as a guarantee for their execution, the provisions of Article 433.

As a means of coercion, according to the general principles of the rights of peoples, apart from war means, can be cited: economic pressure in default of the blockade called pacific, which raises objections on the part of certain Powers-—reprisals, such as an occupation of territory, a seizure of German merchant vessels of less than 1,600 tons, a detention of prisoners of war.

Furthermore, Germany might be warned that the Treaty would not enter into force until such time as she had previously executed in their entirety the obligations assumed by her in the Armistice—or to further stipulate on the part of Germany, at the time of the entry into force, of an express renewal of certain of her Armistice obligations, by henceforth submitting their execution to the supervision of an Interallied Commission or to any other control deemed necessary.

However, it is important to remember that by the terms of the final clauses of the Treaty, the procès-verbal of deposit must be drawn up “as soon as the Treaty shall have been ratified by Germany, on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.” Now, it is publicly known that, in fact, Germany and three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have actually ratified. Germany might thus take advantage of the said final clauses and demand the accomplishment of the formality of the procès-verbal of deposit without further delay. But, in such an event, an adjournment of the completion of the procès-verbal by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be justified as a measure of reprisal.

Appendix H to HD–73

delegation of the interallied
military commission on control
presidency
No. 86

Berlin, October 9, 1919.

From: General Nollet,

To: President Clemenceau.

The resolution taken by the Supreme Council in its meeting of September 23, 1919,¹¹ provides for the attribution of a monthly allowance to the Presidents of the Military Commission and Sub-Commissions.

On the other hand, the resolution taken by the Supreme Council in its meeting of September 22, 1919,¹² provides for the attribution of a monthly allowance to the Heads of Service and of district from the grade of colonel down.

Now, the Military Commission has two heads of Delegation, General Calcagno of the Italian Army and General De Guffroy of the Belgium Army who are not provided for in either one of the above mentioned resolutions.

Owing to the position occupied in the Military Commission by these two Superior Officers, it seems that they should, from a point of view of allowances, be assimilated to rank with the President of the Sub-Commissions.

I am of the opinion that the same measure could be taken concerning the General assisting the President of the Commission.

I would ask you to be kind enough to have the Supreme Council come to a decision on the proposals which I have had the honor of making above.

Nollet

Appendix I to HD–73

Paris, October 14, 1919.

greek delegation

Note From the Greek Delegation Protesting Against the Transporting to Constantinople of Turkish War Material in the Greek Zone of Occupation in Asia Minor

The British Military Command has requested the Greek military authorities in Asia Minor to transport the Turkish heavy artillery material and Turkish munitions now in the territory of Asia Minor occupied by the Greek Army, to Constantinople.

Now, at a time when the Greek army in Asia Minor is actually in a state of war with the Ottoman forces, they cannot understand being deprived of the necessary enemy war material now in their hands.

The Greek Delegation, therefore, has the honor to request the Supreme Council to revoke the order in question issued by the British Military Command, at least until the signing of Peace with Turkey, and to not insist upon the immediate transportation of this material to Constantinople.

His Excellency,

Mr. George Clemenceatt

President of the Peace Conference, etc, etc., etc.,
Quai D’Orsay.

Appendix J to HD–73

Paris, October 18, 1919.

Note Relative to the Repatriation of the Foreign Contingents in Siberia

french delegation

According to indications furnished by General Janin¹³ to the French Ministry of War, the strength of the foreign troops to be repatriated from Siberia is as follows:

Czecho-Slovak	54,000
Poles	12,000
Rumanians	2,700
Letts in Krasnojarsk	800
“ in Vladivostok	1,000

Serbo-Croats:

a) Serbian Regiments	1,400
b) Jugoslav Regiments	1,600
c) In Regiments	1,000

Furthermore, the important transportation of the families must be considered. For the Polish division, in particular, there are about 2,500 persons.

It is necessary that the repatriation of these different classes be operated according to a methodical plan. General Janin has established a plan which is based upon the services rendered by the different contingents and on their state of morale. Any other procedure might entail serious consequences, and give rise to claims and provoke disorders in the increments in question.

Moreover, the removal should be effected methodically in order to permit the Russians to organize the relief of the foreign contingents on the trans-Siberian. The weak resources of Admiral Koltchak in men, the inefficiency of the railroads, would, in fact, prevent the Siberian Government from coping with any unforeseen situation. Now, this is just what would happen if individual misunderstandings interfered with the established order of evacuation. The most serious consequences would be the result, concerning the operation of the railroad, which would produce an immediate influence on the military and political situation in Siberia.

For these reasons it is indispensable that the Supreme Council establish decisions in this matter and determine a logical and impartial plan of evacuation which would have to be rigorously carried out.

The proposals of General Janin, who is particularly competent to formulate an estimation in this matter, are consequently submitted to the Supreme Council.

These propositions stipulate that the evacuation should be conducted in the following order:

1st) Czecho-Slovaks,

2nd) Poles,

3rd) Rumanians,

4th) Letts (Detachment of Krasnojarsk)

5th) Serbo-Croats (Serbian regiments of Krasnojarsk and then the so-called Jugoslav regiments of Krasnojarsk.^*).

6th) Letts of Vladivostok.

1. Ante, p. 669
2. Appendix B to HD-68, p. 583
3. HD–54, minute 1, p. 218.
4. IC–181C, vol. v, minute 17, p. 484.
5. HD–65, minute 2, p. 485.
6. CF–96, minute 5, vol. vi, p. 726.
7. Appendix F to HB–7, vol. vii, p. 149.
8. Infra.
9. Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1204, 1214.
10. Vol. ii, pp. 1, 7.
11. HD–59, minute 3, p. 327.
12. HD–58, minute 3, p. 305.
13. Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army; supreme commander of the Czechoslovak Army in Siberia.
14. with the exception of a few invalids, the Serbians of Vladivostok, as well as several other detachments of the same origin scattered throughout Siberia, do not deserve to be removed before the prisoners. They are deserters and elements unworthy of interest. [Footnote in the original.]