Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/44
HD–44
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great
Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday,
September 1, 1919, at 11 a.m.
Paris, September 1, 1919, 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- Secretary
- British Empire
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Sir George Clerk.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de Saint-Quentin.
- Italy
- Secretary
- Japan
- Secretary
| Joint Secretariat |
| America, United States of |
Mr. C. Russell. |
| British Empire |
Capt. E. Abraham. |
| France |
M. de Percin. |
| Italy |
Lt-Colonel Jones. |
| Interpreter—M.
Carnerlynck |
The following were also present for the items in which they were
concerned:—
- America, United States of
- Professor Coolidge.
- Mr. A. Dulles.
- British Empire
- Mr. Headlam-Morley.
- Mr. A. Leeper.
- Hon. H. Nicolson.
- Mr. Carr.
- Colonel Horlick.
- France
- M. Tardieu.
- M. J. Cambon.
- General Le Rond.
- M. Aubert.
- M. Alphand.
- M. Kammerer.
- M. Laroche.
- Colonel Jourin.
- M. de Montille.
- Italy
- M. Stranieri.
- M. Galli.
- M. Brambilla.
- Colonel Castoldi.
- Capt. Rossi.
[Page 30]
1. The Council had before it the text contained in Appendix “A”.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the Treaty before
the Council was similar to that with Roumania already approved by the
Council. There were three such Treaties, one with Roumania, one with
Jugoslavia and one with Greece, all on the same lines. The Treaty with
Greece would be ready in a few days. The Committee had had the advantage
of consultation with M. Venizelos in regard to the last of these
Treaties. The suggestions he had made had been very helpful. His
attitude had been very different from that adopted by the other States.
As to the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the Delegation of
that State had protested both against the principles of the Treaty as a
whole, and also against its application to old Serbia. The first of
these objections was no concern of the Committee. As to the second, the
Committee was of opinion that the questions involved were questions of
principle which should govern the whole policy of the State. The
Committee thought that it was not practically possible to distinguish
between one part of the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and
another. Serbia in 1912 had had a population of three millions, but
after the Balkan war, this population increased to five millions, and at
the present time it amounted to twelve millions. The State, moreover,
had changed its name and a Constituent Assembly was to be gathered in
order to draw up the Constitution for the whole territory. The Committee
therefore, thought it was fair to consider the whole as a new State. It
did not think that the stipulations in the Draft Treaty represented any
real derogation from the authority of the sovereign State. Treaty with Serb-Croat, Slovene State for the
Protection of Minorities
M. Clemenceau asked whether the supervision of
the Minority Clauses was to vest in the Allied and Associated Powers, or
in the League of Nations.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the State
conferred these rights on the Allied and Associated Powers pending the
creation of a League of Nations, and thereafter stipulated that they
should be transferred to the latter.
M. Clemenceau said that this provision
satisfied him.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that there was
agreement in the Committee on all points save one. Before proceeding to
describe this point, he wished to draw attention to the very first
sentence of the preamble. The date 1913 had been deliberately chosen in
order to show that the Treaty had under consideration, not only the
acquisition of territory made subsequent to the Great War, but also
those which resulted from the Balkan War. This was the more necessary as
the territory acquired in the Balkan war contained most of the [Page 31] population for whom special
minority legislation was necessary, for instance, Macedonia. All were
agreed that a strong and a just Government was necessary in Serbia. It
was even more necessary that the Government should be strong than that
it should be just. Macedonia was now to be delivered to Serbia in
perpetuity. The question arose whether any restriction, not contained in
the general clauses, for the protection of Minorities, should be imposed
on the Serbian Government in this area. The French Delegation was of
opinion that nothing should be done in this sense. The argument was that
freedom of religion and language were to prevail in Macedonia and that
the population would have appeal to the League of Nations. The French
Delegation thought this sufficient. The Italian Delegation on the other
hand proposed a far reaching scheme amounting to a special form of
autonomous Government for Macedonia. He would not explain this scheme as
the British Delegation had not supported it. He would prefer that it
should be explained by a member of the Italian Delegation. The American,
British and Japanese Delegations proposed what was included in the first
version of Article 12 (see Appendix “A”). The suggestion was that the
League of Nations should have their representative living in the
country, who should report to the League and give advice to the Serbian
Government. It was thought the presence of such a representative would
be beneficial to the population as well as to the Serbian Government and
might help to avoid outbreaks of violence. It was proposed that this
arrangement should last five years. He had taken the liberty of
consulting the Secretary-General of the League of Nations unofficially.
He, on his side, made no objection.
M. Tittoni said that he would not insist on the
Italian proposal (see second version of Article 12, Appendix “A”). He
was ready to adhere to the proposal of the majority.
M. Berthelot said that the view of the French
Delegation was that the Article proposed by the American, British and
Japanese Delegations constituted an obvious mark of distrust of the
Serbian Government. It had a further objectionable feature in that it
left Macedonia open to Greek and Bulgarian intrigue, instead of allowing
it to merge into Serbia, as it more naturally should, since it became
part of Serbian territory. He thought the proposal would make it very
difficult for the Serbian Government to accept the Treaty, especially as
no special reasons for this distrust could be alleged.
Mr. Polk asked whether the proposal applied
only to Macedonia.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that it was intended to
apply not only to Macedonia, but also to areas in the neighbourhood of
Albania, where a considerable part of the population was Albanian.
[Page 32]
M. Berthelot said that those people, like other
minorities, had certain guarantees, including appeal to the League of
Nations. The view of the French Delegation was that the Serbian
Government had not deserved any special mark of suspicion.
M. Tittoni observed that the measure was a
temporary one, and that the Commissioner could be withdrawn after five
years.
M. Clemenceau said that he would prefer to tell
the Serbian Government that the League of Nations would establish a
Commissioner in the country if disturbances arose. The Minority Treaties
were already ill-received by the Poles and the Roumanians. He thought it
very undesirable to incur the ill-will of the Jugo-Slavs as well.
Mr. Balfour said that he also would like to
avoid hurting the feelings of the Serbs. Apart from their feelings,
however, he thought there were strong arguments in favour of the
British, American, Japanese proposal. It was said that the people of
Macedonia could appeal to the League of Nations if they were oppressed.
Was it not better for the League of Nations to have an Officer on the
spot who could report on the state of the country, rather than to
receive Delegations from Macedonia in Geneva, Brussels or wherever the
seat of the League might be? In the latter alternative, the League of
Nations would have a poor chance of estimating the comparative mendacity
of the reports brought to them. The Council had had experience of the
kind of evidence supplied from the Balkans. There was equally hard
swearing on both sides, and it was hardly ever possible to disentangle
rights and wrongs. The Commissioner on the spot, assuming he were an
able man, would know what really happened and he could give the League
better evidence than could ever be obtained from rival Delegations. He
did, however, think it was a serious matter to give offence to small
Nations who were perhaps unduly sensitive about their sovereign rights.
He was therefore inclined somewhat favourably towards M. Clemenceau’s
proposal; but it involved delivering Macedonia to the mercy of the Serbs
until such time as the arrangement broke down.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the Committee had
been influenced by the evidence of people with a knowledge of Balkan
affairs. They had led the Committee to apprehend not legal injustices as
in Poland, but outbreaks of illegal violence, such as massacres and
petty persecutions. He ventured to suggest that if the outbreak of such
forms of disorder were to be awaited, the object of the Conference would
not be attained. He thought it could be fairly stated to the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation that it was a matter of common knowledge
that they would have trouble in governing certain areas, and it would be
an advantage not only to the local populations, but also to their [Page 33] Government, to have a
representative of the League of Nations on the spot.
M. Clemenceau said that the adoption of the
preventive system would cause the Conference to have great difficulties
with the Serbs. On the merits, he thought Mr. Headlam-Morley was quite
right, but the result of any stipulation such as he proposed would be to
encourage a large section of the Macedonian population to have recourse
to the Commissioner of the League of Nations in opposition to the
Central Serbian Government. This would in the end probably come about,
but he would prefer that it should come about as the result of the
faults of the Serbian Government, rather than as the result of action by
the Conference.
M. Tittoni said that he thought an
extraordinary commissioner might possibly cause annoyance. The desired
result might be obtained by extending the powers of Consuls in
Macedonia.
M. Clemenceau said that conflict would
inevitably ensue with any such system. It might even amount to the
re-introduction of the “capitulations”.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the object of the
Committee should be to do away with any reminiscences of the old control
of the Powers. A very careful attempt had been made to avoid this
difficulty.
Mr. Polk said that he felt the same scruple as
M. Clemenceau. He did not wish to hurt the national pride of the Serbs.
On the other hand if nothing was done the Macedonians would suffer.
M. Clemenceau said it was for this reason that
he suggested the threat of imposing a Commissioner. He suggested that a
formula be introduced in the Treaty to the effect that the League of
Nations would send a Commissioner to Macedonia, should trouble arise in
the area. The Serbs would understand that they must behave.
Mr. Polk asked whether M. Clemenceau suggested
the insertion of this in the Treaty of Peace itself.
M. Tardieu said that he thought that if
anything of the sort was said, it would be better to say it in a letter,
but he did not think it desirable to say anything of the kind. Why
should Macedonia be specially singled out?
Mr. Polk asked whether the suggestion could not
be made to the Serb, Croat Slovene Delegation. Their opinion might then
be obtained.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that though the
Delegation had not seen the draft Treaty, he was quite certain they
would refuse to sign it. He did, however, think it urgent to submit the
Treaty to them. They would certainly make comment on the Article as at
present drafted. It was better to submit it to them in a strong form, in
order to have a margin for concessions.
[Page 34]
Mr. Polk said he thought in the end it would be
necessary to amend the Article in the sense suggested by M. Clemenceau.
He agreed, however, that the Article in its present form might be shown
to the Serbs.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the Committee
wished genuinely to obtain the views of the Delegation. The Committee
had not had the advantage of discussing the question with them in
consequence of their uncompromising attitude. The conversations with M.
Venizelos on the other hand had been very fruitful.
Mr. Balfour asked what the Committee would do
if the Serbs regarded the Article as such an insult to them that they
refused to discuss it.
M. Tittoni suggested that the Article be so
worded as not to impose a Commissioner, but to suggest the appointment
of one if necessary.
M. Tardieu said that whatever the situation in
Macedonia might be, he did not think it right to add a special provision
to the clauses, which in themselves were extremely unpopular. There were
other areas in which disturbances might be expected. He did not look
forward to the administration of part of Serbia by the League of
Nations. Such a provision could not in any case be made general.
Mr. Balfour said that the Commissioner, he
thought, would not have an agreeable post. He would have no executive
authority and no protection. He could only offer advice which might be
neglected with impunity. There seemed to be areas in which mutual
massacres were the only method of reaching conclusions.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that this was what the
Committee expected would take place, if no arrangements were made in
anticipation. There would be at once considerable agitation fostered by
the friends of the Bulgars, in America, Great Britain and perhaps in
France. They would claim the attention of the League of Nations; and the
trouble would be aggravated.
M. Tardieu said that if information was all
that was desired, consuls could make reports.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that this was the old
system, which it was desirable to eschew.
M. Tardieu said that the old system included
international gendarmerie. The appointment of a
Commissioner appeared to reintroduce that system, in contradiction of
the principles of the Conference, and in particular of the League of
Nations.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that he accepted M.
Tardieu’s general criticism, but that he thought this special exception
was justified.
Mr. Balfour said that no doubt the Serbs, if
they knew their own interests, would suggest the appointment of the
Commissioner themselves, but it was clear they did not.
[Page 35]
M. Pichon said that what chiefly shocked the
world in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was the violation of Serbian
sovereignty. If the Conference were to adopt the same course, Serbia
would refuse to sign. M. Pachitch had already declared quite clearly
that he would not.
Mr. Balfour enquired whether the League of
Nations had a right under the Covenant to send representatives to make
an enquiry, should massacres take place.
Mr. Headlam-Morley said that the League had
this power according to the terms of the Minority Treaties; in this
instance, according to Article 11, the League of Nations could act if an
infraction of the Treaty occurred.
M. Clemenceau after reading Article 11,
expressed the opinion that these stipulations were sufficient to protect
Macedonian and Albanian minorities in the Serbian State.
Mr. Balfour agreed that it would be easier in
practice to give effect to Article 11, rather than to Article 12.
M. Tittoni suggested that the words “prendre
telles mesures” be substituted for the words “procéder de telle façon”
in the French text of Article 11.
(It was then decided to accept the Treaty as a whole, to expunge Article
12 entirely, to amend Article 11 by the substitution of the words
“prendre telles mesures” for “procéder de telle façon”, and, after the
necessary drafting amendments, to communicate the Treaty to the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.)
2. M. Tardieu explained the letter sent by M.
Venizelos to the President of the Council on the 24th August. (Appendix
“B”.) He pointed out that since then a new element in the situation had
been introduced by the telegram from President Wilson (Appendix “C”).
This telegram set aside both the alternatives considered. Frontiers of Bulgaria in Thrace
M. Clemenceau said that he thought that it was
a very dangerous proposal to ask the Commissioner at Constantinople to
take charge of an area containing 700,000 Greeks and 700,000 Turks, who
would be in a continual state of warfare. He could not therefore accept
the proposals made by President Wilson, but he was ready to listen to
any new proposals that might be made.
M. Tittoni suggested that the question be
adjourned, as no decision could be reached that day.
Mr. Balfour pointed out that the Bulgarians
were awaiting the Treaty, which must be completed without further
delay.
M. Clemenceau said that if President Wilson
adhered to his proposal it was not possible to reach a settlement.
[Page 36]
Mr. Balfour said that the future of
Constantinople and Asia Minor need not be settled before the conclusion
of the Treaty with Bulgaria. It was possible to say that Bulgaria should
have nothing south or south-east of a given line. The fate of the
territories outside that line might be reserved.
M. Tittoni said that if this plan was followed,
difficulties would arise in Western Thrace. Eastern Thrace could be
reserved without any difficulty, as it was occupied by Turkish troops.
But the Bulgarians would be called upon to evacuate that part of Western
Thrace they at present occupied. If so, they must be told to whom they
were to deliver the country.
M. Tardieu said that there was also a
difficulty for Greece if the decision were adjourned until the fate of
Constantinople had been settled.
Mr. Balfour said that it was possible to
distinguish between the questions at issue. The most pressing of the
problems was to decide what was the boundary of Bulgaria. The other
questions as to exactly how the parts of the Turkish Empire South of the
Bulgarian boundary should be disposed of, could be for the time being
deferred. As to President Wilson’s telegram, he could not help feeling
the President had not given sufficient consideration to the position of
M. Venizelos. M. Venizelos was the only statesman in the Balkans who had
sincerely tried to assist the Conference, and whose policy aimed at
maintaining peace in the Balkans, yet if the American policy in Eastern
Europe were carried out, Greece of all these States, would fare worst.
Serbia would acquire three times as much territory as she previously
possessed. Roumania, in spite of her constant defiance of the
Conference, would double her population. Poland and Czechoslovakia, were
created by the Conference itself. Greece, if a large Greek population in
Thrace were not added to her, would hardly increase at all, except in
national debt which was as great as Bulgaria’s, even when the Bulgarian
indemnity of £90,000,000 was counted in. He thought that it was not
altogether fair to treat M. Venizelos in this manner nor did he believe
it to be in the interest of Peace, especially as all Greece asked for
was the application of the Fourteen Points. The President’s message,
however, must be seriously considered. He therefore suggested that a
line be adopted for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria and that the
attribution of all territories south of it be reserved.
M. Tardieu said that to the reasons adduced by
Mr. Balfour might be added the fact that Greece since the Armistice, at
the instance of the Conference, had mobilised three more divisions than
she had under arms during the war. She had increased her army from 9 to
12 divisions. Greece was the only Power which had increased her Army [Page 37] since the Armistice. Out of 7¼
million Greeks living in compact masses in Greece, Thrace and Asia
Minor, 2,300,000 living at the very gates of their own country would be
excluded from it by the President’s plan. He did not think this would
conduce to peace. There was also another aspect to the question. The
Council had seen fit to deny the Hapsburgs the recovery of the throne in
Hungary. If Greece were to be treated as was now suggested, King
Constantine would be back on the throne within six months. He agreed
that Mr. Balfour’s solution would meet the practical necessity of
framing a treaty for Bulgaria, but he thought the arguments raised
against the President’s message should be put to him.
Mr. Polk said he would gladly send the
arguments to President Wilson. He heartily agreed with what Mr. Balfour
had said concerning the attitude of M. Venizelos during the Conference.
This attitude had always been most loyal and generous. It was therefore
most distasteful to the American Delegation to adopt any decision not
immediately acceptable to M. Venizelos. He did not wish to enter into
all the reasons which had determined President Wilson. He would only
point out to M. Tardieu that, if all the Greeks outside Greece were
allowed to join Greece, it was rather the territory round Constantinople
than the territory round Adrianople which would become Greek. He felt
sure that the danger of the restoration of Constantine was recognised by
President Wilson.
(It was decided that the Central Territorial Committee should determine a
boundary line in accordance with President Wilson’s message, as the
Southern frontier of Bulgaria. The portion of Western Thrace to be ceded
by Bulgaria would be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. This
territory would be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek
troops, the last being kept in the portion of this territory by general
agreement attributed to Greece. The Treaty should, further, stipulate
for Bulgarian access to a port on the Aegean.)
3. Mr. Balfour said that he had sent M.
Clemenceau’s proposals (See H. D. 42, Minute 4,)1 to the British Government with a personal
opinion in their favour, and was waiting to hear further as to
representatives being sent out to confer regarding details. Situation in Armenia
(It was agreed the question should be adjourned.)
4. Mr. Balfour said that he understood the
policy of the Conference to be that repatriation of the German prisoners
in British and American hands should be carried out without delay under
the auspices of an Inter-Allied Commission. It was not intended that the
Commission should delay [Page 38]
repatriation, even for an hour. The Commission itself was mere
camouflage. He was ready to discuss any report the Commission might
make, provided repatriation went on in the meantime. He did not,
however, think that it was necessary for the Commission to make any
report. All it had to do was to give a free hand to the British and
American Authorities to carry out the repatriation. On Saturday he had
heard that the engine drivers on the French trains said that they would
take no German prisoner trains into Germany without a direct order from
M. Clemenceau. Repatriation of Prisoners of
War
M. Clemenceau said that no obstruction had been
put by him on the process of repatriation.
M. Alphand explained the report made to the
Council (Appendix “D”) and the interpretation of its orders made by the
Commission. He further pointed out that the Treaty stipulated that
repatriation of prisoners should be carried out with the help of German
rolling stock.
M. Clemenceau pointed out that it had not been
intended that the Commission should make any arrangements with the
Germans. All it was to do was to facilitate in every way the
repatriation of the prisoners held by the British and the Americans.
M. Matsui asked whether there was any objection
to a discussion within the Commission regarding repatriation of
prisoners held by the Japanese.
M. Clemenceau said that he saw no
objection.
M. Alphand asked whether German civilian
prisoners held by the French Government should also be repatriated.
M. Clemenceau replied in the negative.
5. The Council had before it a draft note to the German Government
regarding the violation of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 in the
new German Constitution. (Appendix “E”.)
M. Clemenceau said that he saw several
solutions, constitution none of which were entirely satisfactory. One
was to tell the Germans that the Treaty would not be ratified unless
they altered their Constitution. Another was to say that, as Article 178
of the German Constitution rendered Article 61 inoperative, the German
Government was asked to acknowledge the nullity of the latter. The third
idea that struck him was that the Council should avail itself of the
article in the Treaty providing for a prolongation of the occupation of
the Rhine if guarantees against German aggression appeared insufficient.
Article 61 of the New German
Constitution
M. Tardieu pointed out that Article 428 of the
Treaty of Peace with Germany stipulated for something to take place
after the lapse [Page 39] of 15 years. The
breach of the Treaty complained of had just occurred. It seemed a long
time to wait before taking action.
Mr. Balfour said he thought the notion of not
ratifying the Treaty must be rejected. He thought, however, it would be
quite legitimate to occupy more territory on the East of the Rhine
should the Germans not amend their Constitution.
M. Tardieu agreed with Mr. Balfour that action
should be taken at once of such a kind as to discourage Germany from a
repetition of the offence.
Mr. Balfour pointed out that the German
Government alone could do nothing. It could not alter the Constitution.
It could interpret it but its interpretation could be called in question
by another Government. Only the German Parliament could deal with the
matter and the German Parliament was not sitting. He suggested that the
German Government be told that it had committed a breach of the Treaty
which could not be accepted, and that this breach must be remedied
within a certain time, failing which the Allied and Associated Powers
would take such action as they might think fit.
M. Clemenceau suggested that such action might
be the occupation of Frankfurt.
(It was decided that M. Berthelot should re-draft the message to the
German Government regarding the breach of the Treaty constituted by
Article 61 of the new German Constitution in the spirit of the
discussion and that the new draft should be considered at the following
meeting.)
(The meeting then adjourned.)
Astoria Hotel, 1 September, 1919.
Appendix A to HD–44
kingdom of the serbs, croats and
slovenes
Draft of a Treaty2
Between
The United States of America, Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Japan, Described as the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers,
On the one hand;
And The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes,
On the other hand;
Whereas since the commencement of the year 1913 large accessions of
territory have been made to the Kingdom of Serbia and
[Page 40]
Whereas the Croat and Slovene peoples have, of their own free will,
determined to unite with Serbia in a permanent union for the purpose
of forming a single sovereign independent State under the title of
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Words in Bracket proposed by the British and
Japanese Delegations, Not Accepted by the French, American and
Italian Delegations
Whereas the Prince Regent of Serbia and the Serbian Government have
agreed to this union (and have agreed to summon a Constituent
Assembly-elected on a basis of free and universal suffrage for the
establishment of the Constitution of the Kingdom), and
Whereas the Kingdom of Serbia has, in consequence, been transformed
into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and has assumed
sovereignty over the territories inhabited by these peoples, and
Whereas it is necessary to regulate certain matters of international
concern arising out of the said accessions of territory and of this
union and
Whereas it is desired to free Serbia from certain obligations which
she undertook by the Treaty of Berlin of 18783 to
certain Powers and to substitute for them obligations to the League
of Nations, and
Whereas the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of its own free will desires to
give to the populations of all territories included within the
State, of whatever race, language or religion they may be, full
guarantees that they shall continue to be governed in accordance
with the principles of liberty and justice.
For this purpose the following Representatives of the High
Contracting Parties:
The President of the United States of America,
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and of the british Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor
of India, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the
King of Italy, H. M. the Emperor of Japan, His Majesty the King
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
After having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form,
have agreed as follows:
The Allied and Associated Powers, signatories to the Treaty of Berlin
of the 13th July, 1878, taking into consideration the obligations
contracted under the present Treaty by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State,
recognize that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State is definitely discharged
from the obligations undertaken in Article … of the said Treaty of
Berlin.
[Page 41]
Chapter I
Article 1
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes that the
stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this chapter shall be
recognised as fundamental laws, and that no laws, regulation or
official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations,
nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over
them.
Article 2
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, undertakes to assure
full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants
of the Kingdom without distinction of birth, nationality, language,
race or religion.
All inhabitants of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,
shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private,
of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not
inconsistent with public order or public morals.
Article 3
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes admits and declares to
be Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals ipso facto
and without the requirement of any formality Austrian, Hungarian or
Bulgarian nationals habitually resident [or: having indigénat]3a
at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in
territory which is or may be recognised as forming part of the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Treaties with
Austria, and Hungary respectively.
Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over eighteen
years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the
said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to
them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents
will cover their children under eighteen years of age.
Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where
it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and
Hungary, transfer within the succeeding twelve months, their place
of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be
entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. They may carry with them
their movable property of every description. No export duties may be
imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such
property.
[Page 42]
Article 4
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes admits and declares to
be Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals ipso facto
and without the requirement of any formality persons of Austrian,
Hungarian or Bulgarian nationality who were born in the said
territory of parents habitually resident [or: having indigénat] there, even if at the date of the
coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves
habitually resident [or: having indigénat]
there.
Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the
present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the
competent Serb-Croat-Slovene authorities in the country in which
they are resident, stating that they abandon Serb-Croat-Slovene
nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as
Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals. In this connection a declaration by a
husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover
their children under eighteen years of age.
Article 5
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to put no
hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons
concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by
the Allied and Associated Powers with Austria or Hungary, to choose
whether or not they will acquire Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality.
Article 6
All persons born in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes who are not born nationals of another State shall ipso facto become Serb-Croat-Slovene
nationals.
Article 7
All Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals shall be equal before the law and
shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction
as to race, language or religion.
Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any
Serb-Croat-Slovene national in matters relating to the enjoyment of
civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public
employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions
and industries.
No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any
Serb-Croat-Slovene national of any language in private intercourse,
in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any
kind, or at public meetings.
[Page 43]
Notwithstanding any establishment by the Government of the Kingdom of
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of an official language, adequate
facilities shall be given to Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals of other
than Serb, Croat or Slovene speech for the use of their language,
either orally or in writing, before the courts.
Article 8
Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals who belong to racial, religious or
linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in
law and in fact as the other Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals. In
particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and
control at their own expense charitable, religious and social
institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the
right to use their own language and to exercise their religion
freely therein.
Article 9
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will provide in the
public educational system in towns and districts in which a
considerable proportion of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals of other
than Serb, Croat and Slovene speech are resident adequate facilities
for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be
given to the children of such Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals through
the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent
the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from
making the teaching of the (Serbo-Croat) language obligatory in the
said schools.
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of
Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals belonging to racial, religious or
linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an
equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which
may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or
other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.
[The provisions of the present article apply only to territory
transferred to Serbia or to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes price [since] the 1st January
1913].3b
Article 10
The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes agrees to grant to the
Musulmans in the matter of family law and personal status provisions
suitable for regulating these matters in accordance with Musulman
usage.
The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes shall take measures to
assure the nomination of a Reiss Ul Ulema.
[Page 44]
The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes undertakes to insure
protection to the mosques, cemeteries and other Musulman religious
establishments. Full recognition and facilities shall be assured to
Musulman pious foundations (Vakoufs) and religious and charitable
establishments now existing, and the Kingdom of the
Serbs-Croats-Slovenes shall not refuse to the creation of new
religious and charitable establishments any of the necessary
facilities guaranteed to other private establishments of this
nature.
Article 11
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes agrees that the
stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect
persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities,
constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed
under the garantie of the League of Nations.
The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan
hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in
these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the
Council of the League of Nations.
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes agrees that any Member
of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to
bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger
of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may
thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem
proper and effective in the circumstances.
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes further agrees that any
difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of
these Articles between the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes and any one of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the
League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international
character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other part[y]
thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International
Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and
shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of
the Covenant.
Article 12
In view of the peculiar conditions which have arisen in the former
Ottoman provinces of Serbia, as a result of the wars of the last six
years, and in order to inspire confidence in the populations
concerned, [Page 45] the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Government undertakes to invite the Council of
the League of Nations at its discretion to nominate a Commissioner
who shall reside in the district and who shall advise the
Serbia-Croat-Slovene Government in its execution of the foregoing
clauses. The functions of this Commissioner shall be advisory only,
and he shall furnish periodical reports to the Council of the League
of Nations. Proposed by the British, American and
Japanese Delegations—Not Accepted by the French
Delegation
The Commissioner and his staff shall be accorded diplomatic
privileges, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government undertake[s] to
give him all necessary assistance in the performance of his duties.
His appointment shall in the first place be for five years, but will
be renewable at the expiration of this period by a decision of a
majority of the Council of the League.
or
Article 12
I. The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes agrees to grant to the
districts of Macedonia (within the boundaries fixed by the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers) autonomy in matters of language,
instruction and religion as well as in questions of local
administration. Proposed by the Italian
Delegation—Not Accepted by the French Delegation
II. A Central Administrative Council whose seat shall be at Monastir
and an Administrative Council for each district shall have the power
to regulate these matters, as well as all others over which
jurisdiction shall be granted to it by the laws of the
Serb-Croat-Slovene State.
The number of elective members in the Administrative Councils shall
be at least three times as large as that of the de
jure members.
The Religious Heads of each confession shall be de
jure members of the Administrative Councils. The other
members shall be elected in conformity with the laws of the
Serb-Croat-Slovene State.
III. The Administrative sub-division of the Macedonian territory
shall be made so as to group, as far as possible, the populations of
the same nationality and religion.
IV. The Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes agrees that the officials
of the districts of Macedonia shall be chosen among the inhabitants
of these districts.
V. The Governor of each district shall be appointed by the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, taking into consideration, as to
their choice and designation, the numerical importance of the
population as regards nationality and religion.
VI. An organic regulation shall be prepared, within three months
after the signing of the Peace Treaty, to determine the powers and
[Page 46] the attributions of the
Governors as well as the administrative, judicial and financial
regime of the districts of Macedonia, taking as a starting point the
preceding regulations on that matter.
Provisions shall be included concerning the right of the General
Council to propose modifications to this regulation, in the course
of its first session.
The final text, once decided upon, can be modified only on the
initiative of the Scouptchina.
Chapter II
Article 13
Pending the obligations of new treaties or conventions, all treaties,
conventions, agreements and obligations between the Kingdom of
Serbia, on the one hand, and any of the principal Allied and
Associated Powers on the other hand, which were in force on August
1st, 1914, or which have since been entered into, shall ipso facto be binding upon the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Proposed by the
American, French, Italian, and Japanese Delegations
or
The High Contracting Parties agree that all treaties, conventions,
agreements and obligations to which on August 1st, 1914, the Kingdom
of Serbia, was a party, or to which it has subsequently become a
party, shall ipso facto apply to all the
territories which are or may be recognized as forming part of the
Kingdom of Serb-Croat-Slovenes. Proposed by the
British Delegation
Article 14
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to make no
Treaty, Convention or arrangement and to take no other action which
will prevent her from joining in any general Convention for the
equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be
concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five
years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes also undertakes to
extend to all the Allied and Associated Powers any favours or
privileges in Customs matters, which it may grant during the same
period of five years to any State with which since August 1914 the
Allied and Associated Powers have been at war or to any State which
in virtue of Article 6 of Part X of the Treaty with Austria has
special Customs arrangements with such States.
[Page 47]
Article 15
Pending the conclusion of the general convention referred to above,
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to treat on
the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured
nation the vessels of all the Allied and Associated Powers which
accord similar treatment to Serb, Croat and Slovene vessels. As an
exception from this provision, the right of the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or of any other Allied or Associated
Power to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is
expressly reserved. The Allied and Associated Powers further agree
not to claim under this article the benefit of agreements which the
states obtaining territory formerly belonging to the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy may conclude as regards coasting traffic
in the ports of the Adriatic sea.
Article 16
Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of
a general convention to secure and maintain freedom of
communications and of transit, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods,
vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any
Allied or Associated State over Serb, Croat and Slovene territory,
including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as
favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and
mails respectively of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation or
ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all
other matters.
All charges imposed in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable
having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in transit
shall be exempt from all customs or other duties.
Tariffs for transit across the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes and tariffs between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes and any Allied or Associated Power involving through
tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of the
Allied or Associated Power concerned.
Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic
services.
Provided that no Allied or Associated Power can claim the benefit of
these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which
reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject
matter.
[Page 48]
If within a period of five years from the coming into force of this
Treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded
under the auspices of the League of Nations, the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shall be at liberty at any time
thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of
the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of the present
Article.
Article 17
All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing articles to the
Allied and Associated Powers shall be accorded equally to all States
members of the League of Nations.
The present treaty, of which the French and English texts are both
authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same
time as the Treaty of Peace with Germany.
The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.
Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be
entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic
through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their
ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the
instrument of ratification as soon as possible.
A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.
The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a
certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of
ratifications.
In faith whereof the above-named
Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.
Done at Versailles, in a single copy which will remain deposited in
the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated
copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.
Appendix B to HD–44
hellenic
delegation
at the peace congress
Paris, August 24, 1919.
[The President of the Greek
Delegation (Venizelos) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]
Mr. President: About ten days ago M.
Tardieu informed me, regarding the question of Thrace, that two
solutions were in view.
According to the first, Greece would obtain in Western Thrace the
Kazas of Xanthi and of Gioumouldjina, while the territories situated
on the north of these Kazas would be left to Bulgaria, and [Page 49] an international state would
be made of the eastern part of Western Thrace. There would be
accorded, besides, to Greece, Eastern Thrace having as its boundary
on the north and the west the Turko-Bulgarian frontiers of 1915, and
on the south a line passing from the Gulf of Xeros to a point south
of Midia on the Black Sea.
The second of the solutions under consideration would attribute to
Greece Western Thrace, except a part on the northwest, as well as
the adjacent part of Eastern Thrace—about two-fifths of it. Only the
city and port of Dedeagatch and the railway leading to it would be
internationalized.
Between these two solutions I felt myself obliged to prefer the
latter in order to avoid the great inconvenience of discontinuity in
Greek territory.
M. Tardieu then suggested to me that I see Mr. Polk who had said that
he would gladly telegraph my opinion to President Wilson and await a
reply.
I had, in fact, an interview with Mr. Polk last Friday, August 15,
and at his request I addressed to him on the same day a letter, of
which a copy is attached,5 summarizing what I had
just explained to him orally.
Unfortunately, up to the present moment, no reply has as yet come
from President Wilson, and it has not been possible, therefore, for
a decision to be taken by the Supreme Council on the question of
Thrace.
This being so, I venture to inform you that since I am anxious to
hasten the settlement of this question I should be disposed, if
necessary, to accept even the first of the proposed solutions.
Nevertheless, in order to diminish the inconveniences attending this
solution, it is necessary:
- (1)
- that a right of commercial and military transit, in time
of war as in time of peace, be accorded to Greece, not only
across the territory of the international state, but also
through the port of Rodosto.
- (2)
- that the Greek and Moslem inhabitants of the territories
to be included in the new international state, who were
forced to leave their homes at the time of and during the
Bulgarian occupation, shall be repatriated under the
supervision and protection of an international commission
and shall be reinstated in their possessions which were
confiscated by the Bulgarian Government.
May I add, finally, that if this international state should be
created, there would be no justification for incorporating also in
the international state the purely Turkish population of 100,000
souls who inhabit the territories north of Western Thrace awarded to
Greece.
Accept [etc.]
[Page 50]
Appendix C to HD–44
[Statement of President Wilson’s
Views on the Frontiers of Bulgaria6]
We are unable to justify in our own minds the acceptance of the
suggested compromise.
The rejection of the proposals, it should be stated, is not on
account of any lack of warm friendship for Greece or because of
sympathy with Bulgaria. The loyal and worthy service rendered by the
Greeks is by no means overlooked by us. We have furthermore given
sympathetic consideration to their natural wish to include all
territories inhabited by those of Greek blood within the boundaries
of Greece. We cannot, however, allow our judgment regarding a
settlement upon which depends the stability of future peace to be
affected by sentiments of friendship and regard. If the United
States is to be a signatory of the Bulgarian and Turkish treaties as
well as one of the guarantors of the territorial settlements set
forth therein, these settlements must not be based exclusively upon
the principle of the national aspirations of a brave people or of
reward. Primarily, they must be based upon the purpose of removing
the causes of future wars and upon the permanence of the
settlements, because of their reasonable and equitable nature. In
our opinion these conditions are not met by the compromises
suggested. The separation of the Greek territories and the
separation of the territories of the international state would make
neither for stability nor for continued peace.
Moved by a strong desire to meet the wishes of the Greek nation as
far as is compatible with his conception of a settlement which is to
be permanent in nature, the President would agree to the cession to
Greece of the west portion of western Thrace, while the east portion
of western Thrace as well as all of eastern Thrace should be
included in the international state. According to this arrangement
the division of the territory would be as follows:—in Western Thrace
the eastern boundary of Greece would be a line running due north
from the Aegean Sea through Maronia to a point just south of
Chelepi. From that point the line would run in a westerly direction
until it touched the 1913 Greek-Bulgar boundary. The territory of
the international state in west Thrace would lie east of the Greek
territory. It would be bounded on the north by a line commencing at
the northeast corner of the Greek territory and running in an
easterly direction through Karakalissa to the Maritza River and
thence northward and following the Turkish-Bulgar boundary up to the
[Page 51] Black Sea. A land right
of way to the Aegean Sea across the territory of Western Thrace
included within the international state as well as the free use of
the port of Dedeagatch should be granted to Bulgaria.
The foregoing settlement, in the President’s opinion, appears to have
elements of permanency which the others lack. The Greek aspiration
to secure sovereignty over the greater part of Eastern Thrace is of
course denied. In view, however, of the mixture of races in that
region hostility and bitterness would be excited by the grant of
sovereignty to one of the races. The populations would be free from
national intrigues and quarrels if incorporated in the international
state.
It may be pointed out that the maintenance of the government of
Constantinople will be a constant and very considerable expense to
the power or group of powers which is charged with the government
unless a considerable territory is attached to it.
Appendix D to HD–44
Commission on Prisoners of War
Constituted in Accordance with the Decision of the Supreme
Council of August 27, 19198
Report to the Supreme
Council
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council on August 27,
the Interallied Commission on Prisoners of War has met, and has the
honor to submit to the Supreme Council the following proposals:—
1. The subcommissions provided for in paragraph 2 of article 215 of
the Treaty of Versailles will be immediately formed so far as
concerns the United States of America and Great Britain.
These subcommissions, so far as they deal with prisoners now in
France, should meet at Versailles, and, because of passage through
France, French delegates should be associated with them.
2. The Japanese delegation has requested that the Japanese
sub-commission for the repatriation of prisoners in Japan be
immediately constituted.
3. The Commission having ascertained that the Allied and Associated
Powers acquiesce in applying by anticipation article 214 of the
Treaty of Versailles, it is expedient to request forthwith the
application [Page 52] of articles 222
and 223, and to organize immediately the Commission to search for
missing men, and to retrieve the property of prisoners and internees
which has been kept by the German authorities.
Appendix E to HD–44
[Draft Note to the German
Government]
The Allied and Associated Powers have taken note of the German
Constitution of August 11, 1919, and inform the German Government
that the provisions in the second paragraph of article 61 are in
absolute contradiction to article 80 of the Treaty of Peace signed
at Versailles on June 28, 1919.
Article 80, by which Germany has undertaken “to acknowledge and
respect strictly the independence of Austria” and has agreed “that
this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of
the Council of the League of Nations,” was prompted by two
considerations: on one hand, by the impossibility that the first
result of the peace should be an increase of German population and
strength by the union of Germany and Austria whose common action
provoked the war; and on the other hand, by respect for the right of
peoples to dispose of themselves as confided to the League of
Nations, whose function it is to control the expression of that
right and to weigh the proofs and guarantees given by Germany of a
change of heart.
The Allied and Associated Powers consider that the second paragraph
of article 61 of the German Constitution violates not only the
spirit but also the letter of article 80 of the Treaty of Peace.
This violation is twofold: In the first place, article 61, in
stipulating the admission of Austria into the Reichsrat, assimilates
Austria to the German territories (Deutsche
Lander) which composes the German Empire, an assimilation
which is incompatible with respect for the independence of
Austria.
In the second place, in granting and regulating the participation of
Austria in the Council of the Empire, article 61 creates a political
bond and a common political activity between Germany and Austria,
absolutely opposed to the independence of Austria.
The Allied and Associated Powers are not in the least disposed to
engage in a judicial controversy regarding this matter: at the
meeting of June 28, 1919, before proceeding to the signature of the
Treaty of Peace with Germany, the President of the Conference
expressly reminded and declared to the German plenipotentiaries that
the treaty [Page 53] was a treaty of
good faith, and was to be interpreted and executed as such. From the
point of view of political action as well as from the point of view
of interpretation article 61 of the Constitution is a violation of
article 80 of the treaty. Article 178 of the German Constitution,
which declares that “the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles
cannot be affected by the Constitution,” of itself establishes the
nullity of article 61.
The Supreme Council warns the German Government, therefore, that it
regards the maintenance of the terms proposed in the second
paragraph of article 61 as a violation tending to prevent the
ratification of the Treaty of Peace, and it invites the German
Government to cause the suppression of those terms, and to advise at
once of the steps taken to that effect.
