Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/67

HD–67

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Friday, October 10, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, October 10, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de St. Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja
  • Secretary
    • M. Barone Russo.
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui.
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Mr. C. Russell
British Empire	Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Mr. Dresel
  • Colonel Logan
  • Mr. Shepardson
• British Empire
  • General Sackville-West
  • Lt. Colonel Kisch
  • Sir George Clerk
  • Mr. Leeper
  • Mr. Carr
  • Capt. Fuller
• France
  • Marshal Foch
  • M. Loucher
  • M. Tardieu
  • General Weygand
  • M. Laroche
• Italy
  • M. Brambilla
  • M. Vannutelli-Rey.

1. Mr. Polk said that the question of making a communication to the German Government relative to granting permission to German and Austrian representatives to proceed to Washing-ton to attend the International Labor Conference had been referred to the American Delegation,¹ which had been asked to assume the responsibility of providing arrangements to enable the German representatives to proceed to Washington. He had informed Baron von Lersner in accordance with the Supreme Council’s instructions and had now received a reply which he wished to place before the Council. Admission of German of Austrian Delegates to the International Labor Conference at Washington

(Mr. Polk then read a note from Baron von Lersner of the 4th October. (See Appendix “A”.))

Mr. Polk said that he had prepared a draft of a note in reply to Baron von Lersner which, in his opinion, expressed the views of the British, French and American labor representatives. He wished to submit this note to the Council and to ask that, if there should be any objections to its contents, they might be brought up at the next meeting.

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Bulgarian Delegation of the 7th October requesting an extension of ten days to the time limit for the transmission of the reply to the Conditions of Peace. (See Appendix “B”.)) Request of the Bulgarian Delegation for the Prolongation by Ten Days of the Time Allowed for the Presentation of Its Obervations on the Conditions of Peace

M. Clemenceau said that in view of the circumstances he did not feel that the Council could refuse the request of the Bulgarian Delegation.

(It was decided:

to accede to the request of the Bulgarian Delegation for the prolongation by ten days of the time allowed for the presentation of its observations on the Conditions of Peace.)

3. (The Council had before it a note of the 29th September addressed to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission by the American Delegation. (See Appendix “C”).) The Question of German and Austro-Hungarian Ships in Spanish Ports

M. Loucheur briefly commented upon the note in question. He said that, in his opinion, no action could be taken until the Treaty of Peace had come into force. The matter had been discussed by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, which was of the opinion that they had authority under the Treaty of Peace to create a tribunal competent to deal with the question and consider the case in question. He urged that if this view should be accepted, all the Allied and Associated Governments should make the same reply to the Spanish Government in the event of a request being made to these Governments by the Spanish Government.

Mr. Polk asked whether it was proposed to take the same course in regard to Norway.

M. Loucheur replied in the negative. He said that the Norwegian claims for reparations from Germany for Norwegian ships lost during the war had been referred by the Conference to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission. The Commission was of the opinion that the matter was one affecting only Norway and Germany, and should consequently, be settled between them, as Norway was not one of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr. Polk said that he agreed, as in the case of Spain it was a question of ships now in Spanish ports.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the principles contained in the note of the American Delegation (See Appendix “C”) to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission as a basis for a reply from the Government of the United States to the Spanish Government in regard to the final disposition of German and Austro-Hungarian ships in Spanish ports;

(2) that each of the Allied and Associated Governments, in communicating a reply to the Spanish Government on the subject, if occasion should arise, should address that Government in the same sense.)

4. (The Council had before it the draft of a note addressed to the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (See Appendix “D”), prepared by Marshal Foch, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of October 7th, 1919, (H. D. 66).)² Draft of a Reply to the Note of the German Government Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

General Weygand read and commented upon the draft of the note in question. He added that, in view of the fact that information had just been received to show that German troops were conducting active operations in Latvia, he proposed that a sentence be added to the end of the third paragraph pointing out that information had just been received to show that the German troops had attacked the army of the Letts.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he agreed with the terms of the note prepared by Marshal Foch. There was one point, however, which he wished to raise. The German Government would undoubtedly publish the note and cause public opinion in Germany to feel that the Allied and Associated Governments were acting in a brutal manner towards Germany. He considered it of equal importance that the note should be published by the Allied and Associated Governments, and that a paragraph should be inserted to make the reasons clear why these Governments considered the German reply³ to be unsatisfactory. He proposed that a paragraph in this sense should be inserted after the second paragraph of Marshal Foch’s draft. Sir Eyre Crowe then read the draft of the paragraph in question, (See Appendix “E”.)

M. Clemenceau said that he would have no objection to the insertion of Sir Eyre Crowe’s paragraph in the reply to the German Government.

Mr. Polk said that he had referred the matter to General Bliss and that he could not express his final opinion at the moment. He would, however, communicate his reply at the first opportunity.

M. Clemenceau said that it would be also necessary to name a General to act as head of the mixed Commission mentioned in the note.

Marshal Foch said that the General could be named after a reply to the note had been received from the German Government.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the draft note prepared by Marshal Foch relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces with the addition to the text proposed by Marshal Foch, and with the addition of the draft paragraph submitted by Sir Eyre Crowe. (See Appendix “E”);

(2) to publish the text of the note.)

5. (The Council had before it the draft of a resolution on the subject of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany (See Appendix “F”) prepared by Marshal Foch in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council of the 7th October, 1919, (H. D. 66).)⁴ Draft of a Resolution Respecting Russian Prisoners of War in Germany

General Weygand read and commented upon the draft resolution.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he could not help but feel that the Council were going back on their previous decision. In the first instance they had decided to wash their hands of the Russian Prisoners in Germany,⁵ and they had later decided that an International Commission should be appointed upon which there should be both German and Russian Representatives.⁶ If the present draft were accepted, the Council would be going still further, for they would be again assuming responsibility. He pointed out that in the second paragraph of the note, there was a clear expression of the acceptance of responsibility and that in the paragraph numbered 1, the Allied and Associated Governments spoke of re-establishing an Inter-Allied Commission for the control of Russian prisoners. He thought that it was important to avoid the use of the word “re-establishment”. Paragraph No. 2, Section B, spoke of regulating the ways and means for the repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War. This paragraph also was a clear expression of the re-establishment of responsibility, and he considered it necessary that the responsibility of the Allied and Associated Governments should not be re-established in regard to Russian Prisoners of war in Germany.

General Weygand said that he thought it possible that the expressions which had been used in the draft resolution went somewhat too far, but the question was one of the intention of the Allied and Associated Governments. The Russian Political Conference at Paris had been informed by General Denikin that it was necessary to avoid at all costs the repatriation to Bolshevist Russia of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany, who came from those parts of Russia, which were under the control of the Soviet Government. He could not help but feel that the Allied and Associated Governments had an important interest in this matter, and he did not believe that they could wash their hands of the affair and leave the matter entirely to the Germans. He felt that the Council should not be willing to consider themselves bound by the resolution in regard to Russian Prisoners of War which was taken on the 2nd August.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that, at the present time, the German Government were not in a position to repatriate the Russian Prisoners of War by way of Poland and the Ukraine.

(It was decided:

to request General Weygand and General Sackville-West to modify the draft resolution relative to Russian Prisoners of War in Germany (See Appendix “F”), taking into consideration the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe.)

6. General Weygand said that he had just received a telegram from General Dupont according to which the situation in the Baltic Provinces was regarded by the War Office at Berlin as being very grave. General von der Goltz was unable, or rather unwilling, to return. A new Government had been formed at Mitau, at the head of which was Count Palen. Telegram From General Dupont Relative to the Situation in the Baltic Provinces

M. Berthelot said that this information was similar to that which he had received, and, according to which, a Russo-German reactionary Government had been established.

7. Sir George Clerk said that he had little to add to the written report which he had made to the Council. (See Appendix “G”.) Statement by Sir George Clerk on the Situation in Roumania

He ventured to express the hope that his report would be kept wholly to the Council as he had expressed a number of opinions. He had endeavored to ascertain in Roumania the real meaning for the attitude of the Roumanian Government on the Hungarian question, and the result had been to convince him that M. Bratiano had thought that by playing for time the Allied waters would become sufficiently troubled for him to catch many excellent fish. He therefore considered it essential to make the Roumanian Government understand that the Allied and Associated Governments were both absolutely united and absolutely definite in their decisions in regard to Roumania. He considered it advisable to point out to the Roumanian Government that the decisions taken in regard to Roumania, both as regarded the line of the frontier and the principle of the minorities treaty, were definite. He considered that this would put an end to the Roumanian hopes, which were founded on delay in settling with Turkey, arranging the Adriatic question and other difficult points upon which M. Bratiano was counting. In regard to Hungary, he considered that the first step necessary was a provisional recognition of a Hungarian Government which could maintain order, hold elections and negotiate peace. As soon as such a Government existed, the Roumanian troops could be asked to evacuate, and this alone could definitely put an end to the requisitions about which there had been so much discussion. He proposed that the Hungarians should be told the conditions upon which a Hungarian Government would be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. He thought that M. Friedrich should be told what he must do, that his present Government no more corresponded to the views of the Allied and Associated Governments than the Government of Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Friedrich should be invited to broaden the bases of his Government. It was necessary to have some solvent to loosen the crystals concerned in Hungarian affairs. For instance an Allied Commission of a political character, holding direct, and locally supreme authority from the Allies, should negotiate with the various Hungarian political parties. He thought that upon such a condition [commission?] Roumania should be represented at least in a consultative character.

M. Clemenceau suggested that Sir George Clerk prepare draft notes to the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments.

Mr. Polk asked whether the Supreme Council had received a reply to the message decided upon by the Supreme Council at its meeting of the 22nd August (H. D. 36),⁷ instructing the French Minister at Bucharest in the name of the Supreme Council to ask for further information on the intentions of the Roumanian Government with regard to the Banat, and directing him to inform the Roumanian Government that the frontiers laid down by the Council in the Banat and elsewhere were final.

M. Berthelot said that no reply had been received from the Roumanian Government.

M. Laroche said that, as the first telegram did not appear to have reached its destination, a second telegram in the same sense had been despatched about a month before the present date. The French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of this second telegram and had stated that he had brought it to the attention of the Roumanian Government. Up to the present, however, the Roumanian Government had made no reply.

Mr. Polk said that the American Chargé d’ Affaires at Bucharest had been unable to discover whether the communication in the sense of the telegram in question had been received at the Roumanian Foreign Office. He thought that M. Bratiano appeared convinced that he could improve his position by waiting.

Sir Eyre Crowe said, with reference to Sir George Clerk’s first memorandum, that on the 20th September, M. Bratiano had stated that the Roumanian Government claimed new frontiers.

M. Clemenceau said that at the present time the Roumanians and the Serbs were in agreement as to the Banat.

M. Berthelot added that the question dealt with the evacuation of the Banat and that both the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments were withdrawing their troops.

Mr. Polk asked Sir George Clerk whether he had had a copy of the telegram based upon the resolution of the 22nd of August.

Sir George Clerk replied that he had not had a copy of this telegram.

M. Clemenceau proposed that Sir George Clerk and M. Berthelot be directed to draft notes to the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments.

Mr. Polk asked for information as to the attitude of the Roumanian Government on the subject of the requisitions which had taken place.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the note to the Hungarian Government should be addressed to M. Friedrich.

M. Clemenceau said that he thought that it should.

Mr. Polk said that he felt considerable doubt on the subject.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the relations between the Interallied Generals at Budapest and the Roumanian authorities had become very strained, and that for this reason he believed there was a great deal to be said for the appointment of a civil Commission, which should be authorized to speak in the name of the Council.

Mr. Polk said that he had grave doubts as to the advisability of recalling the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest. The Mission were in a most unenviable position, and there was no question of the fact that the Roumanian authorities at Budapest had lied to them continually.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he agreed with Mr. Polk as to the unenviable position of the Inter-Allied Military Mission. He had not intended to recall that Mission, but considered that to send a Mission of higher rank would have many advantages.

Mr. Polk said that he thought this proposal was worthy of serious consideration.

M. Berthelot said that it would be necessary to tell M. Friedrich that the Allied and Associated Governments considered that he was acting as a mask for the Archduke Joseph, and that they considered it impossible for him to remain.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he thought that M. Friedrich might be asked to resign or else to broaden the basis of his Government.

M. Berthelot said that he thought it would be preferable to have M. Friedrich retire. The Governments of the States bordering upon Hungary had no confidence in him and he thought that they considered him reactionary and Anti-Semitic and that in occupying his present position it was to act as a mask for the Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Friedrich should consequently retire as the head of the Government, but this did not mean that he should not occupy a position in the Government.

Sir George Clerk said that he felt that he ought to point out that in the opinion of the Allied Generals at Budapest, M. Friedrich was the best person.

M. Berthelot said that he had no objection to M. Friedrich as a man but considered him, however, merely as a symbol. If the Conference adopted the course of treating with him, they would give the appearance of treating with the Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Heinrich⁹ was a person with whom the Allied and Associated Governments could enter into negotiations. He was undoubtedly a man of the same sort as Friedrich but there was a difference. His Government might be more democratic, and in entering into negotiations with him, the Allied and Associated Governments could not be charged with entering into negotiations with the Archduke as he did not think M. Heinrich represented the Archduke.

Sir GeIorge Clerk said he agreed but there was a question of form to be considered. He proposed that the Conference inform M. Friedrich that they were not satisfied with the Government as constituted under him. He suggested that M. Friedrich be asked whether he was prepared to broaden the basis of his Government in such a form as to be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. If he were not prepared to do this he should be informed that he must go. It would then be a question of a Government under Heinrich or Peidl.¹⁰

M. Berthelot said that he felt that there was danger in treating with M. Friedrich in any form whatsoever.

Mr. Polk said that he was confident that M. Berthelot and Sir George Clerk could prepare a text which would be satisfactory to the Council. He then asked Sir George Clerk where the difficulty in arming the police of Budapest lay.

Sir George Clerk replied that the Roumanian Government said that if the police at Budapest were armed, there was danger of a White Terror. M. Diamandi had said that at the time when the Roumanians should evacuate Budapest it would be necessary for them to arm the police.

Mr. Polk said that he thought they had no intention of arming the police.

Sir George Clerk said that in his opinion the only means of improving the situation lay in appointing a Commission or in despatching a note. He wished to add, confidentially, that M. Friedrich had informed him, but asked him in no event to let the Roumanians become aware of the fact, that if the Roumanians should leave, he had sufficient police and arms. He thought that M. Friedrich undoubtedly had some scheme in view.

Mr. Polk said that Colonel Antonesco, a Roumanian officer, who had recently been in Paris, had assured him in a conversation which had taken place a few days before that the police at Budapest would be armed upon the following day. In point of fact nothing had occurred. He thought that it was most important that the blockade preventing the shipment of arms to Hungary should not be removed. He also wished to say that the conduct of the Roumanians in Bessarabia had called forth strong adverse comment. He was informed that the Roumanian authorities were holding elections and enforcing conscription. He thought that the action of the Roumanian Government in Bessarabia should be considered by the Council.

M. Clemenceau said that he agreed and that the matter should be discussed at the next meeting.

8. (The Council had before it a memorandum of 23rd September prepared by the American Representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.) (Appendix “H”.) Proposal of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission for the Despatch of a Sub-Committee To Determine the Removed From Hungary by the Roumanians

M. Loucheur said that the American Delegation proposed that a sub-committee be sent to Budapest to ascertain what material had been requisitioned and what could be placed to the account of the Allies. Sir George Clerk was informed in regard to the matter, and, in his report, he had expressed the opinion that Roumanians would be inadvisable to put the Roumanians before a Tribunal. If this were done Roumanian opinion would be unnecessarily offended and it was important to treat the Roumanians as Allies. He proposed that the Roumanians should be admitted to representation on the sub-committee in a deliberative capacity. He added that in taking this action the Allied and Associated Governments would only be giving to Roumania what was due her, because, according to the regulations of the Treaty of Peace in regard to the Reparations Commission, the Allied States interested, and Roumania was one, were to be admitted to the meetings of the Reparations Commission in the discussion of the questions affecting them. The sub-committee could also study the food question in Hungary, but the immediate question before the Council was that of appointing a sub-committee with a Roumanian member.

Sir George Clerk said that he would suggest that the sub-committee be placed under the orders of the Reparations Commission rather than of the Allied Generals at Budapest.

Mr. Polk said that he agreed. He wished to submit an amended proposal which he thought would meet the objections which had been raised. (See Appendix “I”.)

M. Loucheur said that he agreed in principle to the proposed resolution submitted by Mr. Polk, but desired time to examine it carefully.

It was decided:

(1) to send to Budapest a Sub-Committee to determine the reparation value of material removed from Hungary by the Roumanians;

(2) that this Sub-Committee should be composed of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers and to which should be added a Roumanian Representative, who should sit in a deliberative capacity;

(3) that the Sub-Committee should be under the orders of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.

It was further decided:

to refer to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission the proposed resolution (See Appendix “1”), relative to the constitution and functions of the Sub-Committee, submitted by Mr. Polk.

9. Marshal Foch said that it was of urgent importance to decide as to the composition of the Armies of Occupation, which should be furnished by the Allied and Associated Governments in the plebiscite and other areas. Composition of Interallied Forces of Occupation

M. Clemenceau said that he had just sent Sir Eyre Crowe a communication in regard to the matter.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Crillon, Paris , 10 October, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–67

October 4, 1919.

English Translation of a Note From Baron von Lersner to Mr. Polk

Mr. President: I did not fail to communicate to my Government the contents of the letter which you were good enough to send me relative to the participation of German and Austrian Delegates in the Labor Conference which will be held in Washington. My Government has directed me to thank you for this communication, of which it has taken due note. It is needless to say that, should occasion arise, my Government will gratefully avail itself of the offer of the Government of the United States of America, unofficially set forth at the end of the letter, to facilitate the voyage of the German Delegates. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the German labor unions are not free to decide the question of sending a labor delegate, as they feel bound by the resolution of the International Congress of Labor Unions, held in July of this year at Amsterdam, providing for the participation of delegates of the labor unions in the Washington Conference, on the condition that labor delegates from all countries, without exception, be invited and admitted with equal rights. The same question will arise also as regards the other German delegates. Under these circumstances, the German Government considers an explanation of importance as to whether the assumption above indicated of German participation in the Conference at Washington can be looked on as an actuality.

In view of the shortness of the time remaining for the completion of preparation for the voyage, my Government would be especially grateful if this supplementary information could be communicated to it without delay.

Please accept, etc., etc.,

Baron von Lersner

To the President of the American Delegation,
The Under Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk,
Paris

Appendix B to HD–67

bulgarian delegation
to the peace conference

Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 7, 1919.

Note, No. 363, October 7, 1919, From the Bulgarian Delegation, Requesting an Extension of the Time Allotted for the Preparation of the Observations on the Treaty of Peace

From: M. K. Sarafov.

To: M. G. Clemenceau.

I have just received a telegram from the Bulgarian Government charging me to ask Your Excellency for an extension of ten days to the time limit for the sending of the reply to the Peace Conditions.

This prolongation is made necessary owing to the difficulties of a technical order, notably in the work of translation and printing.

I have the honor of calling Your Excellency’s attention to the fact that the great distance separating Paris from Sophia is one of the most important reasons for this step of the Bulgarian Government.

I dare hope that the Peace Conference will be kind enough to accede to my request, made in the name of the Council of Bulgarian Ministers, and I beg Your Excellency please to accept, etc., etc.

K. Saratov

Appendix C to HD–67

107

Note of the American Delegation to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission

With reference to the disposition of German and Austro-Hungarian ships in Spanish waters, the American Mission is advised by its Government that a note has been received from the Spanish Embassy setting forth the Spanish attitude on the subject. This document refers to Annex 3, Section 1 of Part 8 of the German Treaty, and states that the Spanish Government had consented to the use of these vessels on the basis that their final disposal should not be prejudiced and that with regard to pending claims, Spanish rights in the ships should not be impaired. The note proposed that the final decision as to disposal should be left to an “International Commission or Organization which may be designated at the proper time to work out a juridical and friendly solution of the question.” It is further stated in this note that, as the claims consisted of losses suffered through acts of a belligerent power committed in violation of international law, it was logical that neutrals in whose waters the ships were at the time the injury was done should have the prior claim on indemnification through these ships.

The answer of the United States Government which it is proposed to send refers to Paragraph 20, Annex 2, Section 1 of Part 8 of the German Treaty, and points out that on ratification of the Treaty the Reparation Commission will constitute, under the Paragraph referred to, the suitable tribunal for the hearing of the claims of the Spanish Government in regard to these vessels.

The American Delegation consider it important that the views of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission be obtained on this subject in order that uniform action may be secured. It is obvious that the same question will come up in relation to ships of enemy powers detained in other neutral ports, and in fact it is questioned by the Department of State whether, under Paragraph 20 cited, the future Reparation Commission cannot properly pass on specified claims as to maritime losses suffered by Norway. These claims were briefly discussed at the meeting of the Committee on September 4, 1919.

Paris, September 29, 1919.

Appendix D to HD–67

commander-in-chief
of the
allied armies
General Staff G–3

G. H. Q., October 7, 1919.

Draft of a Note To Be Sent to the German Government Regarding the Evacuation of the Baltic Countries

The Allied and Associated Governments note the formally expressed pretentions of the German Government, in its note of October 3,¹¹ to undertake and to pursue in the most energetic manner, the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic regions and Lithuania.

They also consider as opportune the measures decided upon by the German Government for that purpose.

However, they call attention to the fact that those measures will have value and be efficacious only if they are fully and strictly executed by the German troops. Experience proves indeed that certain agreements already made have not been respected—notably on the subject of stopping reinforcements for the East.

The Allied and Associated Governments could not therefore admit that the German Government can be considered as having done all that was in its power to fulfill its obligations of evacuation.

As a consequence, they maintain the principle of the full responsibility of that Government in the execution of the evacuation, and they mean to maintain integrally the coercive measures announced by their telegram of September 27th,¹² as long as the evacuation has not been undertaken and pursued with all the desirable celerity.

However, for the purpose of encouraging the execution of that operation and lending assistance to the German Government, the Allied and Associated Governments accept to send Allied representatives whose mission should consist:

in receiving from the German Government information regarding the measures decided upon by it, in view to regulating the conditions of the evacuation, as well as in proposing measures which they themselves may deem advisable.

in exercising on the spot and, with all freedom of action, the effective control of the execution of said measures.

The Chairmanship of the Allied Commission should be in the hands of a superior officer appointed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Only when that superior officer has informed the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments that the operations of evacuation are progressing normally, can the stopping of the measures provided for by the telegram of September 27th be considered.

The German Government is asked to kindly send its answer as soon as possible.

Appendix E to HD–67

[Draft Paragraphs by Sir Eyre Crowe To Be Inserted After Second Paragraph in Draft of a Note To Be Sent to the German Government, Appendix D, supra]

But when the German government contends that the action they have taken must absolve them from the charge of having neglected to fulfil their honourable obligations under the armistice, it is necessary to point out that the orders of the German government have, notwithstanding the repeated demands and remonstrances on the part of the Allied and Associated governments, been so long delayed that the German government now claim to be practically powerless to enforce them. It is difficult not to believe that their long delay has been deliberate, calculated as it was to lead to the very results which the German government now affect to deplore. It seems indeed impossible otherwise to explain their refusal to recall General von der Goltz who has been their official instrument in creating the present situation in open defiance of the legitimate representations of the Allied and Associated governments. Why was the General’s recall thrice demanded, refused? Why was he, after being summoned to Berlin only recently, sent back deliberately to the scene of his activities except to complete under the authority of his official command the organization which now affords to the German government the pretext that the troops hitherto paid, clothed, and transported by them have passed out of their control? Has General von der Goltz acted contrary to their instructions? If so, why has not his insubordination been punished either by formal dismissal or in any other way?

Unless some very much more satisfactory explanations of these matters than those hitherto afforded are given by the German Government the Allied and Associated governments cannot admit the contention that the German government have, as they assert, continually made the most energetic efforts to withdraw the German troops from the Baltic states.

Appendix F to HD–67

Draft of a Resolution on the Subject of the Russian Prisoners of War in Germany [Prepared by Marshal Foch]

By its resolution of August 2nd, 1919,¹³ the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments has charged again the German Government with the supplying and the upkeep of the Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany, and accorded to that Government full liberty of action regarding the ways and means of repatriating those prisoners.

The application of those provisions, creating certain difficulties of such a nature as to aggravate the material and moral situation of the interned Russian prisoners of war, the Allied and Associated Governments, in a spirit of humanity, have decided to adopt all measures guaranteeing to those prisoners decent conditions of life, and to pursue their repatriation within the limit compatible with the internal situation of Russia.

For that purpose, and taking into account the request expressed by the German Government itself, it has been decided:

1st: The interallied Commission for the control of the Russian prisoners of war, created in execution of the Armistice of January 16, 1919,¹⁴ shall be reestablished and transformed into an International Commission by the adjunction of a German representative and a Russian representative.

2nd: That International Commission, operating in Berlin under the Chairmanship of one of the Allied representatives, shall have as mission:

a) to control the material situation of the interned Russian prisoners of war (food, clothing, hygienic conditions of installation, sanitary treatment);

b) to regulate, in accord with the German Government, and taking into account the instructions of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the ways and means for the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war.

c) to send to the Supreme Council all useful proposals concerning the help which might be granted, in case of urgency, by the German Government [and?] by the Allied and Associated Governments, (improvement of the material situation of the prisoners, facilities for the transportation for their repatriation), being understood that the cost for the upkeep of the prisoners of war falls entirely upon the German Government, and that the cooperation considered above would have to be reimbursed by Germany.

3d: A special Interallied Commission, operating in Paris shall be charged with the final settlement of the questions of a financial nature, of supplies and of transportation which remain unsettled at the time of the dissolution of the Interallied Commission of Control, namely:

Reimbursement for flour to the German Government.

Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission (500,000 marks).

Reimbursement to the German Government of its expenditures made for the Kiev refugees.

Utilization of the Russian money which remains in the hands of the German Government (20,000,000 rubles).

That Commission will be qualified to prepare the decision of the Supreme Council regarding those questions and to follow its execution in connection with the Interallied or national organs concerned.

Besides, in the future, it shall have to follow, in the same conditions, the proposals which the International Commission might send to the Supreme Council in conformity with the provisions of Par. 2, Alinea c.

Appendix G to HD–67

British Delegation, Paris, 7 October, 1919]

[Report by Sir George Clerk of His Mission to Bucharest and Budapest]

Monsieur le President du Conseil: I have the honour to submit herewith to Your Excellency and the Supreme Council a report of my Mission to Bucharest and Buda Pesth, from September 24th last, when I sent Mr. Leeper back to Paris with M. Bratiano’s latest proposals, to the 4th instant on which day I left Buda-Pesth. Attached to my report is a note by Mr. Leeper dealing with the questions of the minorities treaty and the internal political situation in Roumania.

My mission was, strictly speaking, confined to taking the communication of the Supreme Council¹⁶ to M. Bratiano, with such verbal comments as he might seek from me, and, on subsequent instructions, to comparing the evidence as to Roumanian requisitioning collected by the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Buda-Pesth with the assurances given to me on this head by the Roumanian Government. I have therefore throughout considered and declared myself as simply a messenger from the Supreme Council, and if my report seems to go beyond the functions of a messenger, it is because I thought it my duty to give the Supreme Council as clear an appreciation as possible of the Roumanian and Hungarian situation, an appreciation derived from conversations with those most qualified to speak in both countries.

In the same spirit, I have ventured to make certain suggestions, not because I consider myself qualified to put them forward, with any authority, but in the hope that, in a very complicated question, they may at least serve to help the Supreme Council to take their decision.

I venture to observe that, if I have in any way succeeded in faithfully representing the Roumanian situation to the Supreme Council, it is mainly, if not entirely, due to the assistance I received from Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, the Secretary of my Mission. His experience of the Roumanian question in all the forms in which it came before the Peace Conference, his great knowledge of Roumanian men and parties, and his objective and impartial insight into their real aims and intentions, were of the highest value. Moreover, Mr. Leeper was able, while in Bucharest, to correct in many quarters misunderstandings and misrepresentations of the attitude of the Allies, and, if Roumania does once more co-operate loyally with the Allied Powers, the credit will be in no small measure due to him.

In conclusion, I should add that the Roumanian Government welcomed and assisted my mission in every way possible. They showed the greatest readiness to help, and they manifestly desired to express their sincere wish to re-establish complete friendship and understanding with the Allies.

I have [etc.]

George M. Clerk

[Enclosure]

Report

The Supreme Council is already aware of the situation in Roumania up to September 24th last, on which date I sent Mr. Leeper to Paris with M. Bratiano’s detailed views, and it is perhaps unnecessary to recapitulate anything before that date.

But in order to give a clear appreciation of the Hungarian situation, I must travel somewhat outside the actual object of my mission, as political developments in Roumania interact closely upon her attitude in Buda-Pesth.

When Mr. Leeper left, a pro-Bratiano Government had been formed under M. Manolescu but it collapsed that same day owing to the sudden refusal of the Transylvanian Ministers to participate. Bucharest is a small place, and in view of the general political excitement, which made it impossible for me to greet a Roumanian statesman without immediate rumours that the Supreme Council were supporting his party, I judged it best to withdraw to the country while waiting for the instructions which were to be sent to me after the meeting of the Council on September 25th.

On September 28th I received the telegram instructing me to proceed to Buda-Pesth, and I arranged to leave next morning. Meanwhile, after the collapse of the Manolescu Government, the King sent for M. Take Ionescu, who also spoke for General Averescu and M. Maniu, and agreed to their forming a joint Government, whose foreign policy was to be based on complete understanding with the Allies, including, in M. Take Ionescu’s intention, acceptance of the Minorities Treaty, but with, if possible, modifications of some of the most obnoxious clauses. The same afternoon M. Bratiano had a long interview with the King, with the result that His Majesty suddenly formed a Government of six Generals on the active list, under General Vaitoianu with M. Misu as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This Government took office next day, and was in being on my return to Bucharest. The King was under the impression that he has happily solved his difficulties by creating a neutral non-political Government that could hold the elections with complete freedom and impartiality, but in fact it is only a form of a Bratiano Government, for the President of the Council, who was Minister of War, under M. Bratiano, is bound by many ties to M. Constantinescu, who is the political shadow of M. Bratiano.

Before leaving for Buda Pesth on September 29th, I saw M. Bratiano and General Vaitoianu. Both assured me, as the King had repeatedly done, the [that?] Boumania intended to stay in the Alliance and to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Entente. The difficult point was the Minorities Treaty, to yield on which was impossible for Boumanian honour and independence, but the intention was to keep this burning question floating until the Roumanian people had pronounced upon it at a free election. I wondered what would happen if the Allies, who were perhaps less interested in the skilful moves of M. Bratiano’s internal policy, could not keep their decision waiting for the Roumanian elections, which have, I think been successively postponed since last January, and should demand a definite answer from Roumania in the near future. Neither M. Bratiano nor General Vaitoianu—who told me he absolutely accepted M. Bratiano’s foreign policy—could answer more than that a very serious situation would arise. On the other hand, both gave me the most satisfactory assurances as regards Hungary. All requisitions, beyond those of railway and war material, and food supplies for the army of occupation, had been stopped, and the Roumanian Government were most anxious, in their own interests to establish good relations with Hungary. It was only a question of finding a Hungarian Government with which both the Allies and Roumania could work in accord.

I left Bucharest on the morning of Monday, September 29th but only arrived at Buda Pesth on Wednesday morning, October 1st. I could not see the Allied Generals until the afternoon, so I visited M. Diamandy, the Roumanian High Commissioner, first. He repeated what M. Bratiano had said about the stopping of requisitions, and maintained that care had been exercised to leave the agricultural population supplies sufficient for their needs, and gave me the attached report on the supplying of Buda Pesth,¹⁷ to show what had been done for the inhabitants of the city. As regards the breaking up and removal of machinery, with the consequent loss of work and danger of disorder, he maintained that Roumania was justified in protecting herself against her enemy being able to manufacture masses of war material, and inevitably the Roumanian action was on a large scale, since practically every Hungarian factory turned out war material.

With respect to his relations with the Hungarian Government, he said that M. Friedrich would neither resign himself, nor accept colleagues in his Ministry from other political parties, so that a coalition Government, which alone gave the guarantee necessary for a free electoral choice of the Hungarian people, did not exist. M. Friedrich was, after all, the man who called the Archduke Joseph to take charge of the Government, and stood for a reactionary and anti-Roumanian policy. M. Diamandy had been much impressed, during a recent visit to Vienna, by the anxiety with which M. Renner and the Austrian Government were watching developments in Hungary. They, and to some extent he too, professedly dread reaction and a White terror.

Lastly, M. Diamandy complained that he got but little help or support from the inter-allied Mission, though he recognised that this was largely due to the fact that they were soldiers, rigidly bound by, and adhering to, certain definitely limited instructions. He could therefore never get from them any wider political consideration, but he felt that while he, whatever differences there might be amongst ourselves, always tried to maintain outwardly the solidarity of the Allies, the Generals tended to look on themselves as the protectors of the Hungarians against the Roumanian oppressor—an attitude of which the Hungarian was not slow to avail himself.

Subsequently I attended a meeting of the Commission of the four (4) Allied Generals, of which a procès-verbal is attached.¹⁸ Their instructions from the Supreme Council were:—

1. to see that the conditions of the November armistice were properly carried out;

2. to protect such Hungarian property as would form the common reparation stock of the Allies and to prevent it from being taken out of the country;

3. to organize a Hungarian police and gendarmerie.

To these instructions they have rigidly adhered, but say that they have found nothing but obstruction from the Roumanians. They cannot get Roumanian officers detailed to help them in checking requisitions, they get promises, but nothing else, of rifles wherewith to organize the police, and they live in a cloud of polite lies. In view of the Roumanian attitude, it has been impossible for them to carry out their instructions, and their position in Buda Pesth is helpless until there is either an Allied dictator, with force at his back which the Roumanians must respect, or the Roumanians evacuate. The first solution being improbable, the Generals strongly advocate immediate evacuation, the more so as they are confident that, whatever might have been the case 3 or 4 weeks ago, M. Friedrich could now keep order from the moment the Roumanians leave. But they urge strongly that they should have authority from the conference to give the amount of support, which provisional recognition by the Conference would confer, to such a Government as they, with their experience of the situation, consider adequate for a temporary administration and for preparing the elections. Such recognition would both oblige the Roumanians to loosen the bands with which they have tied the Hungarian Government hand and foot, and would enable that Government to exercise real authority and so escape having to improvise it at the last moment.

As regards the question of requisitions, the Generals consider that the Roumanians, who were at first gratefully welcomed by the Hungarian people as their saviours from the Bolsheviks, have seriously if not irretrievably, spoilt their position by the persistence, extent and stupidity of their requisitioning, and they have further lost Hungarian sympathy by the way in which they have blocked all attempts of the Hungarian Government to administer the country.

The inter-Allied Mission has accumulated a mass of evidence which it is quite impossible to ignore on the subject of requisitions. I annex to this report some of the instances which the Mission have given to me. It is believed to be true that the Roumanian Government have given official orders to stop all requisitioning of private property and is requisitioning only railway material, war material, and food-stuffs necessary for the army of occupation. Indeed, the Roumanians are actually by way of sending back into Hungary, locomotives in excess of the thousand they have already taken. Now while the Roumanian idea of “war material” is very large, if these orders were rigorously applied, the Hungarians would at least know where they stand and could make a beginning of a fresh industrial and agricultural life. But the facts carefully compiled by the inter-Allied Mission leave little doubt that in practice requisitioning of all sorts is continued. Cases brought to the notice of the Roumanian authorities such as M. Diamandy, the High Commander or General Mardarescu, the Commander-in-Chief, are indeed dealt with at once by them and an order is immediately issued for investigation, reparation, and, if necessary, punishment. But the experience of the Allied Mission is that, with the writing of the order, the matter ends and the members of the Mission have neither time nor personnel to drive the Roumanians into full investigation of the large number of cases that are reported daily. In fact, the Roumanian, who is after all a Balkan and therefore an Oriental, and who has been pillaged and looted by the enemy and by his Russian ally, sees here, in the occupation of Hungary, an opportunity which he will consider himself a lunatic to forego. From the private soldier who “requisitions” the umbrella of a passenger leaving the station, to the officer who “requisitions” a motor car or a carpet to be sold for cash to a Jew and re-sold by the latter at a higher price to its original owner, they intend to leave this country with their pockets full. The Roumanian Government, and those responsible for the conduct of its affairs do realize that Hungary, stripped bare of all necessaries of life, is entirely contrary to the interests of Roumania, and are possibly sincere in their intention to take, with a little interest, only what they consider to be their lawful property, stolen from them, and to limit their requisitions to the quantities they have laid down. But unfortunately they have neither the authority nor the energy to suppress with a rigorous hand the misdoings of their subordinates.

While it is hard to believe that the Roumanians can really have stripped the country to the extent presumed in the Memorandum of September 23rd, 1919 by the American Representatives on the Organisation Committee of the Reparation Commission¹⁹—after all, the Hungarian peasant is as good as others in hiding his possession from the looter, and the Roumanian has many more accomplished rivals in the art of looting—there is no shadow of doubt that the common property of the Allies has been diminished by Roumanian action, and that owing largely to that action, the Allies have the additional burden of helping Hungary to regain her economic existence.

I also had an interview with M. Friedrich, the head of the Hungarian Government. He is a young man, the son, I believe, of a small doctor, and not, I should say, a man of big political imagination. But he has shown strength and courage in holding on to an office which is neither lucrative nor comfortable, and he has by now probably more or less established himself in the opinion of a great mass of Hungarians. He is frankly against a coalition government, which in reality, according to him, really means giving a wholly disproportionate representation to the 8 or 10 per cent of Socialists among the workers of Buda Pesth. He admits that his strength does not lie in Buda Pesth, but claims that the country outside is wholly with him. In fact one reason why he has not resigned, in face of the impossible position in which he is kept by the Roumanians, is that, were he to do so, the peasants would see in it a Jewish manoeuvre and would start local retaliation, with fatal results. He is frankly anti-Roumanian: in fact, he is—like the leaders in all these countries in regard to their neighbors—pessimistic about the stability of all the new and aggrandized States of Southern and Central Europe, except Hungary, whose geographical position, command of the Danube, and industrial population ensure her recovery and eventual prosperity. But to recover, Hungary needs help, and M. Friedrich looks to the Western Powers to provide it. Hungary entered the war, not because she liked it nor for gain, but because in honour bound to Austria and Germany. She has lost and must pay the price, but now asks for help to win back her rightful place among the nations of Europe. For the moment, M. Friedrich does not ask the Supreme Council to grant him provisional recognition, for fear they should refuse, and thereby undermine such moral authority as he possesses. But he does ask that the Council should allow him to hold the elections, under the control and supervision of Allied officials, so that there may be no accusations of pressure or unfairness. The elections will provide a Government which Roumania cannot completely ignore, and will allow Hungary to make a beginning of her new life.

M. Friedrich further assured me that he could maintain order in Buda Pesth when the Roumanians left.

I also received a visit from M. Garami, a leader of the Social Democrat party.

He said that Hungary had two pressing needs: social quiet and order at home, and an early peace with the Allies. M. Friedrich’s Government was unable to secure one or the other. It was unrepresentative, for it included neither the commercial nor the industrial nor the working sections of the community. Its strength was among the peasants, and it represented those who belonged to the three “Christian” parties who were well under 50 per cent of the population and the majority of the territorial magnates, but it did not even include the small landholders, the strongest peasant organisation in Hungary. It was avowedly royalist, and M. Friedrich was merely keeping a place warm for the Archduke Joseph. Such a Government could not bring social quiet, nor did it correspond to the demand of the Peace Conference for a Government representing all parties. But so long as M. Friedrich was there, the way for any other Government was blocked. Therefore M. Friedrich must go.

There were two ways to effect this.

One, by a popular rising in Buda Pesth, but M. Garami, himself an avowed Social Democrat, would deplore this, for it would be a disaster for Hungary and Europe. Who could say where such a rising would end? And what would be the effect on the workers of Western Europe of the Hungarian proletariat, who had rejected Bolshevism, being driven back towards it as the only reply to the reactionary Government by which it was now replaced?

The other way, the only way, was for the Supreme Council to repeat to M. Friedrich the message they had sent to the Archduke.²⁰ It was no longer possible to be rigid about nonintervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. The principle had already been broken in the case of the Archduke, and only intervention could save Hungary now.

All classes, if they knew that the Allies’ view, as stated to the Archduke, held good for Friedrich, were ready to form a Government answering to those views. But it would want a week or ten days, and, in the absence of any international force, must therefore be done while the Roumanians were still in occupation. Otherwise, Admiral Horthy’s force would come, and the incidents of Trans-Danubia would be repeated on a larger scale in Buda Pesth, until the workers, in self-defence, brought out their hidden arms, and revolution and anarchy broke loose.

Unless Hungary got a new Government, which the Allies would accept until the elections, or unless an international gendarmerie could be created to replace the Roumanians, Hungary was doomed.

M. Garami said that in such a representative Government the workers, about 20 per cent of the population, would not insist on having their members, and would in no case accept more than two offices, provided always that the basis of the Government was republican and democratic. Moreover, if, when the elections came, and provided they were really free, the result was a majority in favour of a monarchy, the workers would loyally accept the voice of the country, though they would continue to fight the decision with all possible legal and constitutional weapons.

M. Garami’s practical proposal was that the “bourgeois” parties should visit the inter-allied Mission with a list of a coalition Government, corresponding to the demands of the Allies, for immediate communication to Paris. If the Supreme Council assented to the formation of such a provisional Government, it would come into being forthwith, provided the Roumanians were still in occupation to maintain order. The important thing was to obtain as soon as possible from the Allies a clear statement of their intentions and of how they viewed these suggestions. Otherwise, everyone in Hungary was working in the dark.

Before seeking to draw any conclusions from these various expressions of opinion and desire, I venture to submit that the general foreign policy of Roumania is also a factor that must be taken in account.

At present, the policy of M. Bratiano holds the field. That centres on refusal to accept the principle of the Minorities Treaty, and it is there that the Allies will have to apply most pressure. Their weapons are not many, and they cannot afford to dissipate them, and M. Bratiano is possibly counting on this. That is, he means to use his positions in Roumania to the utmost to extort the territorial concessions he has demanded. But if the Allies are firm, it is to be hoped that in his turn M. Bratiano will not carry his bluff so far as to break with the Allies over this Hungarian question. It would not pay him in the end.

The two problems in regard to the Hungarian question that have to be solved are:—

1. To stop the requisitions.

2. To find a Hungarian Government with which the Allies and Roumania can alike deal.

The question of requisitions has again two sides to it:—

(a) Cessation.

(b) Restoration to the Allies of their common property or its value, and to Hungary of the means to live.

As regards (a), I fear that orders from the Roumanian Government however sincerely meant, will continue to be evaded, and that evacuation is the only real remedy. But it may be expected that the Roumanians, as their time draws to a close, will increase their activities, and it may be possible to put some check on this.

There are only the two roads from Hungary to Roumania over the Szolnok and Csongrad bridges.

At present, a French and Italian officer, with half a dozen men each, are doing most useful work in checking the trains as they go over, but they have no control over the contents of sealed wagons, of which over 6,000 have been sent across. These officers are there with the consent of the Roumanian authorities, and it would seem desirable to extend the system, in collaboration with the Roumanians. The officers and personnel should be largely increased and Roumanian officers must work with them. They should have a copy of the way-bill of every train, with full authority to verify the loads, and to open and inspect sealed wagons. This would at least check and put on record the depredations that are being committed; it would facilitate the making up of the bill against the Roumanians; it would be a test of the good faith of the Roumanian Government; and it might even, by exposures and their consequences, deter some of the looters from their proceedings.

It would, of course, be even better if such a commission could unload or detach trucks containing goods that should not have been taken, but I fear that difficulties of storing, and lack of sidings, make this impractical.

I may add that M. Diamandy expressed his personal assent to this suggestion, though he could not commit his Government, but pointed out a practical objection from the delay and blocking that inspection of sealed wagons might cause. It is an objection that would have to be over-ruled.

With respect to (b), the American Representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission have, in a paper dated September 23rd, last, suggested the establishment of a Special Commission at Buda Pest to make out the bill against Roumania. So far as it goes, the proposal seems to be useful and practical, though more provisions might perhaps have been made for Roumanian collaboration. What the Roumanians feel, and feel very deeply, is that from the outset they have been pre-judged by their Allies as criminals and put into the dock. They ask for collaboration and co-operation, and, instead, are haled before the tribunal for sentence. This does not make them any more ready to sink their own interests in the common stock, and if they were treated more as Allies, who have fought and suffered, and less as criminals, things would probably go far more easily. They feel bitterly such implications as that their action alone has turned Hungary into a burden on the Allies. They ask that allowance should be made for other factors: Bolshevism, moderate harvest, the peasant’s general mistrust of the future, the general dislocation of economic life in Europe; all these are factors in the Allies’ disappointment at Hungary proving to be not self-supporting, but the whole sin is visited upon Roumania.

In any case, while the American plan provides a means for restoring common property, or its value, to the Allies, it contains no definite scheme for helping the Hungarians, though presumably it is to be inferred that the suggested Commission will study that aspect of the question, and no doubt make Roumania foot the bill. That would provide a solution, but if the Commission is to work under the Allied Generals, it will possibly be looked on by the Roumanians as absolutely anti-Roumanian, and they will continue their Oriental obstruction. The best chance is for an independent Allied and Roumanian Commission.

Even more difficult is the solution of the second problem, the discovery of a possible Hungarian Government.

I have set down, as faithfully and impartially as I can the views of those most qualified to speak. The Generals, disgusted by their experience of the Roumanians are on the whole for the recognition of M. Friedrich. The Roumanians themselves, and democratic Hungary, look sourly on Friedrich and hold that his recognition in any form by the Supreme Council would be a mortal blow to the moral influence of that body, after their action against the Archduke, for whom Friedrich is but the “Locum tenens”.

It is for the Supreme Council to decide, and it is only with the greatest deference that I put forward any suggestions.

The first point seems to me to make clearly known to Roumania what the decision of the Supreme Council is in regard to the territorial adjustments asked for by M. Bratiano. Whether these requests be granted in whole or in part or refused altogether, the Roumanian Government should be informed at once, as it will then have no motive to coquet with various Hungarian parties, in the hope of getting the concessions out of them in return for recognition as a Government, and possibly even a separate Alliance.

It is, I think, the hope of finding a more pliant Hungarian administration that is a main cause of the Roumanian objections to Friedrich and one of their principal reasons for not leaving Hungary. If the Roumanians knew that they have nothing to hope for in this respect, they might be more ready to carry out immediate evacuation. The only plea the Roumanian Government could urge for remaining would be the maintenance of order, and that could be met by insisting on the provision of sufficient arms to the Hungarian Police.

The difficulty is, however, to decide what provisional Government is to control that police force, and the choice must precede any steps that may be taken to ensure Roumanian evacuation. Though M. Garami’s fears may be exaggerated, there is force in the case he makes against M. Friedrich from the point of view of the Peace Conference. On the other hand, the Generals believe in Friedrich and Horthy, and on the evidence before them have no fear of a white terror or reactionary excesses.

But could not M. Garami’s proposal be applied to M. Friedrich first? He is, at present, opposed to widening the basis of his Ministry, but if he realised that only so could he comply with the Allies’ conditions and secure recognition, he might accede. Pressure might have to be put on the other parties to come in, but if they are really moved by patriotism, a Coalition Government should not be an impossibility.

If M. Friedrich refuses, then the support of the Supreme Council might, as suggested by M. Garami, be offered to a Coalition Government without him, which would be prepared to meet the Allies’ conditions.

There is also another alternative, which it might be worth while to consider. I believe that, technically the Upper and Lower Houses of the Hungarian Parliament have never been abolished and still have a legal existence. The two Houses (or rather these members whose seats are included within the present frontiers of Hungary) might be summoned for the purpose of adding members from other parties to the Hungarian Ministry and of appointing dates for the elections and for a plebiscite as to the form of government which Hungary is to have. The objections seem to be (a)that such a Parliament has no real relation to the political feeling of Hungary to-day, and (b)that the summons must be through the Hungarian Government and therefore provisional recognition of M. Friedrich is involved, though it would be confined to this one purpose alone.

None of these solutions may commend themselves to the Supreme Council, and other and better ones may be found, but I venture to submit the urgency of imposing some solution from the outside. On that point all parties are agreed: that Hungary can only be saved, if the Allies intervene and by their recognition of some Government, enable that Government to exert the authority necessary to preserve the country from ruin and anarchy. This is an interest of all Europe.

[Annex 1]

Note by Mr. Leeper

The Minorities Treaty

The burning question in Roumania at the present moment is that of the Minorities Treaty. It is a burning question not because the majority of Roumanians, or even of Roumanian politicians really have any practical objections to the conditions contained in the treaty, but because the Bratiano Government and its agents have misrepresented the issue and so misled and inflamed public opinion that many Roumanians are under the impression that the treaties proposed are quite different from what they really are. After the explanations which we were able to furnish to different Roumanian politicians with whom we talked, many of these misunderstandings were cleared away. The treaties with the different new States themselves have now been published in the Roumanian press, and consequently the atmosphere of ignorance prevailing about them has been to some extent dispelled. Roumanians who have discussed the matter with an open mind are quite willing now to admit the Treaty itself involves no infringement of Roumanian sovereignty or violation of Roumanian interest, and if they still object to certain clauses and articles in the Treaty, fortunately the clauses involved are precisely those which could most easily be altered or omitted without affecting the character and force of the Treaty. It is for consideration whether it would not be good policy if both in any demand addressed to the Roumanian Government relative to the signature of the Treaty, and in any communication made by the Peace Conference thereafter to the Roumanian Government, a cordial invitation were addressed to it to discuss the actual text of the Treaty, provided always that the principle of the Treaty, contained above all in Article 13, was accepted as unconditionally binding.

I went through the text of the Treaty with M. Bratiano, with the Opposition leaders, and with the Transylvanian ministers. M. Bratiano’s objections were mostly founded on a curious misunderstanding both of the object and actual text of the Treaty. He particularly protested against the economic clauses to which he ascribed the most sinister intentions but he also found fault with most of the articles of the Treaty except that automatically emancipating the Jews. He refused, in particular, to accept Article XIII, providing for the control of the League of Nations. M. Take Ionescu and General Averescu expressed themselves as perfectly ready to sign the Treaty. M. Take Ionescu declared himself wholeheartedly in favor of the economic clauses, lie considered the minority clauses as a whole as the logical consequence of the foundation of the League of Nations and as in themselves in no way prejudicial to Roumanian sovereignty and interests, and objected only to two paragraphs in the Preamble and to Articles 10, 11 and 12 which, as I have suggested above, may be quite easily removed from, the Treaty without impairing its force. The Transylvanian leaders, M. Maniu and others, were more cautious about the matter and anxious, while not like M. Bratiano refusing absolutely to sign, to obtain a preliminary discussion of the Treaty before accepting the principle.^* I have every reason to believe, however, from conversations both with them and with others who know them well, that their opposition to acceptance to the principle is most unlikely to be an obstinate one if the attitude of the Conference towards the discussion of detail is clearly shown to be a friendly and conciliatory one.

It has in our several conversations always been made perfectly clear that there can be no question of a relaxation of the principle of control by the League of Nations in favor of Roumania; that this principle has already been imposed as binding on Poland, Czechoslovakia and various enemy countries, and the Transylvanian leaders can have no possible loop-hole of excuse for hoping that more concessions will be given to them than the Conference is likely to give. In any case I feel no doubt at all that the agitation against signature of the Treaty which has been artificially inspired and kept alive would subside at once were the demand made on Roumania publicly presented in a firm but friendly fashion. The urgent necessity for prompt action on this subject can perhaps hardly be overemphasized.

Annex 2 to Sir George Clerk’s Report of October 7, 1919

interallied military mission
budapest

Budapest, October 1, 1919.

Translation

Minutes of the Session of October 1st (Afternoon)

Under the Presidency of General Mombelli

1. The Commission assembled at 4:00 p.m. to hear Sir George Clerk who having returned from Bucarest where he had been sent on a mission by the Peace Conference, was in Paris [Budapest?].

2. Sir George Clerk exposes to the four Generals the purpose and result of his mission to Bucarest.

3. The purpose may be resumed by the four following questions:

a) Has Rumania decided to remain with the Entente?

b) Is Rumania ready to cease requisitions in Hungary?

c) Will Rumania agree to have an Entente Commission regulate the distribution of the spoils taken from Hungary by the Rumanian troops?

d) Has Rumania the intention to cooperate in the establishment of a stable Government in Hungary which would be disposed to enter into friendly relations with the Entente?

4. Regarding the first question, Sir George Clerk is convinced that the Crown, the Government, as well as the political circles, are all animated with a desire to have Rumania remain faithful to the Entente.

5. Relative to the requisitions (question b) Mr. Bratiano—President of the Rumanian Council—has stated that the requisitions in Hungary would cease immediately, with the exception of those strictly necessary for the needs of the occupation troops.

6. Concerning the third question (c)Mr. Bratiano has stated that Rumania agrees that the distribution of the spoils, removed from Hungary by their troops, be settled by an Entente Commission, provided that their rights to the material removed by the enemy during the occupation of Rumania and to the spoils “captured by the Rumanian Army” be safeguarded.

7. Concerning the last question (d)Mr. Bratiano declared that Rumania is ready to give her support for the establishment in Hungary of a Government such as the Entente desires; on condition, however, that certain special rights of Rumania—which she judges of great importance—be protected.

A condition which would lend to the establishing and entertaining of friendly relations with Hungary, is that Hungary accept, and that the Entente sanction the frontier boundaries which Rumania esteems as indispensable in the protection of her economic interest and her strategical security.

Rumania requests, consequently, that within her territory be included:

(a) the mouth of the Maros, the possession of which represents an economic necessity of the first order for Rumania, as the Maros is the only navigable way leading to the center of Transylvania.

(b) The Bekescsaba railway system, which is the outlet for the entire Arad region.

(c) A tract of land to the depth of 20 kilometres to the West of the Oradeamare-Szatmar railway line, in order to insure the strategic security of the line.

8. Sir George Clerk reads a memorandum which he had sent to the Peace Conference, and in which the above mentioned questions are exposed in detail.

He afterwards calls attention to a letter which he addressed to Mr. Bratiano, in which—while reserving all decisions regarding the Rumanian provisions for the Supreme Council—the principal objections which the Supreme Council might raise are pointed out, and also the eventuality of a refusal.

9. Sir George Clerk expresses his opinion to the Commission that the Supreme Council will not accept the frontier rectifications proposed by the Rumanians. In this case the relations between Rumania and Hungary might be more difficult, and Sir George Clerk wishes to know if these relations are at the present time friendly or strained.

Following is the reply of the Commission:

The Rumanians, by their requisitions, have compromised the very favorable situation which they had created in Hungary by delivering the country from Bolshevism.

Mr. Diamandy—representing the Rumanian Government at Budapest—many times affirmed the good intentions of Rumania to establish a friendly understanding with Hungary, but this understanding was seriously impeded by the excessive requisitions which developed feelings of bitterness among the Hungarians.

It is said that Hungarian statesmen are now making advances to the Rumanians with a view to establishing an understanding, but the importance of these pourparlers is not known.

The Commission is unaware, in particular, if the question of frontier rectification was brought up. On this subject Sir George Clerk remarks that it would not be inopportune to inform the Rumanians that any decision relative to the rectification of the frontiers appertains exclusively to the Peace Conference, and that, for this reason, the responsibility for a refusal of the proposals formulated in this matter by Rumania, would in no wise devolve upon the Hungarian Government.

10. Sir George Clerk wishes to know if the Rumanians would be disposed to recognize—in accord with the Entente—the Friedrich Cabinet and to give it their support.

The Commission replies on this subject:

Under the present circumstances the Friedrich Cabinet is as good as any other. It has remained in power for more than one month and has the confidence of the agricultural masses who form the majority of the Hungarian population; it has undergone many alterations as a result of which it today presents a more liberal base. It is, however, but the continuation of a government which, having come into power by a coup d’état at the same time as the Archduke, has never given satisfaction to the Entente and which—after the abdication of the Archduke—has remained as an emanation of that source.

Furthermore, this government has evidenced reactionary tendencies, which, although exaggerated by its opponents, might nevertheless be dangerous.

Finally, the Government compromised itself with the Rumanians by clandestine organizations of armed forces which the Rumanian military command at Budapest had strictly forbidden. Consequently, the Rumanians proposed its overthrow to the Entente and, not having obtained the necessary consent, they are trying in every way to impede its action and to perhaps cause its overthrow by its political opponents to whom the Rumanian Government has granted—for the last several days—a liberty of reaction which before had been strictly forbidden them.

At the same time they refuse to support a Government which is not accepted by them and consequently continue in every fashion to hinder the formation of the police at Budapest and the reorganization of the Hungarian Army, which is absolutely indispensable to insure order in the country at the time the Rumanian troops shall decide to evacuate.

Under these circumstances the labors of the Commission of Generals becomes daily more difficult and may soon become impossible.

The Commission did not fail to inform the Supreme Council of these circumstances and proposed that it either recognize the Friedrich Cabinet or, if unable to do so, to furnish their precise intentions regarding a new Hungarian Cabinet. But the Supreme Council did not answer.

Therefore, the Commission can only wish for the sending of that answer, confirming that it is indispensable that the formation that [of?] a decent Hungarian Government be made in common agreement between the Entente and the Rumanian Government.

11. Sir George Clerk asks the Commission if, in its opinion, the Rumanians would be willing to accept the Friedrich Cabinet in case the latter declares itself ready to follow them in their intentions.

The Commission is not in a position to express an opinion on that subject.

If the Rumanians do not make the Hungarian Government responsible for a refusal on the subject of the delimitation of the future common boundary, an agreement with the Friedrich Cabinet would perhaps be facilitated.

But there would remain the difficulties represented by the presence of one Head and several members of the Cabinet who are personally compromised by their clandestine actions against the prescriptions of the Rumanian military Command.

It is therefore possible that Mr. Friedrich be accepted for lack of a better person. But even in that case, modifications in the cabinet, with the exclusion of some of the present Ministers is to be foreseen.

12. Sir George Clerk asks if, in case they had a free hand, the Four Generals would be in a position to propose the list of a new cabinet.

The Commission remarks that, according to its instructions, and since it must not intervene in the internal questions of Hungary, it has not until now given its special attention concerning the persons who might form the new cabinet.

Nevertheless, it has already had the opportunity to state to the Supreme Council that a list proposed by Mr. Heinrich would fulfil the conditions of the Entente and that, consequently, in its opinion, the Supreme Council could have given its approval. But the Supreme Council did not answer.

In the present circumstances the Commission thinks that, in agreement with the Rumanians, the composition of a fitting list would not be difficult.

13. Sir George Clerk begs the Commission to kindly deliver to him as soon as possible the minutes of the meeting so that he might draft his telegraphic information to the Supreme Council.

14. The meeting is adjourned at 17:20.

The President for the Bay, General Mornbelli

E. Mombelli

Annex 3 to Sir George Clerk’s Report of October 8 [7], 1919

Summary Report Relative to the Provisioning of the City of Budapest

1. The Rumanian Command has authorized free circulation throughout all Hungary to all agents officially entrusted by the Hungarian Ministry of Supplies. The number of these agents surpasses 1200.

In spite of these authorizations given on August 12th, the trains which run expressly for provisioning, return to Budapest almost empty.

The reason is that the agents of the Hungarian Ministry spend their time in speculating and in frauds instead of in the purchase and transportation of cereals. One proof of this is shown in the falsification of an authorization given, by hundred copies, authorizing the carrying of foodstuffs for the Hungarian functionaries of the supply Ministry, and with which the respective agents secured great quantities of foods which they did not share among the famished population, but placed in express hidden warehouses for speculation purposes.

We are annexing a copy of one of these falsified authorizations which are now being examined in the Rumanian military courts, as a proof.²²

2. All the Rumanian troop Commanders were ordered to permit and facilitate the transportation of cars and carts, as well as boats, which are being sent with foodstuffs to Budapest, and to give them priority over military transports.

3. The supply warehouses captured from the Bolshevist army have all been placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Ministry.

4. From the commencement, approval was given to have all assistance utilized in procuring foodstuffs for Budapest, with the same purpose the Rumanian Command furnished II pairs of trains daily, named “supply trains” which run in all directions and transport foodstuffs into the city.

A train schedule, such as is published in all the small stations with an aim to facilitate the task of the supply purchasing agents, is annexed hereto.²²

5. The entire region between Tisza and the Danube has been divided into administrative supply departments, under the direction of the Hungarian Department Prefects, who are directed to furnish general statistics of all the foodstuffs which remain available in their department, aside from the needs of the local population, in order that these foodstuffs may be sent to Budapest under the control of the Rumanian Command.

The Departments are further divided into sub-Departments, then into centers and sub-centers, the country people being obliged to thresh the grain with the aid of Bolshevist prisoners so that the surplus may be sent to Budapest. In this way 10–15 carloads of grain, vegetables, and other foodstuffs were sent to Budapest daily by the Rumanian army.

6. The Rumanian Command has formally prohibited all sorts of food requisitions in Budapest for the needs of the Rumanian army and it has placed the central bakery of the Hungarian army at the disposition of the city in order that bread might be obtained for the population.

7. The “Haditelmin” supply society belonging to the Hungarian supply Ministry had hidden the following meats in their local refrigerators:

50,000	kilograms	of frozen meat
20,000	“	of pork and veal
20,000	“	of salted meat

and 10 carloads of fat which was distributed by the Rumanian Command among the population.

8. 60,000 hogs in the suburbs of Budapest were placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Minister in order that 300 might be killed per day with a view to filling the needs of the population, but the Supply Ministry suspended this measure, although the hogs in question weigh more than 100 kilograms each.

9. 10,000 carloads of potatoes from the region East of Tisza were placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Ministry by the Rumanian Command, but on account of the negligence of the Ministry nothing has been transported up to the present time, although every facility possible has been offered for the execution of this transportation.—The Hungarians claim that they have not enough locomotives, but in the organization region of the Hungarian army (Szombathely) there are 500 locomotives and in spite of all the guarantees of the Rumanian Government, stating that these machines will not be requisitioned, the Hungarian authorities refuse to have these locomotives used for the transportation of foodstuffs.

10. Because the Hungarian Supply Ministry agents do not pay the farmers for the grain which they buy, they have commenced to hide all the grain in their possession by burying it or depositing it in places hidden from view.

In order to remedy this inconvenience the Rumanian Command has made arrangements to have the mills do the farmers’ grinding on condition that they pay in kind.—The wheat which is collected in this fashion, at the mills, is bought by the Rumanian Command and distributed at the same price among the population at Budapest.—Furthermore, the Rumanian Command has arranged for the paid requisition of exposed and hidden wheat by Rumanian Delegates to be later sold to the population at Budapest.

11. The Hungarian Supply Ministry forbids the purchase of wheat by individuals and permits these purchases by the local supply society of the Ministry only, but the retail sale of the wheat flour is untrammelled. This society speculates largely as a result of this privilege, in such a way that the flour is sold in retail in numerous stores of the capital at a price of 25 kronen a kgr.

The Rumanian Command intervened to permit the free sale of grain and flour by anyone, which has certainly helped greatly to prevent speculations.

12. In order to assist the population of Budapest the Rumanian Command requested the Government and Rumanian G. H. Q. to sell the surplus grain in Rumania to the Hungarians.

13. The Rumanian Command has authorized, and has given orders to this effect, the Rumanian troops to facilitate by every possible means the transportation of every sort of combustible [comestible?] by railway and in carts. Furthermore, the Rumanian Command has permitted Hungary to export her wine and to receive in exchange any nature of foodstuffs.

14. The Rumanian Command has never refused any request of the Hungarian Supply Ministry. On the contrary, they have tried to facilitate the labors of this Ministry and have given their entire assistance in the provisioning of Budapest. Unfortunately, they are forced to affirm with regret that instead of facilitating the provisioning of the population the Ministry in question tolerated the most flagrant speculation, and that furthermore the excessively precarious situation of the city concerning supplies is the direct result.

15. From the occupation of the city of Budapest by the Rumanian troops, these troops, in their ardent desire to assist the poor population and in order to protect them from certain famine, established 14 canteens for the poor where the children and aged daily receive free nourishment.

The Rumanian Command possess photographs of these canteens taken at the time of the distribution. They also possess a great number of letters of thanks sent by the mayors, city authorities and individuals in Budapest, in which the gratitude of these people is expressed for the large heartedness of the Rumanians in these days of famine.

16. Furthermore, each troop corps nourishes a great number of poor, especially children; each soldier has from one to three guests daily which he nourishes from his own allowance. The Rumanian Command is in possession of photographs confirming this.

17. The Budapest hospital patients were suffering the blackest misery on account of hunger and want at the time of entry of the Rumanian troops. The Rumanian Command immediately took the necessary measures to abolish this state of affairs. They distributed among the hospitals the foodstuffs captured from the Bolshevist army as well as other supplies brought to the city by the Rumanian troops themselves. A few days after the installation of our troops in Budapest, thanks to the cares above referred to, the situation of the hospitals has become normal.

18. When the Rumanian Command became definitely convinced of the poor faith of the Hungarian official supply organizations, they nominated special delegates from the Rumanian army whose mission was to collect foodstuffs, transport and distribute them among the population. Our delegates received precious aid from the English supply Commission under Colonel Cope.

19. As a result of the lack of foodstuffs in Budapest the Rumanian Command arranged for the reservation of 40 communes, in the surrounding district, for city supplies alone and forbade all army requisitions in the territory of these communes.

20. Despite the repeated and precise orders which the Rumanian Command issued and published, totally forbidding transports from leaving Budapest, persons engaged in contraband with written authorization of the Hungarian Supply Ministry were discovered in the action of clandestinely sending out great quantities of foodstuffs with a view to increasing the heavy task of the Rumanian Command and to favor an extended speculation.

Appendix H to HD–67

american representatives
on the organization committee
of the reparations
commission

September 23, 1919.

Memorandum—The Hungarian Situation and the Effect of Roumanians Appropriation of Valoes and Property in Hungary on the Other Interested Allied and Associated Powers

Roumania has removed values and property from Hungary far in excess of her individual equity under the reparation and other policies laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers. Roumania has forcibly effected monetary exchanges in Hungary to her own benefit disregarding the reparation equity of her Allies in these same benefits. It results that Roumania has appropriated values and property belonging to Italy, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and other interested Powers. The latter, therefore, have just claim against Roumania for compensation.

Roumania is reported to have stripped Hungary of all its seed grain, live stock, agricultural machinery, etc., with the result that the supplying of the minimum needs of the Hungarian population will shortly have to be borne by Roumania’s Allies at considerable sacrifice and financial cost to their respective Governments and peoples. It would, of course, have been to the joint interest of all the Allies had sufficient seed grain, live stock, agricultural machinery, etc., been left in Hungary to take care of the minimum requirements of these people.

A substantial surplus of foodstuffs existed in Roumania, even before her appropriation of Hungarian foodstuffs. Under the ordinary working of the laws of supply and demand, Roumania is now in that curious position whereby she alone will benefit by supplying foodstuffs to her Allies (particularly Czecho-Slovakia and Poland), from stocks in which her Allies had a joint ownership. A similar situation with corresponding effects occurs in the case of many other classes of property similarly appropriated by Roumania.

A portion of this same surplus foodstuff must go to Austria which is faced with a serious shortage in foodstuff for the coming year. The Supreme Council has decided, and the same intent is written in the Austrian Peace Treaty, that the “first preoccupation” of the Reparations Commission in Austria is to set up finance to meet the minimum needs of the Austrian population during the coming year. The curious analogy is therefore presented of the Reparations Commission setting up finance, at the expense of Roumania’s Allies, for the purchase of foodstuffs and other property which they in fact own in common with Roumania but for [from?] which Roumania alone will benefit.

The Allied and Associated Powers will shortly have to give the Reparations Commission with reference to Hungary, the similar “first preoccupation”, they have already given it with reference to Austria. This would not have been necessary had Roumania awaited the orderly workings of the Reparations Commission in securing her reparations. However, by her systematic stripping of Hungary, without preoccupation as to leaving the minimum necessities for the Hungarian population during the coming year, Roumania has improperly thrown this burden on her Allies. A similar curious analogy occurs in this case as already exposed in the Austrian case. In the Austrian case, however, the minimum necessities of the population did not exist. In the Hungarian case these necessities which actually existed in Hungary and which were appropriated by Roumania must now be replaced by necessities provided at the expense of the latter’s Allies.

Roumania has taken values and property out of Hungary without the prior agreement or approval of her Allies and without their representation at the time of removal. Therefore, there exists no basis for determining which if any of these were due Roumania under the adopted policy providing for “restitution of cash, animals, objects of every nature and securities seized and sequestrated” “which prove possible of identification”. Under these circumstances and for accounting purposes, it is only possible at this time to assume that none of these come within the “restitution” categories and, therefore the full valuation of all must be charged to Roumania on her various reparation accounts. What part or parcel of these values or property now in Roumania as come within the definition of “restitution” consequently rests on Roumania to prove before the Reparations Commission before these charges can be properly cancelled.

As Roumania similarly failed to consider the interests of her Allies when taking over values and property not coming within the “restitution” categories, which she presumably considered to be her reparation equity, its valuation and the determination of the respective allies’ reparation equities, including Roumania’s can now alone be determined and reported to the Reparations Commission by the other interested allies.

A proposal, today, on the part of Roumania to abide, in the future, by the terms of her engagements with the Allied and Associated Powers could not be accepted as an equitable solution of this matter. An agreement to any such proposal would be to the sole interest of Roumania with an entire disregard of the other Allied interests, as such agreement could only be construed as a “quitclaim” or approval of all Roumania’s appropriations of Hungary’s values and property to date. Any agreement entered into today with Roumania should be predicated upon her admission of the right of her allies to make a joint inquiry into what has happened in the past and to fix their own and Roumania’s interests in all Hungarian values and property in the manner hereinafter set forth.

It is therefore, suggested that the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission recommend to the Supreme Council the early adoption of the following resolutions:

• First: That a Special Commission, including representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers having property and financial interests in Hungary under the Reparation clauses, which interests have been either partially or wholly appropriated by Roumania, be established at once in Budapest for the purpose of listing and valuing the property removed by Roumania in contravention of Roumania’s engagements with her allies and in contravention of the direct and specific instructions of the Supreme Council.
• Second: That this Special Commission will establish the value of the various Allies’ equities in Hungarian values and property appropriated by the Roumanians, in accordance with the reparation policies adopted by the Allied and Associated Governments, and that these values will be at once reported to the Committee on Organization of the Reparations Commission, so that upon the establishment of the Reparations Commission, they may be appropriately entered against the Roumanian accounts, under the various treaties of peace which have or are to be formulated.
• Third: That this Special Commission investigate and report to the Supreme Council the fiscal or other effect on Roumania’s Allies of Roumania’s appropriation of foodstuffs, grain seeds, live stock, agricultural machinery, etc., with reference to its effect on future purchases by them of Roumanian food and other surpluses and the similar direct or indirect effect of Roumania’s action so far as it affects benefits accruing to Roumania’s Allies from Austrian and Hungarian reparations.
• Fourth: That this Special Commission is empowered to give proper credit to Roumania for values and property returned to Hungary up until the time of the closing out of its operations and to make appropriate cancellations on this account on reports submitted to the Supreme Council or to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, as provided for in the preceding paragraphs.

It is recommended that the proposed Special Commission include representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers and representation of Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland and that these Powers be requested to at once designate their representatives on this Commission and to send them to Budapest accompanied by such accountants, statisticians, etc., as they may consider necessary, for the first meeting of the Special Commission which should be held at Budapest September 28, 1919.

It is further recommended that Chairmanship of the Commission rotate from day to day as between the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers represented on it.

In view of the existing political situation in Hungary, it is recommended that for the time being this Special Commission be subordinated to the Allied Commission of Generals now in Budapest.

Appendix I to HD–67

[Despatch of a Sub-Committee to Budapest To Determine the Reparation Value of Material Removed From Hungary by the Rumanians]

Proposed Resolution

[Submitted by Mr. Polk]

• First: That a Special Commission composed of a Delegate from each of the Powers represented on the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, be established at Budapest without delay. The Presidency of this Special Commission should be held at each meeting by each of the Delegates in turn; the Secretary should be permanent. There should be added to this Special Commission for the purpose of consultation following the nature of the subject dealt with, representatives of the neighboring States who have reparation interests in Hungary, viz:—Roumania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia.
• Second: That this Special Commission should proceed without delay in listing all values and property removed from Hungary by any of the Allied and Associated Powers in contravention of the reparation policies laid down in the various Treaties of Peace.
• Third: That this Special Commission will establish the values on the lists provided for in the Second paragraph and will forward the lists so prepared without delay to the Committee on Organization of the Reparations Commission, so that upon the establishment of the Reparations Commission the values so reported may be appropriately entered on the reparation accounts under the various Treaties of Peace which have or are to be formulated.
• Fourth: That this Special Commission is empowered to cancel or propose to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission for cancellation, any charges raised in accordance with the provisions of the Second and Third paragraphs of this resolution for values and property restored to Hungary up until the time of the closing of this Special Commission’s operations.
• Fifth: That this Special Commission should investigate and report to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission or the Reparations Commission, the direct or indirect financial effect on Allied and Associated Governments, individually or collectively, by individual acts on the part of any of these Governments who have appropriated values or property in Hungary. In making this report the Special Commission will include their recommendation as to the compensatory adjustment of the various reparation accounts that should be made by the Reparations Commission on this account.

1. HD–56, minute I, p. 255.
2. Minute 1, p. 505.
3. Appendix A to HD–66, p. 517.
4. Minute 2, p. 506.
5. HD–22, minute 7, vol. vii, p. 486.
6. For previous discussion concerning the establishment of an international commission, see HD–66, minute 2, p. 506.
7. Minute 5, vol. vii, p. 791.
9. Franz Heinrich, Hungarian Minister of Commerce, August 18 to September 12, 1919.
10. Julius H. Peidl, Hungarian Socialist Leader; Prime Minister, August 1 to August 6, 1919.
11. Appendix A to HD–66, p. 517.
12. Appendix E to HD–62, p. 419.
13. HD–22, minute 7, vol. vii, p. 486.
14. Vol. ii, p. 11.
16. Appendix E to HD–47, p. 111.
17. Annex 3, p. 566.
18. Annex 2, p. 562.
19. Appendix H, p. 570.
20. Appendix C to HD–32, vol. vii, p. 709.
21. Two days after our conversations with Mr. Maniu an obviously inspired article appeared in the official Transylvanian organ headed “We wish to treat”. It obtained considerable prominence in the Roumanian press. [Footnote in the original.]
22. Does not accompany the minutes.
22. Does not accompany the minutes.