Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/66


Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, October 7, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

  • Present
    • America, United States of
      • Hon. F. L. Polk
    • Secretary
      • Mr. L. Harrison
    • British Empire
      • Sir Eyre Crowe
    • Secretary
      • Mr. H. Norman
    • France
      • M. Pichon
    • Secretaries
      • M. Dutasta
      • M. de St. Quentin
    • Italy
      • M. Scialoja
    • Secretary
      • M. Barone Busso
    • Japan
      • M. Matsui
    • Secretary
      • M. Kawai
Joint Secretariat
America, United States of Mr. C. Russell
British Empire Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
France M. Massigli
Italy Lieut, de Carlo,
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

  • America, United States of
    • Mr. E. L. Dresel
    • Colonel Logan
    • Colonel Browning
  • British Empire
    • General Sackville-West
    • General Mance
    • General Groves
    • Lt. Col. Kisch
    • Major Money
    • Mr. Ibbetson-James
    • Mr. Forbes-Adam
    • Mr. Herbert-Brown
  • France
    • Marshal Foch
    • M. Loucheur
    • General Weygand
    • M. Laroche
  • Italy
    • General Cavallero
    • M. Brambilla.

[Page 505]

1. (The Council had before it the Note of the German Government of October 3rd (See Appendix “A”).)

Marshal Foch said that he thought the members of the Council had already taken note of the contents of the German Note. The German Government protested its good faith and asked for the appointment of a mixed Commission which should take the necessary steps to effect a speedy evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. He proposed that a reply be made stating that the Allied and Associated Governments were willing to work with Germany, but this must not be interpreted as meaning that they were willing to relieve Germany of her responsibilities. The Allied and Associated Governments agreed to the appointment of a mixed Commission, but maintained the view that this Commission should be particularly charged with seeing that the German Government took the necessary steps to guarantee the evacuation. This method of procedure seemed to him all the more necessary, because the German Government had enumerated a series of steps which it had taken, which were in fact only half steps. The Commission would be charged with seeing that the promises, which had been made to the Allied and Associated Governments, were kept. On the other hand, it was to be understood that, if the results were not forthcoming, these Governments would be obliged to put into effect the means of coercion which had been decided upon. Reply to the Note of the German Government Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

Mr. Polk said that he fully agreed with Marshal Foch. He asked whether the German Government had up to the present paid the troops in question. If this was in fact the case it created a ridiculous situation. He was not surprised that the German Government paid these troops, but he was very much surprised that they confessed to the fact so openly.

Marshal Foch said that the Germans not only continued to pay the troops in question but they also were supplying them constantly with provisions of every kind.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he approved of Marshal Foch’s proposals. He desired to add that he thought it necessary to state in the reply to Germany that the Allied and Associated Governments were not satisfied with the explanation which had been made. It was important to point out that the recall of General von der Goltz had been demanded three times and that it was only now that such a step had been decided upon by the German Government. The German reply was drafted to a great extent for public opinion at home and for purposes of propaganda, and for this reason the Allied and Associated Governments were also entitled to state their views fully. He had just received a telegram from the British Mission at Riga, dated the 4th October, and consequently despatched after the German Note had been transmitted. The telegram pointed out that movements of German troops [Page 506] in the direction of Jacobstadt were continually being reported. There was not a single sign to indicate that evacuation was contemplated. In the neutral zone to the east, the Germans had been replaced by Russians, and finally General von der Goltz had assumed a most threatening attitude towards the Letts.

M. Pichon suggested that Marshal Foch should be requested to draft a reply to the German Government taking note of the remarks made by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe. He considered it important to point out to the Germans that the Allied and Associated Governments held them entirely responsible for what had occurred.

Marshal Foch said that the appointment of a Commission did not raise particular difficulties; the Commission existed in fact in the form of the Inter-Allied Mission, at the head of which General Gough had been placed. General Gough, however, was no longer at Riga, and it would therefore be necessary to place an energetic officer at the head of the Commission. He wished to ask from what army the Council desired that the officer in question should be chosen.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British Government would have no objection to the appointment of a French General.

M. Pichon suggested that Marshal Foch submit his views to the Council on the following day.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Germans had asked in their Note that the means of economic pressure decided upon by the Allied and Associated Government[s] be abandoned. He desired to express the hope that in the Note which Marshal Foch was about to prepare, it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures in question would only be suspended when the Commission had submitted satisfactory reports.

It was decided:

that Marshal Foch should present to the Supreme Council at its next meeting the draft of a reply to the Note from the German Government of the 3rd October, respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, in which Marshal Foch should take into consideration the views expressed by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe.

2. (The Council had before it a memorandum from the British Delegation of the 30th September, 1919 (See Appendix “B”).)

General Weygand read and commented upon this memorandum. He said that there was first the general question of policy to be decided. The Supreme Council in a resolution taken on the 2nd August1 had said that the German Government should be given full liberty in regard to the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war and that the Allied and Associated Governments would not intervene either [Page 507] in the repatriation or in the maintenance of these prisoners. The resolution in question had not been sufficiently far-reaching. Marshal Foch had pointed out in a number of notes addressed to the Conference, that serious difficulties might arise, if the Allied and Associated Governments abandoned all control and left the field entirely open to German action. He had pointed out that without undertaking the entire control, it would be possible to appoint an International Commission upon which there would be, in addition to representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, German and Russian representatives. This would create a means of dealing with German manoeuvres. It would be a simple matter to organize such a Commission in view of the fact that there were already officers at Berlin, who were dealing with the question. The Germans could easily appoint a representative, but insofar as the Russians were concerned, the question was somewhat delicate, for it might perhaps be difficult to find a man who was not affiliated with a particular faction. If the Council decided to appoint such an International Commission, that Commission could be directed to liquidate the routine matters which required action and which had been mentioned in the memorandum of the British Delegation. Maintenance and Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the Council should decide as to the questions of principle and leave it to the Commission to insure their application. If the Commission were left too much to itself, its first act would undoubtedly be to address a new report to the Supreme Council. It would therefore be necessary to give full directions.

General Weygand agreed, and said that this matter could be dealt with in the instructions to be prepared for the Commission. In reply to a question asked by Mr. Polk, he stated that the Commission would sit in Berlin.

Mr. Polk said that he agreed in principle, but that so far as he was concerned, there was a difficulty in regard to detail. General Harries, who had been the head of the American Mission at Berlin, had left, and the officer who would be appointed would necessarily be without information on the subject.

General Weygand said that the questions for the Commission to decide were chiefly of a financial nature, and which financial representatives could study at Paris. It would be sufficient if an officer, who was informed as to the questions, such as Colonel Kisch, could supply the necessary information. There was one question, however, which was somewhat delicate, and that related to the refugees from Kieff. The Germans maintained that the Allies had guaranteed the maintenance in Germany of four hundred Russians who had left Kieff with the German troops in order to escape the Bolshevists. The German Government added that their action had been taken at the request of the Entente. The amount expended amounted to about two millions. [Page 508] So far as the French authorities were concerned, they were without information as to the action which the Germans claimed had been taken by the Allies.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British Government were equally without information in regard to the matter.

(It was decided:

that Marshal Foch should present to the Council at its next meeting a draft resolution respecting the organization of an International Commission to deal with the maintenance and repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.)

3. (The Council had before it a note from the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission of the 27th September, 1919. (See Appendix C.))

M. Loucheur read and commented upon the proposals of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. He said that the proposal was most urgent, particularly in view of the fact that the situation became worse each day. He wished most strongly to urge that the principle of the appointment of the subcommission should be approved upon that day and that the members of the commission should be ready to act at the earliest possible moment. Organization at Vienna of a Subcommission of The Organizing Committee of The Reparations Commission

(It was decided:

that a subcommission of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission should be ‘established at Vienna at the earliest possible moment to study the questions relating to the revictualing of Austria;
that this subcommission should be composed of a delegate from each of the Powers represented on the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. The presidency of the subcommission should be held at each meeting by each of the delegates in turn; the secretary should be permanent. There should be added to the subcommission for purposes of consultation and following the nature of the subjects dealt with, representatives of the States bordering upon Austria: Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Hungary;
that the subcommission should determine the foodstuffs and raw materials needed by Austria and ascertain all the available means of developing the greatest amount of production in Austria itself;
that the subcommission should examine and propose the means which should appear best to facilitate and to guarantee the delivery and transport from the countries bordering upon Austria of such merchandise as was necessary as well as the payment by Austria to its vendors. The subcommission should see to it that its views were adopted by all the interested states.

It was also decided:

that the subcommission should be established at Vienna by a member of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission, who [Page 509] should present his credentials from the Supreme Council to Dr. Renner.)

4. (The Council had before it the draft of a telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission (See appendix “D”).)

M. Loucheur read and commented upon this telegram. He said that he proposed to add at the end of the text an appeal to the good will of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments. Telegram to the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments Respecting the Supply of Coal to Austria

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to call the attention of the Council to the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph of the text in which the words, “tout retard nouveau a partir de ce jour devra être ratrappé dans le délai minimum”.2 This phrase appeared unnecessary on account of the difficulty of execution and he proposed that it be omitted.

It was decided:

to transmit the telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission (See appendix “D”) to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and to the Government of the Polish Republic;
to omit in the telegram the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph.

It was further decided:

that M. Loucheur should add to the text a supplementary paragraph appealing to the good-will of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments.

5. (The Council had before it a telegram addressed to General Haking by the British Delegation at Paris (See appendix “E”).)

M. Loucheur said that he did not agree with the European Coal Commission, which had brought to the attention of the Council with a favorable recommendation, the telegram addressed to General Haking, which had embodied a suggestion made by M. Paderewski. Despatch of Allied Officers to Upper Silesia To Insure the Normal Output of Coal

He thought that the despatch of a large number of officers to Upper Silesia would provoke serious difficulties on the part of the Germans.

M. Pichon said that he agreed with the view expressed by M. Loucheur.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that his experts were not convinced that the despatch of a Commission of Officers would have the practical results which had been anticipated.

Mr. Polk said that Colonel Goodyear, who had come from Upper Silesia, thought that it would serve a useful purpose to send a Commission composed of a small number of members. The despatch of [Page 510] such a Commission would make it possible to obtain definite information as to the situation in the mines. General Dupont shared this opinion.

M. Loucheur said that if it were possible to send a representative of each of the Powers, the Allied Missions at Berlin could be directed to take the necessary steps, and it would be understood that the Commission would be under the orders of the Missions at Berlin, but it should also keep in close touch with the Coal Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau.

Mr. Polk said that the American Delegation would be obliged to send one of its representatives from the Coal Commission at Paris. He wished to mention this fact simply as a matter of detail.

It was decided:

to despatch to Upper Silesia a sub-commission composed of a Representative of the United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy to insure the normal output of coal;
that the members of this Commission, with the exception of the American Representative, should be chosen by the Chiefs of the Entente Missions at Berlin from among the officers attached to these Missions;
that the Commission should be placed under the orders of the Military Representative of the Entente at Berlin.

It was further decided:

that the Commission should keep in touch with the Coal Commission at Mahrisch-Ostrau.

6. (The Council had before it a proposal made by Colonel Logan to the European Coal Commission (See Appendix “F”).)

M. Loucheur read and commented upon Colonel Logan’s proposal. He thought that the distribution of Austro-Hungarian rolling stock ought not to be delayed any longer than necessary. It the transports had been suspended and traffic was practically interrupted, it was not because the material was lacking, but because the distribution of this material had not yet been made. Article 318 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria called for the formation of a special Commission to deal with this redistribution. He proposed that the Commission called for by Article 318 be appointed at the present time and that it should act in a provisionary character until the Treaty came into force. Commission Charged With the Provisionary Re-Distribution of the Rolling Stock of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

M. Pichon said that he saw a difficulty in view of the fact that the Treaty called for the presence on the Commission of a Representative of the Hungarian State Eailways.

M. Loucheur said that the draft resolution prepared by Colonel Logan tended to appoint a new Commission. It would be preferable [Page 511] to appoint a permanent Commission immediately, specifying that it would act at present with only a temporary character.

Mr. Polk said that, with reference to M. Pichon’s objection, he proposed that the Commission be constituted in accordance with the proposal of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission approved by the Supreme Council on the 29th July,3 and that the Hungarian Representative, who should be chosen from the Hungarian State Railways, be named by the Allied Generals at Budapest.

It was decided:

to appoint in advance a Commission of experts to deal with the re-distribution of the rolling stock as prescribed by Article 318 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria;
that the Hungarian Representative attached should be appointed by the Allied Generals at Budapest from the staff of the Hungarian State Railways;
that upon the appointment of the Commission, instructions should be given to the President in a sense of the resolution prepared by Colonel Logan (See Appendix “F”).

7. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation of the 3d October (See appendix “G”).)

Sir Eyre Crowe said that when the Council had decided on the 23d September4 to fix the amount of the allowances for the President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany as well as for the Presidents of the sub-commissions, they had forgotten to fix the amount of the allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control. He thought that the three Presidents of the Commissions of Control should be placed upon the same footing and be given the same allowances. Allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany

Mr. Polk said that he had spoken to General Bliss in regard to the matter and that the latter had expressed surprise that the resolution had been adopted in that form. He (Mr. Polk) had just returned to Paris and was not in a position to make a reply at the moment, but he would communicate his answer to the Secretariat-General later on.

The Proposal of the British Delegation was accepted on the understanding that Mr. Polk would communicate his reply as soon as possible.

8. M. Laroche said that the decision of the Supreme Council to hold a plebiscite at Teschen5 had been communicated to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments. In accordance with Nomination the terms of this decision, the plebiscite was to be held within a period of three months after notification. It was therefore most urgent that a Commission [Page 512] should be appointed. He wished to add that it was important that the Commissioners should leave at as early a date as possible in order to put an end to the unrest which was showing itself in the Duchy. Nomination of a Teschen Commission

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he had telegraphed his Government but, probably on account of the recent disturbances in England, he had received no reply.

Mr. Polk said that he had also received no reply up to the present.

M. Scialoja said that the Italian Government, in view of the fact that the resolution of the Supreme Council, did not make it obligatory to change their representative on the Teschen Commission, had thought it advisable to appoint their present representative at Teschen.

M. Pichon said that he was informed that the authorities at Prague were most desirous that the Inter-Allied Commission should be composed of new members. The question was an important one for the Czecho-Slovak Government in view of the demonstrations which had been made against it within the course of the last few weeks. He believed that the wishes of the Czecho-Slovak Government should be met in this matter.

M. Laroche said that the French Representative would be M. de Manneville, Minister Plenipotentiary.

M. Scialoja said that if the other Powers appointed new representatives the Italian Government would do the same.

M. Laroche said that it was further necessary to arrange for the Military occupation of the Duchy; it was an urgent matter, but the Council would have to await the reply of the British Government on the general question of the constitution of the forces which were to undertake Inter-Allied occupations.

(The Council decided to postpone the discussion of the question until the American and British Representatives had received instructions from their Governments.)

9. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated the 2nd October, 1919 (See Appendix “H”).)

Sir Eyre Crowe read and commented upon the note presented by the British Delegation of the 2nd October. He recalled that General Milne had been asked by the Supreme Council to fix a line which neither the Turks nor the Greeks should pass.6 The General had gone to the spot. He thought that the present line could not be held. It was necessary for the Greeks either to advance or retreat. If they advanced they could not avoid a conflict with the [Page 513] Turks. The Greeks were aware of this fact. General Milne thought that it would be possible to advance the line, but in this event, it would be necessary to take armed resistance into consideration. General Milne had summarized the situation in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the Note which was before the Council. Before M. Venizelos had left Paris he had been sounded as to whether he was willing to accept a withdrawal of the Greek line under the conditions fixed by General Milne. M. Venizelos appeared to be willing to agree, but upon condition that a withdrawal in the region of Aidin should call for occupation of the territories evacuated by the Greeks by Interallied contingents. Limitation of Greek and Italian Zones Of Military Occupation in Asia Minor

General Cavallero said that from a military point of view he had no objection to the proposals of General Milne as a whole. He objected only to these proposals which dealt with the southern part of the line held by the Greeks. General Milne appeared to desire a withdrawal in the region of Aidin. From a military point of view, this proposal was the better one, because the situation of the Greeks at Aidin was precarious, and, if it were to be improved, a conflict with the Turks was inevitable. He wished also to state that the line drawn on the map annexed to the British report7 did not entirely correspond to the conclusions of the report. So far as the occupation of the valley of the Meander was concerned, he thought the proposals contained in the fourth paragraph of the British Note did not quite agree with the terms of General Milne’s report. There was in this report nothing to show that the actual line of demarcation should continue to form the northern limit of the Italian occupation. If the valley of the Meander was to be occupied by Allied troops it was natural that the occupation should be effected by Italian troops, in view of the fact that they were on the spot, and also as the refugees from the region of Aidin were concentrated in the territories occupied by the Italian troops, it would be easy for the Italians to return them to their homes. The character of the Italian soldier was such as to make incidents impossible. The Italian soldier lived on good terms with the local population and this was a guarantee that the occupation could be made under the best conditions.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the proposals contained in the British Note were based upon General Milne’s report. There was no reason for believing that the General had thought of advancing the Italian line. He knew an agreement had been made between the Greeks and the Italians; an agreement approved by the Supreme Council in regard to the limits of the respective zones of occupation.8 He wished to state, with all due deference to the Italian Government and its military authorities, [Page 514] that he did not feel that the idea of replacing Greek troops by Italian troops would meet the situation. If the Greek withdrawal were followed by an Italian advance, he feared that the effect would be disastrous from a Greek point of view. The proposal to which M. Venizelos had finally agreed looked to a Franco-British occupation. Such an occupation seemed possible of realization, but if the Greeks learned that they were to be replaced by Italians the situation would be worse than at present.

General Cavallero said that in examining the resolution taken by the Supreme Council on the 18th July, he did not see that it was a question of defining a neutral zone nor that any similar definition was necessary.

M. Pichon said that the reasons given by Sir Eyre Crowe appeared to him most grave. If the Italian proposal were accepted there was great danger that the end which the Council sought, which was the pacification of the region, would not be achieved.

M. Scialoja said that so far as the pacification of the region was concerned experience was in the favor of the Italians. There would be no complaint from the Turkish populations in the region of the Italian occupation. He ventured also to remark that the line of the 18th July was a line of demarcation between the Greeks and the Italians. If the Greeks were no longer there, it would be natural, to establish contact, for the line to go farther north. The Greeks would have no reason to complain. It would be possible to hear the Greeks first or to postpone the settlement of the question until an agreement with them had been reached.

Mr. Polk asked what would be the result if the line were moved farther east.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked the Council to put themselves in the place of the Greek Government. At M. Clemenceau’s request, M. Venizelos had endeavored to reach an agreement with M. Tittoni. If M. Scialoja’s proposal were now adopted, the Council would appear to be taking sides with the Italians against the Greeks without having consulted the latter, and would also be failing in their engagements. So far as he was concerned, he could not associate himself with such a course.

Mr. Polk said that he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe. The Greeks would be put in a humiliating situation, because a line of agreement had already been fixed with them.

M. Scialoja said that if the principle of Interallied occupation of the neutral zone were adopted it would have to be understood that an Italian contingent would form part of the army of occupation. He recalled that the refugees from Aidin had been placed under the protection of Italian troops.

[Page 515]

M. Pichon said that he saw no reason to object to this proposal.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that in taking this action the Council would be precipitating difficulties which would inevitably provoke trouble between the Italians and the Greeks. The Council had assumed obligations towards the Greeks because they had asked them to go to Smyrna. He asked whether any similar resolution had been made requesting the Italians to go to Asia Minor.

M. Scialoja said that there had been a resolution of the 18th July which, by fixing a line between the Italians and Greeks, had recognized the principle of Italian occupation.

Mr. Polk said that the Council had testified to an occupation in fact, but he did not believe that they had accepted the principle of Italian occupation.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that General Milne had only been instructed to fix a line of demarcation.

M. Scialoja said that all occupation was occupation in Asia Minor and occupation in fact and did not constitute a definite right. For the moment he held that Italian occupation had been recognized.

Mr. Polk said that he had heard nothing to the effect that Italian occupation had ever been recognized. The Council, in fixing a line of demarcation, had never sanctioned Italian occupation. It had only been a question of avoiding conflict.

(He then read the resolution of the 18th July (See H. D. 10, Minute 4).)

M. Scialoja said that this resolution constituted a virtual recognition, particularly because of the fact that the line of demarcation had been communicated to the Turkish Government in the name of the Conference. The Italian troops were in Asia Minor in the name of the Conference.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that if M. Scialoja should insist upon this declaration being inserted in the proces-verbal he would be obliged to make a formal reservation. His Government had undoubtedly never recognized Italian occupation.

M. Pichon said that the Council had to pronounce upon a definite proposition. The question was in what manner the zone between the line drawn in accordance with the resolution of the 18th July and with the new line, which General Milne proposed, should be held by the Greeks. He asked whether the territory was to be occupied by Inter-Allied troops, which should include Italian representatives. It must be understood that the Inter-Allied occupation of the new zone could not have the effect of sanctioning the situation created by the landing of Italian troops in Asia Minor.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to add that General Milne advocated the representation of Greek troops in the army of occupation [Page 516] of the zone which they were about to evacuate. It was, in effect, the Greeks who were retiring from a territory to which they had gone with the approval of the Conference.

M. Pichon asked whether it would be possible to send Italian troops as well to this zone.

Mr. Polk said that he was ready to refer the matter to his military advisers, but he could not consent to this arrangement if it meant that the present position of the Italians in Asia Minor was to be recognized. The situation would then be quite different. The presence of Italian troops had never been recognized as resulting from a mandate given by the Conference.

M. Pichon said that it would be possible to state in the decision that the steps which the Council proposed to take should in no way prejudice the final decision. The question now was to decide if the Inter-Allied Army of occupation should contain Greek troops and no Italian troops, if the occupation should be truly Inter-Allied and if, at the side of the American, British and French troops, Italian and Greek troops would be represented.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he thought that he should make his point of view more definite. The Greeks were in occupation. They were being asked to retire for military reasons, to stop their advancing in order to avoid conflict with the Turks. M. Venizelos had said, that the Greek troops should be left where they were, but should be joined by British and French units. This would be sufficient to prevent the Turks from attacking. He asked just what the Council desired; whether it was to prevent the Turks from attack and nothing else. If the situation were complicated in allowing the Italians to enter the Inter-Allied Army, new difficulties would be created. The very fact of putting Italian and Greek troops in contact would place them on the verge of an incident.

M. Pichon said that he recognized the weight of the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe and that he was in agreement with him.

M. Scialoja said that he too would agree.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to take the occasion to express to his Italian colleague his thanks for the conciliatory attitude which he had adopted. There was another matter about which he desired to speak. He did not wish any doubt to exist as to the position of General Milne. General Milne had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in Asia Minor by a decision of the Supreme Council.9 It appeared, however, that the French authorities at Constantinople were unwilling to recognize this situation. They stated that they had received no instructions on the subject. It might be possible to inform them of the decisions of the Conference.

[Page 517]

M. Pichon said that there was no question but that General Milne was in command in Asia Minor. As to the question of the command at Constantinople, that was another matter, and had formed the subject of negotiations between the British and French Governments, and an agreement had been reached in regard to the matter in the month of December last. He asked that Sir Eyre Crowe should permit him to consult with M. Clemenceau, who was Minister of War, in regard to the matter before any actions were taken.

It was decided:

to accept the proposals made by General Milne in his telegraphic report to the Supreme Council (See Appendix “H”);
that in the sector of Aidin the southern limit of the zone of Greek occupation should be changed to a line running to the northeast along the frontier of the sandjak of Smyrna to a point where this line intersects the said frontier;
that the zone between the line established by the decision of the Supreme Council of the 18th July and the new line (frontier of the Sandjak) should be occupied by British, French and Greek troops.)

10. (The question was adjourned pending the receipt of a new Roumanian note.) Observations of the Roumanian Delegation Respecting the Ports, Waterways and Railways Clauses in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary

11. (At M. Peon’s request the appointment of a Committee was postponed.) Committee for the Execution Colonial Clauses of the Treaty of Peace With Germay

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Appendix A to HD–66


Note From the German Government, Under Date of October 3, Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Regions by German Troops

In reply to note No. 1755/G dated September 28 [27], 1919,10 the German Government points out that it attaches the greatest importance to the determination taken regarding the retreat of the troops in the Baltic and in Lithuania, and that it is continually making the most energetic efforts to accomplish this operation.

[Page 518]

An order was issued, among others, to this end, under date of September 25, 1919, ordering that the soldiers’ pay, as well as other advantages accorded to the units who would refuse to conform with the order of retreat, be withheld, and furthermore, in order to prevent reinforcements joining these troops, the German frontier on the Courland side has been closed. Orders were given to fire on the troops who despite this precaution would attempt to cross the line. The furnishing of munition supplies was formally forbidden. General von der Goltz has been recalled from his post. The supreme command is confided, in replacing General von der Goltz, to Major General Von Eberhardt, over all the troops which are at the present time East of the frontier of the Empire until such time as the complete retreat of the troops shall have been effected. Finally, the German Government has addressed a proclamation to these troops pointing out their duty, and indicating the dangers and sufferings of which they seem to be unaware, and which they might cause for the German people if they persist in their disobedience.

All these measures should protect the German Government against the unjustified reproaches which the Allied and Associated Powers have judged necessary to address to Germany (basing the judgment upon the refusal of the German troops to obey orders) accusing them of not trying to fill their obligations relative to the evacuation of the former Russian territory.

The Allied and Associated Governments have a sufficient idea of the position in which the Peace Treaty places Germany to realize that the German Government is unable to have recourse to more energetic military measures.

Referring to the enlistment of German troops in Russian formation, the German Government completely declines any participation in this affair, and adds that it has again clearly expressed its point of view to those concerned. The German Government has never authorized these enlistments and has every desire to do all in its power in the accomplishment of its evacuation obligations.

The German Government must protest energetically against the severe measures contained in Marshal Foch’s note, the object of which is the renewal of the blockade of Germany with a view to cutting off supplies. The Allied and Associated Governments cannot have forgotten that this blockade caused not only the death of hundreds of thousands of women, children and patients, but further introduced a weakening in the labor output as a result of insufficient nourishment, which produced a direct influence upon the disorder under which Germany is seriously suffering at this time.

The German Government has every hope that the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing its good faith, and, in consideration of this, [Page 519] will forego the application of these inhuman war measures against the German civil population which is in no wise responsible for the actions of the troops now in the East.

But, in order to furnish the Allied and Associated Governments with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the intensity of its intervention, the German Government requests that they enter into pour parlers concerning the measures it would be advisable to adopt.

To this end, the German Government proposes the early constitution of a commission composed of representatives of the German Government and representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments. In the view of the German Government, the duty of this Commission would be, after an examination of the situation, to take the necessary measures to bring about a rapid execution of the evacuation of these territories, and to supervise and force their execution. The German Government respectfully requests an early reply in this matter.


Appendix B to HD–66

Note by the British Delegation

Russian Prisoners in Germany

On August 2nd the Supreme Council decided to impose on the German Government the obligation (which has always existed) to maintain the Russian prisoners in Germany.11 At the same time, the German Government was to be informed that all restrictions on the repatriation of these prisoners would be removed.

There are a number of matters which have arisen from this decision which need to be settled.

It will be necessary to review the case of these prisoners from July 18th, 1919, at which time their food supply and support was being carried out through the French Government, the American Red Cross and the British Ked Cross. On the above date the Supreme Council decided12 that, pending repatriation (which was to be studied by an Inter-Allied Commission), the feeding of the prisoners should be taken over by the Commissariats of the Allied Armies of Occupation. This arrangement continued until August 2nd, when all responsibility for the prisoners was, by the decision already referred to, transferred to the German Government.

[Page 520]

The decision involved elaborate arrangements in connection with the transfer of the prisoners’ camps from the charge of the Allied Commission of Control to that of the German Government, and it was not found possible to effect this transfer until August 23rd. The Inter-Allied Commission continued to issue food to the prisoners on the same scale as previously until the camps were actually handed over. The Commission considered that it was morally bound to hand over the camps for which it was responsible in good order, and it is submitted that the period of 21 days from the date of the Supreme Council’s decision (17 days from that on which the order was received by the Inter-Allied Commission) was the minimum possible.

In order to enable the Inter-Allied Commission as at present constituted to be wound up, definite rulings are required on the following points:

1. Question of Repayment in Kind to German Government for Flour Supplied by them for Russian Prisoners of War.

One of the arrangements in force at the date of the Supreme Council’s decision of the 2nd was that the German Government should furnish the Russian prisoners with bread on a scale of 600 grs. per day, the flour required to provide the difference between this amount and the ordinary German civilian ration of 300 grs a day being refunded by the Inter-Allied Commission. The amount of flour owing to the German Government by the Inter-Allied Commission on August 23rd under this arrangement was 2,495 tons of wheat flour or 2,745 tons of rye flour. The Commission ask that these quantities should be furnished and handed over to the German Government as early as possible.

2. The Question of Settling the Accounts of the Inter-Allied Commission.

The President of the Inter-Allied Commission has reported that the amount of money required to meet the financial liabilities actually incurred by the Commission is 400,000 marks; that all accounts are in order, but that these accounts cannot be closed until the above sum is received.

3. The Question of the Formation of an International Commission to take the Place of the Former Inter-Allied Commission.

On being informed of the decision of August 2nd, the German Government at once pointed out that this decision placed them in a most difficult position, and that the Russian prisoners would inevitably suffer considerably as a result of it. These contentions were supported by General Malcolm as President of the Inter-Allied Commission and Marshal Foch in a letter addressed to the Peace Conference dated August 22nd urged that the Inter-Allied Commission should be replaced by the International Commission of Control on which Germany [Page 521] would be represented. General Malcolm urges that it is essential that the Entente should re-assume some sort of control, both for the sake of their own prestige, and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism amongst the Russian prisoners. He reports that in spite of the arrangements which are being made to proceed with the repatriation of the prisoners by sea during the coming winter, there will still remain about 90,000 Russians who cannot at present be repatriated owing to the conditions prevailing in Russia, and for whose care the Entente at one time made themselves responsible.

4. The Question of the Appointment of a Fully Accredited Russian Mission to Berlin.

This question is closely connected with 3 above. At present there is at Berlin a Russian Colonel Brandt looking after the interests of Russian prisoners of war. He has, however, no official status, and the Germans do not recognise him. Colonel Malcolm points out that it is essential that some Russian official be appointed to act as a channel of communication between the Russian prisoners of war and the authorities responsible for their care and repatriation. He does not consider Colonel Brandt of sufficient weight and reliability to act in that capacity, and urges the appointment of a Russian representative whose integrity and authority are beyond dispute.

5. Question of Repayment to German Government of Expenses (2 Million Marks) Incurred in the Care of Kiev Refugees.

The following is an extract from a report by General Malcolm, dated August 18th, explaining this question:—

“These refugees were brought to Germany by the request of the Entente Representatives at Kiev in January 1919, in order to save them from Bolshevik reprisals. On 18th March, General Nudant notified the Inter-Allied Commission that they were to be responsible for the care of these people, and were to study the means of reimbursement of expenses to the German Government.14 The German Government was informed of this decision, and denied all responsibility for the care of these refugees. There are at present some 600 of them in camps supervised by the Inter-Allied Commission, and expenses to date amount to about Marks 2,000,000.

It is essential that a definite arrangement should be made with the German Government for the repayment of past and future expenses incurred on behalf of these refugees, or that the German Government should be informed that they are held entirely responsible for their maintenance.”

In reply to above, General Malcolm was informed by Marshal Foch that the Secretariat of the Peace Conference had no knowledge of any decision of the Supreme Council on this subject, and that the German Government who had allowed these Russians to enter Germany, should themselves take any measures which they might think [Page 522] necessary in order to recover in the future from the Russian authorities the expenses incurred in this connection.

In a further letter dated September 24th (copy attached marked A) General Malcolm has asked that the matter may be referred to the Supreme Council for decision. General Malcolm contends that the Entente accepted the responsibility for these refugees and are repudiating their responsibility. In his opinion the amount involved is small as compared with the breach of faith with which the Entente can be charged.

[Enclosure—Appendix A]

inter-allied commission fob the repatriation of russian prisoners of war berlin

In reply to your letter No. 2244/P. G. 2 of the 16th instant forwarding Foch’s ruling on the question of expenses (2,000,000 marks) incurred in the care of Kiev refugees;

The fact mentioned therein that the Supreme Council issued no decision on the subject of the transfer of Russian refugees from Kiev is fully appreciated.
I wish to draw attention, however, to your letter 657/P. G. 2 of the 18th March (copy attached marked “A”) from which it is clear that the Kiev refugees were admitted into, Germany by the German Government at the request of Entente Representatives at Kiev, and that they were to be taken on charge of the Inter-Allied Commission, and repatriated with the first convoys of Russian prisoners of war.
Accordingly, arrangements were made for their housing and feeding with the German Government on the same lines as the Russian prisoners of war.
Much of the early correspondence dealing with the proposed evacuation of the Refugees from Kiev to Germany is not in my possession, and occurred before I arrived in Berlin. I have, however, a memo, dated 4th March, 1919 (No. 1672 SL/11) from “Le Président du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre” to “Le Général Chef de la Mission Militaire, chargée du rapatriement des Prisonniers de Guerre en Allemagne”, forwarding a proposal by Général Berthelot that 1,400 Russian officers refugees from Kiev should be sent to Novo-rossisk, General Denikin’s Army by the Allied Governments.
In my opinion, the fact of such proposal being made, proves that the Entente considered themselves free to dispose of the Kiev refugees as they desired.
In view of the above facts I request that the matter be again referred to the Supreme Council, and the full circumstances of the case put before them.
N. Malcolm

Major-General President, Inter-Allied Commission


interallied permanent
armistice commission

General Dupont, Adlon Hotel, Berlin, for General Ewart.

  • First. German commission has pointed out to me that more than two thousand Russian officers as well as a certain number of Russian soldiers, women, and children were last January, upon invitation of the representatives of the Entente at Kiev, transported from Kiev to Germany.
  • Second. German Government requests a settlement with regard to expenses for pay and food. This matter is placed henceforth in the hands of the Interallied Commission on Russian War Prisoners, which is to study the means of reimbursing the advances made and of providing repatriation of the Russians in question ahead of the first convoys repatriating the Russian prisoners.
  • Third. Inform German Government of this decision.

French Military Mission

Appendix C to HD–66

peace conference
committee of organization
of the
commission on reparations

No. 815


From the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations.

To the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In conformity with the instructions of July 17, 1919, of the Council of Five;16

[Page 524]

In view of the provisions of Article 181 of the Peace Treaty.

By reason of the interest attached by the Commission on Reparations to the resumption of economic activity in Austria as soon as possible, so that she may compensate by her exports into the neighboring countries the importation of goods which they shall furnish her, and later, in a general way, pay her debt to the Allies;

Considering the necessity, on account of the present weakness of Austria’s own resources, to incite the neighboring States to send her supplies so as to reduce as much as possible the shipments of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Considering, on the other hand, the advisability of instituting in Vienna a sub-Commission which would be charged by the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations to study on the spot the conditions of sending supplies to Austria;

The Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations proposes to the Council of Five to take the following resolution:

There shall be established in Vienna, with the least possible delay, a sub-Commission of the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations, charged with the study of the conditions of Austria’s supplying.

It shall be composed of one Delegate of each of the Powers represented in the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations.

The Chairmanship shall be attributed at each meeting to each one of the Delegates in turn; the Secretary shall be permanent.

It can add to itself, in a consultative capacity, and according to the nature of the question dealt with, representatives of the States neighboring Austria: Poland, Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia and Hungary.

It shall determine the needs of Austria in foodstuffs and raw material and shall try to find all the measures capable of developing to its maximum the production of Austria herself.

It shall examine and propose the means which it shall deem the best to facilitate and insure the delivery and the transportation by the neighboring States of Austria of goods which are necessary to her and the payment by Austria of her purveyors; it shall endeavor to make all the States concerned adopt its views.

That the Sub-Commission shall be installed in Vienna by a member of the Committee of Organization bearer of a letter from the Council of Five to Chancellor Renner.

By order of the Committee,
[Page 525]

Appendix D to HD–66

peace conference
european commission on coal

[Note From the European Commission on Coal]


The Secretariat of the European Commission on Coal has the honor to transmit to the Secretariat of the Peace Conference, the following, to be submitted to the Supreme Council:

—The draft of a telegram to be sent to the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments regarding the supplying of coal to the Austrian Republic and especially to the City of Vienna, and in support of that draft a report drawn by a sub-commission appointed by it and which it had approved.
—The draft of a resolution presented by Colonel Logan of the American Delegation and approved by the European Commission on Coal, a resolution tending to the immediate nomination of a commission charged with the provisional distribution of the rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. (For original English text, see S. H. Bulletin 989.)17
[Subenclosure 1]
peace conference
european commission on coal

Project of Telegram

The Supreme Council to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to the Government of the Polish Republic

The European Commission on Coal has just examined the question of the supplying of coal to Austria and especially to the City of Vienna. It has come to the conclusion that immediate measures must be taken to remedy the intolerable situation resulting for that country and for its capital, especially from the fact that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia did not fulfill their contracts to furnish coal. The Mission declared itself convinced that nothing in the present state of affairs, opposes the execution of those contracts, and that if it is opportune to look for the means to give to the furnishing states the rolling stock they are asking for, it remains well understood that the execution of the contracts in question could not be subordinated to the improvements to be expected in that respect.

[Page 526]

Adopting the conclusion of the European Commission on Coal, the Supreme Council invites you therefore in the most pressing manner to take without delay the necessary measures to execute integrally, from the date of the present communication, the promises to supply coal to Austria; any new delay henceforth will have to be made up within a minimum time limit.

The contract now in force shall be valid until new arrangements have been made, either by an agreement between the Governments concerned, or drawn up by the Commission on Reparations in execution of Article 224 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

[Subenclosure 2]


B. 111, C. E. C. 109

The sub-commission appointed by decision of September 27, 1919, of the European Commission on Coal to study the question of supplying with coal the Austrian Republic and especially the City of Vienna, states and submits to the approval of the European Commission on Coal the following remarks and conclusions:


According to the terms of contracts made, Czecho-Slovakia promised to furnish to Austria, for each work day, the approximative quantities of coal hereafter mentioned:

Gas coal 1,100 tons
Lignite for the electric industry of Vienna 920
Lignite for domestic consumption 2,500
Lignite and coal for railroads and industries 4,226
Total 8,746 tons
or 218,650 tons per month.

According to the terms of contracts made, Poland promised to furnish to Austria 2000 tons, 1000 of which was coal and 1000 lignite per working day, or 50,000 tons per month. That supply is independent of that promised by Poland for the transportation called “Polonia”.


If Czecho-Slovakia and Poland have fulfilled and still continue to fulfill their engagement towards Austria, the latter would have about 50% of her needs. But on account of previous delays, the execution, even complete, from now on, would still leave Austria for a very long time with a very much smaller quota, probably lower than 33%. This remark is increased by the fact that it is a question for the best [Page 527] part for domestic and urban needs. All the witnesses agree as to the distressing situation of the City of Vienna and to foretell, if immediate measures are not taken, such a state of misery that the Allied and Associated Powers could tolerate neither politically nor humanely.

Now, Czecho-Slovakia, with her present production, can satisfy both her engagements toward Austria and her own needs to the amount of 77% according to the figures of 1913. Poland is in a more difficult situation since Upper Silesia has stopped shipments. But even so, she can fulfill her promises to Austria and cover 35% of her own domestic and industrial needs without any importation, according to figures furnished by the Polish Delegate; the suspension of shipments from Upper Silesia for any length of time is however a very unfavorable hypothesis; finally, it appears, although the Polish Delegate expressed an opinion quite contrary, that it would be rather easy for Poland to increase her production.

The sub-commission considers therefore that, from the point of view of production, there exists no prime motive either for Czechoslovakia or for Poland preventing those countries from fulfilling their engagements towards Austria; the amount promised must therefore be delivered.


As regards transportation, the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Delegates pointed out the difficulties resulting from the lack of rolling stock. The Polish Delegate raised the general question of the distribution of that material in Central Europe. The Delegate of the United States insisted upon the necessity of acting as quickly as possible in that respect.

The sub-commission considers that the general question thus raised was not within its jurisdiction and that it would have to limit itself to annex it to its report, to be submitted to the European Commission on Coal, together with a note relating to it and furnished by the delegates of the United States and Poland.

As to the problem of the rolling stock necessary for the execution of the engagements in question, it seemed to it, in spite of the contrary remarks of the Polish Delegate, that there could be no real difficulty for the furnishing countries of filling the gaps for the indispensable quantities. According to a telegram from Colonel Nutt, Austria has just stated that she was ready to make a very important effort in that respect, and, for the surplus that might still be necessary, there is no doubt that the concerted action of the Maehrisch-Ostrau Sub-commission and the Interallied organs in Vienna and Budapest could provide for it.

[Page 528]

The Sub-commission considers therefore that from the point of view of rolling stock no prime motive can be opposed to the execution of the engagements made.


The Sub-commission is not informed of the last provisions made by the Maehrisch-Ostrau Sub-commission. It appears however from the latest news received, that new agreements between Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Austria have been concluded or are about to be concluded. In order to avoid any action contrary to the Maehrisch-Ostrau Sub-commission, the Sub-commission deemed it its duty to limit itself to the examination of the contracts in force and to their execution, and it concludes:


That it is advisable for the European Commission on coal, and if the latter deems it proper to refer the matter to the Supreme Council, to formally invite the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to furnish to Austria the total amount of coal and lignite mentioned in the agreements made with the Government of that country, and to make up, within a minimum time limit, any delay which might take place in the future in the shipments:

Being understood that the contracts made are valid and continue to be valid as long as new agreements have not been made by an accord between the Governments concerned, in anticipated execution of Article 224 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, or drawn up in conformity with the provisions of that article, by the Commission on Reparations.

Appendix E to HD–66

[Telegram From the British Delegation to General Haking]

Cypher telegram to General Malcolm, Berlin, from Astoria, D. 17:30, 25 September 1919.

No. 60

M. Paderewski suggests immediate despatch of a considerable number of allied officers to Upper Silesia to safeguard the interests of inhabitants and ensure normal output of coal.

Telegraph your views as to practicability and desirability of above proposal, and state number of allied officers already in Upper Silesia. This suggestion is entirely distinct from question of dispatching plebiscite Commissioners who could not in any case now proceed prior to ratification.

[Page 529]

Appendix F to HD–66

[Proposal of the United States Representative on the European Commission on Coal (Logan)]

During the meetings of the Sub-Commission of the European Coal Commission considering the Austrian coal situation it was clearly brought out that the shortage of railway equipment contributes largely to the existing coal shortage in Central Europe. The production at the mines is in general increasing and has now reached a point where the coal actually mined cannot be moved due to shortage of railway equipment.

Roumania has removed to date over 1,000 locomotives and over 20,000 railroad cars of all classes from Hungary. It appears needless to point out that Roumania by these seizures has not only secured the restitution of railway equipment belonging to herself, but in addition has also removed equipment belonging to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Notwithstanding these Roumanian seizures there still remains in Hungary and in that portion of Hungary just ceded to Austria, railway equipment considerably in excess of local requirements, which should be put into movement as soon as possible. The coal situation as well as the general economic situation in Central Europe does not permit of any of this railway material resting idle any longer.

The European Coal Commission, therefore, recommends the immediate passage of the following resolution by the Supreme Council:

First: That a Special Commission of Experts be established without delay for the purpose of determining and effecting an immediate distribution of surplus railway equipment now in Hungary and Austria as between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and such of the other Allied and Associated Powers as may have interests therein. That this Special Commission in effecting this distribution shall have regard to the amount of material registered on these lines in the last inventory before November 3, 1918, the length of track (sidings included) and the nature and amount of the traffic. That this Special Commission shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case, and shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in Austrian and Hungarian workshops. The provisions of the foregoing shall be applied to lines of former Russian Poland converted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities to the normal gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian and Hungarian State systems.

That a full report of the determinations arrived at and the distribution effected by this Special Commission will be reported to the Supreme Council at the earliest practical date. It will be understood that the primary reason for the creation of this Special Commission is to provide the means for placing surplus and idle railway equipment [Page 530] now in this territory into economic activity without delay. The findings of this special commission will in no way prejudice the determination of the Commission of Experts contemplated by Article 318 of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and similar provisions included in other treaties.

Second: That this Special Commission will report to the Supreme Council the quantities by classes of rolling stock taken out of Austria or Hungary by any Power in excess of its proper proportion as determined under the First paragraph of this resolution. This same report will include a detailed statement as to the monetary value of the rolling stock thus removed.

Third: That this Special Commission of Experts will include one representative appointed by each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The Governments of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, may each designate a representative who will represent the interests of the respective governments before this Special Commission.

That a representative to be designated by the Austrian Government and a representative of the Hungarian State Railways to be designated by the Allied Council of Generals at Budapest will represent the interests of Austria and Hungary respectively before this Special Commission.

Appendix G to HD–66

british delegation

Note From the British Delegation Relative to the Allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Aerial Missions of Control in Germany

My Dear Ambassador: Your Excellency will recall that the Supreme Council decided in its session of September 2318 that General Nollet, President of the Interallied Commission of Control, charged with the supervision of the execution of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany, would receive 10,000 mks. per month as “frais de représentation”, the Council having decided in its meeting of the day before that the superior officers who preside the subcommissions of the said Commission, would receive 5000 mks. per month in the same conditions.

These provisions seem to have left out the question of the “frais de representation” of the presidents of the Interallied Naval and Aerial Missions of Control since the decision according to which 10,000 marks are allotted for that purpose to General Nollet, President of the Military Mission and 5000 marks to the presidents of the sub-commissions, applies only to them.

[Page 531]

It would appear according to the report of the military delegates at Versailles,19 which was adopted at the Supreme Council on July 9, last, that the three commissions of control, military, naval and aerial, must be considered as distinct and independent organs, and I believe that the members of the Aerial Commission are at least as many as those of the Military Commissions.

The presidents of the Naval and Aerial Commissions shall very probably have to go to the same “frais de représentation” as their colleagues of the Military Commission, it would therefore seem just to allow the same sum.

Consequently I have the honor to propose that this question should be submitted to the attention of the Supreme Council at its next session.

Appendix H to HD–66

Limitation of Greek and Italian Troops in Zones of Occupation in Western Asia Minor

1. The Supreme Council decided on July 18th20 to direct the Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possession of Turkey to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna and Italian and Greek Generals, were to fix the military limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops should be permitted to move.

2. In pursuance of these directions General Milne has telegraphed the following report for communication to the Supreme Council:—

I have arrived at the following conclusions as a result of the report of the Commission who have been visiting the Turco-Greek front at Smyrna:

That a state of active warfare exists between the Greek and Turkish forces,
That the greater portion of the Turkish forces is composed of organised bands of brigands, reinforced by armed peasants driven from the villages by the Greeks and determined to prevent further advance of the Greeks. These armed forces which are secretly receiving reinforcements from the regular units are in considerable strength,
That the Turkish Government has no control over these forces, which are pledged to drive the Greeks out of Asia and hence cannot insist on their withdrawal from any stipulated line,
That generally speaking the civil administration is overruled by the military authorities, the latter being secretly in support of the national movement, which is gaining strength, and the Turkish Government are powerless to exercise any restraining influence,
That the Greek forces having advanced in many places to a purely Turkish area and an extremely difficult country, are from a tactical point of view badly placed but that any further advance to gain better positions will be resisted to the utmost and can succeed only after severe fighting,
That it is of little practical value to define a tactical defensive line, since it would be respected by neither one side nor the other, the Turks because they are determined to drive back the Greeks, the Greeks because no line will satisfy them until they obtain the line asked for by Mr. Venezelos,
To concede this line to the Greeks would be to give them territory which is purely Turkish and where a bitter resistance would be offered by the inhabitants. In addition it will precipitate an outbreak elsewhere in Asia Minor.
Should the Greeks not be allowed to advance, and should they be driven back by the Turks, they will undoubtedly lay the blame on the Entente,
Guerilla warfare will continue so long as Greek troops remain in Sanjak, and any further advance will tend to create greater difficulties.
For the present best solution is for Greeks to remain practically in the present position with exception of certain minor rectifications and that mentioned in para. 13,
I recommend that the Greek occupation should extend approximately along following line starting from North (ref. 1/250,000 Asia Minor) At point on coast 7 miles north east of Aivalik to watershed at Osmanlar (P. 1558) thence following along summits of Kestene. Dagh, Akmaz Dagh to village of Dushme due south along watershed between the Eurkut Dere and Menteshe Dere to junction of Bekir Chai and Jumaali Dere, the summits of Fughlajik and Saritash respectively, along straight line in South South West direction to Urpek Kaya point 1804; through villages Karasigrli, Yenije, Tepejik, Tatarkeui, Munteveli, Yenichiftlik, Papazli; southwest [southeast]over point 1804 and Belen Dagh; to village[s] of Kesterli, Yarishlik (3 miles east of Ahmedei)—Sart; south along ridge to Ardijak-Yaila to villages Kemer, Tabaklar, Semit, Bujak; south to Chaili; south west to Bademma. Question of further boundary will depend on decision given to my proposals in para. 13. All villages mentioned are being taken as inclusive to Greeks.
I have considered in suggesting above delimitation Greek point of view and advance to line east of Soma Akhissar railways but, as it included occupation of further country inhabited almost entirely by Turks occupation of which would lead to further fighting and bitterness until reasons produced by Greeks carry sufficient weight this could not always be admitted. Generally I have selected best tactical line in vicinity of line at present occupied.
As a whole Greek division is practically employed defending Aidin area on 3 sides in close contact with Turks Greek position in vicinity of Aidin is tactically unsound. An advance will be necessary to secure a good and safe position but this will be stoutly resisted by Turks. If Peace Conference raise no objection to further hostilities and to occupation of further Turkish villages Greeks [Page 533] might be allowed to advance to line (? Kochak) Chai but in view of fact that Greeks are at Aidin to [in?] defiance of orders, and that if they remain there there will be constant fighting, I recommend that they may be restricted to Sanjak area and that allied troops occupy Meander valley as bitterness here is more marked than elsewhere. Advances to Manisa and to Aidin have been carried out contrary to orders and it is in these two places that all the trouble is arising, and so long as Greek troops remain there will continue.
It is highly desirable that an early and clear decision from the Peace Conference on above points should be given. Such a decision will carry much weight and should do much to establish tranquillity before the conclusion of harvest when unless some solution be found Turkish forces will be considerably increased.

3. The point in General Milne’s telegram which appears to require special consideration and a decision by the Supreme Council is that raised in para. 13 respecting the south eastern portion of the line, the northern and eastern portions of the line being satisfactorily fixed by para. 11 of the telegram.

4. The Supreme Council approved on July 18th an agreement between M. Veniselos and M. Tittoni fixing the line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations from the mouth of the River Meander as far as Keushk on the Smyrna–Aidin Railway. What General Milne proposes is in effect that this line should either remain as the southern limit of the Greek zone of occupation, or be modified so as to follow the boundary of the Smyrna sanjak from the point where it cuts the boundary of the sanjak, but that in either case the line should remain as the Northern boundary of the Italian occupation, the area between the Veniselos-Tittoni line and the boundary of the Sanjak being occupied by Allied troops.

5. Copies of a sketch map of the area in question showing the boundary of the Sanjak in purple and the Tittoni-Veniselos line in red, are attached hereto;21

2 October [, 1919].

Note: Map referred to in Section 5 routed with original papers as follows—S–G; S–D; S–H; I–F.

  1. HD–22, minute 7, vol. vii, p. 486.
  2. Translation: “Any new delay henceforth will have to he made up within a minimum time limit.”
  3. HD–18, minute 5, vol. vii, p. 372.
  4. HD–59, minute 3, p. 327.
  5. HB–58, minute 2, p. 300; HD–62, minute 8, p. 412.
  6. HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.
  7. Map referred to does not accompany the minutes.
  8. HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.
  9. HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.
  10. Appendix E to HD–62, p. 419.
  11. HD–22, minute 7, vol. vii, p. 486.
  12. HD–11, minute 6, ibid, p. 208.
  13. See subenclosure to enclosure printed infra.
  14. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
  15. HD–9, minute 2, vol. vii, p. 173.
  16. See appendix F, p. 529.
  17. HD–59, minute 3, p. 327.
  18. Appendix E to HD–3, vol. vii, p. 76.
  19. HD–10, minute 4, ibid., p. 194.
  20. The map referred to does not accompany the minutes. It is in the Department’s files under Paris Peace Conf. 867.0146/21.