Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/66
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, October 7, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.
America, United States of
- Hon. F. L. Polk
- Mr. L. Harrison
- Sir Eyre Crowe
- Mr. H. Norman
- M. Pichon
- M. Dutasta
- M. de St. Quentin
- M. Scialoja
- M. Barone Busso
- M. Matsui
- M. Kawai
- America, United States of
|America, United States of||Mr. C. Russell|
|British Empire||Capt. Hinchley-Cooke|
|Italy||Lieut, de Carlo,|
The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:
America, United States of
- Mr. E. L. Dresel
- Colonel Logan
- Colonel Browning
- General Sackville-West
- General Mance
- General Groves
- Lt. Col. Kisch
- Major Money
- Mr. Ibbetson-James
- Mr. Forbes-Adam
- Mr. Herbert-Brown
- Marshal Foch
- M. Loucheur
- General Weygand
- M. Laroche
- General Cavallero
- M. Brambilla.
1. (The Council had before it the Note of the German Government of October 3rd (See Appendix “A”).)
Marshal Foch said that he thought the members of the Council had already taken note of the contents of the German Note. The German Government protested its good faith and asked for the appointment of a mixed Commission which should take the necessary steps to effect a speedy evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. He proposed that a reply be made stating that the Allied and Associated Governments were willing to work with Germany, but this must not be interpreted as meaning that they were willing to relieve Germany of her responsibilities. The Allied and Associated Governments agreed to the appointment of a mixed Commission, but maintained the view that this Commission should be particularly charged with seeing that the German Government took the necessary steps to guarantee the evacuation. This method of procedure seemed to him all the more necessary, because the German Government had enumerated a series of steps which it had taken, which were in fact only half steps. The Commission would be charged with seeing that the promises, which had been made to the Allied and Associated Governments, were kept. On the other hand, it was to be understood that, if the results were not forthcoming, these Governments would be obliged to put into effect the means of coercion which had been decided upon. Reply to the Note of the German Government Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces
Mr. Polk said that he fully agreed with Marshal Foch. He asked whether the German Government had up to the present paid the troops in question. If this was in fact the case it created a ridiculous situation. He was not surprised that the German Government paid these troops, but he was very much surprised that they confessed to the fact so openly.
Marshal Foch said that the Germans not only continued to pay the troops in question but they also were supplying them constantly with provisions of every kind.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he approved of Marshal Foch’s proposals. He desired to add that he thought it necessary to state in the reply to Germany that the Allied and Associated Governments were not satisfied with the explanation which had been made. It was important to point out that the recall of General von der Goltz had been demanded three times and that it was only now that such a step had been decided upon by the German Government. The German reply was drafted to a great extent for public opinion at home and for purposes of propaganda, and for this reason the Allied and Associated Governments were also entitled to state their views fully. He had just received a telegram from the British Mission at Riga, dated the 4th October, and consequently despatched after the German Note had been transmitted. The telegram pointed out that movements of German troops [Page 506] in the direction of Jacobstadt were continually being reported. There was not a single sign to indicate that evacuation was contemplated. In the neutral zone to the east, the Germans had been replaced by Russians, and finally General von der Goltz had assumed a most threatening attitude towards the Letts.
M. Pichon suggested that Marshal Foch should be requested to draft a reply to the German Government taking note of the remarks made by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe. He considered it important to point out to the Germans that the Allied and Associated Governments held them entirely responsible for what had occurred.
Marshal Foch said that the appointment of a Commission did not raise particular difficulties; the Commission existed in fact in the form of the Inter-Allied Mission, at the head of which General Gough had been placed. General Gough, however, was no longer at Riga, and it would therefore be necessary to place an energetic officer at the head of the Commission. He wished to ask from what army the Council desired that the officer in question should be chosen.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British Government would have no objection to the appointment of a French General.
M. Pichon suggested that Marshal Foch submit his views to the Council on the following day.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Germans had asked in their Note that the means of economic pressure decided upon by the Allied and Associated Government[s] be abandoned. He desired to express the hope that in the Note which Marshal Foch was about to prepare, it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures in question would only be suspended when the Commission had submitted satisfactory reports.
It was decided:
that Marshal Foch should present to the Supreme Council at its next meeting the draft of a reply to the Note from the German Government of the 3rd October, respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, in which Marshal Foch should take into consideration the views expressed by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe.
2. (The Council had before it a memorandum from the British Delegation of the 30th September, 1919 (See Appendix “B”).)
General Weygand read and commented upon this memorandum. He said that there was first the general question of policy to be decided. The Supreme Council in a resolution taken on the 2nd August1 had said that the German Government should be given full liberty in regard to the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war and that the Allied and Associated Governments would not intervene either [Page 507] in the repatriation or in the maintenance of these prisoners. The resolution in question had not been sufficiently far-reaching. Marshal Foch had pointed out in a number of notes addressed to the Conference, that serious difficulties might arise, if the Allied and Associated Governments abandoned all control and left the field entirely open to German action. He had pointed out that without undertaking the entire control, it would be possible to appoint an International Commission upon which there would be, in addition to representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, German and Russian representatives. This would create a means of dealing with German manoeuvres. It would be a simple matter to organize such a Commission in view of the fact that there were already officers at Berlin, who were dealing with the question. The Germans could easily appoint a representative, but insofar as the Russians were concerned, the question was somewhat delicate, for it might perhaps be difficult to find a man who was not affiliated with a particular faction. If the Council decided to appoint such an International Commission, that Commission could be directed to liquidate the routine matters which required action and which had been mentioned in the memorandum of the British Delegation. Maintenance and Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany
Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the Council should decide as to the questions of principle and leave it to the Commission to insure their application. If the Commission were left too much to itself, its first act would undoubtedly be to address a new report to the Supreme Council. It would therefore be necessary to give full directions.
General Weygand agreed, and said that this matter could be dealt with in the instructions to be prepared for the Commission. In reply to a question asked by Mr. Polk, he stated that the Commission would sit in Berlin.
Mr. Polk said that he agreed in principle, but that so far as he was concerned, there was a difficulty in regard to detail. General Harries, who had been the head of the American Mission at Berlin, had left, and the officer who would be appointed would necessarily be without information on the subject.
General Weygand said that the questions for the Commission to decide were chiefly of a financial nature, and which financial representatives could study at Paris. It would be sufficient if an officer, who was informed as to the questions, such as Colonel Kisch, could supply the necessary information. There was one question, however, which was somewhat delicate, and that related to the refugees from Kieff. The Germans maintained that the Allies had guaranteed the maintenance in Germany of four hundred Russians who had left Kieff with the German troops in order to escape the Bolshevists. The German Government added that their action had been taken at the request of the Entente. The amount expended amounted to about two millions. [Page 508] So far as the French authorities were concerned, they were without information as to the action which the Germans claimed had been taken by the Allies.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British Government were equally without information in regard to the matter.
(It was decided:
that Marshal Foch should present to the Council at its next meeting a draft resolution respecting the organization of an International Commission to deal with the maintenance and repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.)
3. (The Council had before it a note from the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission of the 27th September, 1919. (See Appendix C.))
M. Loucheur read and commented upon the proposals of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. He said that the proposal was most urgent, particularly in view of the fact that the situation became worse each day. He wished most strongly to urge that the principle of the appointment of the subcommission should be approved upon that day and that the members of the commission should be ready to act at the earliest possible moment. Organization at Vienna of a Subcommission of The Organizing Committee of The Reparations Commission
(It was decided:
- that a subcommission of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission should be ‘established at Vienna at the earliest possible moment to study the questions relating to the revictualing of Austria;
- that this subcommission should be composed of a delegate from each of the Powers represented on the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. The presidency of the subcommission should be held at each meeting by each of the delegates in turn; the secretary should be permanent. There should be added to the subcommission for purposes of consultation and following the nature of the subjects dealt with, representatives of the States bordering upon Austria: Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Hungary;
- that the subcommission should determine the foodstuffs and raw materials needed by Austria and ascertain all the available means of developing the greatest amount of production in Austria itself;
- that the subcommission should examine and propose the means which should appear best to facilitate and to guarantee the delivery and transport from the countries bordering upon Austria of such merchandise as was necessary as well as the payment by Austria to its vendors. The subcommission should see to it that its views were adopted by all the interested states.
It was also decided:
that the subcommission should be established at Vienna by a member of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission, who [Page 509] should present his credentials from the Supreme Council to Dr. Renner.)
4. (The Council had before it the draft of a telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission (See appendix “D”).)
M. Loucheur read and commented upon this telegram. He said that he proposed to add at the end of the text an appeal to the good will of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments. Telegram to the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments Respecting the Supply of Coal to Austria
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to call the attention of the Council to the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph of the text in which the words, “tout retard nouveau a partir de ce jour devra être ratrappé dans le délai minimum”.2 This phrase appeared unnecessary on account of the difficulty of execution and he proposed that it be omitted.
It was decided:
- to transmit the telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission (See appendix “D”) to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and to the Government of the Polish Republic;
- to omit in the telegram the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph.
It was further decided:
that M. Loucheur should add to the text a supplementary paragraph appealing to the good-will of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments.
5. (The Council had before it a telegram addressed to General Haking by the British Delegation at Paris (See appendix “E”).)
M. Loucheur said that he did not agree with the European Coal Commission, which had brought to the attention of the Council with a favorable recommendation, the telegram addressed to General Haking, which had embodied a suggestion made by M. Paderewski. Despatch of Allied Officers to Upper Silesia To Insure the Normal Output of Coal
He thought that the despatch of a large number of officers to Upper Silesia would provoke serious difficulties on the part of the Germans.
M. Pichon said that he agreed with the view expressed by M. Loucheur.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that his experts were not convinced that the despatch of a Commission of Officers would have the practical results which had been anticipated.
Mr. Polk said that Colonel Goodyear, who had come from Upper Silesia, thought that it would serve a useful purpose to send a Commission composed of a small number of members. The despatch of [Page 510] such a Commission would make it possible to obtain definite information as to the situation in the mines. General Dupont shared this opinion.
M. Loucheur said that if it were possible to send a representative of each of the Powers, the Allied Missions at Berlin could be directed to take the necessary steps, and it would be understood that the Commission would be under the orders of the Missions at Berlin, but it should also keep in close touch with the Coal Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau.
Mr. Polk said that the American Delegation would be obliged to send one of its representatives from the Coal Commission at Paris. He wished to mention this fact simply as a matter of detail.
It was decided:
- to despatch to Upper Silesia a sub-commission composed of a Representative of the United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy to insure the normal output of coal;
- that the members of this Commission, with the exception of the American Representative, should be chosen by the Chiefs of the Entente Missions at Berlin from among the officers attached to these Missions;
- that the Commission should be placed under the orders of the Military Representative of the Entente at Berlin.
It was further decided:
that the Commission should keep in touch with the Coal Commission at Mahrisch-Ostrau.
6. (The Council had before it a proposal made by Colonel Logan to the European Coal Commission (See Appendix “F”).)
M. Loucheur read and commented upon Colonel Logan’s proposal. He thought that the distribution of Austro-Hungarian rolling stock ought not to be delayed any longer than necessary. It the transports had been suspended and traffic was practically interrupted, it was not because the material was lacking, but because the distribution of this material had not yet been made. Article 318 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria called for the formation of a special Commission to deal with this redistribution. He proposed that the Commission called for by Article 318 be appointed at the present time and that it should act in a provisionary character until the Treaty came into force. Commission Charged With the Provisionary Re-Distribution of the Rolling Stock of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
M. Pichon said that he saw a difficulty in view of the fact that the Treaty called for the presence on the Commission of a Representative of the Hungarian State Eailways.
M. Loucheur said that the draft resolution prepared by Colonel Logan tended to appoint a new Commission. It would be preferable [Page 511] to appoint a permanent Commission immediately, specifying that it would act at present with only a temporary character.
Mr. Polk said that, with reference to M. Pichon’s objection, he proposed that the Commission be constituted in accordance with the proposal of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission approved by the Supreme Council on the 29th July,3 and that the Hungarian Representative, who should be chosen from the Hungarian State Railways, be named by the Allied Generals at Budapest.
It was decided:
- to appoint in advance a Commission of experts to deal with the re-distribution of the rolling stock as prescribed by Article 318 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria;
- that the Hungarian Representative attached should be appointed by the Allied Generals at Budapest from the staff of the Hungarian State Railways;
- that upon the appointment of the Commission, instructions should be given to the President in a sense of the resolution prepared by Colonel Logan (See Appendix “F”).
7. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation of the 3d October (See appendix “G”).)
Sir Eyre Crowe said that when the Council had decided on the 23d September4 to fix the amount of the allowances for the President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany as well as for the Presidents of the sub-commissions, they had forgotten to fix the amount of the allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control. He thought that the three Presidents of the Commissions of Control should be placed upon the same footing and be given the same allowances. Allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany
Mr. Polk said that he had spoken to General Bliss in regard to the matter and that the latter had expressed surprise that the resolution had been adopted in that form. He (Mr. Polk) had just returned to Paris and was not in a position to make a reply at the moment, but he would communicate his answer to the Secretariat-General later on.
The Proposal of the British Delegation was accepted on the understanding that Mr. Polk would communicate his reply as soon as possible.
8. M. Laroche said that the decision of the Supreme Council to hold a plebiscite at Teschen5 had been communicated to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments. In accordance with Nomination the terms of this decision, the plebiscite was to be held within a period of three months after notification. It was therefore most urgent that a Commission [Page 512] should be appointed. He wished to add that it was important that the Commissioners should leave at as early a date as possible in order to put an end to the unrest which was showing itself in the Duchy. Nomination of a Teschen Commission
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he had telegraphed his Government but, probably on account of the recent disturbances in England, he had received no reply.
Mr. Polk said that he had also received no reply up to the present.
M. Scialoja said that the Italian Government, in view of the fact that the resolution of the Supreme Council, did not make it obligatory to change their representative on the Teschen Commission, had thought it advisable to appoint their present representative at Teschen.
M. Pichon said that he was informed that the authorities at Prague were most desirous that the Inter-Allied Commission should be composed of new members. The question was an important one for the Czecho-Slovak Government in view of the demonstrations which had been made against it within the course of the last few weeks. He believed that the wishes of the Czecho-Slovak Government should be met in this matter.
M. Laroche said that the French Representative would be M. de Manneville, Minister Plenipotentiary.
M. Scialoja said that if the other Powers appointed new representatives the Italian Government would do the same.
M. Laroche said that it was further necessary to arrange for the Military occupation of the Duchy; it was an urgent matter, but the Council would have to await the reply of the British Government on the general question of the constitution of the forces which were to undertake Inter-Allied occupations.
(The Council decided to postpone the discussion of the question until the American and British Representatives had received instructions from their Governments.)
9. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated the 2nd October, 1919 (See Appendix “H”).)
Sir Eyre Crowe read and commented upon the note presented by the British Delegation of the 2nd October. He recalled that General Milne had been asked by the Supreme Council to fix a line which neither the Turks nor the Greeks should pass.6 The General had gone to the spot. He thought that the present line could not be held. It was necessary for the Greeks either to advance or retreat. If they advanced they could not avoid a conflict with the [Page 513] Turks. The Greeks were aware of this fact. General Milne thought that it would be possible to advance the line, but in this event, it would be necessary to take armed resistance into consideration. General Milne had summarized the situation in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the Note which was before the Council. Before M. Venizelos had left Paris he had been sounded as to whether he was willing to accept a withdrawal of the Greek line under the conditions fixed by General Milne. M. Venizelos appeared to be willing to agree, but upon condition that a withdrawal in the region of Aidin should call for occupation of the territories evacuated by the Greeks by Interallied contingents. Limitation of Greek and Italian Zones Of Military Occupation in Asia Minor
General Cavallero said that from a military point of view he had no objection to the proposals of General Milne as a whole. He objected only to these proposals which dealt with the southern part of the line held by the Greeks. General Milne appeared to desire a withdrawal in the region of Aidin. From a military point of view, this proposal was the better one, because the situation of the Greeks at Aidin was precarious, and, if it were to be improved, a conflict with the Turks was inevitable. He wished also to state that the line drawn on the map annexed to the British report7 did not entirely correspond to the conclusions of the report. So far as the occupation of the valley of the Meander was concerned, he thought the proposals contained in the fourth paragraph of the British Note did not quite agree with the terms of General Milne’s report. There was in this report nothing to show that the actual line of demarcation should continue to form the northern limit of the Italian occupation. If the valley of the Meander was to be occupied by Allied troops it was natural that the occupation should be effected by Italian troops, in view of the fact that they were on the spot, and also as the refugees from the region of Aidin were concentrated in the territories occupied by the Italian troops, it would be easy for the Italians to return them to their homes. The character of the Italian soldier was such as to make incidents impossible. The Italian soldier lived on good terms with the local population and this was a guarantee that the occupation could be made under the best conditions.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that the proposals contained in the British Note were based upon General Milne’s report. There was no reason for believing that the General had thought of advancing the Italian line. He knew an agreement had been made between the Greeks and the Italians; an agreement approved by the Supreme Council in regard to the limits of the respective zones of occupation.8 He wished to state, with all due deference to the Italian Government and its military authorities, [Page 514] that he did not feel that the idea of replacing Greek troops by Italian troops would meet the situation. If the Greek withdrawal were followed by an Italian advance, he feared that the effect would be disastrous from a Greek point of view. The proposal to which M. Venizelos had finally agreed looked to a Franco-British occupation. Such an occupation seemed possible of realization, but if the Greeks learned that they were to be replaced by Italians the situation would be worse than at present.
General Cavallero said that in examining the resolution taken by the Supreme Council on the 18th July, he did not see that it was a question of defining a neutral zone nor that any similar definition was necessary.
M. Pichon said that the reasons given by Sir Eyre Crowe appeared to him most grave. If the Italian proposal were accepted there was great danger that the end which the Council sought, which was the pacification of the region, would not be achieved.
M. Scialoja said that so far as the pacification of the region was concerned experience was in the favor of the Italians. There would be no complaint from the Turkish populations in the region of the Italian occupation. He ventured also to remark that the line of the 18th July was a line of demarcation between the Greeks and the Italians. If the Greeks were no longer there, it would be natural, to establish contact, for the line to go farther north. The Greeks would have no reason to complain. It would be possible to hear the Greeks first or to postpone the settlement of the question until an agreement with them had been reached.
Mr. Polk asked what would be the result if the line were moved farther east.
Sir Eyre Crowe asked the Council to put themselves in the place of the Greek Government. At M. Clemenceau’s request, M. Venizelos had endeavored to reach an agreement with M. Tittoni. If M. Scialoja’s proposal were now adopted, the Council would appear to be taking sides with the Italians against the Greeks without having consulted the latter, and would also be failing in their engagements. So far as he was concerned, he could not associate himself with such a course.
Mr. Polk said that he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe. The Greeks would be put in a humiliating situation, because a line of agreement had already been fixed with them.
M. Scialoja said that if the principle of Interallied occupation of the neutral zone were adopted it would have to be understood that an Italian contingent would form part of the army of occupation. He recalled that the refugees from Aidin had been placed under the protection of Italian troops.[Page 515]
M. Pichon said that he saw no reason to object to this proposal.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that in taking this action the Council would be precipitating difficulties which would inevitably provoke trouble between the Italians and the Greeks. The Council had assumed obligations towards the Greeks because they had asked them to go to Smyrna. He asked whether any similar resolution had been made requesting the Italians to go to Asia Minor.
M. Scialoja said that there had been a resolution of the 18th July which, by fixing a line between the Italians and Greeks, had recognized the principle of Italian occupation.
Mr. Polk said that the Council had testified to an occupation in fact, but he did not believe that they had accepted the principle of Italian occupation.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that General Milne had only been instructed to fix a line of demarcation.
M. Scialoja said that all occupation was occupation in Asia Minor and occupation in fact and did not constitute a definite right. For the moment he held that Italian occupation had been recognized.
Mr. Polk said that he had heard nothing to the effect that Italian occupation had ever been recognized. The Council, in fixing a line of demarcation, had never sanctioned Italian occupation. It had only been a question of avoiding conflict.
(He then read the resolution of the 18th July (See H. D. 10, Minute 4).)
M. Scialoja said that this resolution constituted a virtual recognition, particularly because of the fact that the line of demarcation had been communicated to the Turkish Government in the name of the Conference. The Italian troops were in Asia Minor in the name of the Conference.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that if M. Scialoja should insist upon this declaration being inserted in the proces-verbal he would be obliged to make a formal reservation. His Government had undoubtedly never recognized Italian occupation.
M. Pichon said that the Council had to pronounce upon a definite proposition. The question was in what manner the zone between the line drawn in accordance with the resolution of the 18th July and with the new line, which General Milne proposed, should be held by the Greeks. He asked whether the territory was to be occupied by Inter-Allied troops, which should include Italian representatives. It must be understood that the Inter-Allied occupation of the new zone could not have the effect of sanctioning the situation created by the landing of Italian troops in Asia Minor.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to add that General Milne advocated the representation of Greek troops in the army of occupation [Page 516] of the zone which they were about to evacuate. It was, in effect, the Greeks who were retiring from a territory to which they had gone with the approval of the Conference.
M. Pichon asked whether it would be possible to send Italian troops as well to this zone.
Mr. Polk said that he was ready to refer the matter to his military advisers, but he could not consent to this arrangement if it meant that the present position of the Italians in Asia Minor was to be recognized. The situation would then be quite different. The presence of Italian troops had never been recognized as resulting from a mandate given by the Conference.
M. Pichon said that it would be possible to state in the decision that the steps which the Council proposed to take should in no way prejudice the final decision. The question now was to decide if the Inter-Allied Army of occupation should contain Greek troops and no Italian troops, if the occupation should be truly Inter-Allied and if, at the side of the American, British and French troops, Italian and Greek troops would be represented.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he thought that he should make his point of view more definite. The Greeks were in occupation. They were being asked to retire for military reasons, to stop their advancing in order to avoid conflict with the Turks. M. Venizelos had said, that the Greek troops should be left where they were, but should be joined by British and French units. This would be sufficient to prevent the Turks from attacking. He asked just what the Council desired; whether it was to prevent the Turks from attack and nothing else. If the situation were complicated in allowing the Italians to enter the Inter-Allied Army, new difficulties would be created. The very fact of putting Italian and Greek troops in contact would place them on the verge of an incident.
M. Pichon said that he recognized the weight of the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe and that he was in agreement with him.
M. Scialoja said that he too would agree.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to take the occasion to express to his Italian colleague his thanks for the conciliatory attitude which he had adopted. There was another matter about which he desired to speak. He did not wish any doubt to exist as to the position of General Milne. General Milne had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in Asia Minor by a decision of the Supreme Council.9 It appeared, however, that the French authorities at Constantinople were unwilling to recognize this situation. They stated that they had received no instructions on the subject. It might be possible to inform them of the decisions of the Conference.[Page 517]
M. Pichon said that there was no question but that General Milne was in command in Asia Minor. As to the question of the command at Constantinople, that was another matter, and had formed the subject of negotiations between the British and French Governments, and an agreement had been reached in regard to the matter in the month of December last. He asked that Sir Eyre Crowe should permit him to consult with M. Clemenceau, who was Minister of War, in regard to the matter before any actions were taken.
It was decided:
- to accept the proposals made by General Milne in his telegraphic report to the Supreme Council (See Appendix “H”);
- that in the sector of Aidin the southern limit of the zone of Greek occupation should be changed to a line running to the northeast along the frontier of the sandjak of Smyrna to a point where this line intersects the said frontier;
- that the zone between the line established by the decision of the Supreme Council of the 18th July and the new line (frontier of the Sandjak) should be occupied by British, French and Greek troops.)
10. (The question was adjourned pending the receipt of a new Roumanian note.) Observations of the Roumanian Delegation Respecting the Ports, Waterways and Railways Clauses in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary
11. (At M. Peon’s request the appointment of a Committee was postponed.) Committee for the Execution Colonial Clauses of the Treaty of Peace With Germay
(The meeting then adjourned.)
- HD–22, minute 7, vol. vii, p. 486.↩
- Translation: “Any new delay henceforth will have to he made up within a minimum time limit.”↩
- HD–18, minute 5, vol. vii, p. 372.↩
- HD–59, minute 3, p. 327.↩
- HB–58, minute 2, p. 300; HD–62, minute 8, p. 412.↩
- HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.↩
- Map referred to does not accompany the minutes.↩
- HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.↩
- HD–10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.↩
- Appendix E to HD–62, p. 419.↩
- HD–22, minute 7, vol. vii, p. 486.↩
- HD–11, minute 6, ibid, p. 208.↩
- See subenclosure to enclosure printed infra. ↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- HD–9, minute 2, vol. vii, p. 173.↩
- See appendix F, p. 529.↩
- HD–59, minute 3, p. 327.↩
- Appendix E to HD–3, vol. vii, p. 76.↩
- HD–10, minute 4, ibid., p. 194.↩
- The map referred to does not accompany the minutes. It is in the Department’s files under Paris Peace Conf. 867.0146/21.↩