Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/64

HD–64

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 30, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, September 30, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
  • Secretary
    • M. Dutasta.
    • M. Berthelot.
    • M. de St. Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja
  • Secretary
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui.
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Captain Chapin
British Empire	Captain Hinchley-Cooke
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Rear Admiral McCully
  • Colonel Logan
  • Colonel Browning
  • Major Tyler
  • Mr. E. L. Dresel
• British Empire
  • General Sackville-West
  • Lt.-Col. Kisch
  • Mr. McFadyean
  • Mr. Ibbetson-James
  • Mr. Forbes-Adam
  • Mr. Bourdillon
• France
  • M. Loucheur
  • M. Clementel
  • M. Tardieu
  • General Weygand
  • General Belin
  • M. Laroche
  • M. Kammerer
• Italy
  • M. Brambilla.

1. (The Council had before it a report of the Supreme War Council dated April 22nd, 1919, on the subject of cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation in Rhenish territory. (See Appendix “A”.).) Cost of Allierd Occupation in Germany

M. Loucheur explained that the question under discussion was the cost of the armies of occupation from the signing of the Armistice until the ratification of the Peace Treaty. He then read and commented upon the report of April 22nd, summarizing the present status of the matter.

An Allied Subcommission which had met at Spa had undertaken to define the phrase “expenses of maintenance of the troops of occupation” (“dépenses d’entretien des troupes d’occupation”). This body had decided upon the following definition for this phrase:

“During the present Armistice, which includes war occupation, by expenditures for the upkeep of the troops of occupation of the Ehenish territories, are meant all the expenditures imposed upon the Allied Governments for the daily life of the occupying troops as well as all those brought about by the obligation of maintaining constantly the fixed effective of these troops and to keep them in such a state as to allow them at any time to resist an aggression or to resume hostilities immediately.”

Upon the basis of this definition, the expenses of maintenance had been determined upon at the following rates per man per day:

For the French Army,	Fes. 16.60
For the Belgian Army,	Fes. 16.13
For the British Army,	Fes. 17.06
For the American Army,	Fes. 31.14 (The dollar figured at Fes. 5.70).

During the course of the discussions the Belgian and later, the British delegates had agreed upon the adoption of an average uniform figure for all the occupying armies, and which would be the cost of maintenance of one man per day for the French Army. The American delegate had inclined to adopt this solution, but General Pershing subsequently rigorously opposed the same. The Conferences at Spa, therefore, had resulted in a disagreement.

The question thereafter came before the Reparations Commission, but the same differences of opinion arose in this body. In his capacity as president of the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, he now wished to bring the matter before the Council for decision.

The opinion of the French delegation was based on the following arguments: In the first place, when the Council created the Commission for the Left Bank of the Rhine, in which the United States was represented by General Bliss and Mr. J. W. Davis, the British Empire by Lord Robert-Cecil and Field-Marshal Wilson, France by Marshal Foch and M. Loucheur, the question of the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation had arisen. At various times during the discussion the Commission had thought that it would be well to adopt the French price as an average figure. Marshal Foch had even suggested that it would be well to adopt a lower figure for the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and only include within the phrase “expenses of maintenance to be borne by Germany”, the cost of food and billeting. It had been upon this basis that the calculations had been made to reach the sum of 240,000,000 marks gold yearly, as the maximum cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty. This figure had been agreed upon in a proclamation which had been signed on June 16th, 1919 by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd-George (C. F. 73 A. Minute 2 and Appendix).¹ Mr. Lloyd-George had even expressed the opinion that it would be well to reduce the cost of this maintenance to the minimum.

These arguments appeared to him to be sound, and he added that wherever the question of reaching an average figure had arisen in the Peace Treaty, the French figure had been adopted, as, for example, in the matter of pensions and allowances. He therefore strongly urged that the French rate be adopted in this instance, and that it be taken as a basis for calculating the cost of maintaining the armies, not only before the ratification of the Treaty (total maintenance), but also after such ratification (partial maintenance).

Mr. Polk asked whether the figures agreed upon by President Wilson applied to the cost of upkeep of the armies after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. Loucheur answered that this was the case, and he added that it applied more especially from the moment at which Germany carried out the military obligations incumbent upon her by the Treaty.

Mr. Polk said that he had always believed that the question at issue was the same during the entire period of occupation; namely, that each occupying country should be paid its expenses of occupation by Germany. The cost of maintenance of the American Army during the armistice had amounted to a certain figure, and this Germany was called upon to repay. M. Loucheur’s suggestion appeared to him to place a new interpretation upon the matter, as he had always believed up to the present time that the total cost of maintenance was under discussion, and not merely the cost of food and billets.

M. Loucheur said that a slight misunderstanding was apparent. The French proposition had been that it was necessary to make a distinction between the maintenance prior to the ratification of the Treaty and that subsequent thereto. The difficulty of the situation lay in another direction. The fact existed that the American soldier cost his Government Fes. 31.14, while the French soldier cost only Fes. 16.60. What he asked was that, in order to make a calculation as to what Germany should pay each occupying Power, the same figure should be taken as a basis for each of the Allied Armies. He remarked further that when the same question had arisen regarding the pensions called for as part of the reparations, it had been agreed that the calculation should be made on the basis of the French rate.

Mr. Polk said that the matter resolved itself into ascertaining how much the American Armies cost the United States. The question was not one between the United States and its Allies, but rather between the United States and Germany. The situation would not be helped by the fact that the French and Belgian Governments were reimbursed in full for their expenses, while the United States was but partially repaid. The result would be that the American Treasury Department would be obliged to pay the difference, with the consequent danger that further burdens might be placed upon the American taxpayer. The moment the latter discovered that they would be obliged to pay a portion of the expenses of maintaining an army of occupation, they would demand the recall of this force.

M. Loucheur said that the matter was one which interested all the Allies in general, for it was Germany who was called upon to pay. The more money which Germany was obliged to use in paying for the armies of occupation, the less she would have for the reparations claims.

Mr. Polk answered that he believed the United States would consent to accept reimbursement for the time being upon the basis of the average figure determined upon (French rate). The difference between the sum thus reimbursed and the actual cost of maintenance might be included in the sums due the United States by way of reparations.

M. Loucheur called attention to the fact that, as the Treaty imposed an absolute priority for the sums representing the costs of maintaining the armies of occupation, the difficulty would not be done away with.

Mr. Polk replied that he would be willing to waive the priority for that portion of the expenses of maintenance which would be included in the reparations figure. The all important point was that the American Treasury Department should not have to defray any of the expenses of the armies of occupation.

M. Loucheur said that in view of the propositions which Mr. Polk had put forward, he would like to study the matter somewhat more fully. His only wish in that question had been not to prejudice the reparations account.

M. Pichon drew the attention of the Council to the fact that, at the time the rate of allowance for the officers of the Commission of Control had been determined upon, it had been expressly stated that Germany would be called upon to pay the same, but not the salaries of the officers.²

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British delegate on the subcommission at Spa had stated that he would accept the compromise figure if the same were accepted by all the Governments involved, but that no definite decision had been given in the matter. He thought that in view of the attitude of the United States, the British Government would stand by its first proposal, as it was not favorably disposed to sustaining a burden for the maintenance of its armies of occupation. The question at issue was very complicated and raised many technical points. He wished to know to what competent body the Council thought of referring the matter.

M. Loucheur said that there was a body already in existence; namely, the Subcommission for the Cost of the Armies of Occupation, which was attached to the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

(It was decided:

that the question of the cost of the armies of occupation should be referred to the special subcommission of the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission for further examination and report.)

2. General Weygand read and commented upon a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated September 24th, (See Appendix “B”).

The Lithuanians had asked for permission to receive 50,000 litres of fuel oil which Germany was in a position to turn over to them. From a military point of view, Marshal Foch had raised no objections to this request, but a political question was involved therein; namely, that of trading with the enemy, and this was beyond the Marshal’s jurisdiction. Should the delivery be sanctioned, it was necessary that adequate steps should be taken to insure the fact that the Germans themselves should not be benefited by this fuel oil. Proposed Supply of Oil by Germany to Lithuania

Mr. Polk asked whether any guarantee actually existed that a military organization under German control would not profit by the delivery.

M. Clemenceau suggested that the matter could await the ratification of the Peace Treaty, at which time the Allies would be in a position to supervise the delivery.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British Military Authorities agreed with General Weygand, but that there were two difficulties in the situation. In the first place, the Council would be deciding to authorize a delivery of fuel oil at the same moment that it had resolved upon the exercise of economic pressure on Germany; and in the second place, no information was at hand as to whether an actual guarantee could be had that the oil would not benefit Germans in the Baltic Provinces. He proposed that Allied Representatives in these provinces should be asked whether, if the Council were to authorize the delivery, they could guarantee that it would not benefit the Germans.

(It was decided:

to request the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to ascertain from the Allied Military Authorities in the Balkan [Baltic?] States whether the latter were able to guarantee that such oil, as the Allied and Associated Governments might authorize to be delivered to the Lithuanians, should not fall into the hands of German organizations.)

3. (The Council had before it a memorandum of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 29th, 1919. (See Appendix “C”).)

M. Clementel said that the Supreme Economic Council had created a Supply Committee whose function was to insure that the Allies should not become competitors in the world markets for the purchase of articles of prime necessity. At the time when the Germans and Austrians are to be allowed to make purchases on their own account the Supreme Economic Council believed that it would be advantageous to prevent the former enemies from competing with the Allies in the markets, and thus contributing to a rise in the prices of indispensable articles. For this reason the Supreme Economic Council believed that the Committee of Supply should be consulted regarding the German requests. The problem had already arisen in matters of finance and shipping, at which time it was decided that the competent Commissions should be responsible to the Supreme Economic Council with regard to the requests of the Allies, and to the Reparations Commission relative to the applications made by the Germans, because it was to the latter Commission that the German requests would be made. The United States of America was not represented at the present time on the Supreme Economic Council, a most regrettable fact, but they were represented on the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission. They might, therefore, be represented on the Supply Committee on behalf of the Reparations Commission. The other Allies might be represented both from the point of view of the Reparations Commission and of the Supreme Economic Council. In this manner one single Commission, on which all the Allies were represented, would be competent to deal with the situation. Proposal of the Economic Commission Relative to the Procedure To Be Fallowed for the Supply of Foodstuffs and Raw Material to Genniny and Austria

Mr. Polk said that he regretted his inability to accept at the present time the proposal put forward by M. Clementel. He had talked with Mr. Hoover prior to the departure of the latter and they had both been of the opinion that the United States should not be represented on the Supreme Economic Council. On the other hand, they should be represented for all questions of reparations. The matters within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Council, such as division of foodstuffs and coal, were questions which were of vital importance to Europe but not of interest to the United States. Consequently, the latter had no need of representation in this body. It was only on the Reparations Commission that the American Representatives could advantageously function. Therefore, in view of Mr. Hoover’s opinion, and also that of the American Treasury Department, he was unable to agree with M. Clementel at the present time.

M. Clementel replied that it was not a question of asking the United States to take part in the work of the Supreme Economic Council, however greatly this might be desired. The matter was simply to know whether the buyers of the Supreme Economic Council were to ignore the German and Austrian purchasers, and whether or not these two groups were to become competitors.

Mr. Polk said that he had realized that the question would come up for discussion in the Council and had therefore telegraphed his Government for instructions in advance. These had not yet been received, and until they should be he was unable to take any decision in the matter. He therefore requested that the discussion be adjourned, but said that in the interval Mr. Dresel and Colonel Logan might discuss the matter with M. Clementel.

(The discussion of the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the procedure to be followed for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria was adjourned.)

4. (The Council had before it a note of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 20th, 1919. (See Appendix “D”.)

(At the request of Mr. Polk, the detailed examination of this note was adjourned until such time as the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria should be considered.) Note of the supreme Economic Council on the General Economic Situation of Europe

5. (The Council had before it a note of the Supreme Economic Council requesting the appointment by the United States of America of an arbitrator for the distribution of shipping on the Danube (See Appendix “E”).) Appointment of Arbitrators for the Division of Tonnage on the River Danube

Mr. Clementel said that article 300 of the Peace Treaty with Austria provided for the appointment by the United States of America of one or several arbitrators, whose duties would be to distribute among the interested parties the tugs and other vessels forming part of the commercial fleet of the Danube River. In a telegram from Budapest, Admiral Troubridge urgently requested that the American Arbitrator provided for in the Treaty should begin his work as quickly as possible. The Supreme Economic Council therefore asked that the United States hasten the appointment of its arbitrators.

Mr. Polk said that the Austrian Treaty had not yet been ratified by any Government. He would take the responsibility of naming an arbitrator but he did not believe that such an appointment would result to any good effect in view of the fact that Austria itself had not yet ratified the Treaty. Sir Eyre Crowe had called his attention to the fact that a similar article existed in the German Treaty and that, following the ratification of this document by Germany, a special arrangement had been made and an arbitrator nominated. The same procedure might be followed in this instance with regard to Austria without waiting for the ratification by the American Senate. Colonel Logan could take up the question with Mr. Clementel.

It was decided:

that Colonel Logan should confer with Mr. Clementel with regard to the nomination of the American Arbitrators provided for by article 300 of the Austrian Peace Treaty (Distribution and Control of shipping on the Danube).

6. (The Council had before it two letters from Mr. Venizelos dated August 22nd and September 28th respectively (See Appendices “F” and “G”.).)

Mr. Berthelot read and commented upon the letter of September 28th. Protest From the Greek Delegation Regarding the Composition and Functioning of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna

Mr. Polk remarked that the question had been of raised, while Mr. Balfour was sitting in the Council, as to the exact powers of the Greek Officer who had been authorized to follow the labors of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that a resolution in this matter had been taken by the Council on August 14th (See H. D. 31, Minute No. 3),³ as follows:

“It was decided:

that the previous decisions of the Council (See H. D. 12, article #5)⁴ should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna. All necessary data should be communicated to him, however, and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed.”

Me. Berthelot answered that Mr. Venizelos maintained that the Allied Commissioners had kept Colonel Mazarakis completely in ignorance of their labors and have not even furnished him with the minutes of their meetings.

Mr. Clemenceau said that this appeared excessive. A telegram should be sent at once to Constantinople instructing that the minutes should be communicated to the Greek Representative and, should the latter have any complaints to make thereon, he should present the same to the Commission. The attention of the representatives should also again be drawn to the former resolutions of the Council in the matter.

It was decided:

(1) that the minutes of the meetings of the Commission on Inquiry at Smyrna, including the testimony of witnesses, should be communicated to the Greek Representative attached to this Commission;

(2) that said Representative should be asked and permitted to notify the Commission of any criticisms which he desired to formulate regarding the matters in question.

7. (The Council had before it a memorandum from the British Delegation dated August 11th, 1918 [1919], (See appendix “H”).)

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the events at Smyrna had British Proposal indisputably called forth a certain number of complaints against the Greek and Turkish Governments. The Commission of Inquiry which had been appointed might form a sub-commission on the ground to deal with these protests. It might be, however, that such a proposal was now too late as a telegram had been received from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated September 8th, stating that the Greeks had already formed such a Commission. In view of this fact he asked that the Council permit him to telegraph Constantinople for further information and to await the receipt of this before formally presenting his proposal. British Proposal for the Investigation of Complaints Arising Through the Incidents at Smyrna

(The study of the British proposal was adjourned until such time as Sir Eyre Crowe should receive additional information.)

8. Mr. Polk said that it would be as well to adjourn this matter pending the receipt of an answer from the Swedish Government on the subject of the Blockade of Soviet Russia. Question of the Aaland Islands

(The question was adjourned.)

9. (The Council had before it a report of the Baltic Commission dated August 25th, 1919, in this matter, (See Appendix “I”).) Questions of Karelia and Petchenga

Mr. Kammerer read from and commented upon the report in question and said that the Commission had not made any proposal to the Council. They asked merely whether, despite the absence of a responsible Russian Government and regardless of the fact that Petchenga was situated in Russian territory, they might be allowed to study the means of giving satisfaction to the desires of Finland.

Mr. Clemenceau answered that he was prepared to authorize the Commission to make such a study, but that neither he nor any of his colleagues at the present time recognized their right to dispose of Russian territory.

Mr. Kammerer remarked that in 1862 a discussion had taken place between the Governments of Finland and of Imperial Russia for the cession of the port of Petchenga to Finland. An agreement had been reached but had not been executed and its validity was even open to doubt.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Council might later have to discuss the question with the Finns and it would be well to have a solution ready at that time.

(It was decided:

that the Baltic Commission should be authorized to make a study of the ways and means by which the claims of Finland for a modification of its frontiers in Karelia and the district of Petchenga might receive satisfaction.)

(The meeting then adjourned)

Hotel Crillon, Paris , September 30, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–64

supreme war council
military representative

Versailles, April 22, 1919.

Report of Supreme War Council, April 22, 1919, Relative to Cost for Maintenance of Troops of Occupation in Rhenish Territory

Translation

Report Relative to the Cost for the Maintenance of the Troops of Occupation in Rhenish Territory

According to the terms of Article 9 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, “the upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhenish territories (not including Alsace-Lorraine) is at the charge of the German Government.”

An Interallied sub-Commission sitting at Spa was asked by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to define the exact meaning of the expression “upkeep of the troops” and to determine the scope of the obligation which would thus result for Germany.

definition of the expenditures of upkeep

The members of the sub-Commission have unanimously decided upon the following terms:

“During the present Armistice, which includes war occupation, by expenditures for the upkeep of the troops of occupation of the Rhenish territories, are meant all the expenditures imposed upon the Allied Governments for the daily life of the occupying troops as well as all those brought about by the obligation of maintaining constantly the fixed effective of these troops and to keep them in such a state as to allow them at any time to resist an aggression or to resume hostilities immediately.”

“It results from this definition that the expenditures of upkeep must include not only those pertaining to the alimentation of the personnel and of the animals, their lodging and their cantonment, but also those caused by their salary and the accessories.—Salaries, quarters, heat, light, clothing, equipment and harnessing,—armament and rolling material—aviation, treatment of the sick and wounded, veterinary service and remount service, service of transport of every kind (railroad, maritime and fluvial transportation, motor trucks, etc.) that of communication across France and, in a general way, all the expenditures for all the administrative or technical services whose functioning is necessary for the instruction of the troops and for the maintenance of their effectives and of their military power.”

This definition gave rise to no observation on the part of Marshal Foch nor on the part of the members of the Peace Conference.

evaluation of costs

The sub-Commission of Spa has, according to this definition, determined average daily cost in each army per officer, per man and per animal and by multiplying it by the effectives have determined the cost by day and by month.

The total expenditure per month has thus been evaluated at a little more than 600,000,000 francs.^* No difference of opinion came out on the subject of that calculation.

conditions in which the payment shall be made by germany

Considering the amount of the costs which, at the end of the fourth month of occupation, will have reached about two and a half billion francs, and considering that it is materially impossible to ask Germany for the immediate payment of such a sum, the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies was led to look for the means of establishing a distinction between the various expenditures included in the definition of the upkeep costs.

• —a first category of expenditures corresponding to the alimentation of men and animals should alone be immediately paid by Germany,
• —a second category including all the other expenditures brought about by the upkeep of the troops of occupation should be paid later by the enemy as war costs.

For the evaluation of the expenses of the first category, the Marshal considered that an average daily evaluation of 6 francs per man and 3 francs per animal could be admitted, the same for all the allied armies.

This solution was studied by the sub-Commission of Spa.

In the first session held at Spa, on February 23rd, the Delegates of the various Allied Armies agreed without any serious objections.

But in the two later sessions of the same said sub-Commission, held in Paris on February 27 and 28th, various Delegates raised objections.

The British Delegates considered that, from the point of view of payment, it was not advisable to make a distinction between the various categories of expenditures included in the definition of upkeep expenditures.

If the Germans cannot pay in its entirety every periodic payment, the sums that they shall be able to pay shall be received as payment on account to be deducted from the total periodic payments, but not as a complete liquidation of certain categories of expenditures.

They accept the adoption of a single daily price for all the armies, and which shall be the French price.

The British Military Representative at Versailles calls attention to the fact that the transaction proposed by the British representative on February 28th is valid only if all the armies of occupation accept the French daily rate. That rate has not been accepted by General Pershing in his letter of March 8th.⁵ As a consequence, the British proposal is not maintained.

The British thesis is the following: the integral bill for upkeep cannot be divided, such as it has been established and distributed for each of the Allied and Associated Armies, no part of that bill of upkeep can be settled by payment on account by Germany. In other words, the upkeep bill as a whole is entitled to the priority of the German payment.

This opinion seems to have been adopted by the Supreme Council since: article V of the clauses relative to the reparations, accepted by the Supreme Council, stipulates the payment of a certain sum in gold in 1919 and in 1920 “out of this sum the expenditures of the army of occupation since the Armistice shall first be paid, provided that the supply in food and raw materials which the Allied and Associated Governments shall deem essential to allow Germany to meet their obligations of reparation, can be paid out of the said sum, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments.”

The American Delegate is of the opinion that the expenditures of the troops of occupation should be established en bloc according to the definition admitted and the immediate payment of the greatest possible part of the sum to be paid on that account by Germany should be insisted upon immediately and divided among the Allies proportionally to the total claim for each army.

On March 6th [8th], in a letter to Marshal Foch, General Pershing writes what follows:

“March 8, 1919.

My dear Marshal: Since the question of the upkeep of the troops of occupation has been submitted to me, I have the honor of informing you that my ideas on that subject are the following:—

1) The upkeep expenditures such as they are defined in the minutes of the session of the Armistice sub-Commission of January 9, 1919, representing [represent?] the obligations assumed by Germany toward the United States.

2. Considering that the average daily up-keep of the American Army is higher than that of the other armies, the United States cannot accept that the French average daily up-keep expenses be taken as a base in estimating the German obligations towards the United States.

3. Considering that Germany is not in a position at the present time to assume the total of her obligations towards the United States, the United States accepts for the time being, to receive payments from Germany on account, in the same proportion as those that Germany is to pay per man and per horse to the Allied Governments.

4. The sums received from Germany in execution of the provisions specified in paragraph 3, shall be credited by the total of the sums due, but shall not be imputed as complete or partial liquidation of certain accounts or of special expenses.

5. The United States reserves, and shall reserve the sight to collect from Germany all balances due at the present time or in the future on German obligations which shall not have been already liquidated; this collection may be made from any source; either from the funds or properties in possession of the United States, or any others which might in the opinion of the United States be or become available.

The preceding conclusions have the approbation of the Financial Councillor of the United States at Paris.

Pershing

General Bliss, American Military Representative at Versailles, wishes to have the following considerations added:

“The solution of the question as to how much each Allied or Associated Power should receive according to the Armistice terms with Germany, for the upkeep of their armies in occupied German territory, seems to me to have been the object of a confusion resulting from the introduction of an outside question. I understand that an objection might be raised by the Germans against this or that interpretation of the French work upkeep (entretien), but I cannot understand why there should be any difference of opinion among the Allied or Associated Governments.

This difficulty seems to have arisen from the fact that our efforts have been directed to arriving at a definition of the Interallied word ‘entretieri’ while in reality, for each Government this word means: the cost of ‘the upkeep’ of its own army. All that this Government has the right to exact under the heading ‘upkeep’ should be collectable by this Government, notwithstanding the fact that the sum collected might vary according to the army.

Another difficulty seems to arise from the belief on the part of some that whatever amounts may be recovered by the respective Governments constitute a credit for these Governments, when they are simply reimbursements of justified expenses which they have incurred. Therefore, I observe in one of these documents that it is stated if we exact under the heading ‘Maintenance’ anything else but subsistence and lodging, the British and notably the American Government will receive more considerable sums than the French Government. This fact deserves consideration if the sums thus levied by the respective Governments are to go to their treasuries as profit, thus increasing the total sum, which was already on hand. Truly, the payments effected by each Government under the heading ‘Maintenance’ of its army of occupation, produce a void in the coffers, more considerable in one coffer than in the other. But in any case the sums collected simply fill the gaps, whatever they are, leaving each treasury in the state where it was before. For the needs of the special question interesting us, it is of little importance that the pay of an army be more or less higher than that of another army; it is of no more importance that an army of occupation be more important than another. The fact pure and simple is that the occupation ended, unless all the expenses be reimbursed by Germany, the deficit created in the coffers of a Government could virtually be filled by means of a reimbursement effected by Germany, when the deficit of the treasury of another Government would continue to exist.

The acceptance of the proposed French definition on the meaning of the word ‘Maintenance’ really means that the United States are requested to contribute to [sic] a certain considerable sum taken from its treasury. To whom shall this sum be paid? Certainly not to the Germans, for it is known that we have the intention of exacting from the Germans the very last cent that we can get from them. To whom then shall be destined this contributed sum? Evidently to those Allies who are expecting according to the conditions of the Peace Treaty to obtain a contribution on the part of Germany.

The question therefore becomes not a question of definition of ‘Maintenance’, but of policy. As American, and in order to reach a decision on the line of conduct to follow, I should like to know what proportion of the contribution that I must impose upon myself will go to Great Britain, what proportion will go respectively to Belgium, France, Italy, and to Japan. I should like to know if I must impose upon myself a contribution to the profit of these Powers with the exception of Belgium and France and for these two latter countries, for what sum I should tax myself to the profit of one and how much to the profit of the other.

My opinion is the following: the United States participate[d] to [in?] the common cause under the form of the totality of their expenses in the maintenance of their armies during the war. I do not see why the United States should pay the maintenance expenses of their army of occupation during the armistice and after the signing of the Peace Treaty, when these expenses should be paid by Germany. I am of the opinion that like the other Governments, the United States had the right to exact the payment of all their expenses for their army of occupation and to recover as much of the amount of these expenses that we can make Germany pay. I beg you to recall that there is another considerable expense that the United States would have the right to exact payment from Germany. The United States are beginning to replace gradually their considerable army raised by conscription, at present in German territories, by volunteer troops taken from the regular army. These troops must be transported at great expense from the United States to Germany. When their presence in Germany will no longer be needed, they must be transported back to the United States. Tnese operations are in a large measure effected to the profit of the Allied and Associated Powers and not to that of the United States. Nevertheless, the United States have not the intention of presenting the bill for this transportation to Germany. If after the settlement effected by Germany, the United States desired to attribute this sum to one or the other of their Allies, they will have the option of doing so; but they will have the privilege of choosing which one of the Allies shall bear this contribution. To insist that these just expenses remain unpaid by Germany, simply to allow our Allies to take possession of them and to share them amongst themselves, does not seem reasonable to me, nor to any other American. The American Military Representative adheres therefore to the meaning of the phrase ‘maintenance costs’ such as has been defined in the minutes of the Session of the sub-committee on the Armistice of January 9, 1919, and accepted by the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Corps in his letter addressed to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, under date of March 8, 1919.[”]

• Belgian opinion—The Belgian Delegate while accepting the definition on January 9, and preferring the immediate payment of all expenses if possible, is disposed to accept the immediate payment of the expenses of the first category, such as defined by Marshal Foch and to postpone to a later date the payment of the other expenses which would be inscribed under the chapter “War Expenses”. If the solution to divide the expenses into two categories were accepted, the Belgian Delegate is disposed to accept a general and average rate based upon the average rate of the French army.
• French opinion—The French Delegate shares the viewpoint of the Belgian Delegate.
• Italian opinion—The Italian Military Kepresentative set forth today that the Italian contingent having been sent in the occupied territory since March 12, 1919, there is reason to comprise the maintenance costs of these troops in the total of the expenses which Germany shall reimburse as costs for the maintenance of the armies of occupation in Germany.

On this subject, the Italian Military Kepresentative states that he is of the same opinion as the French Delegate, that is to say that the expenses should be divided into two categories:

A —one of which is payable immediately (food and cantonments).

B —the second shall be paid later as “War Expenses”. The average daily cost of each category can be figured for the Italian troops in the same measure as for the French troops.

The French Military Representative to the S. W. C.

Belin

The British Military Representative to the S. W. C.

Sackville-West

The Italian Military Representative to the S. W. C.

Renzo Toni

The American Military Representative to the S. W. C.

Bliss

[Enclosure]

Table A

Expenses

Armies	Average Daily Cost
	Per Officer	Per Man	Per Horse	Per Officer	Per Man
				Not including expenses of animals	Including expenses of animals
French Army	33.60	13.92	6.56	14.54	16.61
Belgian Army	26.22	13.81	6.15	14.319	16.127
British Army	38.96	14.34	6.19	15.52	17.06
American Army	52.48	28.34	8.63	29.38	31.14

(1) The expenses included in the above table are as follows:

Subsistence of personnel and of animals—lodging and cantonments—

(a) pay and accessories:—quarters, heat and ligbt—clothes—equipment and harness—armament and rolling stock—(Maintenance and normal wear)—aeronautics (Maintenance and normal usage)—care of sick and wounded—veterinary and remount services—transport services of all kinds—lines of communication.

(a) [(b)] Are not included in the valuation of the expenses only the accessories and small objects that the Allies are called upon to furnish, it being understood that lodging and cantonment in the full sense of the word are furnished in kind by the German Government and according to proceeding in force in the German army.

Note. These figures are subject to modification following increases in pay and the cost of living.

Appendix B to HD–64

commander-in-chief
of the
allied armies
general staff
General Direction of Army
Supplies and Communications
No. 153, C.R.F.

G. H. Q. September 24, 1919.

Note From Marshal Foch Relative to the Delivery of Petroleum by Germany to Lithuania

Note for the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has been informed by the Military Section of the British Delegation in Paris of a request made by the Lithuanians asking authorization to receive 50,000 litres of petroleum which the German Commissariat in Berlin is willing to cede to them.

This cession is requested by the Lithuanians for their army.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies has the honor to submit this question for the decision of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, with the advice that, if the cession is authorized, it is indispensable that measures be taken which will guarantee that the petroleum will be received by the Lithuanian authorities and not by an organization under German control.

Major-General

Weygand

Appendix C to HD–64

Paris, September 29, 1919.

supreme economic council

Note for the Supreme Council

The Supreme Council has forwarded to the Supreme Economic Council, with a request for their views, a note, copy of which is hereto annexed,⁶ and which was addressed to the Council by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, on the procedure to be followed for the examination of the German demands for supplies in alimentary stuffs and raw materials.

The Supreme Economic Council examined, at the same time, a report which was made to them by the Interallied Consultative Committee on provisioning regarding the same request which had been entrusted to it by the French and British Governments. The Council also examined a letter from the Austrian Delegation relative to the needs of that Country, in which a report had been established by the Consultative Committee on Provisioning.

These different documents are annexed hereto.⁷

In the course of the discussion which is exposed in the minutes hereto annexed, it was recognized that a close coordination was necessary between the labors of the Separations Commission and the different Committees attached to the Supreme Economic Council which the Allied Governments had appointed to examine the questions relative to the food supplies and the provisioning in raw materials.

The Supreme Economic Council believes that the requests presented by the Central Empires are susceptible of affecting not only the interests confided to the Separations Committee provided for by the Peace Treaty, but also, as is evident, the supply interests of all Europe on account of the limited margin available for the provisioning.

Consequently the Supreme Economic Council deems it expedient to present the following demand to the Supreme Council:

“The Supreme Economic Council requests the Supreme Council to give instructions to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission and also to the Reparations Commission itself to proceed in the following manner in all the questions which concern authorization for the purchase of supplies and raw materials in execution of Article 235 of the Peace Treaty with Germany and similar clauses contained in the other Peace Treaties.

The programs drafted, and the purchase orders of material and supplies to be given by virtue of these Articles should be submitted to an examination by the Committee on Raw Materials and by the Consultative Provisioning Committee attached to the Supreme Economic Council.

These Committees shall, at the same time, determine the conditions of purchase which shall seem to them particularly suitable to prevent speculation and unjustified increase in the cost of living throughout the world”.

Appendix D to HD–64

[Note of the Supreme Economic Council on the General Economic Situation of Europe]

General Economic Situation in Europe

(Note by the French Delegation for the Permanent Committee)

I. The labors of the Consultative Food Committee have established the fact that it is not because of any insufficiency in foodstuffs that the world is threatened with famine. As regards Raw Materials (the report of the Raw Materials sub-committee was not to hand at the time of drafting this Memorandum) it does not seem as if the deficits, which may cause grave difficulties to certain industries are such as to threaten the general stability of the world.

Neither does it appear that sea-going tonnage, although there are grave obstacles to its utilisation, caused by the bad working of the land transport, is at the moment insufficient to the needs of international relations. Amid the ruins and disorders resulting from five years of war, one general cause can be isolated. If this cause were to disappear many of the difficulties would remain to be overcome. But if [it] persists, all efforts will be in vain.

II. All over the world, the vast operations of credit necessitated by the war, have depreciated currency. But the disproportion between the respective depreciations of each national currency is considerable. Each country has depended to a different degree on the outside world for its war supplies. Some countries have been able to maintain a great part of those of their industries which are productive of exchangeable securities. Others have had to divert the greater part of their industries [to] the production of war material. These latter are dependent on the former for their Raw Materials and for a great part of their manufactured products. This break in the former equilibrium of exchange has caused a break in monetary relations. The disparity in value between the various national monetary tokens is daily increasing in proportion to the unstable equilibrium of exchange. Their mutual relations vary from day to day. It is sufficient to follow the exchange quotations of countries which have the same monetary system (e. g. French francs, Belgian and Swiss francs, pesetas, lire, lei, etc.) to realise that their enormous variations make international exchange impossible.

III. Money having virtually ceased to be exchangeable between them, or rather money having ceased to perform its function as a medium of exchange, each country, which has available products or services possessing an international value, tends to place them under its control in order to use them for the regulation of its own imports. On the other Tiand, in order to limit at home as much as possible the rise in the cost of life, which is a consequence of the general monetary depreciation, each government is tending to use this control either to limit exports and create an artificial abundance or to fix double prices, the lower price for its nationals, the higher price for foreign countries, the latter calculated so as to compensate the loss made by the effect of the former.

IV. The solution of European difficulties is, therefore, above all a financial solution. It is necessary that a current of credit should be able to develop in a continuous circuit throughout Europe. No European country can be the source of this current. Each of these countries is itself confronted with great difficulties, almost all are under the necessity of borrowing on their own account. Many of them, whose resources, though unequal, are great, can only utilise those resources for themselves. But if they were themselves propped, some of them would be able to place their experience and their organisation at the disposal of Europe.

To sum up, the supply of the greater part of Europe, above all of the new states of Eastern Europe, of Germany and of Austria, cannot, it seems, depend on the European Powers in their present state for these Powers are all at the moment debtors.

It is the business of the Supreme Economic Council to affirm that the well-being and security of the two hemispheres are closely related and interdependent, and the work of reconstruction is obligatory upon all, each to the measure of his power.

20 September, 1919.

Appendix E to HD–64

u. s. naval communication service paris, france

Telegram

From: Budapest.

To: Communication Section, Supreme Economic Council, Paris.

The opening of Danube has caused great activity in shipping circles. New Danubian states and British shipping companies engaged in negotiations for transfer of shipping from former owners are unable to complete transactions and commerce operations owing to doubtful title of ships in river. It is imperative for welfare of all Danubian countries and river navigation that the American Arbitrator referred to in treaty should commence his arbitrage with the least possible delay. No. 44.

Admiral

Troubridge

⁸

Appendix F to HD–64

Paris, August 22, 1919.

greek delegation to the peace congress

From: E. K. Venizelos.

To: President Clemenceau.

During its session of July 18th⁹ the Supreme Council of the Conference decided to send an Investigation Commission of four members representing the Allied and Associated Powers to Smyrna.

As soon as I learned of that decision, I hastened to expose to Your Excellency, through a letter dated July 19th,¹⁰ the reasons for which it did not appear to me either just or in conformity with the customs that the party investigating the conduct of the Greek Army pursue its investigation without the participation of a Greek representative.

Two days later, July 21st, the Supreme Council informed me that I was at liberty to designate a Greek officer who would be authorized to follow the labors of the investigation commission, who would not, however, have the right to vote or authorization to take part in the drafting of the conclusion of the Commission.

Although this measure gave but very partial satisfaction to the legitimate amour-propre of the Greek Army, I accepted it, as I do not have the habit of creating difficulties for the Great Powers. Consequently, I decided to designate Mr. Alexander Mazarakis, Colonel in the General Staff, to follow the labors of the Investigation Commission, and, in a letter dated July 31st, I informed the General Secretariat of the Conference of my decision, and at the same time requested them to notify the other members of the Investigation Commission.

The Commission was established at Constantinople last week and immediately commenced its labors by taking the testimony of certain witnesses. The representative of the Greek Government at once requested that Colonel Mazarakis be invited to proceed to Constantinople in order to follow these investigations. The Investigation Commission, however, deemed it preferable to not have the Greek Delegate present during the interrogations as his presence might intimidate certain witnesses; and considered it sufficient to communicate the depositions to him after the sessions and to keep him informed of the progress of the Commission.

This procedure was giving the most restrictive interpretation to the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council under date of July 31st [21st]¹¹ and further diminished the role assigned to the Greek Delegate who, deprived of the right to vote, found that he was still further deprived of the privilege of being present at least during the labors of the Commission.

Unfortunately, still another humiliation awaited him, the representative of the Greek Government at Constantinople has, in fact, just informed me that the Investigation Commission informed him that on Tuesday last, August 20th, following instructions received from Paris, a Turkish officer is to be admitted on the same footing as the Greek officer and with exactly the same privileges in following the investigations.

I can not, Mr. President, but express the very painful surprise which the announcement of these new measures has caused me, and I appeal to your sentiment of justice with a view to obtaining redress.

To place a Greek officer on an equal footing with a Turk officer in an investigation being conducted in a country occupied by the Greek Army, is not only to inflict an unjust humiliation on that army and to forget that it is there as a representative of the Allied and Associated Powers, but to lose sight of the fact that a state of war is still existing between Greece and Turkey; it is to disregard the services rendered to the common cause by Greece, the serious wrongs committed toward the Entente by Turkey, and her crimes against Christian populations; finally, it is to suppress all distinctions between victors and vanquished and to confound, in an unjust and deceptive equality, enemies and friends.

I must, furthermore, Mr. President, insist upon the necessity of modifying the measure adopted by the Commission to proceed to the interrogation of witnesses in the absence of the Greek officer. The investigation which has already commenced in Constantinople and which will be continued in Smyrna, although solicited long ago by the Greek Government, but in vain, was decided upon by the Supreme Council as the result of a complaint made to the Conference by the Cheik-ul-Islam.¹² It has pleased the Supreme Council, in acceding to this demand, to place the Greek Army of occupation in the position of accused. The Greek officer authorized to follow the labors of the Commission appears, in consequence, as its legitimate defender. It is inconceivable that he not be authorized to be present during the interrogations of witnesses. The Commission appears to fear that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses: I ask what would be thought of a Judge who, for a similar motive, would expel the lawyer for the defense from the court. In civilized countries far from expelling the defense during the examination, the law necessitates his presence as an essential guarantee for the defendant, because his presence gives him an opportunity to check the statements of the witnesses, to demand that they give complementary explanations, and to procure, if need be, new testimony; in short, to allow him to anticipate the errors into which the examining judge might be led.

I trust, Mr. President, that you will not find my application for this common right in the investigation which has been decided upon in Smyrna to be exaggerated, and I am convinced that the Supreme Council, recognizing the absolute justice of this demand, will hasten to accede to it.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix G to HD–64

Paris, September 28, 1919.

greek delegation to the peace conference

From: M. Venizelos,

To: M. Clemenceau.

On July 21 last, the Supreme Council of the Conference notified me of the resolution, copy of which is appended.¹⁴

In conformity with that resolution, a Greek officer was authorized to follow the work of the Commission of Inquiry in Asia-Minor; he was not to have the right of vote in the Commission and could not take part in the drafting of its conclusions.

I appointed Colonel Alexandre Mazarakis of the General Staff to follow the work in the conditions indicated in the resolution. The Secretariat General of the Conference was asked to notify the members of the Commission of Inquiry of the nomination of that officer.

Contrary to the measures adopted by the Supreme Council and which I believed my duty to accept, although it only gave partial satisfaction to my request, Colonel Mazarakis was not authorized to be present at the hearings before the Commission of Inquiry, under the pretext that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses.

He has not even received communication of the depositions of those witnesses. He was not kept in touch with the progress of the inquiry. The character of that procedure is openly contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the resolution which the Supreme Council communicated to me on July 21.

I feel obliged to protest against that arbitrary procedure and have the honor to ask you, Mr. President, to be so kind as to propose to the Supreme Council to order immediately a new inquiry to be made in conformity with the resolution of July 21, with the cooperation of Colonel Mazarakis.

You must agree with me that in such a serious question I cannot give up the right which had been recognized on July 21 to the Hellenic Government by the Supreme Council of the Conference, and that the conclusions of the Commission without any participation of the Greek officer during the hearing of the witnesses cannot be considered as the result of a procedure which would have taken into account the right of defense.

In asking, after my preceding communication, for the resumption of the inquiry, I am making an appeal to the sentiments of justice of the Supreme Council who is not going to repeal a decision to which the Commission of Inquiry did not conform.

Please accept,

E. K. Venizelos

Appendix H to HD–64

[British Proposal for the Investigation of Complaints Arising Through the Incidents at Smyrna]

Note for the Supreme Council

Numerous claims for compensation for damages and losses in connection with the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the surrounding districts are being preferred against both the Greek and Turkish Governments.

It would be a great advantage to have claims of this sort investigated on the spot whilst the acts out of which they arise are still recent, and where it is possible to collect evidence to rebut the statements of claimants.

It is therefore resolved that the duty of investigating these claims be entrusted to the Inter-Allied Commission already appointed to enquire into the incidents in the Smyrna district. This could best be done by furnishing the several Commissioners with sufficient staff to enable them to set up a Sub-Commission which would conduct the investigations and submit their recommendations as to the amounts claimed against the Greek and the Turkish Governments respectively, which should receive the Support of the Allied and Associated Governments.

Paris, August 11, 1919.

Appendix I to HD–64

Italian delegation
to the peace conference
hotel edouard vii

Paris, August 25, 1919.

From: M. Torretta

To: Secretary General Dutasta.

The Commission on Baltic Affairs has recently heard the Finnish Delegation which exposed to it the desire of the Finnish Government to obtain a modification of the frontier of Finland in Carelia and in the district of Petchenga.

It seemed to the majority of the Commission that according to the 4th condition contained in the note addressed to Admiral Koltchak on May 27¹⁵ and saying that “in case the frontiers and the other relations between Russia and Finland could not be regulated by an agreement between the two parties, these questions should be submitted to the arbitration of the League of Nations,” the Commission is therefore not competent to recommend a final solution of the questions themselves.

The minority of the Commission, however, while recognizing the [im]possibility of arriving for the present to a final settlement is of the opinion that the Commission should proceed to the examination of these questions in order to submit to the Supreme Council proposals for a provisional settlement of the questions concerning the district referred to.

In order to decide the line of conduct to be followed, the Commission has examined the proceding [sic] declaration of the Conference on this question.

1. At the session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of May 3,¹⁶ when it was a question to recognize the independence of Finland, it was decided that: “After the recognition of the independence of Finland …, the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France shall instruct their representatives to insist with the Finnish Government so that it accept the decisions of the Peace Conference regarding the Finnish frontiers.”^* This indication and others have encouraged the Finnish Government to expect from the Peace Conference some manifestation on the question of the frontier referred to. It seemed to the minority of the Commission that, for these motives, it would be difficult for the Conference not to take interest completely in this question.

2. The decision of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, May 3, last, is however previous to the communication made to Admiral Koltchak, which bears the date of May 27 and contains the following passage: “the independence of Finland and Poland shall be recognized and in case the frontiers as well as the questions concerning the relations between Russia and those countries should not be regulated by an agreement, all these questions should be submitted to the arbitration of the League of Nations.” This communication clearly indicates that the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has modified its original point of view. It is indeed after the adoption of this new point of view that the Commission on Baltic Affairs abstained from tracing the frontier of Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, etc. …

3. Finally the Commission on Baltic Affairs expressed, in its meetings with the Supreme Council on August 1, the opinion “that there was no need to grant a hearing to the Carelian Delegates since a decision on their requests could not be taken in view of the fact that, for the present, there exists in Russia no legal government whose opinion would be necessary.”

Under these conditions, it seems to the majority that the Commission should not be authorized to handle a possible change of the Finnish frontier in the very region aimed at by the requests of the Carelians.

The minority of the Commission remarked however, that while sharing the opinion expressed in its answer, it did not exclude the possibility of some declaration of a general order on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments regarding the frontiers of Carelia and that, besides, this answer in no way affected the Petchenga question which was the most important.

The Commission also took into consideration other arguments pro and con the examination of this question:

The majority remarks that, during the discussion of the proposal to make a declaration to the Governments of the Baltic States, the Supreme Council had, in its session of July 26,¹⁷ raised among other objections that of the susceptibilities of the Russian elements. The question of Carelia and Petchenga, which are Russian territories situated beyond the present frontier of Finland would raise much more serious questions. Indeed, it will be a question of infringing upon the territorial integrity of Russia, without taking into account that any modification of the frontiers in Carelia would inevitably threaten the safety of the Mourmansk Railroad which is the sole means of communication of Russia with the open sea in the north. The importance of this line has however been sufficiently proved during the war.

The minority of the Commission made the following remarks:

a. —that the Conference had already taken up a question which touched to [sic] the territorial integrity of Russia when it recognized the independence of Finland.

b. —that it would be difficult to leave entirely undefined, for an equally undefined period, the duration of which is impossible for the present to foresee, the “Status” of these regions. In the case of Petchenga, notably, the Government of Finland was anxious to proceed as soon as possible to the development of the harbor and to the construction of a railroad connected with the Finnish lines, but it was impossible to do so as long as there were no indications on the opinion of the principal Allied and Associated Powers concerning its claims in this district.

c. —that it shared entirely the opinion of the majority of the Commission on the importance to preserve to Russia a complete control over the Mourmansk railroad and that it wished that this point be put in evidence in all the declarations of the Allied and Associated Governments on the questions.

d. —that, however, since Petchenga, whose district was the principal point of the discussion, was situated about 60 miles (95 kms) from the Mourmansk Railroad, and since the present Finnish frontier did not approach that railroad at any point less than 40 miles (65 kms), it seemed to it that the safety of this line of communication should in no way be threatened by a modification of these frontiers.

In view of the uncertainty of the decision to be taken in this matter, the Commission on Baltic Affairs unanimously recognized that it was opportune to ask the Supreme Council for instructions, and notably if it should study the question of Carelia and Petchenga and formulate recommendations.

Begging you to kindly notify the above to the Supreme Council, please accept, etc.

Torretta

1. Vol. vi, pp. 521 and 522.
2. HD–32, minute 11, vol. vii, p. 707; HD–58, minute 3, ante, p. 305.
3. Vol. vii, p. 687.
4. Ibid., p. 238.
5. See the detail of it on table No. 1 appended. [Footnote in the original. The table appears as “Table A” in the Department’s files.]
5. Post, p. 468.
6. Does not accompany the minutes.
7. Do not accompany the minutes.
8. Admiral Sir Ernest C. T. Troubridge, British Admiral commanding on the Danube.
9. HD–11, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 207.
10. Appendix E to HD–12, ibid, p. 249.
11. HD–12, minute 5, ibid, p. 238.
12. Appendix A to HD–10, ibid, p. 200.
14. Does not accompany this appendix; see HD–12, minute 5, vol. vii, p. 238.
15. Appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.
16. FM–11, minute 2, vol. iv, p. 662.
17. No Italian Representative was present at this meeting. The Japanese representative had reserved the opinion of his Government, which, however, adhered later to the decision adopted. [Footnote in the original.]
17. HD–15, minute 8, vol, vii, p. 324.