Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/63

HD–63

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 29, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, September 29, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Pichon
  • Secretaries
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Saint Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja
  • Secretary
    • M. Galli
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Mr. C. Russell
British Empire	Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

• America, United States of
  • Rear Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
  • Colonel Browning, U. S. A.
  • Mr. James Brown Scott
• British Empire
  • Major General Sir F. Sykes
  • Major General Groves
  • Mr. Brigstocke
  • Lt. Colonel Kisch
  • Commander Macnamara
  • Mr. Sherman
  • Commander Lucas
• France
  • General Belin
  • M. Laroche
  • M. Seydoux
  • M. Kammerer
  • M. Fromageot
  • Commander Le Vavasseur
  • Captain Roper
• Italy
  • Admiral Orsini
  • Lt. Colonel Piccio
  • General Cavallero
  • M. Ricci-Busatti

1. (The discussion on the British memorandum on this subject was postponed to enable Sir Eyre Crowe to receive instructions from his Government. Mr. Polk also wished to consult his Government before the matter was brought before the Council.) German Ships Sold During the War to Dutch Navigation Companies

2. Captain Roper said that Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany specified that war material the should be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers after the Treaty came into force. In order that this article might be carried out after the Treaty came into force, it was important that this war material should not be alienated in any way or exported from Germany. The Allied and Associated Governments had addressed two notes to the German Government on the subject.¹ The German Government had replied by a letter dated September 8th² sent through the Armistice Commission declining to agree to the obligations placed upon the article by the Allied and Associated Governments. As information was constantly received to show new breaches by Germany, Marshal Foch proposed to the Supreme Council that a resolution be taken that all air material in Germany should be considered as war material and should be stored as war material until such time as the Interallied Air Control Commission had decided as to its nature. Sale of Air Material by the German Government

(Captain Roper then read and commented upon a letter from Marshal Foch of September 25th, (See Appendix A).)

Mr. Polk asked whether the question was one of the Armistice.

Captain Roper replied that it dealt with Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace.

Mr. Polk asked whether what was now said was not broader than the statements of the resolution of August 6th.³ The words used were, “destroyed and used.” He questioned whether the use of the word “used” was not beyond the powers of the Council.

Captain Roper said that if the Germans used the material in question they would take occasion to destroy it, if they could, on the ground of accidents, or they would be able to use the material for other purposes. If they were given a free hand they would undoubtedly transform the material. There had been examples of repeated infractions by the Germans, and in order to avoid these it was essential that the material should be stopped [stocked].

Mr. Polk asked whether the Commission of Control would have the power to decide as to what material was civil and what military.

Captain Roper replied that the Commission would have this power.

M. Scialoja said that it was important that the position of the Council should be founded on firm ground. It was not possible to apply the Treaty before it was ratified. He suggested that a Provisional Commission of Control might permit the Germans to use aircraft which were not military. He thought that the Council were asking for more than under the Treaty they were entitled to ask.

Mr. Polk asked whether the Commission had arrived in Germany.

Captain Roper replied that the advance party had arrived. The Germans were anxious to postpone the discussion of the subject until the Treaty came into force. Under these circumstances the procedure proposed by M. Scialoja would not be applicable. In its resolution of August 6th the Supreme Council had declared its right of property over this material; they therefore had legal rights. During the last month the Germans had several times violated their engagements and Marshal Foch had declared that, unless the Supreme Council took firm and determined action, he was not in a position to obtain any results.

M. Scialoja asked whether it was proposed to stop [stock]all the aircraft in question.

Captain Roper replied that the Technical Experts who had discussed the subject in the Commission on Aerial Clauses, had unanimously declared that there were no civil aircraft in Germany, if by that aeroplanes constructed since the Armistice and upon new plans were meant. Today the Germans had requested permission to use seven hundred aeroplanes for the Postal Air Service and this request was undoubtedly made to conceal their real purpose in endeavoring to keep back from the Allies a large number of aeroplanes.

Mr. Polk asked whether M. Scialoja was satisfied as to the legal right.

M. Scialoja replied that he would withdraw the reservation he had previously made.

Mr. Polk asked Captain Roper if he referred to aeroplanes built since the Armistice.

Captain Roper said that he referred to aeroplanes built before the Armistice.

Mr. Polk asked whether the Commission would have the power to discriminate between aeroplanes built before or since the Armistice. He also asked whether General Weygand had any objection to the German Postal Air Service.

Captain Roper replied that he had no such objection after the Treaty became effective, but he wished to point out that at present it was only a maneuver on the part of the Germans to avoid fulfilling their obligations under the terms of the Treaty. In the opinion of the Technical Experts, there was no defense for the scale upon which the German Postal Air Service was being planned.

Mr. Polk said that there was no legal obstacle of prohibiting the Germans building and exporting aeroplanes which had been built since the time of the Armistice upon new plans.

Captain Roper said that in the first place it would be necessary for the Commission to examine these plans and that pending the ratification of the Treaty the material in question should be stopped [stocked].

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Supreme Council had decided on August 6th that the price of all material sold from the supplies which, according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace, were to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers, should be refunded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought that it was time to apply this resolution.

Capt. Roper explained that in a telegram of Aug. 23rd sent to the German Authorities by Marshal Foch⁴ through the medium of General Nudant there was no mention of refunding this sum because the telegram contained a special authorization for the delivery of certain material to General Yudenitch and to the Czecho-Slovak Government. Marshal Foch had been desirous of assuring the delivery of this material in view of the fact that he had no other means at the moment and it seemed at the time advisable to make no mention of the amount of the sum collected. He thought that the moment had now arrived and that Germany should be required to refund the money.

It was decided:

(1) that all air material now in Germany should be considered as war material and as such could neither be exported, sold, loaned, utilized or destroyed, but should be stocked until such time as the Inter-Allied Air Commission of Control should have taken a decision to determine its nature;

(2) that the German Government should pay to the Allied and Associated Governments the amount of the sales already made.

It was also decided:

that Marshal Foch should be charged with communicating this decision to the German Government.

3. The Council had before it a report from the Supreme War Council of September 5th (see appendix “B”) regarding the principles which should govern the distribution of the aeronautical material to be given up by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace. Report From the Military Representatives at Versailles on the Distribution of Air Material

M. Pichon asked whether the Council were unanimous.

General Belin said that the American Military Representative had objected to the exclusion, with the exception of Belgium, of the smaller Powers. He said that in a report of May 22nd [21st?] to the Supreme Council the Military Representatives had given a list of the articles of war material which each of the Allied Powers should be entitled to possess. In this list there was no mention of air material. In view of the fact that air material had not been included, the Military Representatives did not consider that a distribution should be made among the smaller states.

M. Pichon asked Mr. Polk whether he insisted upon this reservation.

Mr. Polk replied that he did not.

M. Matsui said that it was stated in the report that dirigibles which were in a fit state to fly were to be allotted as far as possible to those Allied countries which on account of their situation were in a position to remove them without dismantling them. In order to avoid any misunderstanding which might arise, he desired that the Conference take note that in accordance with the view of the Japanese Delegation, this statement should not modify the principle of distribution which had been announced elsewhere. The exchange of dirigibles, mentioned in the statement above, should only be made in cases where it was impossible to transport the dirigibles without dismantling them and where the dirigibles could be exchanged against other dirigibles, which if they were not in a fit state to fly, nevertheless, possessed the mechanism which would render them equal in value. The Japanese representative on the Commission had informed the President of the Commission of the desire he had just expressed.

M. Pichon asked whether there were any other objections.

Mr. Polk called attention to the fact that the American Military Representative had stated that he was not prepared to recommend that the United States be included as a recipient of any air material which was the property of a country with which she had not been at war.

General Belin said that there would be, of course, no objection to accepting this reservation.

It was decided:

to accept the report of the Supreme War Council of the 5th of September regarding the principles which should govern the distribution of the aeronautical material given up or to be given up by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

4. General Belin read and commented upon a report from the American, British and French Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles of the 12th September regarding the eventual restitution to the Allies of the rolling stock removed beyond the armistice frontier in violation of the Treaty of Villa Giusti. (See Appendix “C”.) Removal of Rolling Stock Beyond the Armistice Frontier in Violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti

(He then proceeded to read a note by the Italian military representative setting forth the Italian view.)

He wished to reply briefly to the point which the Italian Military Representative had raised.

With reference to the first point, he wished to remark that the observations of the Italian Representative had been made after the signature of the Treaty had taken place. The Armistice was binding, but the signature of the Treaty of peace would bring about a new set of conditions. It appeared advisable to leave to a commission the right of deciding as to the distribution to be made of the rolling stock in question. It was necessary that measures taken for carrying out the terms of the Armistice should not conflict with the carrying out of the terms of the Treaty of Peace. In the Treaty of Peace, there were clauses which called for the cession of railway lines with a fixed amount of railway material. It would be regrettable to remove the material by virtue of the terms of the Armistice, when it would be necessary to return it a short time later in view of the Treaty of Peace.

With reference to the second point, he thought that it was chiefly a question of form.

With regard to the third point, the Italian Delegate had said that the term “Allies” applied to those who were entitled to be so described at the date of the signature of the Armistice. He replied that he had followed the terms of the resolution of the Supreme Council.⁵ It was the prerogative of the Commission to make the distribution among the Allies. There was no doubt that Jugo-Slavia would not be entitled to a share, but Serbia was an Ally at the time of the Armistice and would be entitled to participate in the distribution in question. It was not for the Council at Versailles to give more details as to the distribution.

With regard to the fourth point, he said that there was no inconvenience in principle, but he desired to maintain the reserve without prejudice to the clauses of the Treaty of Peace. He questioned whether it was advisable to hand over material to Italy which would later be attributed to another Power.

General Cavallero said that he could not agree with the view of his American, British and French colleagues. He thought that the question was a purely military one. The questions in regard to the Armistice were quite separate from questions in regard to the Treaty of Peace. He did not think that the repatriation of rolling stock had anything to do with the Treaty of Peace. It was still an Armistice question. It was the duty of the military representatives to study the question as an Armistice question, and it was for the Supreme Council to take into consideration the political aspect. With regard to the first two points in his note he had nothing to add.

With reference to the third point, as he considered that the question was of a purely military nature and as that the Armistice concerned only the Powers who were allied at the moment, he thought that it was necessary to apply the Armistice clauses in regard to rolling stock in the manner in which they had originally been conceived.

With reference to the fourth point, he wished to say that as the terms of the Armistice had given Italy the right to receive, in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, all the material belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he could see no reason why an exception should be made in the case of rolling stock.

General Cavallero replied that the Italian army had been designated to receive all the Austro-Hungarian war material in the name of the Allied Powers and the United States of America.

M. Pichon said that the position of General Diaz⁶ in this matter was exactly the same as that of Marshal Foch. General Diaz acted in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked if there had not been a further Armistice with Hungary.

General Belin said that there had been an armistice concluded by General Franchet d’Esperey,⁷ but that it had not been recognized by Italy.

M. Scialoja said that there were two questions to be considered. One was a question of form and the other of substance. He did not see how, particularly as the Treaty had not been ratified, it was possible to leave the firm ground of the Armistice for the Treaty; for the Treaty had not entered into force. The position of General Diaz, with reference to the Armistice of Villa Giusti, was the same as that of Marshal Foch, with reference to the Armistice with Germany. He thought that it might be possible, instead of constituting a Commission in the place of General Diaz, to establish certain rules of execution. He agreed that there was rolling stock now in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and that it would be complicated and unnecessary to return it to Italy to be again returned to Serbia, but this should not disturb the juridical basis. It would be possible to give the railway material to General Diaz, who could charge someone on the spot to receive it in his name.

General Belin said that it had not been the purpose of the Military Representatives to propose that someone be substituted to act for in the place of General Diaz. What they had desired was that the question, which was very complicated, should be studied by a Commission. Mr. Hoover had suggested that the Inter-Allied experts, who were on the spot, could examine the question and communicate in due course the result of their study to the Supreme Council. It would then be the duty of the Supreme Council to express their opinion, but it was necessary first for the question to be thoroughly studied. He considered that the Commission should be given authority to examine the question and to propose to the Supreme Council a new partition. All that he asked was a study of the question. In his opinion there were no persons better qualified to do this than the Inter-Allied Technical Commission. He thought that if this plan were adopted at the present time, it would avoid trouble in the future.

M. Scialoja proposed that the Commission communicate its findings to General Diaz. He thought that General Diaz would probably agree. He did not think that it was possible for the Supreme Council to apply the terms of a Treaty which was not yet in existence; for, at the moment, only the armistice was in existence. If the proposals were acceptable to General Diaz, he would find the means of carrying them out.

M. Pichon proposed that the Italian Delegation be requested to take up the matter with General Diaz. He added that he considered it important that if General Diaz accepted, the Powers act in conformity.

Mr. Polk asked whether the question was not also raised by the terms of the Armistice with Hungary.

General Cavallero said that in the present case, it was only a question of rolling stock within the lines of the Armistice of Villa Giusti.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that General Cavallero who was the direct representative of General Diaz, had said that General Diaz would be unwilling to accept.

M. Scialoja said that General Diaz would not be willing to accept the substitution of a Commission in place of himself, for it was he who was responsible for the application of the Armistice.

Mr. Polk said there was no question of substituting any authority for that of General Diaz. So far as he understood it, it was purely a question of investigation and report. At the time that the report was received the Council could take a decision as to what States were entitled to receive the railway material in question. He did not see how that question could be left to General Diaz alone, or in fact to any military representative alone.

M. Scialoja said that in this case General Diaz was not acting as an Italian General, but as the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers. His position was similar to that of Marshal Foch.

Mr. Polk said that he had no doubt that cases must have arisen where Marshal Foch was not in a position to take action until information which the Supreme Council desired had been obtained and a decision taken by the Council.

M. Scialoja said that if the Commission were brought into communication with General Diaz he would have no objection.

Mr. Polk said that the information was for the Supreme Council. If the report showed that the Armistice had been violated it would be the duty of the Supreme Council to take a decision and for General Diaz to see that it was carried out. The Powers could not authorize any military representative to act until the necessary information had been obtained by the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that it was necessary to decide whether the Inter-Allied Commission of experts should be taken from the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council or the Reparations Commission.

General Belin said that he agreed that it would be necessary to make such a choice. Mr. Hoover had written to M. Clemenceau on September 3d⁸ and had proposed that the subject be entrusted to the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Polk pointed out that Mr. Hoover had left Paris, and that there was no longer an American Representative on the Supreme Economic Council. He suggested, therefore, that the matter should be left to the Reparations Commission.

It was decided:

(1) that the rolling stock, which had in violation of the Armistice been removed beyond the Armistice line of the 3rd November, 1918, should be delivered to the Allies and the United States of America;

(2) that the Reparations Commission should investigate on the spot all matters relating to the breaches of the Armistice above referred to and propose as quickly as possible to the Supreme Council such measures as might be necessary to insure in this respect the execution of the clauses of the Armistice on the understanding that these measures should [not?] in any way produce [prevent?] an execution at a later date of the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

5. The Council had before it a report from the Inter-Allied Naval Advisers of the 13th September in regard to submarine engines and motors surrendered by Germany in place of certain submarines which were broken up in German yards or sunk passage to England, (see Appendix “D”). Distribution of German Submarine Engines and Parts

M. Pichon asked whether the Naval Representatives were unanimous in their opinion.

Mr. Polk said that they were unanimous, but that the United States Representative wished to add a clause worded as follows: “An appraisal and inventory of this material shall be made by a Naval Committee from the five principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

It was decided:

to accept the report of the Naval Advisers of the 13th September (see appendix “D”) on this subject of submarine engines and motors surrendered by Germany in place of certain submarines which were broken up in German yards or sunk on passage to England, and to add the following clause, “An appraisal and inventory of this material shall be made by a Naval Committee from the five principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

6. M. Fromageot read and commented upon a memorandum with reference to the draft note previously prepared (see H. D. 60, Appendix G),⁹ in regard to the blockade of Soviet Russia. (See Appendix E.) He proposed to add in the third paragraph the words “in conformity with the measures contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.” Blockade of Soviet Russia

Mr. Polk said that before the United States Government would be in a position to take action it would be necessary for internal action to be taken in the United States.

M. Fromageot said that Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant was framed to meet a situation like that which existed at present. It provided for the rupture of commercial and economic relations. In cases where the League of Nations did not wish to resort to war the Covenant of the League of Nations foresaw the use of economic pressure when war was not to be employed. He felt that the difficulties in regard to the question of blockade would be removed in this way.

Mr. Polk said that M. Fromageot’s suggestion raised difficulties in his mind. The League of Nations did not yet exist, and the machinery for which the Covenant of the League provided, could not become effective until the League of Nations was actually in force. He did not see how the United States could adopt the policy proposed at the present time as the United States had never agreed to a pacific blockade. The Council were endeavoring to meet the situation by the establishment of a pacific blockade. In his opinion it was a declaration of war which was really needed.

M. Pichon said that the Council found themselves in the same position as at the time of the last discussion. They would have no commercial relations with Soviet Russia themselves and they did nothing to ask the neutral countries to adopt the same policy.

Mr. Polk said that he thought that the best plan would be to wait until after the winter, and see how the situation was by that time.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that it was necessary to give some instructions to the Allied Naval Officers in the Baltic Sea. He asked what action these officers could take with ships which they were stopping.

The report of the Drafting Committee did not cover the question of instructions. The Naval Officers were acting upon their own authority. He recalled that it had been previously proposed to make a collective request to the neutral Governments. He wished to ask his United States Colleague whether he would have any objection to such a note being sent. He thought that a step would be taken if a collective representation were made to the Swedish Government. He had a suggestion to make, but at the moment he had no authority for committing his Government. He wished to ask whether the British and French Governments were willing to authorize their Naval Commanders to turn ships back. If, for example, a Swedish ship were stopped, the Naval Commander would be in a position to state that the subject had been formally communicated to the Swedish Government by the Allied and Associated Governments, who were awaiting a favorable reply.

Mr. Polk said that he was willing to accept the draft if the last paragraph were omitted. He had suggested a substitute for the paragraph.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he could not answer for the decision of the British Admiralty, but he would refer the subject to them.

M. Pichon suggested that the Drafting Committee be directed to prepare a note to the Neutral Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the Council were already in possession of a draft of such a note.

M. Pichon said that the note could be transmitted with the omission of the proposed paragraph respecting the League of Nations, and the last paragraph.

M. Seydoux read to the Council two communications received from the French Legation at Stockholm. (See Appendix “F”.) After reading these communications, M. Seydoux said that he thought that they contained matters of great interest. It was evident that the Swedish Government not only considered that a blockade existed, but that they had notified their own nationals that navigation was prohibited in the Gulf of Finland.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that these communications tended all the more to show that the reply of the Swedish Government to the note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be favorable.

M. Pichon said that, pending a decision, the British and French warships in the Baltic should turn back ships bound for Soviet Russia.

M. Seydoux said that it would be possible, either by adding a paragraph to the note or by making a verbal communication to the neutral Governments, to say that British and French war vessels would continue to act in respect to ships entering the Gulf of Finland as they had been acting up to the present.

(It was decided:

(1) that the attached note (See Appendix “G”) should be transmitted to the neutral Governments in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers;

(2) that the neutral Governments should, at the same time, be notified verbally that the British and French warships in the Gulf of Finland would continue to turn back ships bound for seaports in Soviet Russia.)

7. M. Fromageot read and commented upon a memorandum of the 29th of September prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix “H”). He added that the formation of a Commission to delimit the frontiers between Austria and Hungary was all the more necessary because Article 27 specified that the new frontier between Austria and Hungary should be fixed upon the spot. It was also necessary to arrange for changes of nationality of persons residing in territory transferred from Hungary to Austria. Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary of an Article Providing for the Constitution of a Commission To Delimit the Frontier Between Austria and Hungary

M. Scialoja said that he agreed with what M. Fromageot had said. He wished to point out, however, that there still remains a large number of articles in the Treaty of Peace with Austria which had not as yet founded [found?] counterparts in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He reserved the right to present drafts of the articles in question.

(It was decided:

(1) to request the Drafting Committee, in view of the delimitation of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, clauses providing for the constitution of a Commission to delimit the frontier between Austria and Hungary;

(2) to request the Drafting Committee to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary articles relative to the nationality of the inhabitants of Hungarian territory ceded to Austria.)

8. Mr. Polk read a telegram dated September 24th from General Bandholtz, American Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission at Budapest, in regard to Roumanian seizures (See Appendix “I”). He said that the information contained in this telegram showed only too clearly that the Roumanians were not willing to obey the wishes of the Allied Powers. The Roumanian Representative told one thing to one Allied Representative and another thing to another. They were apparently entirely unwilling to obey the orders of the Allied Generals who represented the Council. Telegram From General Bandholtz at Budapest

M. Pichon said that it was most important to await Sir George Clerk’s arrival before taking any action in regard to Roumania.

Mr. Polk said that, while waiting, statements made by the Roumanians themselves should not be entitled to much consideration.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Roumanian Government was trying to stir up trouble between the Allies. There was a serious situation between Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M. Pichon said that according to information which he had recently received from Belgrade the situation between Roumania and Serbia was better and might improve.

(The meeting then adjourned)

Hotel de Crillon, Paris , September 29, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–63

commander-in-chief of the allied armies
general staff
1st Section
No. 4665

G. H. Q., September 27, 1919.

Translation

From: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: The President of the Council.

Pursuant to your letter of September 26, 1919, transmitting to me copy of the letter of the Charge d’Affaires of France, to the Netherlands, relative to suspicious importations of German planes in Holland, I have the honor of asking you, with a view to putting an end to the illicit traffic in aeronautic material, which Germany continues to practice, in spite of the notification which was given her of the resolution of August 22,¹⁰ to be kind enough to submit to the approval of the Supreme Council of the Allies the following resolution:

“All aeronautic material existing in Germany should be considered as war material and as such cannot be exported, alienated, lent, utilized, destroyed, but must be stocked up till the moment when the Interallied Commission on aerial control will have pronounced itself on its nature.”

I have already addressed a request of this kind to the President of the Council, the Minister of War (Army Staff, G–3, September 25, number 2644 [4644], (copy of which is enclosed).

Major General

Weygand

[Enclosure]

Translation

staff of the marshal
Commander-in-chief of the allied armies
First Section
No. 4644

September 25, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Council.

Ministry of War, (Army Staff G–3–A.)

Enclosed herewith I am returning the report of September 20 of the General Director of Aeronautics,¹¹ relative to the opening of an aerial postal service in Germany, which you transmitted to me September 23, 1919, under number 8712. 13.S/3.

I am of the opinion that it is not possible to inform the German Armistice Commission of this question, such as it is set forth.

The decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Allies to forbid the sale, cession or exportation of all German aeronautic material has already been notified twice to the German Government (enclosed herewith copy of notes number 3765, of April [August]7, and 4111 of August 26.).¹²

To these two notifications the German Government replied by the note Wako No. 641,¹³ copy of which is enclosed, in which it makes all its reserves on our way of interpreting the aerial clauses of the Peace Treaty, and proposes to leave this question in suspense until the moment when it can be solved by the Commission of Control.

To address a protest relative to the establishing of an aerial postal service in Germany, would be to again desire to open a discussion on this question with the German Government. This discussion would be fruitless. To be brief, I have the honor of asking you to be kind enough to submit to the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Allies the following resolution which I shall then communicate to the German Government.

“All aeronautic material existing in Germany should be considered as war material and as such cannot be exported, alienated, lent, utilized, destroyed, but must be stocked up till the moment when the Interallied Commission on Aerial Control will have pronounced itself on its nature.”

Major General

Weygand

Appendix B to HD–63

supreme war council
military representatives
S. W. C. 467

Versailles , 5 September, 1919.

Report Regarding the Principles, Which Should Govern the Distribution of the Aeronautical Material, Given Up or To Be Given Up by the Central Pouters (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey), in Accordance With the Terms of the Clauses of the Peace Treaty

At a Meeting held on 1st August, 1919,¹⁴ the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers decided:—

“To ask the Military Representatives at Versailles, with whom would be associated a Japanese Representative, to submit a proposal concerning the principles to govern the distribution of all aeronautical war material to be given up by the Central Powers in conformity with the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.”

The Military Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

Taking Into Consideration

(1) That Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany prescribes that:

“all military and naval aeronautical material … must be delivered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”;

(2) That Article 148 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria prescribes that:

“all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by Austria and at her own expense to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”;

(3) That similar prescriptions have been adopted in regard to Bulgaria and Hungary;

(4) That the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers has already contemplated the principle of a limitation of armaments for all small States, including Allied and Associated States;

(5) That the recommendations made on the subject of this limitation by the Military Representatives, especially in their Report of the 21st May, 1919, contain no provisions for the maintenance by the said small Powers of any Military aviation as part of their armed forces;

And Taking Further Into Consideration

That certain types of aircraft, aeroplanes, hangars, technical machines, instruments, etc., possess or may possess a special interest for the States that are carrying on studies and experiments with a view to the advancement of aeronautics,

Have the Honor To Submit to the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the Following Unanimous Conclusions:—

(1) All aircraft matériel given up by the enemy States shall be entered on a single list which shall be divided into various headings, e. g.:

(a) Complete aircraft.

(b) Aircraft engines of all types.

(c) Aircraft instruments of all kinds.

(d) Airships.

(e) Kite ballpons.

(f) Hangars.

(g) All other aircraft parts specified in the Treaty.

The Inter-Allied Commission of Control classify the materiel entered under each heading according to types, and for each type in order of value.

(2) The Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Belgium shall participate in the distribution.^*

(3) All captured aircraft fit to fly and aircraft motors shall be returned to the nation from which the same were taken.

(4) The Powers participating in the distribution shall in addition receive samples of:

(a) Each different type of aeroplane.

(b) Spare engines.

(c) Spares.

(d) Kite balloons with their hangars.

(5) Drawings of each type of aircraft and all other aeronautical materiel shall be supplied on demand to all the Powers participating in the distribution, whether the same have or have not received a sample of the matériel in question.

(6) Airships.

(a) The two best airships of the 70 Class or above shall be allotted the first to France, the second to Great Britain.

(b) The other airships of all types, including those of the 70 class or above, if any exist, shall be entered on a single list by classes, and each class in order of value, and allotted to the Powers participating in the distribution. Each Power shall in turn exercise one choice in the following order until the whole has been distributed:—

(1) United States of America.

(2) Italy.

(3) Great Britain.

(4) France.

(5) Japan.

(6) Belgium.

(Note: In view of the fact that the dismantling of an airship for transport by land or sea means practically dismantling the whole structure, it is suggested that, whilst conserving the right of the several governments to claim the receipt of its share of the dirigibles as provided above, those airships which are in a fit state to fly, should be allotted as far as possible to those Allied countries which on account of their situation are in a position to remove them without dismantling them.)

(7) Airship Hangars.

One of the largest hangars shall be allotted to France and a second to Great Britain.

The remainder shall be classified in order of value and allotted as has been above specified for airships.

While safeguarding the principles set forth above, it is suggested that:

For reasons of geographical convenience, France should be allowed to take as far as possible a part of her share from those hangars which are situated in the occupied territories and in Belgium (outside the proportion which should fall to the latter country).

For the same reasons, England should be allowed as far as possible to choose an airship hangar which is believed to be at Jumboli or some other place in Bulgaria as part of her share.

(8) Hydrogen Plant

One machine of the latest type shall be allotted to France and one to Great Britain.

The remainder shall be distributed as above indicated.

(9) Aircraft and Materiel left over after the above-mentioned Distribution—that is to say, Aeroplanes, Seaplanes, Engines, Spares, Armament, Instruments, etc.

This matériel shall be classified under each heading in order of value. The matériel falling in each class so obtained shall then be grouped in lots of 20.

The Powers participating in the distribution shall receive individually from each of these lots the quantities to be determined on the following percentage basis;—

France	30%	(e. g.,	6	out of each lot	of	20)
Great Britain	30%		do		do
U. S. A	15%	(e. g.,	3	out of each lot	of	20)
Italy	15%		do		do
Japan	5%	(e. g.,	1	out of each lot	of	20)
Belgium	5%		do		do

Gal. Belin

Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council

H. W. Studd

Br-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council

Ugo Cavallero

Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council

P. D. Lochridge

Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council

Tanaka

Major-General, Japanese Military Representative

Note: The American Military Representative is not prepared to recommend that the United States of America be included as a recipient of any air material which was the property of any country with which she has not been at war.

Appendix C to HD–63

Versailles , 12 September, 1919.

supreme war council

S. W. C. 470 (87. MR)

Report Regarding the Eventual Restitution to the Allies of the Rolling Stock Removed Beyond the Armistice Frontier in Violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers at a Meeting held on 6.8.19. passed the following Resolution:—

“It is agreed to submit to the Military Representatives at Versailles, for examination and report, the question of the eventual restitution to the Allies of the Rolling Stock removed beyond the Armistice frontier in violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti”.

The French, British and American Military Representatives^* of the Supreme War Council at Versailles

Considering—

(1) That Paragraph 3 of the Armistice of Villa Giusti contains the following prescription:—“All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) within these territories to be left in situ and surrendered to the Allies and America according to special orders given by the Commander-in-Chief of Forces of Associated Powers on different fronts”;

(2) That in spite of this prescription it appears that a part of the rolling stock has been removed beyond the Armistice line and that up to the present only a small part of this material has been restored;

(3) That the surrender of no other rolling stock has been imposed on the Austro-Hungarian Empire by the Armistice of Villa Giusti;

(4) That Article 157 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria maintains in force and permanently applies the Armistice clause referred to in (1) above;

(5) That Article 199 of the said Treaty “Confirms the surrender of all material handed over or to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the Armistice of November 3rd, 1918 … and recognises the title of the Allied and Associated Powers to such material.”

Recommend—

(a) That the rolling stock which has in violation of the Armistice been removed beyond the Armistice line of the 3rd November, 1918, should be delivered to the Allies and the United States of America;

(b) That an Inter-Allied Commission of Experts, such as the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council or the Reparations Commission, should be provided with the necessary powers to investigate on the spot all matters relating to the breaches of the Armistice above referred to, and to propose as quickly as possible to the Supreme Council all such measures as may be necessary to ensure in this respect the execution of the clauses of the Armistice, on the Understanding that these measures shall in no way prejudice the execution of the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

Gal. Belin, K. C. B.

,
K. C. M. G.
Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council

H. W. Studd

Brig-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council

P. D. Lochridge

Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council

Annexure A to S. W. C. 470

Note by the Italian Permanent Military Representative

The Italian Permanent Military Representative is unable to accept the Report of the French, British and American Military Representatives for the following main reasons:—

(1) The question referred to the Permanent Military Representatives by the Supreme Council relates to the Armistice and must therefore be dealt with as such, that is to say without reference to the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace, more especially as only the clauses of the Armistice are now in force, whereas the Treaty of Peace will not become valid until after ratification;

(2) The French, British and American Permanent Military Representatives only admit the violation of the Armistice in a dubious manner, whereas not only does the Supreme Council clearly affirm this in its Resolution, but Austria herself has officially recognized the fact, so much so that she has already commenced the restitution of the Rolling Stock wrongfully removed;

(3) The restitution of the Rolling Stock wrongfully removed beyond the line of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918, must be made to the Allies and to the United States of America strictly in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the said Armistice, by “Allies” being understood those who were entitled to be so described at the date of the signature of the Armistice. The Report of the Permanent Military Representatives is not clear on this point;

(4) It is necessary clearly to lay down that the material wrongfully removed must be handed over to Italy, who will receive the same on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers. No other Power can in fact be charged with the execution of the clauses of the Armistice of the 3rd November, 1918, which was concluded by Italy alone in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Ugo. Cavallero

Military Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council.

Versailles , 12 September, 1919.

Appendix D to HD–63

[Report of the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers]

Submarine Engines and Motors, Surrendered by Germany in Place of Certain Submarines Which Were Broken Up in German Yards or Sunk on Passage to England

question of disposal

[1.] The British Admiralty has represented that certain machinery, which is described above, is being held in trust for the Allied Naval Armistice Commission. Owing to lack of space this material cannot all be placed under cover, and in view of the approach of winter weather it is liable to serious deterioration. Its disposal is, therefore, an urgent matter.

2. A detailed list of this material is given in Table I, which is attached.¹⁵ A smaller amount, demanded by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission, but which has not yet arrived from Germany, is shown in Table I, a.¹⁵

3. A meeting of the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, to consider the question, was held at the French Ministry of Marine, Paris, on 11 September, 1919.

4. It was unanimously decided:—

(a) That the approval of the Supreme Council should be asked to carry out the division of the material in accordance with the accompanying list shown in Table II.

(b) That this division should form no precedent for the division of other naval material surrendered by enemy Powers.

(c) That the proposed division should be carried out as soon as possible after its approval by the Supreme Council.

	For
N. A. McCully	United States of America
Fuller	British Empire
Ronarch	France
Ruspoli	Italy
Ida	Japan

Paris , 13 September, 1919.

[Enclosure]

Table II

Total H. P. available for distribution 72, 260 H. P.

Country	Actual H. P. allocated
Great Britain	40,140	plus	3,000
France	10,360	“	3,000
Italy	5,860	“	3,000
U. S. A.	900	“	3,000
Japan		“	3,000
	57,260		15,000
Total			72,260

Engine erected for	Port or stbd	H. P. per engine	Stored at	Motor	Stored at
Great Britain
U. 143	S.	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow. 1 charging engine at Wallsend and 1 charging motor at Cammel Lairds for U.145
Not known	S.	3,000	Cammel Laird	2	Barrow
U. 127	P.	1,750	Wallsend
	S.	1,750	N. B. D. Co.	2	N. B. D. Co.
U. 165	P. & S.	1,200	Wallsend	2	Barrow
U. 170				2	Barrow
UB. 158	P. & S.	530	Cammel Laird
U.B. 89	3 P. & 3 S.	530	Cammel Laird	6	Cammel Laird
136
133
U. C. 106	2 P.	300	Barrow	4	Barrow
108	2 S.
U. C. 107	P.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow
U. C. 110	P.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow
U. C. 114	S.	300	Barrow	1	Wallsend
U. C. 114	P.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow (marked for U. C. 112)
U. C. 114	S.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow (marked for U. C.113)
U. 150				2	Barrow 2 charging
149				2	Barrow motors at Cammel Laird
U. 145				2	Barrow
				2	Barrow Not marked—probably for 1200 H. P. eng.
U. 173	S.	3,000	Wallsend	1	Barrow
U. C. 173	P.	300	Barrow	1	Wallsend
		40,140
		3,000
		43,140		34
France
U. 142	P.	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow 1 charging Engine & Motor at Barrow
U. 142	S.	3,000	Wallend	1	Barrow
U. 144	P.	3,000	N. B. D. Co.	1	N. B. D. Co.
U. 168	P. & S.	1,200	Wallend	2	Barrow
UB 137	P. & S.	530	Barrow	2	Barrow
UC. 107	S.	300	Wallsend	1	Barrow
UC. 109	P. & S.	300	Barrow	2	Wallsend
		10,350
		3,000			1
		13,360		10
Italy
U. 173	P.	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow 1 Charging Engine & Motor at Barrow
UC. 115	P. & S.	300	Barrow	4	Wallsend
116	P. & S.
UC. 111	P. & S.	300	Wallsend	1	Barrow
		300	Wallsend	1	Wallsend
UC. 112	P. & S.	300	Barrow	2	Wallsend
U. 169	P. & S.	1,200	Wallsend	1	Barrow
UB. 166	P. & S.	530	Wallsend	2	Barrow
		5,860
		3,000
		8,860		12
U.S.A.
U. 143	P	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow 1 Charging Engine & Motor at Barrow
UC. 113	S	300	Barrow	1	Wallsend
UC. 117	P & S	600	Cammel Laird	2	Cammel Laird
		900
		3,000
		3,900		4
Japan
U. 144	S	3,000	N. B. D. Co.	1	N. B. D. Co. 1 Charging Engine & Motor at N. B. D. Co.

List of Engines in Submarines Which Have Already Been Sent to Japan and U. S. A. for Propaganda Purposes

Country	If used during War	Date of Commission	Surface	Submerged
Japan
U. 46	Yes	1916	2 M. A. N. 6 cyl. 4 cycle Diesel 2000 H. P.	A. E. G. Motors 1600 H. P.
U. 55			ditto 2400 H. P.	ditto 1600 H. P.
U. 125	No	1918	No particulars
U. C. 90	No	1918	“
U. C. 99	No	1918	“
U. B. 125	Yes	1918	2 6 cyl 4 cycle Diesel. 1060 H. P.	? Motors 1000 H.P.
U. B. 143	No	1918	No particulars
U. S. A.
U. 140	Yes	1918	2 6 cyl 4 cycle M. A. N. Diesel 4250 H. P.	? Motors 3000 H. P.
U. 117	Yes	1918	No particulars
U. 111	Yes	1918	2 Augsburg 6 cyl 4 cycle Diesel. 2400 H. P.	? Motors 2000 H.P.
U. B. 88	Yes	1918	2 6 cyl 4 cycle Diesel. 1060 H. P.	? Motors 1000 H. P.
U. B. 148	No	1918	No particulars
U. C. 97	No	1918	No particulars

Appendix E to HD–63

[Memorandum From the Drafting Committee]

The Drafting Committee have the following observations to make:

(1) In the actual circumstances it is perhaps difficult to speak of a blockade, it being understood that the Powers have different views of the legality of a blockade without the existence of a state of war.

(2) The measures proposed, involving the prohibition of all commerce, of all financial relations and of all communications, extend beyond the naval measures commonly called blockade.

(3) On the other hand, if the Supreme Council is of opinion that coercive measures, quite outside any war action, are necessary against Soviet Russia, the principle enshrined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations justifies as a means of coercion, the adoption by the Powers, who do not wish to resort to armed force, of economic pressure which consists in the immediate rupture of all financial or commercial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse, the cessation of all communications, financial, commercial or personal.

The proposed scheme appears to be in conformity with the principle referred to above.

The Drafting Committee add that in its opinion it would be advantageous to refer to this in the third paragraph of the scheme.

Appendix F to HD–63

[Translation¹⁶]

blockade of soviet russia ¹⁷

I.—An Accoimt in the “Stockholm Dagblog”, August 15, 1919

On August first, the Swedish motorship Per, out of Solderberg, reached Björkö, en route to Petrograd. The captain of said ship, John Froberg, applied immediately to the military authorities of Björkö to inquire whether they were acquainted with the exact location of mine fields between Björkö and Petrograd.

The ship in question appearing suspicious, they proceeded to inspect its cargo and they discovered that it had on board 111 tons of clay tubes of gas, destined for the Soviet Government. Since Finland is in a state of war with the Bolsheviki, the cargo has been confiscated. Consequently, last Saturday they took the Swedish ship to Viborg, where the cargo has been landed. Because the tubes are sealed together, they are going to open them at the end of the examination.

The crew consists of 10 persons, of which two are women (all these persons are of Swedish nationality).

II.—Communiqué Given to the Press by the Swedish Government (August 14)

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that it has, after some time, obtained the necessary information to ascertain the views of the British and American authorities with regard to the prohibition against Swedish ships going to Petrograd. The Americans consider that the prohibition of any navigation to the coast of Soviet Russia exists at all times and assert that the rumor which has spread that an American vessel arrived at Petrograd with a cargo of foodstuffs is without any foundation. Such a definitive reply has not yet been given by the British; nevertheless it comes out in references that the Foreign Office concludes that all navigation to Russia is in fact impossible, the submarine mines rendering impracticable the entering of Petrograd.”

III.—Communique Published September 17

“Continuing the information already given concerning the impossibility for Swedish ships to go to Russia, the Swenska Telegram Bureau, after questioning the Department of Foreign Affairs, has learned that the French authorities have likewise recognized that a blockade of the Gulf of Finland is maintained and that French war vessels were preventing ships destined for Petrograd from continuing their voyage.”

IV

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden has informed the Minister of France at Stockholm that as a fact no Swedish vessel would have made any effort to force the blockade except one boat, the Eshiltuna III which was too small to be subjected to the obligations of an authorization to depart from Swedish waters. Since the time it sailed for its destination of Russia with a cargo of mowing machines, there has been no news of it. The commandant of our naval division, whom I have questioned at the request of the Swedish Government, has replied that as long as nothing has been learned of the fate of the Eskiltuna which had not yet been captured, possibly it has been sunk by a mine or been the victim of a storm.

Appendix G to HD–63

Note to the Neutral Governments

[The same, except in French, as the note attached to appendix H to HD–60, printed on page 366.]

Appendix H to HD–63

(Translation)

September 29, 1919.

[Memorandum From the Drafting Committee]

Note

The Treaty of Peace with Austria changes the frontier between Austria and Hungary, but does not provide Commissions of Delimitation to fix upon the spot the line of the new frontier.

There should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary an article similar to those which were inserted for all the other new frontiers fixed by the Treaties:

“A Commission of five (or seven) persons, three (or five) of whom will be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by Hungary and one by Austria, will be set up fifteen days after the coming into force of the present Treaty, to settle on the spot the new frontier line described in Article …, Paragraph . . . .”

Appendix I to HD–63

Budapest , September 24, 1919.
Received 7:03 p.m. 26th.

[Telegram From the American Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission at Budapest (Bandholtz) to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace]

88. Despite promise to deliver rifles and machine guns for distribution by Mission as needed to organize police, Roumanian Commander today sent letter stating there would be additional delay of a week or more, and furthermore attached such conditions to delivery as to nullify its value. The Mission wrote him a letter to effect; that on nineteenth it had been explained to him that immediate organization of the local Police was urgent necessity, that he had promised to deliver ten thousand rifles and forty machine guns by twenty-third for distribution to Hungarian Police by this Mission assisted by Roumanians, he had not kept his promise and that new and unheard of conditions that he had now attached to arms delivery were tantamount to refusal to assist, and that this Mission would hold him responsible for any disorder that might result from lack of suitably armed police and would notify the Supreme Council accordingly. It was proposed to add he could show his good intentions by giving at once three thousands rifles. I refused positively to place myself or nation in a position to [of] dickering for three thousand rifles which might likewise be refused and was sustained by Colleagues. Roumanians have removed Friederich[’s] private telephone and seized auto. General Gorton requests that copy of foregoing as well as copy of my number 87 be furnished British Commission.

Bandholtz

1. The first note, dated August 8 (Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/121), transmitted the text of the proposals accepted by the Supreme Council on August 6, HD–25, minute 14, vol. vii, p. 563. For text of the second note, dated August 22, see appendix C to HD–37, ibid., p. 823.
2. See appendix A to HD–78, pp. 811, 815.
3. HD–25, minute 14, vol. vii, p. 563.
4. Appendix C to HD–37, vol. vii, p. 823.
5. HD–25, minute 11, vol. vii, p. 562; see also appendix C, post, pp. 446–447.
6. Gen. Armando Diaz, Chief of the General Staff of the Italian Army.
7. Military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade November 13, 1918; signed for the Allies by delegates of the general commander in chief, Franchet d’Esperey; for text, see vol. ii, p. 183.
8. Appendix A to HD–46, p. 85.
9. Ante, p. 365.
10. HD–36, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 789.
11. Not enclosed with file copy of this note.
12. See footnote 1, p. 430.
13. See appendix A to HD–78, pp. 811, 815.
14. HD–21, minute 12, vol. vii, p. 461.

15. The American Military Representative invites attention to the following reservation made by Admiral Knapp, American Air Adviser:—

    “The Powers with small interests have with the exception of Belgium been completely excluded from participating in the distribution of enemy aircraft. Belgium has been admitted and there would appear to be no reason either on ground of right or justice why one small Power should be included and the remainder excluded. As far as he is aware none of the small Powers except Belgium have been consulted, and he refuses to subscribe to any recommendations which do not contain any reference to the wishes of those small Powers, and which appear almost to treat the Allies as enemies.

    “For practical reasons connected with the Budget allotments the possibilities of utilisation, the lack of specially trained personnel, and the relative importance of the parts played by these States during the war, Admiral Knapp has not without hesitation decided to accept the proposal to limit the distribution of the airships to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; but he does not desire to commit himself further.

    “This reservation applies also as a natural consequence to the percentages prescribed for the distribution of the aeronautical materiel, which will remain to be distributed after the allocation of the samples and airships.” [Footnote in the original.]

16. The Italian Military Representative dissents for reasons given in the Note attached. Annexure A. [Footnote in the original.]
15. Not attached to file copy of appendix D.
15. Not attached to file copy of appendix D.
16. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
17. Communication from the French Legation at Stockholm read to the Council by M. Seydoux, of the French Delegation.