Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/62

HD–62

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, September 27, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, September 27, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
    • Hon. H. Nicolson
  • France
    • M. Pichon
  • Secretary
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de St. Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja
  • Secretary
    • M. Barone Russo
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Mr. C. Russell
British Empire	Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

• America, United States of
  • Mr. J. B. Scott,
  • Mr. E. L. Dresel.
• British Empire
  • General Groves,
  • General Sykes,
  • General Sackville-West,
  • Lieutenant-Colonel Kisch,
  • Lieutenant-Commander Dunne,
  • Mr. Ibbetson-James,
  • Mr. Brigstocke.
• France
  • M. Claveille,
  • M. Loucheur,
  • M. Berenger,
  • M. Laroche,
  • Commander Levavasseur,
  • M. Fromageot,
  • Captain Roper.
• Italy
  • M. Galli,
  • Admiral Orsini,
  • Lieutenant-Colonel Guidoni,
  • Lieutenant-Colonel Piccio.
  • M. Ricci-Busatti.
• Japan
  • M. Nagaoka.

1. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation of September 24th (See appendix “A”).

M. Loucheur said that he wished to make a brief summary of what had taken place. The Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council had taken decisions in regard to the distribution of the German Oil Tank Ships which had, in accordance with the Brussels decision, been left temporarily to Germany. At a meeting which had taken place in London, it had been decided upon request of the American Delegate that the question should be referred for a definite decision to the Supreme Economic Council. The Council had met at Brussels on the 20th September. Unfortunately an incident had occurred which was the cause of the present discussion. A telegram sent to Brussels by the American Delegation had arrived in a mutilated condition. It was necessary to ask for a repetition which had arrived too late. When the Supreme Economic Council confirmed the resolution of the A. M. T. E. it believed that it was acting in full accord with the views of the American Delegation. He wished to call the attention of the Council to the following points: (1) The German Oil Tank Ships had been left to Germany only temporarily and the Inter-Allied Council at London was alone competent to decide as to their allocation. It was not a matter for the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission. It was a question of a distribution made by virtue of the Armistice. The American Delegation held that it had been decided to leave these ships to Germany to assure the transport of oil. There was a disagreement on this point. The Ships had not been left indefinitely to Germany and the proof of this lay in the fact that, far from protesting against giving up the ships, the German Government had given orders for their delivery. (2) That the Standard Oil Company claimed that the ships belonged to it because the Company owned all the stock of the German Company which owned the ships in question. He wished to say with reference to this point that that was a question which could not be dealt with at the moment and was a matter for the Reparations Commission. German Oil Tank Ships

Mr. Polk said that he agreed that the question should not be discussed at present.

M. Loucheur said that his next point was: (3) That the ships ought not to lie idle. There was a shortage of tonnage from which all the world, including Germany, suffered. There was no doubt but that Germany needed oil and it was necessary to furnish it. The Standard Oil Company was prepared to furnish credit to Germany for oil and asked that the ships in question be placed at its disposal for the purpose of effecting the delivery. He wished to suggest, as his own opinion, the following:

The German ships in question would be turned over to the Powers in accordance with the decision of the A. M. T. E. They should immediately undertake a voyage to transport oil furnished by the Standard Oil Company to Germany with the understanding that the Standard Oil Company should open a credit of sufficient length of time to make it unnecessary to ask Germany at an early date to use part of its gold supply to pay for the oil.

Mr. Polk said that he would like to ask whether the decision taken in London provided for a definite or only temporary allocation of these ships.

M. Loucheur replied that it was only a question of temporary allocation.

M. Henry Berenger said that the distribution had been made in the following manner and that with the exception of the American Delegate there had been a unanimous opinion. The percentage of losses during the war had been taken into consideration and on this basis France had received 50 percent of the tonnage (30,000 tons dead weight and 23,000 tons gross weight), Italy 10,000 tons and Belgium 12,000 tons. It had been decided that Great Britain should receive three-quarters of the remainder, and America one-quarter. The reasons for this decision were as follows. Of the 47 German Oil Tank Ships existing at the outbreak of the war, 17 had taken refuge in American ports; 5 had been destroyed; 14 were discovered at Hamburg and 7 had not been found. The Shipping Board had opened an investigation to ascertain where these ships were. They were the ships which were to be divided between Great Britain and the United States and their value was considerable. The distribution had been made in accordance with the terms of the Armistice and were effective until the moment when, after the Treaty of Peace became effective, the Separations Commission should take definite steps as to the final division of the ships in question. Of the 14 ships found at Hamburg, only 11 were available. Of these 7 belonged to the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, two to the Deutsche Erdoel Gesellschaft, and two to Messrs. Albrecht.

Mr. Polk asked whether the 11 ships would be used for a voyage to Germany.

M. Loucheur replied that they would, and that, if the question of making a second voyage should arise, it would be necessary for the Supreme Council to re-examine the question.

M. Henry Berenger said that M. Loucheur’s proposal was in conformity with the resolution taken by the A. M. T. E. He wished to make certain points clear, and to ask whether it was the Standard Oil Company alone which should furnish Germany with the oil which was needed. There were other American Companies. He asked whether a contract existed and whether part of the price had already been paid. Mr. Polk had said so a few days before and the New York Heraldhad published his statement. He also wished to ask whether the Standard Oil Company was prepared to make a long term credit. The representatives of that company, who had called upon him on the preceding day, had made no definite statement on that subject.

M. Loucheur said that he wished to point out that Germany could not dispose of her funds without the authorization of the Financial Commission. It was proposed to notify Germany that she should make contracts with whatever American company she wished to and it was the duty of the Financial Commission to examine the conditions of payment. It was there that the question of a long term credit would be passed upon.

Mr. Polk said that he was certain that no money had passed but he would ask for complete information and would be glad to furnish such information to the Council. He wished to ask under what conditions the ships would be navigated and by what crews they would be manned.

M. Loucheur replied that the ships would fly the flag of the nation to which they had been allocated temporarily and also the Inter-Allied flag.

M. Henry Berenger said that, so far as the officers and crews of these ships were concerned, it had been decided, and Germany had made no objections, that they should be manned by officers and crews of the Allied nations in question.

Mr. Polk said that, if he understood correctly, there was no question of the ships being allocated to the United States. The suggestion had been made that the United States guarantee their return. He was willing, if the Naval Armistice Commission desired it, to give an assurance on this subject. It was understood that the Standard Oil Company could not keep these ships which they claimed as their property.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he considered it important that the Armistice Commission should be notified without delay and that a telegram should be transmitted to them on that day.

It was decided:

(1) that the provisional exemption of tankers granted at Brussels on the 14th March, 1919, should be cancelled. This cancellation should be without prejudice to any previous action taken by the A. N. A. C.;

(2) that the vessels should be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision decided on by the A. M. T. E. on the 17th September, 1919, under the usual armistice terms which should in no way prejudice the final decision to be made by the Reparations Commission provided for by the Treaty of Versailles;

(3) that, should the German Government so desire, the said ships should be employed under the above terms for one voyage for the conveyance of oil to Germany; should a second voyage be asked for by the German Government, the matter would be again referred to the Supreme Council;

(4) that in consequence the said vessels should be sent forthwith to the Firth of Forth in compliance with the instructions of the A. N. A. C.

The Council also took note of Mr. Polk’s declaration to the effect that he was prepared

(1) to give assurance that no payment had as yet been made by Germany for the delivery of the oil in question and

(2) to furnish to the Naval Armistice Commission, if they should desire it, an assurance that the vessels in question would not be retained by the United States.

2. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation of the 26th of September (see Appendix “B”). Authorization for German Ships To Proceed to Turkish Ports

M. Laroche read and explained the note presented by the French Delegation. The proposals contained in this note were adopted.

It was decided:

(1) that the German ships authorized by the Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission to proceed in Turkish waters and in the Black Sea could not make any movements other than those for which provision would be made in the laissez-passer:

(2) that upon approaching Turkish waters and in the Black Sea each of these ships should carry at least one representative of the Allied and Associated Powers;

(3) that they should in addition fly the Inter-Allied, blue, white and blue, flag;

It was also decided:

that this resolution should be communicated for action to the Permanent Allied Armistice Commission at London.

3. Mr. Polk brought to the attention of the Council the résumé of certain conversations which had taken place at Versailles between an American Representative and Baron von Lersner (see Appendix “C”). He wished to add that Baron von Lersner desired to emphasize the point that the Allied and Associated Governments should make a distinction between the German Government and the German people. They should make the threat to the German people in such a form as to make them understand the harm which their Government was doing in supporting the military party. Baron von Lersner said that the movement in the Baltic Provinces was clearly reactionary in character. He (Mr. Polk) desired to make it clear that the American Delegation did not agree with what Baron von Lersner had said. He (Mr. Polk) felt strongly that it was entirely possible for the German Government to stop rationing the army of General von der Goltz by closing the East Prussian frontier. Communication to the German Government Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

M. Berthelot said that there was serious grounds for doubting the good faith of the German Government in this matter.

M. Pichon said that on that very morning the newspapers had published a telegram from Berlin which contained a report from the German Conservative Press in regard to an exchange of letters between the British General Burt and General von der Goltz. General von der Goltz had used most insolent language to General Burt. He had threatened to break all relations with him and to expel British subjects from the territories under German occupation. He expressed the hope that the German Government would reply to the “injurious pretentions” which the Entente Mission thought themselves able to address to a German General in a foreign country, in a befitting manner.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that this letter only strengthened the opinion of his Government that it was necessary to take action as quickly as possible.

M. Fromageot read the draft note to the German Delegation prepared by the Drafting Committee in accordance with the resolution¹ taken by the Council on the 25th of September (see Appendix “D”). He said that in the first paragraph on the 2nd page the Drafting Committee had substituted the words, “all troops” for the words, “these troops”, which appeared in the draft previously prepared by the British Delegation.² The Committee had desired in this manner to refer to all German troops, no matter under what authority they were. They desired also to omit the last sentence of the third paragraph on the 2nd page, which actually dealt with a matter of interior arrangement. It was hardly necessary to notify the Germans of the instructions given to the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Polk said that America was not represented on the Supreme Economic Council and for this reason he wished to ask if the German demands in question were pending before the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

M. Fromageot said that if there was any question the words “Supreme Economic Council” could be removed wherever they appeared.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that it had been decided to act immediately. The use of the future tense as in the words, “they will be forced”, tended to weaken the weight of the action.

M. Fromageot said that the Committee had had a scruple upon the subject. They remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had promised Germany in July that the blockade would be raised after Germany had ratified the Treaty. The Committee had wished to use an expression which would show that they were not unmindful of the former engagement which had been taken and that they took recourse to these measures only because Germany had failed to live up to her obligations. It would be simpler to say, “they will take into consideration”, at the end of the paragraph; they would suppress the words “Supreme Economic Council” wherever they occurred.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Council had just decided to furnish oil if the supply of foodstuffs under discussion was to be stopped. It should be understood that the Supreme Council were in a position, if they considered it advisable, to cancel the decision which they had just taken.

M. Pichon said that the Council were in agreement on this point, but that he did not consider it advisable to notify the Armistice Commission of this reservation.

M. Fromageot said that in case the Council decided to hold up the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, the Committee had prepared a formula which could be inserted before the last paragraph on page two and which stated that the repatriation of German prisoners of war would be stopped from that day.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he thought this formula was too definite. In spite of his repeated telegrams, he had so far not received instructions from his Government. When the subject had been previously discussed, the Council had spoken of a total or partial suspension of repatriation.

M. Pichon said that he thought it would be better to make no mention of prisoners of war.

M. Berthelot said that it was an efficacious means of pressure, even though it was somewhat objectionable.

Mr. Polk said that he thought it would be advisable to make some intimation on the subject through the Press.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that at the meeting at which Mr. Lloyd George had been present, it had been decided to send the ultimatum through the intermediary of Marshal Foch.⁵ Later they had thought of addressing the German Delegation.⁶ Now they had returned to the formula of the ultimatum. He thought it would produce a stronger effect if it was communicated to the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch. From a technical point of view, he wished to say that all questions concerning the Armistice had been taken up with the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch and in this particular case the question was one relating to the terms of the Armistice.

M. Fromageot said that the note of September 23rd [3rd?] had been addressed to Marshal Foch.

Mr. Polk said that he had no objections to this procedure.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he suggested the advisability of making the note public.

M. Pichon said that the Press could be informed of the note on that day, and the terms could be published on the following Monday.

It was decided:

(1) to accept the draft note to the German Government respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces prepared by the Drafting Committee with the modifications in text approved by the Council (see Appendix “E”).

(2) to transmit this note to the German Government through the intermediary of the Marshal, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies;

(3) to notify the press of the transmission of this note and to make public the text on the 29th of September.

It was also decided:

that the Council, in conformity with the spirit of this note, should reserve the right to stop, if they should consider it advisable, the cargoes of oil, the delivery of which to Germany had been authorized by the Council.

4. M. Fromageot read and explained a note of the 18th of September addressed by the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council on the subject of the Air Convention which had been adopted by the Supreme Council at its meeting of September 10th⁷ (See Appendix “F”) Note From the Drafting Committee Air Convention

The Proposals of the Committee were adopted except in regard to Article 18 respecting which the following discussion took place:

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Article raised very delicate questions. If the Article were entirely suppressed the result might be that aircraft might, upon landing in a foreign country, be prevented from flying for an indefinite period, on the ground that some breach of patent had taken place. He wished to have it stated definitely that in a case of this kind the aircraft would not be detained.

M. Fromageot said that the same question had arisen in the Automobile Convention and at that time it was considered advisable to omit the Article. In point of fact there was no danger that aircraft would be detained for months. It would be sufficient to avoid detention to deposit a bond. It was possible to maintain the article under discussion, but there was no doubt that certain of the Powers would make reservations.

Captain Roper said that the French Delegation had made a reservation in respect of this Article for the purpose of protecting industrial property. They could not agree that a foreigner knowingly committing a breach of patent should land in France and leave without being disturbed. The detention of the aircraft in question appeared to be the only method of dealing with the situation, but in view of the fact that the Legal Advisers of the Conference were of the opinion that industrial property would be equally well protected if after their detention the deposit of a bond were called for, the French Delegation would withdraw their reservation against Article 18 upon condition that the last sentence, concerning suits to be brought in the country of origin against the aircraft, be eliminated.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he was willing to accept the suppression of such a statement. He suggested that the Article be referred to the Drafting Committee which should endeavor to modify it, so that the right of detention or seizure should be limited by the right to set the aircraft free upon the deposit of a bond.

M. Pichon said that he would agree to this.

M. Matsui said that he was obliged to make a reservation. His Government was not yet in possession of the text of the Convention. A period of six months had been allowed in which each Power might say whether or not it agree.

Mr. Polk said that the United States had also made a reservation and understood that they would be given a period of six months in which to communicate their reply.

It was decided:

(1) that the Drafting Committee should be called upon to modify the text of Article 18 of the Convention Relative to Air Navigation in such a manner as to make it possible for aircraft to avoid detention for violation of patent by depositing a security.

(2) to accept, with reference to Articles 15, 22, 24, 34, and 36 the proposals of the Drafting Committee. (See Appendix “F”.)

5. M. Berthelot said that he was directed by M. Clemenceau to say that he considered it inadvisable to publish portions of the Conditions of Peace in their original text. He was not opposed to the publication of all of the text and of the notes which had been exchanged in the premises with the German Government. Publication of Documents Annexed to the Treaty of Peace With Germany

Sir Eyre Crowe said he agreed in principle, but the publication of the whole of the text might be somewhat expensive. He would refer the matter to his Government.

(The question was adjourned)

6. Sir Eyre Crowe read and commented upon a note from the British delegation, dated September 24th, proposing that an article be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary identical with Article 310 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria. This article provided for an understanding with the parties interested to enable a state to use sources of electric and hydraulic energy, which, by reason of the formation of new frontiers, were situated in the territory of another state. (See Annex “G”.) Insertion in the Treaty With Hungary of an Article Identical With Article 310 of the Treaty With Austria

(The British proposal was accepted.)

(It was decided:

to request the Drafting Committee to insert an article in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary identical with Article 310 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)

7. (The Council had before it a memorandum from Mr. Hoover asking that a Committee be formed to make arrangements for and undertake the repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia (See Annex “H”).) Creation of a Commission To Study the Repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian Prisoners in Siberia

M. Berthelot said that the Council would, without question, be unanimous in approving Mr. Hoover’s proposal. It was a question of humanity, but he felt that it should be understood that, before repatriating the Germans and others, it would be necessary to repatriate the fifty thousand Czechoslovak troops who were at present in Siberia.

Mr. Polk said he agreed with M. Berthelot. There were a number of difficult questions in connection with the repatriation of these prisoners, just as there were in the case of the Czecho-Slovak troops, but as the question of the repatriation of the latter was being considered at the present time, it would be possible to study at the same time the questions relating to the Germans and Austrians.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he felt some doubt as to whether the nomination of a Commission would bring about practical results.

M. Pichon thought that there might be favorable results and that they would lead to a means of repatriating the Czecho-Slovak troops.

(It was decided:

that a Commission composed of one American, British, French, Italian and Japanese officer should be created to deal with the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.

It was also decided:

that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.)

8. (The signature then took place of the decision previously taken by the Council for the organization of a plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spisz and Orava.⁸ Signature of the Decision Taken by the Principal Allied Powers for the Organization of a Plebiscite at Teschen

The decision was signed by Mr. Polk, Sir Eyre Crowe, M. Pichon, M. Scialoja and M. Matsui.)

(The meeting then adjourned)

Appendix A to HD–32

September 24, 1919.

Translation

[french delegation]

Note on the German Tank Vessels

Origin of the Question

The Brussels Protocol concerning merchant tonnage⁹ is only the result of several interviews) notably those of Treves of January 15–17 and of Spa of March 4.

The surrender of the German merchant fleet was stipulated by Article VIII of the Convention renewing the Armistice signed at Treves on January 16.¹⁰ This article provided, to settle the details of execution, the conclusion of a civil agreement, which was signed in the same place on January 17.¹¹

The Germans not having fulfilled their obligations, a meeting of experts was held at Spa. Admiral Hope, Chief of the Allied Delegation, submitted a note with two memoranda annexed, one relative to finances and the other dealing with tonnage. This latter memorandum defines the nature of the exemptions accorded and confirms clearly their revocability.

The Germans, without raising objections to the terms of the memorandum, declared that they could not deliver their vessels without obtaining precise guarantees of food.

Therefore the whole question of food supply, tonnage and finance was treated again at Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919.

The exemptions accorded, whose provisional character is emphasized in every particular case, form the subject of the first paragraph of Annex V/a (tonnage) of the Brussels Protocol.

Concerning the tank vessels the drafting is perfectly clear; it is in fact stipulated that “for the moment, the Associated Governments would not insist on the delivery of the tank-steamers”.

Other exemptions granted at that time have since been revoked, for example those covered in paragraph 3 of S 1 of said Annex V/a.

Point of Law

A. Status of the vessels.

Consequently the tank-steamers in question, included in the German fleet that is to be handed over to the Allies, remain still at their disposal.

In March the Allies agreed not to insist on the immediate delivery solely because of the abundance of tank tonnage at that time available (on this subject see the English and German stenographic reports of the discussions).

The Allies are therefore perfectly justified, in law, in demanding the delivery of these steamers, and the Germans moreover can not refuse them (see on this subject the telegrams exchanged between the Coventry and the Admiralty).

B. Competence.

On February 4, the Allied Council of Maritime Transports asked the Supreme Council to sanction the creation of an organism charged with dealing with all questions relative to enemy vessels.

The Supreme Council referred this letter for decision to the Supreme Economic Council, which in the meantime had been constituted, to decide among other questions those brought up by the application of the armistice (other than strictly naval, military or political questions).

It is under these conditions that the Supreme Economic Council decided the question in its session of February 25, 1919 (paragraph 17 of the minutes).

Since that time numerous questions brought up—not only on the subject of the assignment or reassignment of the enemy vessels, but also on the extension of the restriction of exemptions granted—were always decided without reference by the Supreme Economic Council (notably the exemption of the vessels between 1600 and 2500 tons and the withdrawal of the exemption of food for the German army in Curland).

There is so little question about this that in the note that the American Delegate addressed to the Allied Executive of Maritime Transports on September 17, this Delegate asks that the question be decided by the Supreme Economic Council.

The Supreme Economic Council and the A. M. T. E. have therefore received explicit powers from the Allied and Associated Governments for all enemy vessels, whatever their status.

Point of Fact

The inclosed note of the Allied Executive of Maritime Transports¹² sums up this point perfectly, and the French Delegation has accepted it completely.

On receipt of this note, the Supreme Economic Council took the decision which is entered as follows in the minutes of the meeting of September 20th:

“315 [316]—delivery of german tank steamers to the allies

The President of the Transport Executive states the question and asks the Council to ratify the proposals contained in the note of the Transport Executive (document 291).

He calls especial attention to the note of the American Delegate (annex B) in this document, requesting that the Supreme Economic Council be asked to decide on the revocation of the provisional exemption in regard to these vessels granted by the Brussels Agreement.

The Council, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Supreme Council at the time of the Brussels Agreement, decides to approve the proposal of the Transport Executive, as follows:

1. That the provisional exemption of the German tank steamers granted at Brussels shall be revoked. This revocation shall go into force without affecting any measure previously taken by the permanent Naval Armistice Commission.

2. That the vessels shall be delivered to the management of the Allied and Associated Governments under the ordinary Armistice conditions.

3. That if the German Government desires, the vessels shall be employed, at least for one voyage, in carrying petroleum destined for Germany.

It is recalled that the American Delegate of the Transport Executive declared that if the Supreme Economic Council approves of the revocation of the exemption, no objection would be raised by his Government to these resolutions.

The French Delegation declares that it will insist to the French Ministry of the Navy that the Vestabe sent to Italy.”

The present situation is therefore as follows:

1. The Supreme Economic Council, ratifying the proposition of the A. M. T. E., presented in agreement with the Permanent Naval Armistice Commission (P. A. N. A. C), has decided that the vessels in question could not in any case be authorized to fly the German flag.

2. These organizations agree with the Germans that the vessels in question be delivered to the Allies and fly the Interallied flag, under the general conditions fixed for the German boats delivered to the Associated Powers after the Armistice (see telegrams P. A. N. A. C).

3. The Supreme Economic Council, ratifying the proposals presented by the A. M. T. E. at the request of the Committee of Organization of the Reparations Commission (itself acting at the instigation of the American Delegate), has decided that if the German Government so desires, these vessels shall be assigned to carrying petroleum bought by Germany.

The interests of the German supply are thus safeguarded in the method favored by the American Government for the food supply.

In fact the transport of petroleum is assured under the same conditions as that of the American supplies, and, since the furnishing depends only on the transport, Germany’s supply of mineral oils is assured.

In point of law there can be no connection between the delivery of petroleum to be made by American private interests and the execution of Armistice Clauses.

Appendix B to HD–62

September 26, 1919.

Translation

french delegation

Note

German Vessels en Route to Turkey

On September 5, a German boat, the Dianais signaled en route from Pireus to Constantinople.

The French and British High Commissionaries called the attention to the fact that the arrival of a German boat in Turkish waters would produce the worst impression. Besides, it would be contrary to the terms of article 23, of the Armistice Convention with Turkey, thus conceived: “Twenty three: obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the central Powers”.

The High Commissionaries give orders to the Allied forces to prevent the German vessels from passing through the Dardanelles.

On September 8, the French Government approves the instructions given by its High Commissionary and invites its representatives in London and Rome to see that the interdiction ordered by the High Commissionaries be maintained.

On September 15, the French High Commissioner announces that a German, arrived with a permit from the Interallied Commission of Repatriation of War Prisoners in Berlin, announces the near arrival of seven German ships for the repatriation of German prisoners in the Near East and the Black Sea, with a cargo destined for Bulgaria and authorized to take some freight on their return trip.

The French Embassy in London to which this information is communicated notified that indeed:

Taking into account the resumption of normal economic relations with Germany, the Interallied Naval Commission of Armistice has authorized seven ships to go to the Near East and the Black Sea. Three of those vessels have cargoes for Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia, the other four are intended for the transportation of German prisoners. They have all already left the German ports.

By reason of the general shortage of tonnage, it would be hard to make them turn back: an important tonnage would be lost for several weeks. Moreover, they are carrying cargo destined for Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia.

On the other hand the inconveniences which have given rise to the instructions given by the High Commissionaries in Constantinople would become still more serious on account of the fact that the Germans have spread the news that, in spite of these instructions, their flag would soon reappear in Turkish waters.

Under these conditions, it is proposed that orders be given so that:

1. —these vessels be allowed to make no other operations within Turkish waters and the Black Sea except those for which they have a permit.

2. —that on their approach of Turkish waters and the Black Sea, each vessel should receive on board a representative of the Allied and Associated Powers.

3. —that they fly on their stern the Interallied flag, blue, white and blue.

Appendix C to HD–62

Versailles , September 26, 1919.

[Résumé of Certain Conversations Between an American Representative and Baron von Lersner]

german peace delegation

The German Government has for weeks been taking the greatest pains to withdraw the insubordinate troops from the Baltic provinces and Lithuania. The troops, in case of their continuing to disobey orders, have been threatened with the stoppage of food supplies, pay and all canteen service. General von der Goltz had summoned to this effect the leaders of all detachments to his headquarters. General von der Goltz has in point of fact followed all the instructions of the Government. He is now recalled, because he failed to carry through the orders of the Government. It must be admitted that in military quarters they fear that his successor will have still greater difficulty to succeed in obtaining the necessary authority against the insubordinate troops. The troops in the Baltic Provinces are partly demoralized.

In order that the Allied and Associated Governments may form a correct idea of the situation in the Baltic Provinces, and in order to further the prompt evacuation of the Baltic Provinces as desired by the German Government themselves, the latter agree that a mixed German Interallied Commission should proceed to the Baltic Provinces.

The German Government deem it desirable that this Commission should travel via Berlin and should ascertain by direct negotiations with the German Government that Germany is willing to further the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces in every way.

In order to hasten the evacuation the German Government have proceeded to execute the decision taken in the former Cabinet Council to stop the pay of the troops, and have given orders that all troops, who refuse to obey the command to return, are to receive no more pay. Orders have been likewise given that all refractory troops shall lose their claims to maintenance or pension. The Minister for Public Defense has, already a few days ago, despatched a special officer to Courland, who sends daily reports on the situation there and receives orders from Berlin.

It is of great consequence to the German Government that Interallied representatives) should cooperate in the German-Interallied Commission, also on account of the fact that German Nationals established in the Baltic Provinces [wish?] to flee from the country together with the retreat of the German troops. They do not wish to experience another summer there under Bolsheviki rule. It is a case of 170,000 people, whose lives and property have to be protected. Germany is in no way in the position to procure, within the Empire, dwellings and food for these German subjects, established up to the present in the Baltic Provinces. After the retreat of the German troops they would have to be placed under the protection of the Entente.

Up to the present time adventurers from all parts of the Empire have been trying, contrary to the wishes of the German Government, to join the troops in the Baltic Provinces. Sharp admonitions have been issued against these tendencies. The frontier has been closed; soldiers, who, nevertheless, endeavour to pass the frontiers are fired upon. All supplies of ammunition to the Baltic troops have been strictly prohibited for weeks past.

The government have for the present deemed it preferable not to publish in the German press, as has been proposed, the menace of American reprisals, in order that no panic should arise from the impending occupation of further German districts. However, orders have been given to acquaint the troops of the Baltic Provinces at once with the threatened reprisals, in order that they may see the extent of the danger in case that they should not return.

It is absolutely erroneous that a great proportion of the German people by open or clandestine means are supporting the troops in their insubordination. On the contrary the opinion prevails in Germany that the troops can in no case hold out any longer in the Baltic Provinces. Even the leading Conservative paper Kreuz-zeitung wrote last Wednesday that it is wise and necessary to put a stop to the existing state of affairs in the Baltic Provinces, and drew the attention to the necessity of good German relations with the Lettish and Lithuanian people, as well as with their newly arising states.

A further question to be discussed with the Interallied Commission is the following:

What is to become of the Russian detachments which remain in the Baltic Provinces, standing partly between the German troops.

Appendix D to HD–62

[Translation¹⁴]

Draft of a Note to the German Delegation on the Subject of the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

(Proposal of the Drafting Committee)

According to the terms of article XII of the armistice of November 11, 1918, Germany subscribed to the following engagement:

“All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria-Hungary, Rumania, or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914;

All German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.”

Under date of August 27, the Marshal of France, Commander in Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, made known that the time had come for Germany to evacuate the said territories and summoned the German Government to proceed thereto immediately.

By its note of September 3, the German Government endeavored to evade the engagement above referred to, by alleging pretexts which the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to consider.

The Allied and Associated Governments refuse particularly to admit that the German Government can, in order to avoid the responsibility incumbent upon it, shield itself behind the alleged inability to enforce obedience of its orders by the troops in the Baltic regions.

They therefore request the German Government to proceed without delay to the evacuation of all German troops, staffs and services included, now in the Baltic provinces. The German Government will immediately take the necessary steps to withdraw within the aforesaid boundaries all German officers and soldiers who have enlisted since demobilization in Bussian corps organized in the said Baltic provinces and will withhold authorization for and strictly forbid enlistment in said corps.

The evacuation must be started immediately and must continue without interruption.

The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed they will not entertain any of the applications submitted to the Supreme Economic Council by the German Government for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. They have, consequently, given instructions to the Supreme Economic Council not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications.

Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities which the German Government is enjoying at the present time or which it is seeking from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals.

In the event of noncompliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the armistice.

Appendix E to HD–62

September 27, 1919.

Note to the German Government From the Allied and Associated Governments

According to the terms of Article XII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, Germany subscribed to the following engagement:

All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria Hungary, Rumania, or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

Under date of August 27, the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, made known that the time had come for Germany to evacuate the said territories and summoned the German Government to proceed thereto immediately.

By its note of September 3, the German Government endeavored to evade the engagement above referred to, by alleging pretexts which the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to consider.

The Allied and Associated Governments refuse particularly to admit that the German Government can, in order to avoid the responsibility incumbent upon it, shield itself behind the alleged inability to enforce obedience of its orders by the troops in the Baltic regions.

They therefore request the German Government to proceed without delay to the evacuation of all German troops, staffs and services included, now in the Baltic provinces. The German Government will immediately take the necessary steps to withdraw within the aforesaid boundaries all German officers and soldiers, who have enlisted since demobilization, in Russian corps organized in the said Baltic provinces and will withhold authorization for and strictly forbid enlistment in the said corps.

The evacuation must be started immediately and must continue without interruption.

The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed they will not entertain any of the applications put forward by the German Government for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. They have consequently given instructions not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications.

Furthermore the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities which the German Government is enjoying at the present time or which it is seeking from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals.

In the event of non-compliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the Armistice.

Appendix F to HD–62

Paris , September 18, 1919.

Translation

Note to the Supreme Council

The Drafting Committee has finished drawing up, in view of its signature, the Convention on Aerial Navigation, adopted by the Supreme Council in its Session of September 10.¹⁵

On that subject, the Drafting Committee has the honor to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the reservations made by several Delegations which are in disaccord relative to the following articles:

1) Article 18—That article solves certain questions of International Law in matters of industrial ownership (exemption of seizure in case of counterfeit, attribution of judicial jurisdiction).

Nothing seems to prevent the signatory powers from making reservations on that article. The pure and simple suppression of that article can be conceived. The silence of the convention as regard automobiles creates a precedent.

2) Article 22—Alineas 1, 2, and 5, (Right of Police for the States over their atmosphere) are the result of the principle of sovereignty established by article 1. Their maintenance is therefore not necessary.

The Drafting Committee considers that it is not necessary to solve those general questions, apropros of a technical regulation of aerial navigation which makes the subject of the present Convention.

Later agreements can regulate these questions of a purely judicial nature, if need be.

3) Article 34—(International Commission on Aerial Navigation). Cuba protests against the mode of the Constitution of that Commission.

The Drafting Committee considers that this provision adopted by the Commission is the basis of the Convention, which each state is free to sign or not—and that reservations on that score are practically equal to a refusal to sign.

4) —The United States have made reservations on articles 15, 24 and 36; the objections refer to questions of an internal nature and of customs.

But a time limit of six months has been provided for the signing of the Convention, precisely to settle these difficulties.

Under these conditions, the Drafting Committee has the honor to propose to the Supreme Council:

1. —Article 18. Either suppress that article, or accept the reservations which the signatory powers wish to add to their signature.

2. —Article 22. Suppress that article.

3. —Article 34. Take no account of the Cuban protest.

4. —Articles 15, 24 and 35. Make no objection to the provisional reservations made by the United States.

For the Drafting Committee,

Henri Fromageot

Appendix G to HD–62

Paris , September 24, 1919.

Translation

From: The British Delegation.

To: M. Dutasta.

The remarks formulated by the Austrian Delegation regarding the water and the electric light installations in the city of Klagenfurt resulted in, as is known to Your Excellency, the addition of a new article (No. 310) in the Peace Treaty with Austria at the last moment.

This article is drawn up in general terms in such a way as to be applicable to all similar cases and might be advantageously inserted in the Peace Treaty with Hungary.

However, the drafting committee does not feel authorized to adopt this line of action without the approbation of the Supreme Council and, consequently, I have the honor to suggest that this matter be submitted to an examination by the Council in the course of an early meeting.

Accept, etc.

(signature)

Appendix H to HD–62

[Note From the Director General of Relief (Hoover)]

Repatriation of Prisoners of War From Siberia and Elsewhere

It appears that there are some 200,000 German-Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia, and that these prisoners are suffering greatly and are a constant menace to the Siberian Government. There are also certain Polish prisoners and civilians now scattered all over the world who will require more systematic assistance at repatriation, but there is an entire deficiency of funds with which to pay the incidental expenses. There are probably also other odd lots of expatriates of various nationals as the result of the war, who need systematic repatriation. It would appear to me that this problem requires definite organization, and I should like to submit the following plan in the matter for action by the Council.

First, that a Commission, comprising a British, French, American and Italian military officer, should be set up and undertake the management of this repatriation. That this Commission should communicate their appointment to the Austrian, Hungarian and Polish and other Governments, and that they should offer to undertake the repatriation, provided funds are placed to their credit in advance by each of the Governments concerned.

It would appear to me that if such a body is set up under capable officers that they would be able to work out a solution in this manner and to secure from the Allied Governments the necessary shipping and other services which would be necessary. They could invite a delegate of each of the Governments concerned to sit with them in respect to the matters which concerned such a Government and they could engage the necessary staff to carry on the work. They would probably need to appeal to the various Allied Governments and to charitable societies for some assistance in respect to prisoners originating from quarters unable to supply these funds, but, in any event, they would create a center around which all effort of this kind could be directed.

With the repatriation of the Allied troops nearing completion, it would appear to be an appropriate moment for the erection of such a body. I attach two memoranda on the subject indicating the volume of the problem involved, the first from the British authorities on “Prisoners in Siberia”, the second from the Polish Officer for Repatriation.

Herbert Hoover

26 July 1919.

[Enclosure 1]

food section

Memorandum From British Delegates

Ex-Enemy Prisoners of War in Siberia

There are about 200,000 German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war in Siberia. They are in a destitute condition, and it is considered essential, both on humanitarian and political grounds, that food and clothing should be supplied to them. The representatives in Siberia of the Danish and Scandinavian Red Cross Societies have undertaken to carry out the work if they are supplied with funds, estimated at £100,000 a month. The Austrian Government have offered to provide the funds for their nationals, and the British Foreign Office stated on the 24th of June that the Hungarian Government stated that they were unable to contribute to the expenses, but asked that notwithstanding the Relief should be carried out.

It is suggested that the best way to deal with the problem (which has now become a very pressing one) would be to ask the Director General of Relief to approach the Red Cross authorities in order that they may make the necessary arrangements to receive the contributions of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments, and to carry out such measures of Relief as are possible with the finance thus made available.

It is possible that on re-consideration the German Government would also consent to provide the necessary finance. It may be mentioned that the Austrian representative who deals with this matter is at present at St. Germain.

It is suggested that the Red Cross representatives should be informed that the Allied Governments will permit the necessary remittances to be made by the ex-enemy Governments concerned and will facilitate the Relief measures undertaken as far as possible.

S. D. Waley

7/7/19

[Enclosure 2]

Translation

central polish office for the
repatriation of prisoners of war,
civilian refugees and workmen

Memorandum on Polish Repatriation
by
Stanislaw Gawronski

up to the 1st June 1919

In reply to your esteemed communication of the 11th July, I hasten to communicate to you:

1. The approximate figures of Polish subjects in foreign countries awaiting repatriation.

2. The number of foreigners actually in Poland whom it is necessary to repatriate.

3. The number of foreign prisoners of war, interned civilians, refugees and work-people which the Central Polish Repatriation Office has transported across Polish territory at Polish national expense.

I

From the figures possessed by the Central Office for Repatriation of prisoners, interned civilians and refugees at Warsaw, the following Poles still await repatriation in foreign countries:

1. Germany, in which is included the occupied territories and the provinces recaptured by France:

a) 15,000 to 20,000 Polish prisoners of war, the vast majority of which are invalids, wounded and sick (Polish Consul-General, Berlin).

b) about 600,000 Polish workers interned in Germany during the war and taken by force during the German occupation of Polish territory formerly belonging to Russia.

Germany: total between 615,000 and 620,000.

This figure does not include interned civilians and workers, formerly Russian subjects in Posnania, and the Polish subjects of foreign nationalities (Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Jews, etc.) of which the Central Repatriation Office has not adequate figures.

2. Russia: prisoners of war who were formerly soldiers in the Russian Army, who had been evacuated by force from the Polish territory formerly belonging to Russia and occupied by Germany during the war.

a) Russia in Europe, in which is included the Ukraine and the Don country. The figures which are obtainable at the moment, having in view the state of war with the Bolshevists and the absolute lack of communications, are very incorrect. Taking as a basis the original figures obtained by the Polish Poor Relief organization which functioned in the territory of the Russian Empire during the war, and deducting the number of repatriated people up till the first of June, a certain number who enlisted in the Allied armies in Russia, and those who have already gone over the Hungarian and Roumanian frontiers, there remain in Russia in Europe between 165,000 and 180,000 Poles to be repatriated.

b) Siberia: about 40,000. These figures come from Polish organizations in Siberia, and are confirmed by various Allied and neutral missions.

c) Caucasus and Turkistan: about 20,000 (Polish organizations).

d) Finland, Murmansk, Archangel: 3,000 (Polish delegates at Archangel).

e) Baltic Provinces: about 3,000 (idem).

Russia: total between 231,000 and 246,000.

3. Austria: between 20,000 and 25,000, of which 17,000 are registered by the Polish Mission at Vienna as being in that city or its immediate environs.

4. Hungary: about 30,000, of which 20,000 registered at Budapest by Major Tabaszymsky of Colonel Vix’s Military Mission as coming from the south-eastern provinces of Russia.

5. Roumania: about 30,000 from the south-eastern provinces of Russia, (Polish Mission at Bucharest).

6. Serbia: at least 6,000, of which the condition is most deplorable. (Special Polish Mission.)

7. Albania: about 3,000 (Special Polish Mission).

8. Greece: about 1,000 (Special Polish Mission).

9. Jugo-Slavia: about 2,000 (Special Polish Mission).

10. Turkey, Europe and Asiatic: between 10,000 and 15,000 (Special Polish Mission).

11. Denmark: 1,000

12. Holland: 1,000

13. England: 3,000

14. Italy: 5,000 (Polish Consul-General at Rome).

15. France: in which is included the English and American camps:—between 15,000 and 20,000 prisoners of war and between 10,000 and 12,000 workers and refugees, in which are included the refugees from Odessa brought by sea to Marseilles.

recapitulation

1)	Germany	615,000	to	620,000
2)	Russia	231,000	to	248,000
3)	Austria	20,000	to	25,000
4)	Hungary	about		30,000
5)	Czecho-Slovakia	“		2,000
6)	Roumania	“		60,000
7)	Serbia	“		6,000
8)	Albania	“		3,000
9)	Greece	“		1,000
10)	Turkey	10,000	to	15,000
11)	Denmark	about		1,000
12)	Holland	“		1,000
13)	Italy	“		5,000
14)	England	“		3,000
15)	France	25,000	to	32,000
	Total in round figures	1,010,000	to	1,050,000
	Polish subjects prisoners of war, interned civilians and refugees awaiting repatriation.

In this figure of between 1,010,000 and 1,050,000 are not included the Polish subjects of foreign nationalities from the German provinces allotted to Poland by the Peace Treaty. The number of these Polish subjects is not very large, but they must be taken into consideration when arranging the repatriation of Polish subjects who are prisoners of war in the French, English and American prisoner of war camps.

II

The number of foreigners in Poland whose repatriation is necessary and indeed urgent is difficult to formulate. It increases from day to day. Above all there are the Russian subjects fleeing before the Bolshevists and placing themselves under Polish protection after having passed the Polish Bolshevist front. These refugees arrive with their wives and children in a deplorable state, ragged, verminous, starving, bring with them every sort of disease. Among these there are many Bolshevist agents, who under the pretext of fleeing before the Bolshevists penetrate into Polish territory in order to carry out dangerous Bolshevist propaganda. Apart from these and in spite of the Allied order forbidding Germany to repatriate Russian prisoners of war across Polish territory, there are constantly arriving from Germany prisoners who are Russian subjects, who having in view the lack of forces to guard the Polish frontier, cross this frontier on foot and disseminate themselves little by little in Polish territory. The number of these men vary from between 500 and 2,000 per week. The numbers have greatly diminished during the last few weeks. These prisoners of war who are Russian subjects, are also without any means of existence, and naturally they have to be lodged and fed at the expense of the Polish Government.

The number of Russian subjects actually on Polish territory can be said without exaggeration to be between 250,000 and 300,000. The larger part of these prisoners are Russian subjects, but among them is a large number of Jews and Ukrainians and also small parties of White Russians, Lithuanians, and others. Having in view the lack of provisions, the lack of medical requirements and disinfectants, the absolute lack of linen and clothes, the absolute lack of means of transport and the lack of work, all these people without resources or means of existence are a heavy burden on the Polish Government, and present a real danger from the moral and medical point of view, not only for Poland, but for the whole of Western Europe in general.

III

The number of foreign prisoners of war recorded as having passed through Polish territory from November 1918 to the first June 1919 at the expense of the Polish Government is stated below:

1)	Russians	481,171
2)	Germans	7,640
3)	Lithuanians	5,930
4)	Ukrainians	14,235
5)	French	1,549
6)	Serbians	524
7)	Hungarians	19,792
8)	Italians	1,266
9)	Bulgarians	171
10)	Czechs	10,427
11)	Roumanians	1,865
12)	Austrians	6,583
13)	English	62
14)	Belgians	17
15)	Americans	5
16)	Turks	871
17)	Various	3,050
	Total	555,158

This total of 555,158 foreign prisoners is very much below the actual figure, as the Central Repatriation Office did not at first take into account the foreign prisoners of war transported by Galicia, and consequently figures were lacking. Immediately after the Armistice, on account of internal troubles in Germany and the withdrawal of Austrian authorities from Polish territory, the number of foreign prisoners of war in Polish territory was so large that tens of thousands of Russian, German and Austrian prisoners of war were transported from east to west and from west to east of the Polish frontiers without being recorded on account of the impossibility of exercising control. It would be perfectly just and not an exaggeration to augment the total of 555,158 by at least 150,000.

1. HD–60, minute 7, p. 342.
2. Appendix F to HD–60, p. 364.
5. HD–54, minute 1, p. 218.
6. HD–55, minute 1, p. 231; HD–56, minute ii, p. 256; HD–60, minute 7, p. 342.
7. HD–51, minute 1, p. 173.
8. HD–58, minute 2, p. 300.
9. Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 3 sér., tome xi, p. 232.
10. Vol. ii, p. 11.
11. Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 3 sér., tome xi, p. 214.
12. Does not accompany the appendix.
14. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
15. HD–51, minute 1, p. 173.