Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/55

HD–55

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, September 17, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, September 17, 1919, 11 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta.
    • M. Berthelot.
    • M. de St. Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. Scialoja.
  • Secretary
    • M. Barone Russo.
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui.
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. Chapin.
France	Cmdt. A. Portier.
Italy	M. Zanchi.
Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • Mr. A. W. Dulles.
  • Mr. B. L. Dresel.
  • Mr. F. K. Nielsen.
• British Empire
  • Mr. Nicolson.
  • Mr. Waley.
• France
  • M. Tardieu.
  • Marshal Foch.
  • General Weygand.
  • General Le Bond.
  • M. Laroche.
  • M. Kammerer.
  • M. Jouasset.
  • M. Serruys.
• Italy
  • M. Dell’Abbadessa.
  • M. Galli.
  • Colonel Castoldi.
  • M. Pilotti.

1. M. Clemenceau said that he had requested Marshal Foch to be present at this meeting of the Council for the purpose of further studying the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops. He had received a letter from Mr. Polk regarding this matter. (The letter contained in Appendix “A” was then read to the Council.) He would like to know what answer had been given by Mr. Lloyd George in the course of his conversation with Mr. Polk. Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by the German Armies

Mr. Polk stated that he did not like to quote the words of another person, but that he understood Mr. Lloyd George to say that he preferred to let matters stand as they were. Mr. Lloyd George had thought that the question should not be brought up again until the Germans had indicated a refusal to carry out the withdrawal, should they so refuse. He had answered Mr. Lloyd George that he believed the question should be brought up at once, and for this reason had written the letter to M. Clemenceau, which had just been read.

M. Clemenceau suggested that Marshal Foch might read the instructions which he proposed to send to General Henrys.

Marshal Foch said that he had sent the instructions to General Henrys in accordance with the decision reached by the Council.¹ He had told him that the principle of an ultimatum to Germany had been decided upon, but that his opinion was asked before the same should be transmitted to Germany.

Mr. Polk asked whether it was agreed that the Council should take no decision until the receipt of the answer from General Henrys.

Marshal Foch stated that his instructions to General Henrys had been based on the fact that the principle of an ultimatum had been decided upon. If this ultimatum was now considered as conditional, it would be necessary for him to modify the instructions which he had sent.

Mr. Polk pointed out that he was not opposed to an ultimatum, but wished solely to formulate objections to the use of the Polish troops.

Marshal Foch said that the sending of an ultimatum without deciding upon the means to carry it into execution would be a useless procedure. He had made a study of this question and believed that the Polish troops constituted the only force which could be used. If the Council were of the opinion that no use could be made of these troops, it was unnecessary to send an ultimatum.

Mr. Polk stated that the feeling of the American Delegation on this question was that the use of Polish troops against Germany in the Baltic provinces would be to cause hostilities, which had been suppressed in Upper Silesia with great difficulty, to spring up again. A military operation of this character would certainly lead to war between Germany and Poland. It was extremely necessary to maintain the situation in Upper Silesia in a calm state, in order not to increase the actual difficulties of the coal shortage. After the Treaty had been ratified by three great Powers, Upper Silesia would be occupied by Interallied troops. When this occupation became a fact, and when no further disorders in the coal districts were likely, the Council might then decide to use the Polish forces. He was not opposed to their eventual use, should the need arise.

M. Clemenceau said that in view of Mr. Polk’s statement he believed the best course at present was to adjourn the discussion and to take the question up again when Upper Silesia should be occupied by the Interallied troops.

Mr. Polk said that the matter seemed to him particularly serious. The Council was obliged to decide whether it was preferable to allow the Germans to remain in Lithuania for the moment, or drive them therefrom even at the risk of shutting down the production of coal in Upper Silesia. He had talked with Mr. Loucheur and with Mr. Hoover, who had both stated that the cutting off of the coal supply would have very serious consequences. He had talked with Mr. Tittoni on the previous evening regarding the matter and the latter had agreed with him that an unnecessary risk would be run through this operation.

Marshal Foch pointed out that the Conference alone was capable of choosing between these two political courses of action.

M. Clemenceau said that he personally regretted that this operation, which he believed excellent, should not take place. In the face of the opposition of the American Delegation, however, the matter must be suspended, for it was exceedingly dangerous to commence it without being sure of carrying it to a successful completion.

Marshal Foch said that on three separate occasions threats had been sent which had not been followed up.

Mr. Polk said that the gravity of the situation in Silesia appeared worthy of considerable thought and should compel the Council to hesitate.

M. Clemenceau said that he would hesitate if he believed that the proposed action in the Baltic provinces would have an effect on the situation in Silesia, but he was not of this opinion.

Mr. Polk answered that he had recently interviewed the different American representatives, who had arrived from Poland, Silesia and the Baltic provinces, namely, Mr. Gibson, Colonel Goodyear and Colonel Greene. These gentlemen were all of the opinion that the coal situation would be seriously aggravated and threatened should the proposed action be taken. He had also seen Mr. Paderewski and had asked him whether he was ready to bear the expenses of the operation in question. Mr. Paderewski had replied that France was to bear the expense. He had then informed Mr. Paderewski that the United States would not incur any obligations therein. He believed, however, that it would be well to ask General Henrys what his opinion in the matter might be.

Marshal Foch said that General Henrys could only report on one element of the problem, namely, the condition and state of the Polish Army. It should not be lost sight of, however, that the Council, in insisting upon the evacuation of the Baltic provinces, was simply carrying into effect one of the clauses of the Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers should stand together on this matter. It should be understood that the Polish Army would be in charge of the operation, but it would be supported both by the Czecho-Slovak troops and the Allied detachments on the Rhine. General Henrys would answer that he could not defeat Germany with the Polish forces alone—more particularly should Germany be able to concentrate all her troops against Poland.

M. Clemenceau said that the Poles had notified the Council that they possessed an army of 450,000 men.

Marshal Foch pointed out that these figures were accurate but that this force would not be sufficient to defeat Germany and that the Allies would risk seeing Poland severely dealt with, which was obviously not a situation to be desired.

Mr. Polk said that he had no objections to the sending of an ultimatum, but only to the use of Polish troops. He believed that another method of pressure to compel the execution of the ultimatum could be found, either from an economic standpoint through the Economic Council, or by the retention of prisoners of war. He did not think that the risk of starting a new war between Poland and Germany should be run, because no one of the Powers was at present disposed to render financial aid to Poland. On the other hand, economic pressure might be exceedingly effective. For example, the Germans at the present time are in the process of borrowing money from the United States through the agency of private banks. The Council might put a stop to this procedure. The recent example of Rumania, who had acted as an agent of the Allied and Associated Powers, seemed to him extremely unsatisfactory and should not lead the Council to stir up a similar operation elsewhere. He suggested therefore that an ultimatum might be sent, making use of economic pressure.

M. Tardieu said that the retention of the prisoners of war constituted an excellent means of pressure as well, for their immediate repatriation was necessary to the internal political situation of Germany.

M. Clemenceau proposed that Marshal Foch should read the text of an ultimatum which he had prepared, and that if such text were satisfactory to the Council, it might be modified in the way suggested by Mr. Polk.

Marshal Foch then read his proposed letter to the German Government (see Appendix “B”).

Mr. Polk stated that he found this text satisfactory.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the steps which had been discussed as a method of pressure would be sufficient to bring about the execution of the matters covered in the note.

M. Clemenceau said that Mr. Polk was favorable to an economic means of pressure, such as a blockade.

Mr. Polk said that he was particularly anxious not to commit the Council at the present time to the use of the Polish Army. He did not wish to intimate that this Army might not be made use of at some future time, but he wished to leave the decision of this question open.

Marshal Foch said that on three different occasions ultimatums couched in mild language had been sent to the German Government on the following dates: June 18, August 1 and August 24.

Mr. Polk remarked that as the Council had already sent three ultimatums a fourth was scarcely necessary. The best method of procedure would be to notify Mr. von Lersner that the Council insisted upon the carrying out of the Armistice in question, and that in case of refusal certain measures, such as blockade, other means of exerting economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and, as a last resort, the use of the Polish Army, had been decided upon.

M. Clemenceau said that this notice should be in writing.

General Weygand said that he was prepared to draft the text of such a letter, as he was familiar with the question. An answer had been received from the Germans to the effect that they were willing to evacuate the territory in question but that they could not enforce the execution of their orders.

(It was decided that General Weygand should submit to the Council at its next meeting, a draft letter to the German Delegation demanding the withdrawal of the German forces from the Baltic provinces. This letter should draw attention to the means of exercising pressure on the German Government proposed by Mr. Polk, viz., blockade and other economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and possible use of the Polish forces.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdrew.)

2. Upon the proposal of Mr. Scialoja the resolution taken on September 11 (H. D. 52, minute 6)² regarding the languages used for the convention on Aerial Navigation was modified to read as follows: Languages To Be Used in the Convention on Aerial Navigation

“It was decided that the Convention on Aerial Navigation should be drafted in English, French and Italian, each text to be of equal authority.”

3. (At this point the members of the Central Territorial Commission entered the room.)

M. Tardieu stated that the Greek Delegation had sent a letter to the Central Territorial Commission on September 13 relative to certain points with regard to the territorial clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty (see appendix C). The Central Territorial Commission had been of the opinion: Peace Conditions With Bulgarian. (a) TerritorialClauses

1. That the request put forward by the Greek Delegation is ethno-graphically just.

2. That the line proposed by the Greek Delegation should, from a geographical point of view, be modified in accordance with the red line on the map annexed to the commission’s report.

The Italian delegate, in view of the principle put forward by the Greek Delegation, suggested a change in the line of Western Thrace to the advantage of Bulgaria.

The American delegate, while not denying the weight of the opinions of the other delegations, drew attention to the inconvenience which would result from changing a line already unanimously decided upon and it further did not believe itself to be in a position to advance an opinion without a more careful study of the whole question.

Mr. Polk said that he had certain objections to formulate. President Wilson, before his departure, had personally proposed a line of demarkation. He had already agreed to a considerable modification of this line and did not feel that he had authority to make a further change therein. He pointed out that he had already consented to the taking of certain territories in the region of Adrianople from Bulgaria, although there was a large population of Bulgarians in such territories. He could do nothing further along these lines and in addition felt that the proposed change, even though ethno-graphically just, was unsound from a geographic point of view.

(It was decided to reject the proposal of the Greek Delegation with regard to a further modification of the frontiers of Bulgaria in Western Thrace.) (See appendix “C”)

M. Tardieu said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the necessity of asking the Bulgarians to withdraw their troops from Western Thrace as they were still occupying that region as well as the Stroumitza salient. This occupation might last for a long time, as the Bulgarian delegation had requested a period of twenty to twenty-five days in which to prepare their answer to the Peace Conditions of the Allies. The Bulgarian occupation compelled the Allies to maintain troops in the neighborhood which were not absolutely necessary. He suggested that the Bulgarians might be told that the Allies were likely to grant them the delay requested, on condition that they would evacuate the territories in question immediately. Evacuation of Western Thrace by the Bulgarian Troops

Mr. Polk asked what forces would relieve the Bulgarian troops.

M. Tardieu answered that the military experts believed that three battalions only would be necessary to maintain order in Thrace. This force was already on the ground and there was in addition a division in Sofia which could profitably be recalled. He pointed out that there was no question of inserting a clause in the Bulgarian Treaty regarding this matter.

Mr. Polk said that as the matter had no place in the Bulgarian Peace Treaty he proposed the consideration of the Treaty itself be terminated and the proposition of M. Tardieu be adjourned to the following day.

(This proposal was accepted.)

(Mr. Tardieu then withdrew and Mr. Kammerer entered the room.)

M. Kammerer said that the Greek Delegation had, on September 15 sent to the Secretary General some additional remarks relative to the political clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. (See appendix “D”.) The Committee on New States Article 56 had prepared a report on the matter which had been submitted to the various delegations (see appendix E). (b) Political Clauses. Article 56

(It was decided to accept the following clause proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 56, with regard to the protection of minorities and voluntary emigration:

Article 56, paragraph 2: “Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Allied and Associated Powers shall deem opportune relative to reciprocal and voluntary emigration of ethnic minorities.”

M. Kammerer continuing said that the Greek Delegation had also asked that a paragraph be added to Article 50 dealing with the protection of minorities. (See Appendix D.) The Committee on New States believed that the Treaty should be limited to general provisions with regard to the different religious sects, and therefore that by accepting the addition proposed by the Greek delegation the risk would be incurred of entering into details and thereby creating a precedent. For this reason the Committee on New States had recommended that the Council reject the Greek proposal. Article 50

(It was decided to reject the paragraph proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 50 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.)

M. Laroche said that the Greek Delegation had proposed a change in Article 44 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty (See appendix F). By this proposal the Greek Delegation asked solely that it be treated in the same manner as the Slav [Serb]-Croat-Slovene State, and it had appeared difficult to refuse the addition requested. The Drafting Committee upon being consulted had approved of the text drawn by the Greeks. Article 44

(After a short discussion it was decided to insert the following paragraph in Article 44 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, in accordance with the request of the Greek Delegation:

“Bulgarian nationals, however, who became resident in this territory after October 18, 1912, will not acquire Greek nationality without a permit from Greece.”)

M. Kammerer said that the Greek Delegation had formulated certain objections with regard to Article 46 by which Article Greece agreed to execute a special treaty for the protection of minorities. The refusal to execute the article was based on the fact that no additional territory was given to Greece by the Bulgarian treaty. The committee on New States was of the opinion that this point was well taken and therefore proposed that Greece, while agreeing to sign the clause of the Bulgarian treaty obligating her to execute the minorities treaty, should not be compelled to sign the latter treaty until such time as she should be assured of the grant of new territories. Article 46

(It was decided that a letter should be sent by the President of the Peace Conference to the Greek Delegation requesting the latter to accept Article 46 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty and notifying them that the special treaty provided for in this article would not be submitted for signature until such time as the Conference should be able to make known to the Greeks the territory which might be attributed to them.)

M. Kammerer said that the Greeks had in addition raised certain objections with regard to the signature of special clauses in the treaty with Greece. The Committee on New States had rejected all the Greek proposals with the exception of that dealing with the option of nationalities. Should the Council accept the proposal of the Committee a simple modification of Article 3 of the proposed treaty with Greece would give effect to the objection. Special Treaty With Greece

(It was decided that Article 3 of the proposed treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece should be so modified as that the first paragraph should read as follows:

“Greece recognizes as Greek nationals with full rights and without any formalities Bulgarian, Turk (or Albanian) nationals domiciled at the date of the entry into force of the present treaty, on territory transferred to Greece since January 1, 1913.[”])

(At this point Mr. Laroche and Mr. Kammerer withdrew, and Mr. Jouasset entered the room.)

Mr. Jouasset said that the Greek Delegation had formulated certain objections relative to the reparations clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (See Appendix “F”). The Commission on the Reparation of Damages had studied these criticisms and had submitted its report in the matter to the Secretary General. (See Appendix “G.”) (c) Reparation Clauses

It was decided to accept the proposal of the Reparations Commission with regard to Article 121, the sixth paragraph of which should be amended to read as follows: Article 121

“These sums shall be remitted through the Interallied Commission referred to in Article 130 of this part to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919, such as it is constituted by the Treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919, (Part VIII, Annex II, Paragraph 2); This Commission is referred to hereinafter as the Reparations Commission. It will assure the effecting of payments in conformity with the arrangements already made.”

After a short discussion it was decided to accept the proposal of the Delivery of Reparations Commission and to add the following additional paragraph to Article 127: Delivery of Livestock by Bulgaria

“In addition to the deliveries mentioned above, the Interallied Commission shall have the authority? should they recognize it as possible, to attribute to Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during the two years which shall follow the entry into force of the present Treaty, such quantities of livestock as may appear to them justified; the value of these deliveries shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria.”

Mr. Jouasset then read that portion of the report of the Commission on Reparations dealing with this question. (See Appendix “G”, Paragraph II.) He said that the French Delegation had made a proposal which, after liquidation of the debts and credits of Bulgaria to Germany, gave the Reparations Commission the right to decide whether the remainder of the Bulgarian debt should be demanded or whether Bulgaria should be granted certain terms or intervals of payment, or a complete remission of the debt. Such a formula would be simple and would not commit anyone to a fixed course of action in the future. It would have the further advantage of giving satisfaction to the five small States and of nullifying any pretext which the latter might have to refuse advance payments accorded them by the Allies. On the other hand, if a part of the debt were remitted in the first instance to Bulgaria, an enemy Power, the small States might take advantage of this precedent and refuse to settle their debts to the Allies. Debts of Bulgaria With Relation to Germany, Austria, etc.

Sir Eyee Crowe said that the debt of Bulgaria in relation to Germany and Austria should not be compared to the debt of the different small States with relation to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The British Delegation was of the opinion that changes in the text of the Treaty would constitute a sign of weakness and that the most simple course to pursue was to uphold the text in its present form.

Mr. Polk said that it was certain that Bulgaria could not pay more than it was actually called upon. To make a change in the article in question would be to raise false hopes in the minds of the small Powers, that they might obtain something which they were certain not to receive. He therefore believed that the text as drafted should be upheld.

Mr. Scialoja said that the French proposal simply transferred the difficulty to the Reparations Commission. This would lead to a delay of three months, during which time Bulgaria would not be able to obtain the credit which she needed. It was to be feared that in addition she would dispute certain of her debts, and such a loss of time might even result in the enhancement of the payment of such sums as she indisputably owed for the purpose of reparations.

(After a short further discussion, it was decided to make no change in the text of Article 124 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)

(At this point Mr. Kammerer and Mr. Jouasset withdrew, and Mr. Serruys entered the room.)

Mr. Serruys said that the Roumanian Delegation had presented three proposals regarding Articles 171, 175 and 177 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. (See Appendix “H”.) The Economic Commission had studied these proposals and had submitted a report thereon to the Secretary General indicating its opinion. (See Appendix “I”.) (d) Economic Clauses

(After a short discussion, it was decided to accept the report submitted by the Economic Commission:

• Article 171: The English text of Article 171 being the only one which is accurate, it was decided to revise the French and Italian texts to conform therewith.
• Article 175: It was decided to maintain the text of this Article without change. The benefit of capitulations in Bulgaria in favor of Japan is upheld but is not to be extended to all the Allied and Associated Powers.
• Article 177: The Roumanian proposal was rejected and the Article maintained without change.)

4. On the proposal of M. Clemenceau, it was decided that the text of the conditions of the Peace with Bulgaria should be presented to the Bulgarian Delegation at the meeting of the Supreme Council on Friday, September 19, 1919, at 11:00 o’clock, in the Salle de l’Horloge, Quai d’Orsay. Presentation of the Treaty of Peace to the Bulgarian Delegation

The Meeting then adjourned.

Hotel de Crillon, Paris , September 17, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–55

Paris, September 16, 1919.

[Mr. Frank L. Polk to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

Dear Mr. Clemenceau: I have been giving a good deal of thought to the subject we discussed yesterday, namely, what to do with the German forces in Lithuania. After taking the matter up with our experts and with my colleagues I have come to the conclusion that it would be most unwise at the present moment to authorize the use of the Polish troops against the Germans in case of their refusal. It would, in our opinion, probably bring on trouble in Silesia, thereby threatening, if not destroying, the coal supply of Central Europe, a serious thing in itself, but it would also bring on a conflict between the Poles and the Baltic Provinces. Mr. Gibson, our Minister to Poland, is convinced that General Henrys will be of the same opinion. It would seem, therefore, wiser not to commit ourselves to the use of the Poles at present, but to wait until we see what attitude the Germans will take and then decide the question.

In the light of existing circumstances I think this has a further advantage, inasmuch as after the Treaty is ratified the German military forces will be reduced and Allied occupation of Silesia will be possible.

I saw Mr. Lloyd George this morning and told him what our view was and attempted to see you, as I thought it was important that you should know our decision at the earliest possible moment. I will tell Mr. Tittoni this afternoon and will bring the matter up at the Conference tomorrow so that our views can be formally recorded. I regret to have to change my views, but under the circumstances I feel I made a mistake yesterday in consenting to this arrangement.

Believe me [etc.]

Frank L. Polk

M. Clemenceau
President of the Peace Conference,
Quai d?Orsay, Paris.

Appendix B to HD–55

[Translation³]

September 16, 1919.

Note for the German Government

3rd Section

(1) Article XII of the Armistice of November 11 stipulates that: “German troops at present in territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they were on August 1, 1914, as soon as the Allies shall think best, after taking into account the internal situation of these territories.”

Article 433 of the Treaty of Peace confirms these provisions in all points.

(2) The Allied and Associated Governments, who on several occasions have requested Germany to carry out the evacuation of its troops from the Baltic Provinces,^* have decided that this evacuation should be accomplished without any delay.

Moreover, they are prepared to take, in agreement with the Governments of the Baltic Provinces, all suitable measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security in the Baltic territories after the withdrawal of the German troops.

(3) The German Government is called upon, therefore, by the present note, to proceed immediately to the complete evacuation of its military forces from the Baltic Provinces, under the conditions and within the time limits of which the particulars are laid down in No. 5 hereafter.⁴

This complete evacuation is to apply not only to self-contained units, but also to general staffs and departments, and to all isolated German military units now stationed in Russian territory.

(4) The German Government is held responsible for the carrying out of these stipulations.

In case of non-execution, the Allied and Associated Governments have determined upon the necessary measures to enforce respect for their decision.

In the event that they should be obliged to resort to these measures, all the German military remaining in Russian territory would be made prisoners of war.

Appendix C to HD–55

greek delegation
to the
peace conference

Paris, September 13, 1919.

Supplementary Remarks on the Peace Conditions With Bulgaria

Pursuant to its note of September 9 the Greek Delegation has the honor to submit to the examination of the Supreme Council of the Conference the following supplementary remarks on the subject of the frontier line indicated in Articles 27, 30 (page 22).

The proposed frontier in Western Thrace is composed of two parts, one of which runs from west to east, the other from north to south; the latter follows for most of its length the Bulgarian Turkish frontier of 1913.

If this second part of the line were to be definitely maintained it would offer, from the ethnographic and military points of view, serious disadvantages, to which the Greek Delegation thinks it its duty to call the attention of the Supreme Council of the Conference.

I.

The Bulgarian Turkish frontier of 1913 in Western Thrace, south of the Arda, cuts in two, and more or less at right angles to the thalwegof this river, the basin of the Kisildeli, a tributary of the Maritsa.

The trace proposed would leave thus to Bulgaria the upper valley of the Kisildi, taking in the principal part of the casa [Caza?]of Ortakoui.

Now, except for the north-west district, in which are grouped most of the Bulgarians living in the region (4060 souls) the rest of the casa has a population essentially Mussulman and Greek; the first numbering 15,273 souls, the second, 14,562. This would therefore be subjecting nearly 30,000 inhabitants to the Bulgarian yoke, from which, after having equally suffered from it, Greeks and Mussulmans ask only to be delivered.

II.

To avoid this serious disadvantage, the Greek delegation has the honor to propose that, in this region, the Bulgarian frontier be traced along the crest which closes the basin of the right bank of the Arda, from Douk-Doumanlik-Dag (east extremity of the Tokatjik) to midway between the villages of Papas-koui and Orta-koui, then following the crest which runs from south to north, west of the village Karatope, as far as the course of the Arda; then the course of the Arda to its junction with the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier of 1913; and from there, the line of this frontier to the Maritsa.

This line would not only be more in conformity with the ethnographic situation of the country, but it would offer, from the strategic point of view, an incontestable advantage over the frontier indicated in Articles 27 and 30.

[Appendix D to HD–55]

[Translation⁵]

hellenic delegation
to the peace congress

The Secretariat of the Greek Delegation, in continuation of its previous comments on the subject of the conditions of peace with Bulgaria, has the honor to submit to the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference:

(1) A draft of a paragraph to be added to article 50 of the draft treaty with Bulgaria, concerning the protection of minorities.

(2) A draft of a paragraph to be added to article 56, on the subject of the protection of minorities and relating to voluntary emigration.

Paris, September 15, 1919.

Secretariat General of the Peace Conference
Quai d’Orsay.

[Enclosure 1]

treaty with bulgaria

Draft of a Paragraph To Be Added to Article 50 of the Treaty With Bulgaria

(Protection of Minorities)

“The adherents of the Greek Patriarchate who will elect to continue to reside in Bulgaria are attached, from the ecclesiastical point of view, to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Their communities in Bulgaria are recognized as legal persons, capable in particular of holding property and of maintaining churches and schools which use the Greek language, and in which freedom of attendance is guaranteed.”

[Enclosure 2]

treaty with bulgaria

Draft of a Paragraph To Be Added to Article 56

(Protection of Minorities and Voluntary Emigration)

Article 56, paragraph 2

“Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall adopt regarding the reciprocal and voluntary exchange of racial minorities.”

Appendix E to HD–55

Report of the Commission on the New States

bulgarian treaty

Reciprocal and Voluntary Emigration in Macedonia

On September 4 the Supreme Council accepted the report of the Commission on the new States on a proposal of Mr. Venizelos tending to the establishment of mixed commission to facilitate the emigration in Macedonia.⁶ It authorized that Commission to agree with Mr. Venizelos on the best way to give full effect to the proposals of the latter, the principle of which had seemed excellent to the Commission on the new States.

However, since the Drafting Committee had asked an immediate answer as to the final draft of the Bulgarian Treaty, which was to be delivered the next day, the Supreme Council has decided to give up any insertion in that Treaty of the clauses relative to reciprocal emigration in the Balkans, clauses whose drafting have not yet been discussed.

Following the decision of September 5 [4], the Commission on the new States has entered into relation with Mr. Venizelos who declared himself in accord in principle with the proposed text. But the Greek Delegation observed that if no provision on that subject was inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria there was no possibility to make that State accept that draft willingly.

That remark is correct. Since, on account of a delay, the Treaty with Bulgaria had not yet been delivered and it does not seem that it is going to be delivered for several days, the Commission on the new States, unanimously in accord with the Greek Delegation takes the liberty to submit to the Supreme Council the following draft which should be imposed on Bulgaria as alinea of Art. 56 in the section on the protection of the minorities:

“Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall deem opportune relative to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of the ethnic minorities.”

Appendix F to HD–55

[Note From the Greek Delegation]

Remarks on the Peace Conditions With Bulgaria

After having noted the peace conditions with Bulgaria which the Secretary General of the Conference communicated to it yesterday, the Greek Delegation hastens to submit to the examination of the Supreme Council the following remarks, which it requests the Council to take into account in the final draft of the Treaty which will be presented to the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries.

i.—political clauses

(Articles 44 and 46.)

1. —Article 44 contains no reserve on the subject of the automatic acquisition of Greek nationality by Bulgarian nationals established in the territories assigned to Greece.

It is otherwise, in Article 39, on the subject of the acquisition of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality, which is acquired by Bulgarian nationals established in the territories assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State later than January 1, 1910, only by virtue of an authorization from this state.

This provision is inspired by analagous clauses contained in the Peace Treaty with Germany (Articles 36, 53, 91, and 112) on the subject of the settlement of the questions of nationality in the relations of this state with Belgium, France, Poland and Denmark.

The Greek Government has already, before the Commission on the New States, expressed the wish that, by analogy, it be specified that the acquisition of Greek nationality only by its authorization to the Bulgarian nationals who may have established themselves on the territories assigned to Greece, later than the beginning of the Balkan Wars (October 18, 1912) or than the Treaty of Bucarest (August 10, 1913),⁷ which brought them to an end.

The Greek Delegation has, in consequence, the honor to propose that Article 44, on the model of Article 39, be completed by a second paragraph as follows:

“However, Bulgarian nationals who may have established themselves in these territories later than October 18, 1912, shall be able to acquire Greek nationality only on the authorization of Greece.”

2.—Article 46, relative to certain engagements on the part of Greece concerning the protection of minorities and the freedom of transit, does not seem to find its proper place in the Treaty with Bulgaria. Analogous provisions, inserted in the Treaty with Germany, for Poland, or in the Treaty with Austria, for Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, figure in these treaties as the counterpart of the territorial acquisitions realized by the said states by virtue of these treaties.

Article 46 has no counterpart in the Treaty with Bulgaria, since Greece realizes no territorial acquisition by this Treaty.

It would be, it seems, better placed in the later treaty which is to settle the new frontiers of Greece, on the subject of which the Greek Delegation has the honor to recall the fact that it maintains territorial claims in Thrace.

ii.—reparations

(Articles 121, 124, 127)

1. Article 121, paragraph 6, establishing the powers of the Reparation Commission on the subject of the payment of the war indemnity imposed on Bulgaria, mentions the Commission created by the Treaty with Germany. However, since the signing of that Treaty, the composition of the Reparation Commission has been changed in the Treaty with Austria (Article 175 and Annex II, Article 2), which admitted to it, under certain modalities, the collaboration of a Greek delegate.

If the Reparation Commission were to remain from [for?] Bulgaria as it was created by the Treaty with Germany, Greece would not be represented on it, while the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would. There would thus be created a situation strange, to say the least: Greece would have a representative for Austria, with whom she has interests relatively secondary, while she would have none with Bulgaria, with which her interests are vital and of first importance.

The Greek Delegation is of the opinion that it would be just and logical to change Article 121, paragraph 6, taking as a basis the aforesaid texts of the Treaty with Austria; a Greek delegate should be added to the Commission, with the right to take part in the debates and to vote whenever questions concerning Greece were being examined.

2. Article 124 stipulates that Bulgaria recognizes the transfer provided by Article 261 of the Treaty with Germany and the corresponding articles of the Treaty with Austria, Hungary and Turkey, to the profit of the Allied and Associated Powers, of all the credits of her former Allies with regard to her. But it adds, in its second paragraph, that the Allied and Associated Powers undertake to enter against Bulgaria no further claims under this head, for the reason that they have taken these credits into account in fixing the sum to be paid by Bulgaria at two billion, two hundred and fifty million francs (2,250,000,000 francs).

Under the form of a remission of debt, this is a liberality pure and simple, which, shown to a hostile country charged with so many misdeeds, seems all the more unjust and shocking since it is done at the expense of Allied and friendly states, who have suffered cruelly from the war and have been the victims of Bulgaria.

However unusual may be the form of such a clause in a chapter dealing with the reparation due by Bulgaria, one might, as to content, understand it if by fixing at 2,250,000,000 francs the sum total to be paid by this state, the extreme limit of its capacity to pay had been reached.

But it is nothing of that sort. The Delegations of the principal states concerned have tried to establish, and they think they have established, before the second Sub-Commission on Reparation, that Bulgaria can perfectly well pay more as reparation. No account has been taken of their argument, but it has never been shown to be false.

As to the Greek Delegation, it can only continue to be of the opinion that the sum of 2,250,000,000 is far within Bulgaria’s capacity to pay.

It considers, therefore, that Article 124 consecrates a veritable injustice, by depriving Greece of a part of the right that she acquires by virtue of Article 261 of the Treaty with Germany, not only because the sum total fixed by Article 121 is far below Bulgaria’s ability to pay, but also because, as a result of the proposed liberality, Bulgaria will find herself in regard to her foreign debt, in a situation more favorable than her neighbors, and notably Greece.

Under these conditions, the Greek Delegation is of the opinion that if it is just to take into account Bulgaria’s ability to pay, it would be entirely iniquitous not to take into account the ability of Greece, in order to avoid a disproportion of charges between the two countries which would make it possible for Bulgaria to rise in spite of her crimes, while it would condemn Greece to vegetate in spite of her sufferings and her victory.

The Greek Delegation appeals to the Supreme Council’s sense of justice to request the suppression of paragraph 2 of Article 124.

3. Article 124 [127] obliges Bulgaria to deliver to Greece, as restitution of animals taken by her in the course of the war from Greek territories, various categories and quantities of livestock, forming a total of 12,015 head.

More than once the Greek Delegation has already had the honor to call the attention of the Reparation Commission to the fact that the livestock removed by Bulgaria reaches a total of 313,411 head, of which 87,087 were carried away by the Bulgarians of Eastern Macedonia after the armistice and in express violation of its provisions.

The quantity fixed by Article 127 therefore represents only 4% of the total losses of Greece, or 15% of the losses after the armistice.

Greece might doubtless be satisfied with this if Bulgaria were not able to make larger restitution without her livestock suffering greater loss than she imposed on her neighbors. But this is not true. According to Bulgarian statistics themselves, Bulgaria had in 1910 nearly thirteen million head of livestock; since then, her livestock has considerably increased by natural increment, by the acquisition of livestock in the provinces acquired after the Balkan Wars, and finally as the result of innumerable thefts from Serbia, Rumania and Greece. In Greece, on the contrary, the livestock, diminished by the Bulgarian thefts, has literally been decimated to supply for three years the most urgent needs of the Allied and Greek troops, which, on account of the difficulties and dangers of transport, have very often been obliged to live off of the country.

Under these conditions, the quantities of livestock which Article 125 [127]indicates as being due to Greece, beyond the fact that they are infinitesimal in proportion to the losses suffered by the Greek livestock, represent only an insignificant part of the assets that Bulgaria might consent to abandon to her neighbors, still keeping a number of livestock greater than theirs.

The Greek Delegation insists, therefore, that Bulgaria be obliged to deliver to Greece at least the quantity of livestock taken by her after the Armistice, that is, 87,087 head.

Appendix G to HD–55

commission on
reparation of damages

Finance Ministry,
Paris, September 12, 1919.

Note for the Secretariat General of the Conference

The Secretariat of the Reparations Commission of the Peace Conference having received in the evening of September 11th, three letters emanating from the Greek (Annex I attached hereto),⁸ Rumanian (Annex II) and Serb-Croat-Slovene (Annex III) Delegations, and concerning the project of the Treaty with Bulgaria, the Reparations Committee met on September 12th at 10:30 to deliberate on the matter.

The Commission esteemed in the first place that the letter from the Jugo-Slav Delegation called for no action.

Concerning the request of the Greek and Rumanian Delegations, which introduced three important questions, the Commission emits the following views:

I.—Representation on the Reparations Commission

The Commission proposes to the Supreme Council that satisfaction be given one of the requests of the Greek Delegation and that, in consequence, the sixth paragraph of Article 121 of the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria be modified as follows by adding the underlined words below:

“These sums shall be remitted through the Inter-Allied Commission referred to in article 130 of this part to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919, such as it is constituted by the treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919 (Part VIII, Annex II, paragraph 2); this commission is referred to hereinafter as the Reparations Commission. It will assure the effecting of payments in conformity with the arrangements already made.”

This modification causes Greece, Poland, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czecho-Slovakia to have representation by a common delegate to the Reparations Commission when the Commission will take up the application of the Treaty with Austria. The actual text does not accord representation to Greece, Poland, Rumania or Czecho-Slovakia.

On the other hand, the Commission did not think it possible to agree to the request made by Greece, that she be accorded a special representative on the Reparations Commission.

II.—The Debts of Bulgaria With Relation to Germany, Austria, etc.

The Greek Delegation protests against Article 124, Paragraph II, of the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria, by which the Allied and Associated Powers, although supporting the transfer for their profit of the credits of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey on Bulgaria, in fact they undertake to formulate no claim under this head against this latter Power.

The Commission deemed that it was not necessary to modify Article 124 because the limit of Bulgaria’s paying capacity appeared to it to be reached by the obligations imposed on that country as reparations and because they thought it preferable that all the sums the payment of which are to be obtained from Bulgaria be paid under a reparations head.

A proposition made by the French Delegation, tending not to have this remission of debt officially affirmed, or to leave it open only to possibility, was not recognized; the American and British Delegations pronounced themselves against it and the Italian Delegation expressed reserve.

III.—Delivery of Stock by Bulgaria

The Greek and Rumanian Delegations request that the totals carried in Article 127 of the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria be raised regarding the delivery of stock which Bulgaria is to make to their countries.

The Commission does not think this request opportune. But it appeared to the Commission possible that provision be made that supplementary deliveries might, at the will of the Inter-Allied Commission which will operate at Sofia, be attributed to the countries interested. These deliveries would be subordinate to economic, political and other possibilities—they would be calculated by the Inter-Allied Commission itself and would be made, no longer as a restitution claim and aside from reparations, but under the head of reparations and their value would be placed to the credit of Bulgaria.

In consequence the Commission proposes to add to Article 127 an additional paragraph conceived as follows:

“In addition to the deliveries mentioned above, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have the authority, should they recognize it as possible, to attribute to Greece, Rumania and to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during the two years which shall follow the entry into force of the present treaty, such quantities of stock as may appear to them justified; the value of these deliveries shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria”.

For the American Delegation:	E. L. Dresel
For the British Delegation:	S. D. Waley
For the French Delegation:	G. Jouasset
For the Italian Delegation:	M. D’Amelio

Appendix H to HD–55

rumanian delegation
to the
peace conference

Paris, September 9, 1919.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Rumanian Delegation to the Economic Commission, while thanking the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference for sending the draft of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, which it has just received, wish to call attention to the fact that, probably by an error in the transposition of a phrase in the text of Article 171 of the French edition, the following draft is found in this text:

“Bulgaria recognizes as being and remaining abrogated all treaties, conventions or agreements that she has concluded, before August 1, 1914, or since that date, until the entry into force of the present Treaty, with Russia or with any other State or Government whose territory formerly constituted a part of Russia after August 15, 1916, as well as with Rumania, until the coming into force of the present Treaty”.

in place of the draft, which corresponds exactly with the draft of the same article in the English and Italian editions, should be as follows:

“Bulgaria recognizes as being and remaining abrogated all treaties, conventions or agreements that she has concluded, before August 1, 1914, or since that date until the entrance into force of the present Treaty, with Russia, as well as with Rumania, after August 15, 1916, until the entrance into force of the present Treaty.”

In calling your attention to this subject, the Rumanian Delegation requests that arrangements be made to change the text to conform with the latter draft, before it is sent to the Bulgarian Delegation.

Although it has already stated in its note of August 30, 1919, handed to the Secretariat General of the Economic Commission, relative to Article 244, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with Austria, which corresponds with Article 177, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with Bulgaria, that the provisions of these texts do not apply to Rumania, the Rumanian Delegation thinks, nevertheless, that it should call the attention of the Conference to the fact that the provisions contained in the texts are contrary to the good and just principles admitted in the Treaty with Germany in favor of all the Allied and Associated Powers.

Consequently, the Rumanian Delegation requests that in the Treaty with Bulgaria a return be made to the principles which, in the matter of liquidations, have been admitted in the Treaty with Germany.

The Rumanian Delegation to the Commission on Prisoners has the honor to communicate to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference the satisfaction that it feels at seeing admitted in the Treaty with Bulgaria Article 113, proposed by the Rumanian Delegation—to which adhered also the Delegations of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Greece, referring to the Inter-Allied Investigating Commission on the subject of prisoners of war and interned civilians. The drafting of this article constitutes an act of profound justice towards the unhappy prisoners of war and interned civilians, in whose name we beg you to accept our heart-felt thanks.

Appendix I to HD–55

conference on
peace preliminaries
economic commission

Paris, September 12, 1919.

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Rumanian Delegation has entered three objections to the text of the Treaty with Bulgaria, concerning Articles 171, 175 and 177.

Concerning Article 171, the decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 3¹¹ admits of no doubt, and it is evident that the text as it appears in the Treaty arises from an error, as is shown moreover in the obvious divergence between the French Text and the Italian Text.

The French text should be changed so as to read: “as well as with Rumania after August 15, 1916, until the entrance into force of the present Treaty”, (ainsi qu’avec la Roumanie après le 15 août 1916 jusqu’à la mise en vigueur da présent traitè.)

In the Italian text the change has been made; it is necessary to add: “until the entrance into force of the present treaty”, (fine all’entrata in vigoro del presento trattato.)

Concerning Article 175, paragraph 2, it has not seemed possible to extend this provision to all the Allied and Associated Powers, because in that case the benefit of the capitulations in Bulgaria would have been accorded to Powers which are themselves subject to that regime. The Text is therefore to be maintained, unless the Supreme Council decides otherwise.

Article 177 of the Treaty with Bulgaria takes into account the principles accepted in the Treaty with Germany (Articles 297 h, 2) and in the Treaty with Austria (Articles 249, l, and Article 267).

In this matter, the remarks contained in the Rumanian Note of September 9¹² seem to be without foundation.

D. Serruys

Secretary General of the Economic Commission of the Peace Conference

1. HD–54, minute 1, p. 218.
2. Ante, p. 187.
3. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
4. Notes of June 18, No. 3039; of August 1, No. 3637; and of August 24, No. 4050. [Footnote in the original.]
4. No. 5 does not accompany the minutes.
5. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
6. HD–47, minute 4, and appendix F. pp. 101, 114.
7. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cvii, p. 658.
8. The annexes do not accompany the appendix. For the text of the Greek letter, see appendix F, supra.
11. HD–46, minute 6, p. 82.
12. Appendix H, supra.