Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/54

HD–54

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Clemenceau’s Office at the Ministry of War, Monday Afternoon, September 15, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Paris, September 15, 1919, 11 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • The Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George O. M., M. P.
  • Secretary
    • Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G. C. B.
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau
  • Secretary
    • M. de St. Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni
  • Secretary
    • M. Paterno
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the discussion of the first item:

• M. Paderewski.
• Marshal Foch.
• General Weygand.

1. M. Clemenceau explained to M. Paderewski that the council had invited him to attend to state his views regarding the Russian situation. Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany

M. Paderewski stated that the Polish Government were anxious to learn the view of the Allies with respect to Russia. At the present time the Germans were proceeding in their usual methodical and tenacious manner to extend their influence and control in the East. In the northern provinces the German Generals von der Goltz and Prince Lieven were holding out to be the enemies of the Bolsheviki but this was mere pretence on their part. In the south General Kraus was operating, and in the centre the Germans had one thousand instructors who were extending German influence and enlisting volunteers, offering thirty-five marks per day with a bonus of a thousand marks. These activities were carried on under the instructions of the German War Office as he knew from a secret general order to this effect which had come into his hands. He pointed out that the Polish Army was the one obstacle to covetous Germany. At the present time the Polish Army consisted of 545,000 men under arms. If it were necessary 480,000 additional men could be raised in a few months. The present forces were now costing Poland some 30,000,000 marks or say 10,000,000 francs per day. If additional forces were raised there would then be a further cost to Poland of some 24,000,000 marks per day. Poland could not fight on indefinitely. He would therefore ask what were the plans of the Allies. The Polish Government will settle their plans in accordance with those of the Conference. Poland cannot afford to keep up or increase her large military establishment. She is a new State and is lacking in raw materials and war manufactories. If the decision of the Allies should be for Peace he was most anxious to know this as soon as possible for very advantageous terms of peace had been offered him by the Bolsheviki. The territorial ambitions of Riand [Poland?] had been fulfilled. Their advance against the Bolsheviki had been uniformly successful, and they had had a series of large and small victories. At present they had from thirty to thirty-five thousand Bolshevik prisoners. In conclusion he emphasized the importance of a rapid decision by the Conference, whatever it might be.

It was explained to M. Paderewski by M. Clemenceau that he had asked Marshal Foch to prepare a plan of action in the Baltic Provinces. This plan was based on the cooperation of the Polish Army.

M. Paderewski responded that the Polish Army was at the service of the Conference.

Marshal Foch gave a brief outline of the plan now in course of preparation. His idea was to insist that the Germans should carry out their solemn engagements; first, the Armistice, and second, the Treaty when it shall have come into force. By the terms of the Armistice the Germans were required to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces at the pleasure of the Allies. He did not foresee any difficulty in meeting the situation after their withdrawal. The plan would be to substitute the control of the Germans by local governments in the several Baltic Provinces, and then to assist these local governments. It would be necessary for the Conference to select and appoint some prominent individual as their representative, who should be instructed to order the Germans to evacuate, and then advise the local governments to establish themselves. To ensure his instructions carrying weight a force would be needed, and it was therefore desirable that the Allies’ representative should be able to turn to the Polish Army for this military support. It would be necessary to have a general on the spot. As a matter of fact there was a French General there. Marshal Foch suggested that this officer might be instructed to wind up the situation and have the Polish army ready if need be.

The Marshal explained that this was but a brief outline of his plan which would be ready for submission in 24 hours.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he liked the Marshal’s idea. If nothing were done the Germans would overrun the Baltic Provinces and within a short time their power would be immensely enhanced. If action were not taken immediately, the situation would become far more difficult in the future. For his part, he would support the appointment of a French General. He would like, however, before a final appointment were made, to have the opportunity of passing upon any name that might be submitted.

M. Clemenceau said that General Henrys was now in command of the Polish Army and would be a suitable appointee.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed. He inquired whether Marshal Foch contemplated sending a demand direct to the German Government.

M. Clemenceau believed that the Marshal should make a demand for immediate evacuation.

Mr. Polk asked for a precise statement as to the plan proposed by Marshal Foch.

M. Clemenceau explained that the Marshal should require the Germans immediately to evacuate their troops from the territories outside of the frontiers of Germany, and inform them that if they failed to comply with his demand he would proceed to enforce it; that General Henrys should be appointed the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers to control the evacuation, and lastly, should be empowered to use the Polish Army if that were necessary.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he agreed with this proposal. It was understood, therefore, that in the event of a German refusal Mr. Paderewski would place the Polish Army at the service of the Allies.

M. Paderewski expressed his agreement.

Mr. Polk inquired whether there would not be a danger if the proposed plan were followed and it were necessary to use the Polish Army, that this would bring on the Silesian difficulty, the Dantzig difficulty and a war between Germany and Poland.

M. Paderewski feared that the German Government would in Silesia, as in the Baltic Provinces, decline all responsibility as regards the actions of the German troops, claiming that the latter were no longer subject to their authority.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the Baltic situation and the Silesian situation were somewhat different. It was expected that the German Government would in all probability be willing to comply with the Allies’ demands, but from the information in his possession it appeared that the Central Government had little control over the Eastern German Army and might not be able to enforce compliance with their orders. In that event the Eastern German forces would be outlawed and would be in much the same situation as were Morgan and Drake in the time of Elizabeth, both of whom had been disavowed by the British Government. If the Polish Army were then to attack the German troops, how could the German Government claim that this would constitute an act of war on the part of Poland. In his opinion, the Silesian situation was quite different. Silesia was within the boundaries of Germany. The German Government was responsible for the situation there. This was very different to the Baltic provinces which were outside Germany and within Russia.

Mr. Polk admitted that in a legal sense this was true. The question in his mind was whether the use of Polish troops in Lithuania would not result in reprisals all along the line.

Mr. Lloyd George did not see that there was any alternative to Marshal Foch’s plan other than the imposition of a Blockade.

Mr. Polk stated that he had raised the question in order that when war came it should be thoroughly understood that the Council was responsible.

M. Clemenceau desired to make it clear that Marshal Foch will demand that the German troops evacuate the Baltic Provinces and will warn those troops that he will be prepared to enforce the demand under the Armistice.

M. Paderewski called attention to the fact that it was not merely a question of enforcing the evacuation of German troops but that it was necessary also to drive out the German officers. In Kovno there was a very numerous General Staff composed of Germans. It would be necessary to force them to leave. In this relation he referred to the fact that at least two of the Allied governments had been furnishing to the Lithuanians, supplies, munitions, etc. In his opinion this should cease, the Lithuanian Government being in the pay of Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed very earnestly the hope that there would be no interference with the Lithuanian Government. It was simply a question of forcing the Germans out. If it should become necessary for the Polish Army to intervene, it must be thoroughly understood that neither the Polish Government nor the Polish Army would interfere with the local governments. The plan now proposed contemplated merely a military occupation, if that should be necessary.

M. Paderewski observed that the Council should not hold him responsible if the territories to be occupied by the Polish Army should declare themselves for Poland.

Referring to M. Paderewski’s inquiry as regards the question of peace or war with the Bolsheviki, M. Clemenceau explained that the Council did not desire that the Poles should march on Moscow. As far as he was concerned he would not make peace nor would he make war. He suggested that Poland could carry out the first part of the proposed programme and by that time the Bolshevik situation would be clarified.

Mr. Lloyd George called M. Paderewski’s attention to the fact that Poland would be in a precarious position if the Baltic Provinces should become German. As it was, the Poles had advanced in the east beyond the boundaries of Poland. He understood that the Bolsheviks had only 80,000 men opposed to an army of 250,000 Poles.

M. Paderewski replied that, owing to the state of the country, it was necessary for the Poles to maintain a considerable police force in that region.

Marshal Foch considered that it would be very dangerous for Poland to open the Russian question on its Eastern frontier before settling the German question on its Western frontier. He believed it would be well to proceed step by step and consolidate the existing situation.

Mr. Lloyd George declared that he was in complete agreement with M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch.

(M. Paderewski, Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdrew.)

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should make a formal demand on the German Government immediately to evacuate the Baltic Provinces of Russia, and to withdraw their forces within the boundaries of Germany as defined by the Treaty of Peace. He shall further inform the German Government that if they do not comply with his demand he will take the necessary steps to enforce it.

It was agreed that General Henrys should be entrusted by the Allied and Associated Powers, as their representative, with the control of the evacuation of the German troops. Acting in the same quality, he shall have authority to use the Polish Army in case the Germans do not comply with the demand for evacuation.

In placing the Polish Army at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers, M. Paderewski indicated at the same time that there should be no interference by the Polish Government or Army with the local governments of the Baltic Provinces.)

2. M. Tittoni handed to his colleagues copies of the memorandum (Appendix A) which he had promised to give to them at the meeting in the morning. Question of Fiume and the Adriatic

Mr. Polk asked what was difference between the proposals which M. Tittoni was now presenting and those which the Conference transmitted to President Wilson a week ago.

M. Tittoni said that the Conference had asked President Wilson to make a choice between two solutions. The first was that Fiume should be a free city in an International State placed under the control of the League of Nations. The second was that the city of Fiume should be attributed to Italy, the port and the railway to the League of Nations and that the territories which in the first proposal would be attributed to the International State would be given to the Jugoslav State. He proposed that the second solution of the question should be adopted. One of his reasons for favouring this proposal was that Mr. Polk had told him that President Wilson had favoured a plebiscite in the free state. He was unwilling to agree to such a plebiscite.

Mr. Lloyd George asked what M. Tittoni meant exactly in saying that no concession would be made to the Jugoslavs in the valley of the Drin.

M. Tittoni meant that this disposition was found in the first memorandum for the reason that, as the Fiume Railway passed directly from Jugoslav to Austrian territory, he desired that the Trieste Railway should pass directly from Italian to Austrian territory. He had asked that Italy be given the territory known under the name of the Assling triangle which was inhabited by Slovenes but the possession of which was necessary for Italy to assure direct communication between Trieste and Austria. The Serbs had recognised that in Albania the frontier of 1913 was drawn on lines of ethnic justice but they demanded that the valley of the Drin be given to them in order that they might establish a railway there which would give them independent communication with the Adriatic. He thought that there was a complete analogy between the two cases and he would say to the Serbs, if they wished to have the Valley of the Drin they should give the Italians the Assling triangle and that if the Serbs contended that the Italians should be satisfied with the guarantee of the League of Nations for Assling they should be satisfied with the same guarantee for the Drin.

M. Clemenceau said that in effect M. Tittoni asked that the Council should send President Wilson a telegram telling him that the Council was in favour of the second of the two proposals recently submitted to his choice and that it was their strong desire that he accept this proposal.

M. Tittoni agreed that this was what he meant.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished to paint out to M. Tittoni two points of his memorandum which would probably elicit objections from President Wilson. The President did not want Italian sovereignty in Fiume—though Mr. Lloyd George did not wish to insist upon this point. The President would also not be satisfied with having the diplomatic representation of Zara belong to Italy. He suggested that it would be more advisable to say that Zara should be able to choose its diplomatic representatives. Nothing would prevent its intrusting its interests to Italian agents.

M. Tittoni said that he had no objections to this solution. He wished to add, however, that this solution which Mr. Lloyd George criticized appeared in the proposals approved by President Wilson on the 7th of June.¹

Mr. Polk said that he wished to repeat that the President had not given his definite approval to this rather summary note which had been prepared during a meeting of the Supreme Council for the purpose of serving as a basis for discussion between the Italian delegation and the Jugo-Slav delegation. He desired to say, in so far as Fiume was concerned, that he had received a telegram from President Wilson from which it appeared that the President was disposed to accept the first of the two solutions which had been presented to him in the name of the Conference. He feared that the President would be surprised to again receive a new proposal.

M. Tittoni said that it was not a question of a new proposal. The Conference would simply state that they preferred one of the two solutions between which they had asked the President to choose.

Mr. Polk said that he desired to remind the Council of what had occurred. It had been agreed that M. Clemenceau, Mr. Balfour and M. Tittoni should address a joint telegram to the President. After he had made note of the text he had written to M. Clemenceau to point out to him the objections which the President would not fail to make. After the despatch of this letter M. Tittoni and M. Tardieu had come to see him and finally they had agreed as to a new text. He knew that even in this form the proposals were not in accordance with the views of the President. He had, however, transmitted them, pointing out that the British, French and Italian delegates recommended them, and insisted earnestly that the President should consent to settle the affair on one of these bases. He could not help but wonder what would happen if he should transmit to the President the new Italian proposals after one of the former proposals had been accepted. He asked to be permitted to examine M. Tittoni’s plan before telegraphing and to be given time to consider what impression this communication was likely to make upon the mind of the President.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he agreed with Mr. Polk in thinking that it would not be fair to the President to submit a new proposal to him at the point which had now been reached.

M. Tittoni was prepared from the point of view of Italian interests to accept one or other of the two plans, even though the Italian people probably preferred the second, but only upon the condition that no change should be made in these proposals. If President Wilson should alter the first solution by introducing a plebiscite it would be necessary for him to express his preference for the second proposal.

Mr. Lloyd George said that so far as he was concerned he was glad to accept the new Italian proposal but he wished to say again that he was unwilling to run the risk of making a new proposal to President Wilson after the latter had accepted another proposal.

M. Tittoni then suggested that the Conference wait. (Alors attendons.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that the sixth point of the Italian memorandum did not appear to him to be just to the Serbs. The Assling Railway was in existence and there was now a question of its use for Italian traffic only. On the other hand there was neither a railway in the Valley of the Drin nor a port at St. Jean de Medua. Certainly the Albanians would construct neither a railway line nor a port. If the Conference did not give the Serbs the opportunity of constructing them, they would be deprived of all access to the Adriatic. Moreover it should not be forgotten that it was necessary to secure the consent of the Jugo-Slavs to the arrangement which was being discussed.

M. Tittoni said that the Jugo-Slavs already had several outlets to the Adriatic and could construct the Railway line in question by another route. But, however that might be, the Italians were refused the Assling Railway because it ran through territory where the population was Slovene. He saw no reason for giving the Valley of the Drin to the Jugo-slavs where the population was Albanian and did not desire to be placed under the yoke of the Serbs. He was also willing to agree to a plebiscite; he was quite sure that the Albanians would not vote for the Serbs.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it was not his intention to add the Valley of the Drin to the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, but he believed that it was necessary to give the Serbs the right to construct a railway in the Valley of the Drin and that facilities for a port be granted them. He did not see that it would be of any use to give to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the same rights on the Drin as would be given to Italy in the Assling territory because in the first case the railway existed already, and in the second case the line had not yet been constructed.

M. Clemenceau proposed that the Council wait until the following day for the reply of President Wilson, of which Mr. Polk had spoken.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he would be at the disposal of the Conference during the morning.

3. M. Tittoni said that according to information which he had just received Italian troops had surrounded the city of Fiume, and were blockading it from the land side. He asked that the Allied and Associated Powers should assist by using their ships of war in enforcing the blockade from the sea. Incidents at Fiume

M. Clemenceau said that they could not do otherwise than accede to M. Tittoni’s wish. He considered it advisable, however, in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to the nature of the Allied intervention to issue a statement to the Press in the following language:

“On the request of the Italian Government the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to participate in the maritime blockade of Fiume, which the Italian troops have already surrounded on land.”

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished it understood that the Allied and Associated Powers would lend the assistance of their warships which were on the spot but that they would not send other ships.

M. Tittoni said that he agreed to this but he asked that decision should be suspended until he should have had an opportunity to comunicate with M. Nitti on the subject.

M. Clemenceau said that he agreed and that the Allied and Associated Powers would take no action and make no public statement until M. Tittoni had confirmed his request.

(It was agreed that as soon as M. Tittoni had obtained the consent of the Italian Government the following press notice should be published.

“On the request of the Italian Government the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to participate in the maritime blockade of Fiume which the Italian troops have already surrounded on land.”)

4. M. Clemenceau said that he had received good news. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had informed him that they were prepared to sign without reserve the Treaty of Peace with Austria and the special treaty for the protection of minorities. Signature of the Treaty of Peace With Austria and the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities Delegates of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

M. Tittoni asked whether the intentions of the Rumanian Government were yet known. He added that for the past two weeks he had not received a single telegram from the Italian Ministry at Bucharest. Rumanian Affairs

Mr. Lloyd George said that it was quite likely that the Rumanians stopped the telegrams of the Allied and Associated representatives.

But the question confronting the Council was more general. It was to find a means of forcing the Rumanians to obey the decisions of the Conference.

M. Clemenceau said that the Rumanians would not refuse openly to obey the demands of the Conference. They found a means of obeying without obeying. In any case it was necessary to wait before taking action until there was a government with which to deal in succession to that of M. Bratiano, whose resignation had been announced.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it was quite useless for the Conference to give orders if these orders were not heeded by the Allies. If this state of affairs continued the entire work of the Conference would be doomed to failure and the League of Nations would be condemned to impotence in advance, for the Conference was the predecessor of the League of Nations. He wished to add that it was most important not to permit the view to be held at Bucharest that the United States and Great Britain were the only great powers hostile to Rumania. He felt that he should say, as the deliberations were entirely frank, that the attitude of the French Minister at Bucharest was not such as to remove this impression.

Mr. Polk said that it was desirable that the French and Italian Ministers at Bucharest should be seriously cautioned against these tendencies.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he felt that this applied equally to the Quai d’Orsay.

M. Clemenceau said that, as his colleagues knew, he was in entire agreement with them as to the policy to be followed in regard to this matter.

5. Mr. Polk said that he considered it important to reply to the request for instructions which had been addressed to the Council by the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest.² Instructions to the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest

Mr. Lloyd George said that he believed that the Council had decided in the morning to await the return of Sir George Clerk.

Mr. Polk said that he was raising a different question. Sir George Clerk’s mission related only to Rumanian affairs. It was necessary for the Conference to inform the Allied Generals at Budapest without delay that they should encourage the formation of a local police force for the preservation of order after the departure of the Rumanian military forces. The Rumanian commander should at the same time be asked, so long as his occupation of Rumanian [Hungarian?] territory continued, to facilitate the constitution of these forces. Finally the Conference could not omit replying to the request for a loan which had been addressed to it by the Mission on the part of the Hungarian Government.

(After further discussion between different members of the Council it was agreed that the following telegram should be sent to the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest:

“We do not intend to interfere at all in the internal affairs of Hungary. Our only wish is the constitution of a stable government, if this is possible, and to this effect we invite you to let the Hungarian authorities know that we desire the speedy constitution of a gendarmerie force capable of maintaining order after the withdrawal of the Roumanian Army.

We therefore direct you to inform the Roumanian authorities of our intentions and at the same time to invite them in the most categorical way to give every facility so long as they keep Hungarian territory, for the formation and armament of this Gendarmerie.

In no case can there be any question of a loan.”)

The meeting then adjourned.

Hotel Grillon, Paris , September 15, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–54

The Question of the Adriatic³

1) Fiume. The city (Corpus Separatum) shall be placed under the sovereignty of Italy. There shall be no independent state of Fiume. Jugoslavia shall receive all the territories included in this state according to President Wilson’s line (Island of Cherso included and Albona excepted).

All the territories that would have made part of the independent state shall be permanently demilitarised.

The Port of Fiume, with all facilities for its development as well as for the railways terminating there, shall be given over to the League of Nations, which shall make such arrangements as it shall see fit, both for the country of which this port is the outlet and for the city of Fiume itself.

The rights of ethnic minorities shall be guaranteed.

2) Dalmatia. All Dalmatia shall go to the Jugoslavs, except the city of Zara, which shall be a free city under the guarantee of the League of Nations, which shall recognise and encourage its intimate connection with the Italian State and Italian culture. The city shall be represented diplomatically by Italy.

Every facility shall be given to the commerce of the hinterland. The economic interests of Italy existing in Dalmatia and the rights of Italian minorities shall be guaranteed.

3) Islands. The only Italian islands shall be Lussin, Unie, Lissa and Pelogosa.

4) Albania. To be independent, with a mandate given to Italy.

5) Vallona. Italian sovereignty over the city, with the hinterland strictly necessary to its economic life and its security.

6) Railways. For the Assling Railway, Italy no longer makes any territorial demands, but demands only definite guarantees for the use of the line in Jugoslav territory. On the other hand, no territorial cession shall be granted to the Jugoslavs in the Valley of the Drin, but they shall receive there, as to the use of the railway to be constructed, the same guarantees as are given to Italy for the Assling Railway.

7) Neutralisation. Italy demands the general neutralisation of the entire coast and of the islands from the Southern point of Istria to Cattaro, inclusive.

8) A Commission appointed by the Conference, on which each of the five Powers shall be represented by a delegate and an expert, shall as soon as possible trace the frontiers on the maps and draw up all details.

1. CF–52, minute 7, and appendix IV thereto, vol. vi, pp. 244 and 249.
2. Appendix A to HD–53, p. 216.
3. Memorandum handed by M. Tittoni to the other members of the Supreme Council.