Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/52
HD–52
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Fire Great
Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday,
September 11, 1919, at 11 a.m.
Paris, September 11, 1919, 11 a.m.
- Present
- America, United States of
- Secretary
- British Empire
- Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Mr. P. Kerr.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de St. Quentin.
- Italy
- Secretaries
- M. Paterno.
- M. Barone Russo.
- Japan
- Secretary
| Joint Secretariat |
| America, United States of |
Mr. C. Russell. |
| British Empire |
Capt. E. Abraham. |
| France |
Capt. A. Portier. |
| Italy |
Capt. Rossi. |
| Interpreter—M.
Camerlynck |
The following were also present for the items in which they were
concerned:
- America, United States of
- Dr. Scott.
- Mr. Gibson.
- Mr. A. Dulles.
- British Empire
- Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
- Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
- Colonel Kisch.
- Mr. Hodgson.
- France
- M. J. Cambon.
- M. Colliard.
- M. Fromageot.
- M. Laroche.
- Italy
- M. Ricci-Busatti.
- M. Stranieri.
- M. Brambilla.
- M. di Palma.
[Page 183]
1. Mr. Balfour said that he wished to draw the
attention of the Council to an urgent matter. He did not suggest the
matter should be discussed immediately, nor did he wish himself make any
statement on the subject. He wished to hand in a document which he had
himself received on the previous day from General Seely.1 This document gave an alarming
account of the development of aircraft industry in Germany. Internal
civil aviation was being developed on an immense scale and German
companies were buying up old army aeroplanes. The first difficulty which
arose in this connection was whether those aeroplanes belonged to the
Allies or to the purchasing companies. There was the additional risk
that under the guise of civil aviation Germany was merely creating a
strong offensive force, more especially as civil aviation was being
heavily subsidised by the Government. He suggested that the French
General Staff should study this matter and in the hope that this would
be done, he begged to hand the document to the Chairman. (Appendix “A”.)
It was also worth noticing that German aircraft industry had already
obtained a footing in neutral markets and it was certain that the
foundation of German air power was the development of the aircraft
industry. It appeared that the best military brains of Germany were
being employed in the construction of aeroplanes. Aircraft industry in Germany
M. Clemenceau said that he would have the
matter examined by the French General Staff.
(It was agreed that the question of aircraft construction in Germany
should be reported on by Allied experts, and again brought up before the
Council.)
2. (The Members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.)
Mr. Hurst read the draft contained as Appendix
“B”.
M. Clemenceau said that he had one observation
Reply to Note of to make. In the proposals made on the previous day, it
had been suggested that the German Government should be given 15 days to
obtain from the Legislative Assembly a repudiation of the Articles
infringing the conditions of the Treaty. He did not lay any particular
stress on the period of 15 days, but he thought some fixed period should
be laid down. If the German Delegation protested that the period allowed
them as too short, and asked for an extension, he would agree to it, but
he did not think it proper to leave it to them to estimate the period
themselves. Reply to Note of German Delegation
Relating to Article 61 of the German Constitution
Mr. Hurst asked whether M. Clemenceau referred
to a period for the signature of the instrument itself.
[Page 184]
M. Clemenceau said that he referred to the
ratification of the instrument by the German National Assembly.
Mr. Balfour observed that the German Government
was asked to undertake and present the instrument to the Assembly at its
next Meeting.
M. Clemenceau said that he would prefer,
instead of the words “when it next assembles”, to say “within 15 days
after the coming into force of the Treaty”, that was to say, upon
ratification by three of the Great Powers.
Mr. Polk asked how soon the German Delegation
was to sign the proposed declaration.
(It was decided to introduce into the text, the word “forthwith” in this
connection.)
M. Clemenceau observed that the German
Delegation must have time, if they required it, to telegraph to Berlin.
He also informed his colleagues of a telegram received that morning to
the effect that the National Assembly was being summoned at Weimar to
reconsider the provisions of the Constitution complained of. This was
not official news, but informal information he had received.
(After a few slight verbal alterations, the draft reply and declaration
as contained in Appendix “B”, were accepted.)
3. (The Members of the Commissions on Polish and Czecho-Slovak Affairs
entered the Room.)
M. Cambon said that in accordance with the
directions of the Council on the previous day, the two Commissions had
met in the afternoon. The majority maintained their original opinions.
He then read and explained the report of the Meeting contained in
Appendix “C”. Question of Teschen
Mr. Balfour said that he feared the result of
the plebiscite in Teschen would be to deprive Czecho-Slovakia not of 40%
of the coal, but of 100%. The territory was Polish and the Commission
had attributed it to Czecho-Slovakia, because of the railway running
through it connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. This railway would almost
certainly become Polish property. Surely this was far more contrary to
the interest of the Czecho-Slovaks than anything the Commission had
proposed. Nevertheless, as M. Benes appeared to accept a plebiscite, it
must be assumed that he knew his own business best.
M. Cambon said that neither M. Benes nor M.
Dmowski could be brought to accept either of the lines suggested in the
Commission. Both, however, agreed to accept the plebiscite.
M. Scialoja said that it was impossible for the
Council to refuse the plebiscite if both claimants agreed to it.
[Page 185]
(It was then agreed that a plebiscite should be held in the Duchy of
Teschen and in the districts of Spisz and Orava in accordance with the
proposals of the Joint Commissions (Appendix “C”) The detailed
organization of this plebiscite was referred for examination and report
to the Joint Commission.)
4. (At this point, the members of the Labour Commission entered the
room.)
M. Clemenceau said that, on the previous day,
he had come to an agreement with Mr. Barnes. It had been agreed that the
Congress should be left free to invite the attendance of the German and
Austrian Delegates or not. As it was practically a foregone conclusion
that the Congress would invite them to attend, the French Government
would facilitate the granting of passports in anticipation to the
Germans or Austrians, who might be delegated to go to Washington. Admission of German & Austrian Delegates to the
Labour Congress at Washington
Mr. Barnes said that he had received
information that President Wilson was willing to invite the German and
Austrian Delegates to Washington.
Mr. Polk said that this was not quite correct.
The President said that he was willing that the Labour Congress should
decide whether or not the German and Austrian Delegates should be
admitted. He, himself, as Head of the American Delegation, had
undertaken that no passport difficulties would be made on the American
side, to prevent the Germans and Austrians from going to Washington, in
the hope of being admitted to the Labour Congress.
Mr. Barnes said that he was not sure that these
arrangements would be satisfactory to the Germans and Austrians.
M. Clemenceau said that they should take what
was being done as a sign of goodwill. He was himself making a step in
the direction of conciliation, since, in the Council of Four, he had
decided adversely.2 Now that Peace was signed, he
was ready to yield to some extent. He had been assured by the French
Labour Representatives that they would be satisfied with the very thing
he was now offering.
M. Scialoja said that Italian labour opinion
required an implicit invitation to the Germans and Austrians. Otherwise,
Italian working men would not attend the Congress. There were two
distinct questions involved. The first was admission to the Congress and
the second was admission to the International Organisation of Labour. As
to the second, it must be left to the Congress to decide and each State
could give its representatives instructions. The first, however, which
involved the right to be heard in the Congress, could only be decided by
the Council.
[Page 186]
M. Clemenceau said that nothing would ever
prevail upon him to extend an invitation on behalf of the Council to
German and Austrian Delegates to attend the Labour Congress. He would
not submit to pressure from Italian socialism, which had been
consistently against the war and pro-German.
Mr. Barnes observed that the Council had
already decided that Germany would be admitted to the second meeting of
the Labour Congress. Consequently, Germany would, ipso
facto, be let into the International Labour Organisation.
M. Clemenceau said that that was no doubt the
case. What he refused to do was to invite them, in the name of the
Council, to attend the Congress at Washington. He was prepared to leave
the question to the Congress.
Mr. Balfour said that he was of the same
opinion, but he would ask Mr. Barnes whether the abstention of the
Italian Socialists would have any effect on Labour Organisations in
other countries.
Mr. Barnes said that it would have a certain
effect. He had tried to anticipate it by telling British Labour
Organisations that the admission of the Germans and Austrians depended
upon the representation of Labour and Socialism in the Congress. This
would be an inducement to Labour and Socialist representatives to attend
the Congress.
Mr. Polk said that he did not think the
question was one the Council should decide.
M. Scialoja said that he was not a defender of
the Socialists. There were in Italy, as in other countries, moderate and
extreme Socialists. The Italian Government wished to support the former
rather than the latter. He thought that public opinion should be made to
feel that the Council was not opposing moderate demands.
M. Clemenceau said that the Congress would
almost certainly invite the Germans and Austrians to attend, and he
would himself state in the Chamber of Deputies that the decision taken
was taken in a conciliatory spirit.
(It was decided that the question of the admission of German and Austrian
Delegates to the forthcoming Labour Congress at Washington should be
left to the decision of that Congress. In the meantime, the Allied and
Associated Governments would put no obstacles in the way of German or
Austrian Delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington, in anticipation
of a decision in their favour.)
5. Mr. Barnes said that confirmation by the
Council was asked for a resolution passed by the Labour Committee on the
4th June, 1919,
[Page 187]
(See Appendix
“B”, to H. D. 413). In spite of a Rights &
decision taken some two or three months earlier, the principle embodied
in this resolution had not found a place in the Treaty with Austria. The
Italian Delegation had therefore suggested that a resolution be adopted
by the Labour Commission. The resolution had been taken and it was hoped
that the Council would endorse it. Rights &
Privileges of Allied workpeople Admitted to Enemy Territories and
Vica Versa
Mr. Polk said that, as the proposal involved
questions of law, he was not prepared to state off-hand the attitude of
the American Delegation.
M. Clemenceau said that German workmen at
present engaged to work on the devastated districts of France, brought
with them their own rights and privileges.
Mr. Balfour asked whether foreign workmen going
to England were also to have their own rights.
Mr. Barnes said that the case did not arise in
England, as a foreign workman was granted British rights even to the
extent, after a certain period, of receiving a share in the National
Health and Unemployment Insurances and Old Age Pensions.
Mr. Polk said that he could not, for the time
being, express an opinion, but he had no objection to the principle.
Mr. Barnes observed that it was only the
principle of reciprocity that was involved. It did not become binding on
any given State, unless that State made individual agreements with
another State.
M. Clemenceau said that he was ready to vote
the resolution.
(Subject to an announcement, at a future date, of the views of the
American Delegation, the resolution passed by the Labour Committee on
June 4th (See Appendix “B”, H. D. 41,) was accepted as a general
principle of the Conference.)
6. M. Dutasta said that the Drafting Committee
requested instructions as to the language in which the Air Convention
should be drafted. Should it be, like previous Conventions, in French,
English and Italian, the French text prevailing in case of divergence,
or in French and English, each having equal authority, as in the case of
the Conventions signed at Versailles? Language of Air
Convention
M. Scialoja said that, as the Convention was
very important for Italy, he desired an Italian text.
(After some discussion, it was decided that the Air Convention should be
drawn up in English, French and Italian, the text in the two former
languages having equal authority.)
[Page 188]
7. After some discussion, it was agreed:—
That the Bulgarian Delegation should be invited to receive the Treaty in
the Salle de L’Horloge, at the Quai d’Orsay, and that the Greek and
Roumanian observations just received should be discussed at the next
meeting of the Council. Presentation of the Treaty to
the Bulgarian Delegation
8. M. Clemenceau said that he had received a
letter from M. Pachitch (Appendix “D”) stating that as the Government
had resigned, the Delegation was bound to wait or authority before
signing the Treaty of Peace with the Austrian Republic. Signature of the Austrian Treaty by Representatives of
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
9. Mr. Polk drew attention to a telegram
received from Budapest (see Appendix “E”).
M. Clemenceau said that he was not at all
disposed to offer the Hungarian Government financial credits, nor was he
prepared to see the Government of the country handed over to the Allied
Generals at Budapest. He agreed, however, that it was desirable to send
the Mission instructions. Instructions to
Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest
It was decided that the question of sending further instructions to the
Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest should be placed on the Agenda.
Mr. Polk observed that Roumanians were under
the impression that the United States alone, among the Allied and
Associated Powers, raised objections against their conduct in Hungary.
This impression had not been set right by Allied representatives on the
spot. It was desirable that the Roumanian Government should be informed
that the Council had acted only upon information received from the
Inter-Allied representatives.
M. Pichon observed that as M. Clemenceau signed
all the telegrams sent in the name of the Council, France was incurring
a great deal of unpopularity in Bucharest, where it was supposed that
France was particularly antagonistic to Roumanian ambitions. It had
therefore been pointed out to the Roumanian Government that these
telegrams emanated from the Council of the Five Principal Allied and
Associated Powers and not from M. Clemenceau as French Prime
Minister.
Mr. Polk said that he thought it was the people
on the spot who had created the impression that America alone was
responsible for Roumanian troubles.
The Meeting then adjourned.
Hotel Astoria,
Paris
, September
11, 1919.
[Page 189]
Appendix A to HD–52
British
Delegation,
Paris, 10 September,
1919.
[Brigadier-General P. R. G.
Groves, Aviation Adviser, British Delegation, to the Under
Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force (Seely)]
Copy. AS/C/595
Dear General: The attached letter to
General Masterman4 from the
German Aviation authorities contains the information you asked me to
let you have regarding the German proposals to start civil aviation
with war machines. The proposals may be summarised as follows:—
Six aerial post lines to be started from Cologne. The estimated
number of aeroplanes required for one of these lines, viz., Cologne
to Berlin, is 170. The Company has already bought 140 aeroplanes and
other aircraft material from the German Government. It is claimed
that these aircraft are exempt from delivery to the Allies as they
are new and have never been used for warlike purposes.
As regards the above proposals, the six aerial post lines are, of
course, capable of indefinite expansion. The estimated number of
aeroplanes required for the Cologne-Berlin line, viz. 170, includes
one-third for repair. This percentage for repair is insufficient,
and the total number required would be at least 200. There would, of
course, be no limit to the reserve which could be built up, and it
is highly probable that several thousand aeroplanes would be
required for the efficient working of these routes.
The 140 aeroplanes which the Company has bought from the German
Government are the property of the Allies, as under the Air Clauses
Germany is required to surrender all her naval and military
aircraft, and these machines are all of military types.
The whole question, I think, hinges upon this point, namely, the
type. So far as our information goes, Germany has not produced any
distinctly civil types of aeroplanes since the Armistice. A Gotha
which has been built since the Armistice, and has not been fitted
with bomb-racks is, nevertheless, a Gotha, and could be adapted for
war uses within 24 hours.
Although the Germans have consulted us with regard to the scheme
outlined in the attached letter, they have already started civil
aviation on a somewhat extensive basis, and there appears to be no
doubt that the machines employed are converted war machines.
Furthermore, Germany has, as you are aware, carried out a wholesale
exportation of her aircraft to neutral Powers, and this exportation
[Page 190]
is still in progress
despite various remonstrances which have been made by the Armistice
Commission and latterly by Marshal Foch, acting under instructions
of the Supreme Council.
Owing to the delay in the ratification of the Treaty, the Air Clauses
have already been to a large extent circumvented, and if Germany is
permitted to regard a military machine adapted to civil purposes as
a civil machine, the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty will have
little value.
A survey of the whole aeronautical position in Germany at the present
moment would be lengthy, and in many respects incomplete, owing to
lack of sufficient data, but I think there is sufficient information
to warrant the following conclusions:—
- (1)
- That civil aviation in Germany is being heavily
subsidised.
- (2)
- That the German aircraft industry, aided by the German
Government, has attained considerable footing in neutral
markets. It is to be remembered that Germany’s aircraft
industry is the foundation of her air power.
- (3)
- That the military brain of Germany intends to develop
German air power under camouflage of civil aviation.
As regards (3), I do not think this can be prevented, as the Supreme
Council was not willing to adopt the measures recommended for its
prevention by the Advisory Aeronautical Commission. But I think that
it is possible to delay the development of German air power by
enforcing the air clauses to the letter. In order that this shall be
done, it will be necessary for the President of the Inter-Allied
Aeronautical Commission of Control, viz, General Masterman, to be
given a free hand, and to receive strong support from the Supreme
Council.
Yours sincerely,
Major General The Rt. Hon. J. E. B.
Seely,
C. B., C. M. G., etc.,
Under Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force.
[Enclosure]
Copy
Memorial About the Opening Up of an
Aerial Post Service Between Cologne, Hanover and Berlin
The German “Flugverkerr-Aktiengesellschaft” has obtained the approval
of the German Government to establish an aerial post service on 6
lines. The same are:—
| From |
Cologne |
to |
Berlin. |
| “ |
Cologne |
“ |
Hamburg. |
| “ |
Cologne |
“ |
Breslau. |
| “ |
Cologne |
“ |
Munich. |
| “ |
Cologne |
“ |
Stuttgart. |
| “ |
Cologne |
“ |
Bâle. |
[Page 191]
For this purpose the Flugverkerr-Aktiengesellschaft has bought in
Germany from the German Government the following unused aeroplane material:—
| 60 |
L.V.G. |
Cells. |
Type |
C. VI. |
|
|
| 30 |
“ |
Aeroplanes |
“ |
C. VI |
with |
Bz. IV ue. |
| 100 |
F.D.H. |
“ |
“ |
C.VII |
“ |
ditto. |
| 10 |
F.D.H. |
“ |
“ |
C.III |
“ |
ditto. |
| 200 |
Motors Bz. |
IV ue. |
|
|
|
|
In accordance with paragraph 202 of the Peace Treaty, these machines
are exempted from delivery because, being perfectly new, they were
never used during the war for warlike purposes and they are not
destined for warlike purposes, because the Army is demobilized.
If the flying service is to be established in the near future, it is
necessary that the Allies confirm the release of this aeroplane
material.
In the first place it is intended only to open up the line
Cologne–Hanover–Berlin. The connections by rail and post are
unreliable on account of the general condition; but the linking up
of the most important places in the occupied and unoccupied
territory is for the German authorities of the greatest interest. At
the same time it is intended to carry not only the German post but
also the post of the occupation authorities.
It is intended to organize the aerial post service
Cologne–Hanover–Berlin as follows:—
1. 17 intermediate stations are to be established on the line
Cologne–Hanover–Berlin. Every intermediate station has at the
disposal aeroplanes as well as motor cars, in order to be able to
continue an interrupted flight without loss of time for the postal
service.
2. In the first place the orientation of the aeroplanes takes place
by land orientation; by installing the sending off and receiving
apparatuses in the aeroplanes and by erecting arrow stations, it
will by Spring be possible to direct the aeroplanes automatically by
means of wireless telegraphy.
3. The following aeroplane material is needed for the line
Cologne–Hanover–Berlin:—
| 17 Stations each with 2 aeroplanes |
34 |
aeroplanes. |
| 3 Principal stations each with 15 aeroplanes |
45 |
“ |
| For every day service 2 times 12 aeroplanes = 24
aeroplanes to be changed from day |
48 |
“ |
| Total |
127 |
aeroplanes. |
The least to be considered as being in repair is one-third, therefore
170 aeroplanes would be required. This great number of aeroplanes is
necessary in order to make it possible to provide every intermediate
station accordingly, and in order to be able to dispose of the
necessary reserve machines.
[Page 192]
4. The postal service will be arranged in such a way that the line
will in each direction be covered 12 times per day. It is of the
utmost interest that the line Cologne–Hanover–Berlin is opened up as
early as possible. After release of the aeroplanes by the Allies the
aerial post service will be started 4 weeks after its approval.
In order to be able to examine the correctness of the Company’s
statement about the material at disposal, and in order to keep
control that the aeroplanes have all been rendered useless for any
military purposes, it is suggested that the Allies appoint a control
Officer at the expense of the Flugverkerr-Aktiengesellschaft.
Schwink
,
Captain. German General Staff
Officer,
Bridgehead, Cologne.
Cologne
, 30
August, 1919.
Appendix B to HD–52
[Reply to the Note of the German
Delegation Relating to Article 61 of the Germcm
Constitution]
By their Note of September 2nd,5 the Allied
and Associated Powers have brought to the notice of the German
Government a clause in the new German Constitution respecting German
relations with Austria which is in direct contradiction with the
provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to the same subject.
The German Government by its Note of September 5th,6 reply that no article whatever be its
plain grammatical meaning can really be in contradiction with the
Treaty of Peace, because there is another clause in the Constitution
which says that nothing the Constitution contains can affect the
Treaty. By this ingenious device the German Constitution could
eventually be so amended as formally to contradict every provision
which the Treaty of Peace contains. It might for example, enact that
a German Army of several million men was to be maintained by
conscription; and when the Allied and Associated Powers pointed out
that this was not in conformity with the Treaty which narrowly
limited the German Army and forbade conscription, the German
Government could reply that if so, the Constitution itself in
Article 178 provided a sufficient remedy for the evil by laying it
down that nothing in the Treaty could be affected by the
Constitution.
The above, one may say, is an imaginary case, but it is justified
when one reads in Article 112 of the German Constitution, as at
[Page 193]
present drafted, that no
German nationals can be surrendered for trial before a foreign
tribunal, when the Treaty stipulates in precise terms that certain
persons charged with offences against the laws and customs of war
are to be surrendered for trial before a foreign tribunal.
According to the Germany reply, Article 178 was introduced in order
to avoid “all possible contradictions between the provisions of the
Constitution and the conditions of the Peace Treaty”. The intention
is excellent if it relates to those doubtful and accidental
contradictions which the ingenuity of lawyers may detect in the
language of two long and complicated documents. But, in this case it
is not a question of doubtful and accidental contradictions. Those
of which the Allied and Associated Powers make complaint are
assuredly open and manifest, and can be hardly other than
deliberate. No one can believe that the framers of the German
Constitution, when they inserted Article 61 and settled the terms of
Article 112, were not aware that their wording was irreconcilable
with the engagements into which Germany had solemnly entered only a
few weeks before.
This condition of things cannot be allowed to endure.
The German Government itself admits and declares that if the
Constitution and the Treaty clash, the Constitution must give
way.
In view of this admission, the Allied and Associated Powers call upon
the German Government to place on record without further delay in
the diplomatic instrument of which the text is enclosed herewith,
the explanation which it has made to the Allied and Associated
Powers in its answer of September 5th, 1919. This instrument must be
signed at Versailles forthwith, by an authorised representative of
the German Government, in the presence of representatives of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and must be duly approved by
the competent German legislative authorities within 15 days of the
coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.
[Enclosure]
Draft Declaration
The undersigned, duly authorised and acting in the name of the German
Government admits and declares that all the provisions of the German
Constitution of August 11th, 1919, which are in contradiction with
the terms of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28,
1919, are null and void.
The German Government admits and declares that the second paragraph
of Article 61 of the said Constitution is therefore null and void,
and in particular that Austrian representatives cannot be
[Page 194]
admitted to the Reichsrat,
except so far as the Council of the League of Nations in accordance
with Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace should consent to such a
change in the international status of Austria.
The present Declaration will be approved by the competent German
legislative authority within 15 days of the coming into force of the
Treaty of Peace.
Done at Versailles the day of September 1919 in the presence of the
undersigned representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers.
Annex C to HD–527
Joint Report Presented to the
Supreme Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the
Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs on the Question of
Teschen
In fulfilment of the resolution taken by the Supreme Council on
September 10,8 the Commission on
Polish Affairs and the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs met on
the afternoon of September 10th to re-examine the question of
Teschen. As a result, they were obliged to recognise the
impossibility of defining a frontier line between Czecho-Slovakia
and Poland acceptable to all the Delegations.
While the majority of the Commission (American, British, Italian and
Japanese Delegations) declared that they still adhered to the
conclusions of the Report of August 22nd,9
the French Delegation proposed a fresh line which the majority found
themselves unable to accept.
I.—Majority Report.
(American, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations.)
The Supreme Council took exception to two points in the Report of
August 22nd:—
- (a)
- it divides the Karwin coalfields between Poland and
Czechoslovakia;
- (b)
- it is less favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than was the
Report of April 14th.
As regards the first point, the majority of the Commission
respectfully submits that this objection applies to several other
frontiers which follow ethnical lines of division. The objection,
moreover, is not a vital one, provided that the two nations
concerned give proof
[Page 195]
of
their mutual goodwill with regard to the settlement of the economic
interests involved. Examples may be found in the case of the
following coalfields:—
- (1)
- The Franco-Belgian coalfield, which crosses the frontier
between Valenciennes and St. Ghislain.
- (2)
- The coal mines north of Aix-la-Chapelle, of which the
chief mining area extends across the Dutch-German
frontier.
With regard to the objection to the fact that the Report of August
22nd is less favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than the Report of April
14th, the attention of the Supreme Council is respectfully drawn to
the following points:—
- (a)
- The Report of April 14th was not a unanimous
Report.
- (b)
- The solution proposed in the Report of April 14th was not
supported by the Interallied Commission at Teschen.
- (c)
- The Report of August 22nd is ethnographically much more
favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than to Poland, in that the
whole Czech population of the Duchy, except 10,400, is
incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia, while 62,000 Iroles are
lost to Poland.
- (d)
- Since April 14th, the date of the first Report, the Treaty
of Peace with Germany has been ratified by Poland. The
majority of the Commission believes that the Poles of the
Duchy of Teschen, living as they do on the border of the
territory over which Poland already exercises sovereign
authority, will no longer be content to accept the solution
which might have been imposed in April last.
- (e)
- Apart from the ethnographical results noted above, the
proposed settlement assigns to Czecho-Slovakia the Jablunkau
Pass railway, affording easy possibility of railway
connection between the Mährisch-Ostrau mining basin and
Slovakia.
- (f)
- As regards coal, it assigns to Czecho-Slovakia 60% of the
coal basin of Teschen, and 69% of that portion of the basin
which produces coking coal.
The majority of the Commissions find themselves unable to recommend a
frontier alignment more favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than that of
the Commissions’ Report of August 22nd, as any such recommendation
would, in their opinion, involve grave injustice to Poland and
lasting hostility between the two countries.
In the Report of August 22nd, moreover, the joint Commissions
unanimously asked that, should the frontier proposed by them be
accepted, the task of determining the economic and railway
concessions which Poland should, in justice, concede to the
Czecho-Slovak State, should be entrusted to them; these concessions
would be guaranteed by a Treaty, the draft of which would be
prepared by the Commissions.
If the solution proposed by the Majority is, despite the foregoing
information, still unacceptable to the Supreme Council, the Majority
considers that the only manner of arriving at an alternative
solution of the question is by a plebiscite.
[Page 196]
The general lines of such a plebiscite which is in principle
acceptable to both parties, are indicated below.
II.—Minority Report. (French
Delegation.)
The French Delegation considers that the frontier, as defined by the
majority of the Commission, does not take moral considerations
sufficiently into account; may leave lasting germs of discord
between the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles, and consequently does not
possess those characteristics which are essential to a definitive
delimitation between two Allied countries; its adoption would
therefore fail to give the guarantees desirable from the point of
view of the maintenance of general peace.
The French Delegation considers that these serious drawbacks would to
a large extent be avoided if the frontier line proposed in the
previous Report of the Commission were altered as follows:—
- (1).
- South of Teschen, in the Jablunkau district, the frontier
would be carried more to the West so as to restore to Poland
a fairly extensive stretch of land where the Polish element
predominates, whilst leaving the Oderberg–Kaschau railway in
Czecho-Slovak territory. The town of Teschen would be left
to Poland.
- (2).
- North of Teschen the frontier would rejoin the Olsa; it
would follow that stream until the neighbourhood of the
Oderberg–Cracow line; it would then turn westward, the
Oderberg–Cracow line remaining in Polish territory and the
town of Deutschleuten being attributed to Czecho-Slovakia;
following the railway line closely, the frontier would,
south of Oderberg, rejoin the line proposed in the previous
Report of the Commission.
The whole of the Karwin coalfield would thus be attributed to
Czecho-Slovakia.
It should be noted that the number of Poles living in the territory
lying between the blue line (frontier proposed in the last report)
and the red line (frontier proposed on April 14th) in the district
north of Teschen does not exceed 70,000; the additional number of
Poles who would be attributed to Czecho-Slovakia if the French line
were adopted would obviously be much below that total. The short
time allowed the Commission in which to present its Report has made
it impossible to ascertain the exact number, from which, moreover,
the member of Poles to be restored to Poland in the south would have
to be deducted, in order to obtain an exact idea of the position of
the Polish element.
Failing the acceptance of this solution, and in view of the serious
political results which it considers that the adoption of the line
proposed in the Report of August 22nd (blue line) must involve, the
French Delegation is of opinion that the only solution calculated
[Page 197]
to restore peace would
be the consultation of the population by means of a plebiscite; all
parties would have to submit to the result of the voting.
III.—Proposals of the
Commission
In view of the fact that they are unable to recommend for the
approval of the Supreme Council a frontier line accepted by the Five
Delegations, and being nevertheless desirous of conforming to the
instructions received to submit to the Supreme Council proposals
unanimously adopted by their members, the two Commissions, although
fully aware of the drawbacks of a solution of the kind, have decided
to recommend the Council to settle the question by recourse to a
plebiscite, should the Supreme Council not feel able to accept
either of the two lines proposed. When questioned by the Commission,
Messrs. Benes and Dmowski declared their readiness to submit to a
decision of this kind. When a member of the Commission pointed out
to Mr. Benes that the plebiscite might result in the establishment
of a frontier less favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than that proposed
by the Commission, the latter replied that even were an attempt made
to impose the line of the Report of August 22nd he would claim a
plebiscite.
The principle of a plebiscite being admitted by Czecho-Slovaks and
Poles alike, and the results being accepted beforehand, it would be
well to agree to it.
The plebiscite would take place under the following conditions:—
- (a)
- it would include the whole of the Duchy of Teschen;
- (b)
- the voting would take place by communes with the least
possible delay;
- (c)
- the country would be occupied by Allied troops (one
regiment of three battalions would apparently be
sufficient;
- (d)
- the Duchy of Teschen would be temporarily administered by
an Interallied Commission.
- The latter Commission would define a frontier according to
the results of the voting, and would submit it to the
approval of the Conference.
- (e)
- The Commission would have authority to propose to the
Conference any draft economic agreement between
Czecho-Slovakia and Poland that might be necessitated by the
result of the voting.
- It should be noted in this connection that Mr. Dmowski
today renewed to the Commission the declaration which he had
made at a, previous meeting: “if Upper Silesia is attributed
to her, Poland is ready to conclude with Czecho-Slovakia any
agreements which the latter may desire for the supply of the
coal which she requires.”
- (f)
- Finally, it would seem expedient to satisfy the
Czecho-Slovak claims for the extension of the plebiscite
zone tp the territories of Spisz and Orava.
[Page 198]
If the Supreme Council approves of the proposal which the Commission
has the honour to submit, it will be necessary:—
- (1)
- to instruct the Commission to consider the method of
procedure for the plebiscite and to draw up draft
regulations for that purpose;
- (2)
- to call upon it to define the district known as the
“territories of Spisz and Orava”, which does not correspond
to any definite administrative area.
J. Cambon
,
Chairman of the Commission.
Paris
, September 10, 1919.
Annex D to HD–52
delegation of
the
kingdom of the serbs, croats
and
slovenes
Paris, September 10, 1919.
Mr. President: Referring to my letter of
this morning, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the
Royal Government has just resigned, and that this delegation feels
itself obliged, therefore, to await from the new Government the
authorization to sign the treaty of peace with the Austrian
Republic.
Please accept [etc.]
His Excellency M. Georges
Clemenceau,
President of the
Peace Conference,
Quai d’Orsay.
Appendix E to HD–52
Following is text of telegram (translation) sent by the Inter-Allied
Mission at Budapest to the Supreme Council under date of September
9th, 1919:
“In a letter copy of which will be sent you by next mail,
President Friedrich informs the Commission that his Government
has the confidence of the greater part of the country but he
lacks the necessary support from the Entente.
That the Roumanian requisitions throw many workmen into idleness,
compromising the next year’s harvesting—that the Roumanian
occupation prevents the collection of taxes, elections,
organization of armed force.
He asks that the Entente furnish him financial credit.
[Page 199]
He declares that if certain political parties are going to
henceforth enjoy the support of the Entente and if the present
Government is by this fact powerless to accomplish its duties,
the Council of the Ministers will transmit the power to the
Commission of Four Generals. The Commission demands instructions
from the Supreme Council and considers it their duty to
emphasize the embarrassing situation in which they are placed by
receiving no response to their preceding telegrams. Inter-Allied
Military Mission.”
