Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/51
HD–51
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in the Chateau of Saint Germain-en-Laye, on Wednesday, 10 September, 1919, at 11:15 a.m.
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Present
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United States of America
- Hon. F. L. Polk.
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Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison.
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British Empire
- Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
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Secretaries
- Mr. H. Norman.
- Mr. P. Kerr.
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France
- M. Clemenceau.
- M. Pichon.
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Secretaries
- M. Dutasta.
- M. Berthelot.
- M. de Saint-Quentin.
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Italy
- M. Tittoni.
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Secretaries
- M. Paterno.
- M. Barone Russo.
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Japan
- M. Matsui.
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Secretary
- M. Kawai.
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United States of America
| Joint Secretariat | |
| United States of America | Captain Chapin. |
| British Empire | Lt-Commander Bell. |
| France | M. de Percin. |
| Italy | Captain Rossi. |
| Interpreter—M. Camerlynck | |
The following also attended for the items with which they were concerned:
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United States of America
- Dr. J. Brown Scott.
- Mr. Woolsey.
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British Empire
- Brig-General Seely.
- Mr. Hurst.
- Brig-General Groves.
- Lt-Colonel Kisch.
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France
- M. Tardieu.
- M. Cambon.
- M. Fromageot.
- General Le Rond.
- Captain Ropert.
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Italy
- Colonel Castoldi.
- M. Ricci-Busatti.
- M. Brambilla.
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Japan
- M. Nagaoka.
1. The Council took note of the following draft resolution with regard to the Air Convention:— Air Convention
“That the Air Convention shall be signed with the least possible delay by the Contracting States, it being understood that it shall remain open for a period of six months for signature by such of those States as are not at present in a position to sign it.”
Mr. Polk drew the attention of the Council to the fact that he was unable to sign the Air Convention on behalf of the United States at the moment. It was even possible that the United States might not be able to give its adherence to the Convention, should the American Government maintain the reservations made by the American Delegates to the clauses relating to patents and customs duties.
(The draft resolution on the subject of the Air Convention was agreed to, subject to the reservation formulated by Mr. Polk, on behalf of the United States.)
2. Mr. Balfour said that he had closely considered the question left over at the last meeting of the Council. He had prepared a draft note for transmission to the German Government, but was not wholly satisfied with it. The conclusion was rather long and not decisive. Mr. Hurst had devised another plan, which seemed more effective than the mere despatch of a note. After reading his own draft Note (Appendix “A”) he called upon Mr. Hurst to explain his plan. Violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles by Virtue of Certain Articles in the German Constitution. (See HD–50, Minute 1)1
Mr. Hurst said that he had not been able to prepare any document which could be submitted to the Council. He had, on the previous day, made out a very rough draft, and had shown it to Dr. Scott. At the previous meeting he had been aware that the desire of the Council had been to formulate some plan of action, which would combine two separate ideas. Firstly, the two separate violations of the Peace Treaty should be drawn attention to. Secondly, whatever note, or communication, were sent to the Germans, they should be compelled to reply immediately. In addition to this, whatever line of action were adopted it should be of such a nature as to avoid adverse criticism in neutral countries. The solution that had seemed best to him was, to collect together all the admissions made by the Germans in their letter; to draw them up in the form of a protocol, which should be presented to the Germans for signature. When this had been done, their admissions would be given legal force, and be binding upon them. The Germans had admitted that the Peace Treaty and the Constitution were not in agreement. If, when presented with this admission in proper legal form, either the German [Page 174] Government, or the Reichsrat, refused to ratify it, then the intentions of the Germans would be made clear. The Drafting Committee had agreed, generally, to this proposal, at their meeting. The manner in which the protocol and the note by which it was to be transmitted were to be drafted, was doubtful, and, before proceeding to work, it was necessary that his main idea should be approved.
M. Clemenceau said that he understood that the Japanese Representative on the Drafting Committee had a proposal of his own to make.
M. Nagaoka then read his draft proposal. (See Appendix B.)
M. Tittoni said that he had understood, on the previous day, that the Council wished to force the German Government to make a special enactment, cancelling the Articles in their Constitution that were objected to. He understood M. Nagaoka’s proposal to consist in demanding a declaration of nullification of the Articles in question, with the addition, that the Reichsrat should itself confirm the declaration.
Mr. Balfour said that the Japanese proposal effected no more than what the Germans alleged to result naturally from Article 178 of their Constitution.
M. Clemenceau said that he agreed with Mr. Hurst’s proposal, which he considered to be the best solution of the difficulty. He proposed that the Drafting Committee should bring a draft legal instrument before the Council on the following day, of such a nature as to oblige the German Government to sign, in the form of a protocol, whatever they had admitted in their letter of the 5th September. The advantage of Mr. Hurst’s proposal was, that the Germans would be unable to enter into lengthy negotiations. The measures proposed, therefore, seemed to him to be the wisest and the most effective possible.
Mr. Polk said that he approved of Mr. Hurst’s proposal also.
M. Tardieu said that the draft protocol to be prepared by Mr. Hurst and the Drafting Committee, would have to be sent under the cover of a letter. He thought that some of Mr. Balfour’s arguments and phrases might be put into the covering letter with great advantage.
(It was decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft protocol, giving legal force to the admissions of the German Government in their letter of 5th September, and should present it to the Council at its meeting on the following day, together with a draft letter under cover of which, the aforesaid protocol should be transmitted to the German Government.)
3. M. Cambon reported the decision of the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees on the subject of the demarcation line to be [Page 175] adopted in the Teschen area, with the aid of a map. He said that the Polish Delegates had provisionally approved of the line proposed, which was ethnographically correct. Teschen
M. Tittoni said that he had received a visit from M. Benes, who had admitted the justice of the new line, from an ethnographic point of view. He, (M. Benes) had, however, argued, that if a strict ethnographic line were to be adopted in the Teschen area, it seemed hardly fair, conjointly with such a decision, to put four millions of Ruthenes in Eastern Galicia under Polish jurisdiction. A solution might consist in making concessions to the Czecho-Slovaks in the Teschen area, to balance the very great political and economic advantages that were being conferred on the Poles by virtue of the Galician decision.
Mr. Balfour said that he could not consider the analogy between the Galician and Teschen situations as very relevant, for two reasons; (1) the solution proposed for Eastern Galicia was provisional only, and was not intended to be a permanent settlement, and (2) the decision on the subject of Galicia had been arrived at because the Ruthenian population in that country could not stand alone. It was inevitable that the Ruthenians should eventually be placed under the rule of a non-Ruthenian State. Nothing parallel, or similar, to those considerations arose in the Teschen problem.
M. Clemenceau said that the Council proposed to discuss the Teschen question, which was quite difficult enough, without the Galician problem being added to it.
Mr. Polk said that M. Benes had proposed to him a line of demarcation following the river Vistula. The line in question would, however, be quite unacceptable to the Poles; although M. Benes considered that, in proposing it, he was making concessions.
M. Pichon said that the Council had heard the point of view of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations.2 The Czech Delegates had insisted that their interest in the Teschen area was centered on the coal that it contained; the Poles had asserted that their interest in Teschen was on a political basis, and was purely concerned with the Polish population in the disputed districts. It was therefore clear that the Poles were asking for population, and the Czechs for coal. A solution might be found by giving the whole of the Karwin district to the Czechs, and the indisputably Polish districts, in the remainder of the area, to the Poles. He did not think that the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees could be upheld.
Mr. Polk said that, if such a line as that proposed by M. Pichon were adopted, it would separate the people working in the mines from their own homes, by a national frontier.
[Page 176]M. Clemenceau said that a situation similar to that foreseen by Mr. Polk existed in Northern France, Belgium and the Saar Basin. It had not given rise to any serious difficulties.
Mr. Balfour said that the Poles regarded the Karwin Basin as a Polish district, as indeed it was. There was no serious objection to cutting the coal-field into two halves, because geological formations in other portions of the world were frequently divided politically. He was quite sure that the French frontier did not follow the geological structure of that country, in the northern districts, where the coal strata ran over into Belgium and into Germany. This fact did not, however, give rise to serious difficulties, but M. Pichon’s proposal involved cutting off a Polish population from the place where it worked, and this constituted a grave danger for the future. His conviction on this point was not only that of the Expert Committees of the Peace Conference, but also that of the International Commission in Teschen, who had studied the question locally. It was very dangerous to try to improvise another solution, more particularly as the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees was really favourable to the Czechs, to whom it granted 60 per cent, of the coal produced, and 40 per cent, to the Poles. It could not possibly be said that, under such a solution, the Czechs were being deprived of coal.
M. Tardieu said that it should not be forgotten, that the Poles contended, that they could not count on the Silesian coal-fields until the plebiscite in that country had been taken. This argument was ingenious, but it was none the less certain that the Poles would eventually obtain possession of the greater part of the Silesian coal-fields.
M. Pichon said that the Poles had repeatedly asserted that they did not care about coal.
Mr. Polk said that M. Benes had stated to him, that either the line proposed by him (M. Benes) should be adopted, or a plebiscite should be held in the area.
M. Berthelot said that M. Benes had stated to him, that the situation in Bohemia was now so grave that it would be preferable to the Czecho-Slovaks to risk a plebiscite, rather than to consent to a solution which they regarded as so hopelessly unfavourable to them, and equivalent, in their opinion, to a refusal of all their demands.
M. Tittoni said that, if a plebiscite were to be held, the area would have to be divided into two portions, as he had proposed for Kadkersburg and Marburg, when these areas were under discussion.
M. Berthelot said that the Czech contention was that, if they could not possess the coal, they would be dependent upon their neighbours for it, and might be cut off from their necessary supplies at a time of diplomatic tension. M. Pichon’s solution gave them the coal, and the rest of the Polish population to the Poles. By adopting it, the present [Page 177] state of affairs would not be altered, since the coal areas were now occupied by the Czechs.
Mr. Polk said that the difficulty was that, under M. Pichon’s proposal, a proportion of the Polish Teschen districts would be ceded to Czecho-Slovakia.
M. Berthelot said that the Karwin coal district could more properly be compared to the Lens, than to the Belgian, coal district, for it was concentrated in a narrow area as in the case of Lens. The original proposals of the Joint Committees had been most favourable to the Czechs, but the proposals in question had now been withdrawn. Even by accepting M. Pichon’s proposal, the Poles would be given far more than they had hoped for in the first instance. If, as he now thought possible, M. Benes could persuade his countrymen to consent to the new proposal, it was surely worth consideration.
Mr. Polk said that M. Pichon’s line would place 60,000 Poles under the administration of the Czechs.
Mr. Balfour said that it should not be forgotten that even the line proposed by the Joint Committees gave a considerable number of Poles to the Czechs.
M. Berthelot said that M. Benes had based a good many of his arguments on the solution to the Galician problem, contemplated by the Council. The proposed decision was very favourable to the Poles, and the impression left upon the Czechs was that, although the Council was ready to place 4 million Ruthenes under Polish jurisdiction, they were not prepared to make a concession far smaller, from an ethnographical point of view, in favour of the Czecho-Slovak State. This would, in consequence produce a very bad impression. M. Benes’ attitude had been extremely moderate and conciliatory, and it would be a great misfortune if he found himself compelled to resign his post, on account of what he considered an unconciliatory attitude of the Conference. M. Benes’ resignation would be a political consideration, not entirely relevant to the Teschen problem, but the possibility of it could not be disregarded, and ought to be duly considered.
Mr. Balfour said that he understood that the line described to the Council by M. Cambon had been adopted unanimously in the Joint Committees. As M. Berthelot had not been a member of either Committee, he regarded his proposals as interesting, but not of sufficient authority to outweigh a unanimous proposal by an Expert Committee.
M. Berthelot agreed with Mr. Balfour and said that the Committees had been unanimous, but it should not be forgotten that their unanimous opinion, for the first six months, had been to adopt a solution far more favourable to the Czechs than any now proposed. They had subsequently altered their opinion, and this, when made known, would cause a bad impression in Czecho-Slovakia. The Committees [Page 178] had studied the problem from its ethnographical and economical sides, leaving out political considerations, which seemed to be for the Council to decide. The French representatives on the Joint Committee had originally objected strongly to the line reported on by M. Cambon that morning, but they gave their assent to it finally, in order to facilitate a solution of some sort. The consent of the French representatives had only been given on the understanding that the Poles should be obliged, by some means or another, to grant special facilities to the Czechs with regard to the coal and to the railways.
M. Tittoni said that he understood that the line described by M. Cambon would not be adopted without a special convention, assuring to the Czechs the special economic facilities described by M. Berthelot.
Mr. Polk said that he had understood that the Joint Committees had been unanimous. If they had not been, the question ought obviously to be referred back to them.
M. Berthelot said that the Report of the Joint Committees had only been unanimous because the French representatives had given their consent, so as not to isolate themselves from their colleagues.
M. Clemenceau said that he did not understand the reasons that had prompted the French representatives on the Joint Committee to give their assent to a proposal of which they did not approve. He retained opinions independently of whether they were shared by others or not. He had thought M. Pichon’s proposal a very good one, and had hoped that it might have been adopted.
Mr. Balfour said that he saw grave objections to the adoption of M. Pichon’s solution.
M. Clemenceau said that, whilst agreeing with Mr. Balfour, he was convinced that the coal question in Teschen was the outstanding problem.
M. Cambon said it should not be forgotten that, in the Karwin Basin, which M. Pichon proposed to cede to Czecho-Slovakia, there were nearly 70,000 Poles.
M. Clemenceau said that Mr. Balfour could not agree with M. Pichon. He, himself, could not agree with the Committee’s proposals. He therefore proposed to refer the whole question back to the Joint Committees, who, as they had already changed their minds several times, could certainly do so again, and present another report. He would never accept a line cutting a coal basin into two, for such a solution would be like placing a man on one side of a frontier, his wife upon the other, and dividing the children up between the two.
M. Cambon said that he admitted M. Clemenceau’s objection, but drew the attention of the Council to the fact that it was just as unwise to devise a line giving the surface of the land to one country and the [Page 179] subterranean deposits to another, and this seemed to be what was required of him [and?] the Joint Committees.
(It was agreed that the Teschen question should be referred back to the joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees for report on the following day.)
4. Mr. Polk drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Bulgarian Delegation was objecting to having the Peace Terms presented to them without a formal diplomatic ceremony. Presentation of the Bulgarian Peace Terms
M. Dutasta further called attention to the fact, that the Bulgarians were asking for a period of thirty days, after the presentation of the Peace Terms, in which they might be allowed to draft their replies. Their request was based upon the plea that it would be necessary for them to take the terms to Sofia, and discuss them in the Bulgarian Sobranie.
(After some discussion, it was agreed that the Peace Terms to the Bulgarians should be formally presented to them at the Quai d’Orsay at a date which should be decided upon later.
It was further decided that the Bulgarian Delegation should be given a period of 25 days after the presentation of the Peace Terms, for the preparation of their replies.)
The Meeting then adjourned.