Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/260
The Allied and Associated Powers therefore feel it necessary to begin
their reply by a clear statement of the judgment passed upon the war by
practically the whole of civilised mankind.
In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers the war which began on
August 1st, 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity and the
freedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself civilised, has ever
consciously committed. For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the
Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They
were not satisfied with that growing prosperity and influence to which
Germany was entitled, and which all other nations were willing to accord
her, in the society of free and equal peoples. They required that they
should be able to dictate and tyrannise to a subservient Europe, as they
dictated and tyrannised over a subservient Germany.
In order to attain their ends they used every channel in their power
through which to educate their own subjects in the doctrine that might
was right in international affairs. They never ceased to expand German
armaments by land and sea, and to propagate the falsehood that [Page 927] this was necessary because
Germany’s neighbours were jealous of her prosperity and power. They
sought to sow hostility and suspicion instead of friendship between
nations. They developed a system of espionage and intrigue which enabled
them to stir up internal rebellion and unrest and even to make secret
offensive preparations within the territory of their neighbours whereby
they might, when the moment came, strike them down with greater
certainty and ease. They kept Europe in a ferment by threats of violence
and when they found that their neighbours were resolved to resist their
arrogant will, they determined to assist their predominance in Europe by
force.
As soon as their preparations were complete, they encouraged a
subservient ally to declare war against Serbia at 48 hours’ notice,
knowing full well that a conflict involving the control of the Balkans
could not be localised and almost certainly meant a general war. In
order to make doubly sure, they refused every attempt at conciliation
and conference until it was too late, and the world war was inevitable
for which they had plotted, and for which alone among the nations they
were fully equipped and prepared.
Germany’s responsibility, however, is not confined to having planned and
started the war. She is no less responsible for the savage and inhuman
manner in which it was conducted.
Though Germany was herself a guarantor of Belgium, the ruler[s] of
Germany violated, after a solemn promise to respect it, the neutrality
of this unoffending people. Not content with this, they deliberately
carried out a series of promiscuous shootings and burnings with the sole
object of terrifying the inhabitants into submission by the very
frightfulness of their action. They were the first to use poisonous gas,
notwithstanding the appalling suffering it entailed. They began the
bombing and long distance shelling of towns for no military object, but
solely for the purpose of reducing the morale of their opponents by
striking at their women and children. They commenced the submarine
campaign with its piratical challenge to international law, and its
destruction of great numbers of innocent passengers and sailors, in mid
ocean, far from succour, at the mercy of the winds and the waves, and
the yet more ruthless submarine crews. They drove thousands of men and
women and children with brutal savagery into slavery in foreign lands.
They allowed barbarities to be practised against their prisoners of war
from which the most uncivilised peoples would have recoiled.
The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human history. The
terrible responsibility which lies at her doors can be seen in the fact
that not less than seven million dead lie buried in Europe, while more
than twenty million others carry upon them the evidence of [Page 928] wounds and sufferings, because
Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to war.
The Allied and Associated Powers believe that they will be false to those
who have given their all to save the freedom of the world if they
consent to treat this war on any other basis than as a crime against
humanity and right.
This attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers was made perfectly
clear to Germany during the war by their principal statesmen. It was
defined by President Wilson in his speech of April 6, 1918,3 and
explicitly and categorically accepted by the German people as a
principle governing the peace:
It was set forth clearly in a speech of the Prime Minister of Great
Britain, of 14th December 1917:
It was made clear also in an address of M. Clemenceau, of September 1918:
Justice, therefore, is the only possible basis for the settlement of the
accounts of this terrible war. Justice is what the German Delegation
asks for and says that Germany had been promised. Justice is what
Germany shall have. But it must be justice for all. There must be
justice for the dead and wounded and for those who have been orphaned
and bereaved that Europe might be freed from Prussian despotism. There
must be justice for the peoples who now stagger under war debts which
exceed £30,000,000,000 that liberty might be saved. There must be
justice for those millions whose homes and land, ships and property
German savagery has spoliated and destroyed.
That is why the Allied and Associated Powers have insisted as a cardinal
feature of the Treaty that Germany must undertake to make reparation to
the very uttermost of her power; for reparation for wrongs inflicted is
of the essence of justice. That is why they insist that those
individuals who are most clearly responsible for German aggression and
for those acts of barbarism and inhumanity which have disgraced the
German conduct of the war, must be handed over to a justice which has
not been meted out to them at home. That, too, is why Germany must
submit for a few years to certain special disabilities and arrangements.
Germany has ruined the industries, the mines and the machinery of
neighbouring countries, not during battle, but with the deliberate and
calculated purpose of enabling her industries to seize their markets
before their industries could recover from the devastation thus wantonly
inflicted upon them. Germany has despoiled her neighbours of everything
she could make use of or carry away. Germany has destroyed the shipping
of all nations on the high seas, where there was no chance of rescue for
their passengers and crews. It is only justice that restitution should
be made and that these wronged peoples should be safeguarded for a time
from the competition of a nation whose industries are intact and have
even been fortified by machinery stolen from occupied territories. If
these things are [Page 930] hardships for
Germany, they are hardships which Germany has brought upon herself.
Somebody must suffer for the consequences of the war. Is it to be
Germany, or only the peoples she has wronged?
Not to do justice to all concerned would only leave the world open to
fresh calamities. If the German people themselves, or any other nation,
are to be deterred from following in the footsteps of Prussia, if
mankind is to be lifted out of the belief that war for selfish ends is
legitimate to any state, if the old era is to be left behind and nations
as well as individuals are to be brought beneath the reign of law, even
if there is to be early reconciliation and appeasement, it will be
because those responsible for concluding the war have had the courage to
see that justice is not deflected for the sake of convenient peace.
It is said that the German Revolution ought to make a difference and that
the German people are not responsible for the policy of the rulers whom
they have thrown from power.
The Allied and Associated Powers recognise and welcome the change. It
represents a great hope for peace, and for a new European order in the
future. But it cannot affect the settlement of the war itself. The
German Revolution was stayed until the German armies had been defeated
in the field, and all hope of profiting by a war of conquest had
vanished. Throughout the war, as before the war, the German people and
their representatives supported the war, voted the credits, subscribed
to the war loans, obeyed every order, however savage, of their
government. They shared the responsibility for the policy of their
government, for at any moment, had they willed it, they could have
reversed it. Had that policy succeeded they would have acclaimed it with
the same enthusiasm with which they welcomed the outbreak of the war.
They cannot now pretend, having changed their rulers after the war was
lost, that it is justice that they should escape the consequences of
their deeds.
The Allied and Associated Powers therefore believe that the peace they
have proposed is fundamentally a peace of justice. They are no less
certain that it is a peace of right fulfilling the terms agreed upon at
the time of the armistice. There can be no doubt as to the intentions of
the Allied and Associated Powers to base the settlement of Europe on the
principle of freeing oppressed peoples, and re-drawing national
boundaries as far as possible in accordance with the will of the peoples
concerned, while giving to each facilities for living an independent
national and economic life. These intentions were made clear, not only
in President Wilson’s address to Congress of January 8, 1918,4 but in “the
principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent [Page 931] addresses”, which were the agreed basis of
the peace. A memorandum on this point is attached to this letter.
Accordingly the Allied and Associated Powers have provided for the
reconstitution of Poland as an independent state with “free and secure
access to the sea”. All “territories inhabited by indubitably Polish
populations” have been accorded to Poland. All territory inhabited by
German majorities, save for a few isolated towns and for colonies
established on land recently forcibly expropriated and situated in the
midst of indubitably Polish territory, have been left to Germany.
Wherever the will of the people is in doubt, a plebiscite has been
provided for. The town of Danzig is to be constituted a free city, so
that the inhabitants will be autonomous and not come under Polish rule
and will form no part of the Polish state. Poland will be given certain
economic rights in Danzig and the city itself has been severed from
Germany because in no other way was it possible to provide for that
“free and secure access to the sea” which Germany has promised to
concede.
The German counter-proposals entirely conflict with the agreed basis of
peace. They provide that great majorities of indisputably Polish
population shall be kept under German rule.
They deny secure access to the sea to a nation of over twenty million
people, whose nationals are in the majority all the way to the coast, in
order to maintain territorial connection between East and West Prussia,
whose trade has always been mainly sea-borne. They cannot, therefore, be
accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers. At the same time in
certain cases the German Note has established a case for rectification,
which will be made; and in view of the contention that Upper Silesia
though inhabited by a two to one majority of Poles (1,250,000 to
650,000, 1910 German census) wishes to remain a part of Germany, they
are willing that the question of whether Upper Silesia should form part
of Germany, or of Poland, should be determined by the vote of the
inhabitants themselves.
In regard to the Saar basin the regime proposed by the Allied and
Associated Powers is to continue for fifteen years. This arrangement
they considered necessary both to the general scheme for reparation, and
in order that France may have immediate and certain compensation for the
wanton destruction of her Northern coal mines. The district has been
transferred not to French sovereignty, but to the control of the League
of Nations. This method has the double advantage that it involves no
annexation, while it gives possession of the coal field to France and
maintains the economic unity of the district, so important to the
interests of the inhabitants. At the end of fifteen years the mixed
population, who in the meanwhile will have had control of its own local
affairs under the governing supervision of the [Page 932] League of Nations, will have complete freedom to
decide whether they wish union with Germany, union with France, or the
continuance of the regime established by the Treaty.
As to the territories which it is proposed to transfer from Germany to
Denmark and Belgium, some of these were forcibly seized by Prussia, and
in every case the transfer will only take place as the result of a
decision of the inhabitants themselves taken under conditions which will
ensure complete freedom to vote.
Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the native
inhabitants of the German colonies are strongly opposed to being again
brought under Germany’s sway, and the record of German rule, the
traditions of the German Government and the use to which these colonies
were put as bases from which to prey upon the commerce of the world,
make it impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to return them
to Germany, or to entrust to her the responsibility for the training and
education of their inhabitants.
For these reasons the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that
their territorial proposals are in accord both with the agreed basis of
peace and are necessary to the future peace of Europe. They are
therefore not prepared to modify them except as indicated.
Arising out of the territorial settlement are the proposals in regard to
international control of rivers. It is clearly in accord with the agreed
basis of the peace and the established public law of Europe that inland
states should have secure access to the sea along navigable rivers
flowing through their territory. The Allied and Associated Powers
believe that the arrangements which they propose are vital to the free
life of the new inland states that are being established and that they
are no derogation from the rights of the other riparian states. If
viewed according to the discredited doctrine that every state is engaged
in a desperate struggle for ascendancy over its neighbours, no doubt
such an arrangement may be an impediment to the artificial strangling of
a rival. But if it be the ideal that nations are to co-operate in the
ways of commerce and peace, it is natural and right. The provisions for
the presence of representatives of non-riparian States on these river
commissions is security that the general interest will be considered. In
the application of these principles some modifications have however been
made in the original proposals.
The German Delegation appear to have seriously misinterpreted the
economic and financial conditions. There is no intention on the part of
the Allied and Associated Powers to strangle Germany or to [Page 933] prevent her from taking her
proper place in international trade and commerce. Provided that she
abides by the Treaty of Peace and provided also that she abandons those
aggressive and exclusive traditions which have been apparent no less in
her business than in her political methods, the Allied and Associated
Powers intend that Germany shall have fair treatment in the purchase of
raw materials and the sale of goods, subject to those temporary
provisions already mentioned in the interests of the nations ravaged and
weakened by German action. It is their desire that the passions
engendered by the war should die as soon as possible, and that all
nations should share in the prosperity which comes from the honest
supply of their mutual needs. They wish that Germany shall enjoy this
prosperity like the rest, though much of the fruit of it must
necessarily go for many years to come, in making reparation to her
neighbours for the damage she has done. In order to make their intention
clear, a number of modifications have been made in the financial and
economic clauses of the Treaty. But the principles upon which the Treaty
is drawn must stand.
The German Delegation have greatly misinterpreted the Reparation
proposals of the Treaty.
These proposals confine the amount payable by Germany to what is clearly
justifiable under the terms of armistice in respect of damage caused to
the civilian population of the Allies by German aggression. They do not
provide for that interference in the internal life of Germany by the
Reparation Commission which is alleged.
They are designed to make the payment of that reparation which Germany
must pay as easy and convenient to both parties as possible and they
will be interpreted in that sense. The Allied and Associated Powers
therefore are not prepared to modify them.
But they recognise with the German Delegation, the advantage of arriving
as soon as possible at the fixed and definite sum which shall be payable
by Germany and accepted by the Allies. It is not possible to fix this
sum to-day, for the extent of damage and the cost of repair has not yet
been ascertained. They are therefore willing to accord to Germany all
necessary and reasonable facilities to enable her to survey the
devastated and damaged regions, and to make proposals thereafter within
four months of the signing of the Treaty for a settlement of the claims
under each of the categories of damage for which she is liable. If
within the following two months an agreement can be reached, the exact
liability of Germany will have been ascertained. If agreement has not
been reached by then, the arrangement as provided in the Treaty will be
executed.
The Allied and Associated Powers have given careful consideration to the
request of the German Delegation that Germany should at once be admitted
to the League of Nations. They find themselves unable to accede to this
request.
The German revolution was postponed to the last moments of the war and
there is as yet no guarantee that it represents a permanent change.
In the present temper of international feeling, it is impossible to
expect the free nations of the world to sit down immediately in equal
association with those by whom they have been so grievously wronged. To
attempt this too soon would delay and not hasten that process of
appeasement which all desire.
But the Allied and Associated Powers believe that if the German people
prove by their acts that they intend to fulfil the conditions of the
peace, and that they have abandoned those aggressive and estranging
policies which caused the war, and have now become a people with whom it
is possible to live in neighbourly good fellowship, the memories of the
past years will speedily fade, and it will be possible at an early date
to complete the League of Nations by the admission of Germany thereto.
It is their earnest hope that this may be the case. They believe that
the prospects of the world depend upon the close and friendly
co-operation of all nations in adjusting international questions and
promoting the welfare and progress of mankind. But the early entry of
Germany into the League must depend principally upon the action of the
German people themselves.
In the course of its discussion of their economic terms and elsewhere the
German Delegation has repeated its denunciation of the blockade
instituted by the Allied and Associated Powers.
Blockade is and always has been a legal and recognised method of war, and
its operation has from time to time been adapted to changes in
international communications.
If the Allied and Associated Powers have imposed upon Germany a blockade
of exceptional severity which throughout they have consistently sought
to conform to the principles of international law, it is because of the
criminal character of the war initiated by Germany and of the barbarous
methods adopted by her in prosecuting it.
The Allied and Associated Powers have not attempted to make a specific
answer to all the assertions made in the German note. The fact that some
observations have been passed over in silence does not indicate,
however, that they are either admitted or open to discussion.
In conclusion the Allied and Associated Powers must make it clear that
this letter and the memorandum attached constitute their last word.
They have examined the German observations and counter-proposals with
earnest attention and care. They have, in consequence, made important
practical concessions, but in its principles they stand by the
Treaty.
They believe that it is not only a just settlement of the great war, but
that it provides the basis upon which the peoples of Europe can live
together in friendship and equality. At the same time it creates the
machinery for the peaceful adjustment of all international problems by
discussion and consent, whereby the settlement of 1919 itself can be
modified from time to time to suit new facts and new conditions as they
arise.
It is frankly not based upon a general condonation of the events of
1914–1918. It would not be a peace of justice if it were. But it
represents a sincere and deliberate attempt to establish “that reign of
law, based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the
organised opinion of mankind” which was the agreed basis of the
peace.
As such the Treaty in its present form must be accepted or rejected.
The Allied and Associated Powers therefore require a declaration from the
German Delegation within five days from the date of this communication
that they are prepared to sign the Treaty as it stands today.
If they declare within this period that they are prepared to sign the
Treaty as it stands, arrangements will be made for the immediate
signature of the Peace at Versailles.
In default of such a declaration, this communication constitutes the
notification provided for in article 2 of the Convention of February
16th 19195 prolonging the Armistice which
was signed on November 11th 1918 and has already been prolonged by the
agreement of December 13th 1918 and January 16th 1919.6 The said
Armistice will then terminate, and the Allied and Associated Powers will
take such steps as they think needful to enforce their Terms.
[Enclosure]
Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the
Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of
Peace
introduction. basis of the peace
negotiations
The Allied and Associated Powers are in complete accord with the
German Delegation in their insistence that the basis for the
negotiation [Page 936] of the Treaty
of Peace is to be found in the correspondence which immediately
preceded the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918. It was
there agreed that the Treaty of Peace should be based upon the
Fourteen Points of President Wilson’s address of January 8, 1918, as
they were modified by the Allies’ memorandum included in the
President’s note of November 5, 1918,7 and upon
the principles of settlement enunciated by President Wilson in his
later addresses, and particularly in his address of September 27,
1918.8 These are the
principles upon which hostilities were abandoned in November 1918,
these are the principles upon which the Allied and Associated Powers
agreed that peace might be based, these are the principles which
have guided them in the deliberations which have led to the
formulation of the Conditions of Peace.
It is now contended by the German Delegation that the Conditions of
Peace do not conform to these principles which had thus become
binding upon the Allied and Associated Powers as well as upon the
Germans themselves. In an attempt to prove a breach of this
agreement the German Delegation have drawn quotations from a number
of speeches, most of which were before the Address to Congress and
many of which were uttered by Allied statesmen at a time when they
were not at war with Germany, or had no responsibility for the
conduct of public affairs. The Allied and Associated Powers consider
it unnecessary, therefore, to oppose this list of detached
quotations with others equally irrelevant to a discussion concerning
the basis of the peace negotiations. In answer to the implication of
these quotations, it is sufficient to refer to a note of the Allied
Powers transmitted to the President of the United States on January
10, 1917,9 in response
to an inquiry as to the conditions upon which they would be prepared
to make peace:
“The Allies feel a desire as deep as that of the United
States Government to see ended, at the earliest possible
moment, the war for which the Central Empires are
responsible, and which inflicts sufferings so cruel upon
humanity. But they judge it impossible today to bring about
a peace that shall assure to them the reparation, the
restitution and the guarantees to which they are entitled by
the aggression for which the responsibility lies upon the
Central Empires—and of which the very principle tended to
undermine the safety of Europe—a peace which shall also
permit the establishment upon firm foundations of the future
of the nations of Europe.”
In the same note, in addition to a reference to Poland, they declared
the War Aims of the Allies to include:
“… first of all, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia,
Montenegro, with the compensation due to them; the
evacuation of the invaded [Page 937] territories in France, in Russia, in
Roumania with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe,
guaranteed by a stable regime and based at once on respect
for nationalities and on the right to full security and
liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples,
small and great, and at the same time upon territorial
conventions and international settlements such as to
guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified
attacks; the restitution of provinces formerly torn away
from the Allies by force against the wish of their
inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the
Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign
domination; the setting free of the populations subject to
the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of
Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western
civilisation.”
It cannot be disputed that responsible statesmen, those qualified to
express the will of the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers,
have never entertained or expressed a desire for any other peace
than one which should undo the wrongs of 1914, vindicate justice and
international right, and reconstruct the political foundations of
Europe on lines which would give liberty to all its peoples, and
therefore the prospect of a lasting peace.
But the German Delegation profess to find discrepancies between the
agreed basis of peace and the draft of the Treaty. They discover a
contradiction between the terms of the Treaty and a statement taken
from an address delivered at Baltimore on April 6, 1918, by
President Wilson:
“We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be
just to the German people, as with all others. … To propose
anything but justice to Germany at any time, whatever the
outcome of the war, would be to renounce our own cause, for
we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.”
This quotation does not stand alone. It should be read in conjunction
with one of the cardinal principles of the Mount Vernon address of
July 4, 1918,10 which
demanded:
“The destruction of every arbitrary power everywhere that can
separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the
peace of the world or, if it cannot be presently destroyed,
at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.”
Neither of these two principles of the agreed basis of peace has been
lost sight of in the formulation of these Conditions.
The German Delegation see in the provisions with regard to
territorial settlements a conflict between the terms of the Treaty
and the following statement made by President Wilson on June 9 [7], 1918:11
“if it is in deed and in truth the mutual aim of the
Governments allied against Germany and of their nations, in
the coming negotiations [Page 938] of peace to bring about a sure and
lasting peace, all who sit down at the table of negotiations
will be ready and willing to pay the only price for which it
can be gotten. … This price is impartial justice in every
item without regard to whose interests may be crossed by it,
and not only impartial justice but also satisfaction to all
nations whose future is to be decided upon.”
In their communication they enumerate a number of territorial
settlements and conclude that “their basis is indifferently, now the
consideration of an unchangeable historical right, now the principle
of ethnographical facts, now the consideration of economic
interests. In every case the decision is against Germany.”
If in certain cases, not in all, the decision has in fact not been in
favour of Germany, this is not the result of any purpose to act
unjustly towards Germany. It is the inevitable result of the fact
that an appreciable portion of the territory of the German Empire
consisted of districts which had in the past been wrongfully
appropriated by Prussia or by Germany. It is a chief duty of the
Allied and Associated Powers to rectify these injustices in
accordance with the explicit statement of President Wilson in his
address to Congress of February 11, 1918:12
“Each part of the final settlement must be based upon the
essential justice of that particular case and upon such
adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be
permanent.”
The German Delegation find a conflict between the terms of the Treaty
which set forth the economic provisions and the third of President
Wilson’s Fourteen Points:
“The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers
and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions
among all the nations consenting to the peace and
associating themselves for its maintenance”.
In their application of this principle the German Delegation would
neglect entirely the economic conditions which have resulted from
the war, with their own country intact and in no wise suffering from
the devastation brought upon the lands and homes of the Allied
peoples. They nevertheless seek immediate admission to all of the
trade arrangements which are to be provided for by the Conditions of
Peace. This would have the effect of establishing an inequality of
trade conditions which would continue in Europe for many years to
come. Equality can only be established by arrangements which take
into account the existing differences in economic strength and
industrial integrity of the peoples of Europe. But the Conditions of
Peace contain some provisions for the future which may outlast the
transition [Page 939] period during
which the economic balance is to be restored; and a reciprocity is
foreseen after that period which is very clearly that equality of
trade conditions for which President Wilson has stipulated.
The German Delegation profess to find in the terms of the Treaty a
violation of the principle expressed by President Wilson before
Congress on February 11, 1918:
“That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and
pawns in a game”.
The Allied and Associated Powers emphatically reject the suggestion
that there has been any “bartering about” of peoples and provinces.
Every territorial settlement of the Treaty of Peace has been
determined upon after most careful and laboured consideration of all
the religious, racial and linguistic factors in each particular
country. The legitimate hopes of peoples long under alien rule have
been heard; and the decisions in each instance have been founded
upon the principle explicitly enunciated in this same address; that
“All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the
utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without
introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and
antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace
of Europe and consequently of the world”.
Finally, the German Delegation take exception to the fact that
Germany has not been invited to join in the formation of the League
of Nations as an original member. President Wilson’s declarations,
“however, envisaged no league of nations which would include Germany
at the outset, and no statement of his can be adduced in support of
this contention. Indeed, in his speech of September 27, 1918, he
laid down with the greatest precision the conditions which must
govern her admission:
“It is necessary to guarantee the peace, and the peace cannot
be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in
plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed, is that there
will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved
untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with
the peace settlement itself to remove that source of
insecurity”.
and further,
“Germany will have to redeem her character not by what happens at
the peace table but by what follows”.
The Allied and Associated Powers look forward to the time when the
League of Nations established by this Treaty shall extend its
membership to all peoples; but they cannot abandon any of the
essential conditions of an enduring League.
[Page 940]
part i. the league of
nations
I
The Allied and Associated Powers regard the Covenant of the League of
Nations as the foundation of the Treaty of Peace. They have given
careful consideration to all its terms and they are convinced that
it introduces an element of progress into the relations of peoples
which the future will develop and strengthen to the advantage of
justice and of peace.
The text of the Treaty itself makes it clear that it has never been
the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers that Germany or
any other power should be indefinitely excluded from the League of
Nations. Provisions have accordingly been laid down which apply
generally to States not members of the League and which determine
the conditions of their admission subsequent to its formation.
Any State whose government shall have given clear proofs of its
stability as well as of its intention to observe its international
obligations—particularly those obligations which arise out of the
Treaty of Peace—will find the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
disposed to support its candidature for admission to the League.
In the case of Germany, it is hardly necessary to say that the record
of the last five years is not of a character to justify an
exception, at the present time, to the general rule to which
reference has just been made. Her case demands a definite test. The
length of this period will largely depend upon the acts of the
German Government, and it is within the choice of that Government,
by its attitude towards the Treaty of Peace, to shorten the period
of delay which the League of Nations, without any intention of
prolonging it unduly, shall consider it necessary to fix.
Provided these necessary conditions are assured, they see no reason
why Germany should not become a member of the League in the early
future.
II
The Allied and Associated Powers do not consider that an addition to
the Covenant in the sense of the German proposals regarding economic
questions is necessary. They would point out that the Covenant
already provides that “subject to and in accordance with the
provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be
agreed upon, the Members of the League … will make provision to
secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, and
equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League.”
So soon as Germany is admitted to the League, she will enjoy the
benefits of these provisions. The establishment of general
conventions with regard to transit questions is now being
considered.
[Page 941]
III
The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to accord guarantees,
under the protection of the League of Nations, for the educational,
religious and cultural rights of German minorities in territories
transferred from the German Empire to the new states created by the
Treaty. They take note of the statement of the German Delegates that
Germany is determined to treat foreign minorities within her
territory according to the same principles.
IV
The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the
German Delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides
for “the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action
of international obligations.” They recognise that the acceptance by
Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will
facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of
armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a
view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction.
It goes without saying that the realisation of this programme will
depend in large part on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of
her own engagements.
parts ii and iii. boundaries of
germany and political clauses for europe
Section I. Belgium
The territories of Eupen and Malmedy were separated from the
neighbouring Belgian lands of Limburg, Liège, and Luxemburg in
1814–15, when they were assigned to Prussia for making up the number
of people on the Left Bank of the Rhine taken over as an offset for
certain renunciations in Saxony. No account was taken of the desires
of the people, nor of geographical or linguistic frontiers.
Nevertheless, this region has continued in close economic and social
relations with the adjacent portions of Belgium, and in spite of a
century of Prussification the Walloon speech has maintained itself
among several thousand of its inhabitants. At the same time the
territory has been made a basis for German militarism by the
construction of the great camp of Elsenborn and various strategic
railways directed against Belgium. The reasons seem sufficient to
justify the union of the territory to Belgium, provided the
petitions to this effect are sufficiently supported by the
population of the district. The Treaty [Page 942] makes provision for consulting the population
under the auspices of the League of Nations.
With regard to the neutralized territory of Moresnet the sovereignty
of which has been in dispute since 1815, the Prussians make a claim
for which there appears to be no justification of any kind. The
Treaty settles this dispute in favour of Belgium, and at the same
time awards to Belgium, in partial compensation for the destruction
of Belgian forests, the adjacent domanial and communal woods in
Prussian Moresnet.
Section II. Luxemburg
The observations of the German Delegation as to Luxemburg do not
require any answer, as the clauses of the Treaty are justified by
two uncontrovertible facts: the violation of the neutrality of the
Grand Duchy by Germany during the war, and the denunciation of the
Customs Union on which Luxemburg herself has decided and which she
has communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers since the
armistice.
Section IV. Territory of the Saar Basin
The territory of the Saar basin has already been the subject of an
exchange of notes with the German Delegation.13 The new
observations contained in the German communication seem to show a
complete misapprehension of the spirit and purpose of this section
of the Treaty.
The purpose and decision of the Allies have twice been stated, first
in the text of the Treaty itself, in which (Articles 45 and 46)
Germany is to accept the provisions in question “as compensation for
the destruction of the coal-mines in the North of France and as part
payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage
resulting from the war, and … in order to assure the rights and
welfare of the population”; and secondly, in the note of May 24th,
“the Allied and Associated Governments have chosen this particular
form of reparation because it was felt that the destruction of the
mines in the North of France was an act of such a nature that a
definite and exemplary retribution should be exacted; this object
would not be obtained by the mere supply of a specified or
unspecified amount of coal. This scheme, therefore, in its general
provisions, must be maintained, and on this, the Allied and
Associated Powers are not prepared to agree to any alternative.”
The German Delegation, on the other hand, declares that “the German
Government refuses to carry out any reparation which will have the
character of a punishment”. The German idea of justice appears [Page 943] then to be one which
excludes a conception which is essential to any just settlement and
a necessary basis for subsequent reconciliation.
It has been the desire of the Allied and Associated Powers in
determining upon the form of reparation to be imposed to choose one
which, by its exceptional nature, will be for a limited period a
definite and visible symbol. At the same time, they intended, by
assuring themselves of the immediate possession of a security for
reparation, to escape the risks to which the German memoir itself
has drawn attention.
On the other hand they have exercised the greatest care in order to
avoid inflicting on the inhabitants of the district itself any
material or moral injury. In every point their interests have been
most scrupulously guarded, and in fact their condition will be
improved.
The frontiers of the district have been precisely determined so as to
secure the least possible interference with the present
administrative units or with the daily vocations of this complex
population. It is expressly provided that the whole system of
administration of criminal and civil law and of taxation shall be
maintained. The inhabitants are to retain their local assemblies,
their religious liberties, their schools and the use of their
language. All existing guarantees in favour of the working
population are maintained, and new rules be in accordance with the
principles adopted by the League of Nations. It is true that the
Governing Commission, with which the final control rests, will not
be directly responsible to a Parliamentary Assembly, but it will be
responsible to the League of Nations and not to the French
Government. The arrangement made will afford an ample guarantee
against the misuse of the power which is entrusted to it; but, in
addition, the Governing Commission is required to take the advice of
the elected representatives of the district before any change in the
laws can be made or any new tax imposed. The whole revenue derived
from taxation will be devoted to local purposes and for the first
time since the forcible annexation of this district to Prussia and
to Bavaria, the people will live under a Government resident on the
spot which will have no occupation and no interest except their
welfare. The Allied and Associated Powers have full confidence that
the inhabitants of the district will have no reason to regard the
new administration under which they will be placed as one more
remote than was the administration which was conducted from Berlin
and Munich.
The German Note constantly overlooks the fact that the whole
arrangement is temporary, and that at the end of 15 years the
inhabitants will have a full and free right to choose the
sovereignty under which they are to live.
[Page 944]
Section V. Alsace-Lorraine
The clauses concerning Alsace and Lorraine are but the application of
the 8th of the 14 Points which Germany, at the time of the
Armistice, accepted as the basis of Peace: “The wrong done by
Prussia to France in 1871, as regards Alsace and Lorraine, which has
disturbed the peace of the world for nearly 50 years must be
righted, in order that peace may again be assured in the interest of
all”.
Fifty years ago, the injustice consisted in the annexation of a
French country against the will of its inhabitants, as unanimously
expressed at Bordeaux by their elected representatives, reiterated
in the Reichstag in 1874 and many times since by the election of
protesting deputies and finally confirmed during the war by the
special measures which Germany had to take against Alsatians and
Lorrainers, both civilians and soldiers.
To right a wrong is to replace things, so far as possible, in the
state in which they were before being disturbed by the wrong. All
the Clauses of the Treaty concerning Alsace and Lorraine have this
object in view. They will not, however, suffice to wipe out the
sufferings of two Provinces which, for nearly half a century, have
been for the Germans merely a “military glacis” and, according to
the expression of Herr von Kühlmann, a means of “cementing” the
unity of the Empire.
The Allied and Associated Powers could not therefore admit a
plebiscite for these Provinces. Germany, having accepted the 8th
Point and signed the Armistice which places Alsace and Lorraine in
the position of evacuated territories, has no right to demand a
plebiscite. The population of Alsace and Lorraine has never asked
for it. On the contrary it protested for nearly 50 years, at the
cost of its own tranquility and its own interests, against the abuse
of strength of which it was the victim in 1871. Its will is not
therefore in doubt, and the Allied and Associated Governments mean
to ensure respect for it.
The arguments, based on history and language, once more brought
forward by Germany, are formally contested by the Allied and
Associated Powers and do not modify their point of view.
The legal objections derived from the “ante-dated cession” are also
inadmissible. Germany recognised this when she signed the Armistice.
Moreover Alsace and Lorraine, by throwing themselves into the arms
of France, as into those of a long-lost mother, themselves fixed the
date of their deliverance. A Treaty founded on the right of
self-determination of peoples cannot but take note of a people’s
will so solemnly proclaimed.
In all its Clauses, whether they concern nationality, debts or State
property, the Treaty has no other object than to restore persons and
[Page 945] things to the legal
position in which they were in 1871. The obligation of repairing the
injustice then committed admits of no other alternative, and Germany
herself has accepted this obligation in subscribing to the 14
Points.
It should be added that it is easy to justify the exception made in
favour of France to the general principle admitted in the Treaty,
according to which the State receiving territory takes over part of
the public debt of the ceding State and pays for the property of the
said State in the ceded territory. In 1871, Germany, when she seized
Alsace and Lorraine, refused to take over any part of the French
debt; she paid nothing for any French State property, and Herr von
Bismarck boasted of this in the Reichstag on May 25th, 1871. Today
the Allied and Associated Powers mean France to recover Alsace and
Lorraine under exactly the same conditions, and consequently that
she should take over no part of the German debt nor pay for any
State property. This solution is just, for if German State property
includes railways, the French owners of which Germany compensated in
1871 by sums drawn from the war indemnity, and if these railways
have been developed since 1871, Germany on the contrary not having,
at that time, assumed liability either for that portion of the
French debt which belonged to Alsace and Lorraine or for the State
property, the loss (capital and interest) imposed on France under
this head exceeds the sum to which Germany makes a claim.
As regards the local debt of Alsace and Lorraine and of the public
institutions of the Provinces which existed before August the 1st,
1914, it has always been understood between the Allied and
Associated Governments that France should accept liability for
them.
Section VI. Austria
The Allied and Associated Powers take note of the declaration in
which Germany declares that she “has never had and will never have
the intention of changing by violence the frontier between Germany
and Austria”.
Section VII. Poland
In dealing with the problem of the Eastern frontiers of Germany, it
is desirable to place oil record two cardinal principles.
First, there is imposed upon the Allies a special obligation to use
the victory which they have won in order to re-establish the Polish
Nation in the independence of which it was unjustly deprived more
than one hundred years ago. This act was one of the greatest wrongs
of which history has record, a crime the memory and the result of
which has for long poisoned the political life of a large portion of
the continent of Europe. The seizure of the Western provinces of
Poland [Page 946] was one of the
essential steps by which the military power of Prussia was built up,
the necessity of holding fast these provinces has perverted the
whole political life, first of Prussia and then of Germany. To undo
this wrong is the first duty of the Allies, as has been proclaimed
by them throughout the war, even when to some it might have appeared
that the prospect of ultimate success was most remote; now that the
victory has been won, the aim can be achieved. The restoration has
already been spontaneously agreed to by the Russian Government; its
attainment is ensured by the collapse of the Central Powers.
The second principle, which has been proclaimed by the Allies and
formally accepted by Germany, is that there shall be included in the
restored Poland those districts which are now inhabited by an
indisputably Polish population.
These are the principles which have guided the Allies in determining
the Eastern frontiers of Germany, and the Conditions of Peace have
been drawn up in strict accordance with them.
posen and west prussia
In the Western portions of the former Kingdom of Poland which are now
included in the Prussian Provinces of Posen and West Prussia, the
application of the second principle only to a very small degree
modifies that of the first. When the partition took place these
portions of Poland were predominantly inhabited by Poles; except in
some towns and districts to which German colonists had made their
way, the country was completely Polish in speech and sentiment. Had
the Allied and Associated Powers applied the strict law of historic
retribution, they would have been justified in restoring to Poland
these two provinces almost in their entirety. They have in fact not
done so; they have deliberately waived the claim of historic right
because they wished to avoid even the appearance of injustice, and
they have left to Germany those districts on the West in which there
is an undisputed German predominance in immediate contiguity to
German territory.
Apart from these districts it is true that there are certain areas,
often far removed from the German frontier, such as Bromberg, in
which there is a majority of Germans. It would be impossible to draw
a frontier in such a way that these areas should be left to Germany
while the surrounding purely Polish areas were included in Poland.
There must be some sacrifice on one side or the other. If this is
once recognised, there can be no doubt as to who has the prior claim
to consideration. Numerous as the Germans in these districts may be,
the number of Poles concerned is greater; to have left these
districts to Germany would be to sacrifice the majority to the
minority. [Page 947] Moreover, it is
necessary to recall the methods by which German preponderance in
certain districts has been established. German settlers, German
colonists, German residents have not come here merely in obedience
to natural causes. Their presence is the direct result of the policy
pursued by the Prussian Government, which has used all its immense
resources to dispossess the original population and substitute for
it one of German speech and German nationality. This process has
been continued to the very eve of the war with exceptional
harshness, and has called forth protests even in Germany itself. To
recognise that such action should give a permanent title to the
country would be to give an encouragement and premium to the
grossest acts of injustice and opposition.
In order to eliminate any possible injustice the Allied and
Associated Powers have caused the Western frontiers of Poland to be
carefully reconsidered; as a result of this they have made certain
modifications in detail with the object of bringing the frontier
into closer harmony with the ethnographical division; the result of
these changes will be on the whole to diminish the number of Germans
who are included in Poland. In particular, the Allied and Associated
Powers have determined to adhere strictly to the historical frontier
between Pomerania and West Prussia, so that here no part of Germany
outside the former Kingdom of Poland shall be assigned to Poland. It
is not certain that these changes will be practical improvements;
the closer adherence to the ethnic line may produce some local
inconvenience.
upper silesia
A considerable portion of the German answer is devoted to the
question of Upper Silesia. It is recognised that the problem here
differs from that in Posen and West Prussia for the reason that
Upper Silesia was not a part of the Polish territories when
dismembered by the Partition. It may be said that Poland has no
legal claim to the cession of Upper Silesia: it is emphatically not
true that she has no claim which could be supported on the
principles of President Wilson. In the district to be ceded, the
majority of the population is indisputably Polish. Every German book
of reference, every school-book, teaches the German child that the
inhabitants are Polish in origin and in speech. The Allied and
Associated Powers would have been acting in complete violation of
the principles which the German Government itself professes to
accept had they left unregarded the Polish claims to this
district.
However the German Government now contest these conclusions. They
insist that separation from Germany is not in accordance with the
wishes or the interests of the population. Under these circumstances
the Allied and Associated Powers are willing to allow the [Page 948] question to be determined
by those particularly concerned. They have therefore decided that
this territory shall not be immediately ceded to Poland, but that
arrangements shall be made to hold a plebiscite there.
They would gladly have avoided this, for the appeal must be postponed
for some considerable time. It will involve the temporary occupation
of the district by foreign troops. In order to secure the full
impartiality of the vote, it will be necessary to establish a
separate Commission to administer the territory during the
intervening period.
Moreover, in order to prevent Germany from being deprived arbitrarily
of materials necessary for her industrial life, an additional
Article has been included in the Treaty providing that mineral
products, including coal, produced in any part of Upper Silesia that
may be transferred, shall be available for purchase by Germany on
the same terms as by the Poles themselves.
In order further to meet any criticism regarding the consequences of
the transfer of territory to Poland, the Allied and Associated
Powers have introduced a new provision, described below in the
paragraphs on Property, Rights and Interests, the effect of which
will be to give protection to Germans in any liquidation of their
property.
The restoration of the Polish State is a great historical act which
cannot be achieved without breaking many ties and causing temporary
difficulty and distress to many individuals. But it has been the
special concern of the Allied and Associated Powers to provide for
the adequate protection of those Germans who will find themselves
transferred to Poland, as well as of all other religious, racial or
linguistic minorities. There is in the Treaty a clause by which
there will be secured to them the enjoyment of religious liberty and
also the right to use their own language and that of having their
children educated in their own language. They will not be subjected
to persecution similar to that which Poles had to endure from the
Prussian State.
Section IX. East Prussia
The German Government declares that it cannot accept a solution by
which East Prussia shall be separated from the rest of Germany. It
must, therefore, be recalled that East Prussia was in fact so
separated for many hundreds of years, and that at no date until 1866
was it actually included in the political frontiers of Germany; it
has always been recognised by German historians as being not an
original German land, but a German colony. It is no doubt for the
convenience of Germany that this country, which has been conquered
and wrested from its original inhabitants by the German sword,
should be in direct contact with the true Germany, but the
convenience of [Page 949] Germany is
no reason why the dismemberment and partition of another nation
should be continued. Moreover, the interests which the Germans in
East Prussia, who number less than two millions, have in
establishing a land connection with Germany, is much less vital than
the interest of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access to
the sea.
The larger part of the trade of East Prussia with the rest of Germany
is sea-borne; for the commercial life of the province it will matter
little that West Prussia is restored to Poland, but for Poland
immediate and unbroken communication with Danzig and the remainder
of the coast by railways which are entirely under the control of the
Polish State is essential. The inconvenience caused to East Prussia
by the new frontiers is negligible compared to that which would be
caused to Poland by any other arrangement.
But in addition the importance of the railway connection between East
Prussia and Germany has been fully recognised in the Treaty, and
Articles dealing with this have been inserted. They have now been
carefully revised, and they provide the fullest security that there
shall be no impediment placed in the way of communication across the
intervening Polish territory.
It is difficult to understand the objections raised by the Germans to
the plebiscite which is to be held in certain portions of East
Prussia. According to all information, there is in the Allenstein
district a considerable Polish majority. The German note states, on
the other hand, that it is not inhabited by an incontestably Polish
population and suggests that the Poles will not wish to be separated
from Germany. It is precisely because there may be some doubt as to
the political leanings of the inhabitants that the Allied and
Associated Powers have determined to hold a plebiscite here. Where
the affinities of the population are undoubted, there is no
necessity for a plebiscite; where they are in doubt, there a
plebiscite is enjoined. It is noted with surprise that the Germans
at the very moment when they profess assent to the principle of
self-determination, refuse to accept the most obvious means of
applying it.
Section X. Memel
The Allied and Associated Powers reject the suggestion that the
cession of the district of Memel conflicts with the principle of
nationality. The district in question has always been Lithuanian;
the majority of the population is Lithuanian in origin and in
speech; and the fact that the city of Memel itself is in large part
German is no justification for maintaining the district under German
sovereignty, particularly in view of the fact that the port of Memel
is the only sea outlet for Lithuania.
[Page 950]
It has been decided that Memel and the adjoining district shall be
transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers for the reason that
the status of the Lithuanian territories is not yet established.
Section XI. Danzig
The German note declares that the German Government “must reject the
proposed rape of Danzig and must insist that Danzig and its environs
be left to the German Empire”. The use of this language seems to
show some want of appreciation of the true situation. The proposed
settlement for Danzig has been drawn up with the most scrupulous
care and will preserve the character which Danzig held during many
centuries and, indeed, until forcibly and contrary to the will of
the inhabitants it was annexed to the Prussian State. The population
of Danzig is and has for long been predominantly German; just for
this reason, it is not proposed to incorporate it in Poland. But
Danzig, when a Hansa city, like many other Hansa cities, lay outside
the political frontiers of Germany, and in union with Poland enjoyed
a large measure of local independence and great commercial
prosperity. It will now be replaced in a position similar to that
which it held for so many centuries. The economic interests of
Danzig and Poland are identical. For Danzig as the great port of the
valley of the Vistula, the most intimate connection with Poland is
essential. The annexation of West Prussia, including Danzig, to
Germany, deprived Poland of that direct access to the sea which was
hers by right. The Allied and Associated Powers propose that this
direct access shall be restored. It is not enough that Poland should
be allowed the use of German ports; the coast, short as it is, which
is Polish must be restored to her. Poland claims, and justly claims,
that the control and development of the port which is her sole
opening to the sea shall be in her hands and that the communications
between it and Poland shall not be subjected to any foreign control,
so that in this, one of the most important aspects of national life,
Poland should be put on an equality with the other States of
Europe.
Section XII. Schleswig
Schleswig was taken from Denmark by Prussia in 1864 but by the Treaty
of Prague in 186614 Prussia undertook
that the northern districts should be ceded to Denmark if by a free
vote the population expressed a wish to be united to Denmark. In
spite of repeated demands on the part of the inhabitants, no
measures have ever been taken by Prussia or the German Empire to
carry out this promise, and the Government of Denmark and the people
of Schleswig have now asked [Page 951] the Peace Conference to secure for them a plebiscite. This the
present Treaty now guarantees. At the request of the Danish
Government provisions have been drawn up for the evacuation of the
territory as far as the Rider and the Schlei by the German troops
and the higher Prussian officials, and for the temporary
administration of the territory and the holding of the plebiscite by
an impartial International Commission, on which Norway and Sweden
will be represented as well as the Allied and Associated Powers. In
consequence of a request made by the Danish Government it has been
decided to alter the limits of the territory within which the
plebiscite will be held in accordance with their wishes. On the
basis of the plebiscite which will be held there, the international
commission will propose a precise delimitation of the frontier
between Germany and Denmark, a delimitation in which geographic and
economic conditions will be taken into account.
Section XIII. Heligoland
As regards Heligoland, while accepting the dismantling of the
fortifications the German Delegates observe that—
“The measures which are necessary for the protection of the
coast and of the harbour must continue in force, in the
interests of the inhabitants of the island as well as of
peaceful navigation and the fishing industry”.
A Commission will be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, after the signature of the Treaty, to supervise the
destruction of the fortifications. This Commission will decide what
portion of the works protecting the coast from sea erosion can be
allowed to remain and what portion must be destroyed as a precaution
against the refortification of the island.
The only harbours it is proposed to destroy are the naval harbours
within the positions given in Article 115; the fishing harbour is
not within this area, and the naval harbours are not used by fishing
vessels. The Article must accordingly be accepted
unconditionally.
Section XIV. Russia
The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that none of the
reservations or the observations offered by the German Delegation as
to Russia necessitate any change in the relevant articles of the
Treaty.
part iv. german rights and
interests outside germany
I
In requiring Germany to renounce all her rights and claims to her
overseas possessions, the Allied and Associated Powers placed before
every other consideration the interests of the native populations
advocated [Page 952] by President
Wilson in the fifth point of his Fourteen Points mentioned in his
Address of the 8th January, 1918. Reference to the evidence from
German sources previous to the war of an official as well as of a
private character, and to the formal charges made in the Reichstag,
especially by MM. Erzberger and Noske, will suffice to throw full
light upon the German colonial administration, upon the cruel
methods of repression, the arbitrary requisition, and the various
forms of forced labour which resulted in the depopulation of vast
expanses of territory in German East Africa and the Cameroons, not
to mention the tragic fate of the Hereros in South West Africa,
which is well known to all.
Germany’s dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilisation has been
revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers
consenting to make a second experiment and of their assuming the
responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of
natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them.
Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers felt themselves compelled
to safeguard their own security and the Peace of the world against a
military imperialism, which sought to establish bases whence it
could pursue a policy of interference and intimidation against the
other Powers.
II
The Allied and Associated Powers considered that the loss of her
Colonies would not hinder Germany’s normal economic development.
The trade of the German Colonies has never represented more than a
very small fraction of Germany’s total trade; in 1913 one-half of
one per cent of her imports and one-half of one per cent of her
exports. Of the total volume imported by Germany of such products as
cotton, cocoa, rubber, palm kernels, tobacco, jute and copra, only 3
per cent came from her Colonies. It is obvious that the financial,
commercial and industrial rehabilitation of Germany must depend on
other factors.
For climatic reasons and other natural causes the German Colonies are
incapable of accommodating more than a very small proportion of the
excess German emigration. The small number of colonists resident
there before the war is conclusive evidence in this respect.
III
The Allied and Associated Powers have drawn up, in the matter of the
cession of the German Colonies, the following methods of procedure,
which are in conformity with the rules of International Law and
Equity:
- (a)
- The Allied and Associated Powers are applying to the
German [Page 953] Colonies
the general principle in accordance with which the transfer
of sovereignty involves the transfer under the same
conditions to the State to which the surrender is made of
the immovable and movable property of the ceding
State.
- They see no reason for consenting in the case of the
Colonies to any departure from that principle which may have
been admitted as an exceptional measure in the case of
territory in Europe.
- (b)
- They are of opinion that the Colonies should not bear any
portion of the German debt, nor remain under any obligation
to refund to Germany the expenses incurred by the Imperial
administration of the Protectorate. In fact, they consider
that it would be unjust to burden the natives with
expenditure which appears to have been incurred in Germany’s
own interest, and that it would be no less unjust to make
this responsibility rest upon the Mandatory Powers, which,
in so far as they may be appointed Trustees by the League of
Nations, will derive no benefit from such
Trusteeship.
IV
The Allied and Associated Powers considered that it would be
necessary in the interest of the natives, as well as in that of
general peace, to restrict the influence which Germany might seek to
exert over her former Colonies and over the territories of the
Allied and Associated Powers.
- (a)
- They are obliged for the reasons of security already mentioned
to reserve to themselves full liberty of action in determining
the conditions on which Germans will be allowed to establish
themselves in the territories of the former German Colonies.
Moreover, the control to be exercised by the League of Nations
will provide all the necessary guarantees.
- (b)
- They require Germany to subscribe to the Conventions which
they may conclude for the control of the traffic in Arms and
Spirits and for the modification of the General Acts of
Berlin15 and
Brussels.16 They do not think that Germany has any ground to
consider herself humiliated or injured because she is required
to give her consent in advance to medsures accepted by all the
great commercial Powers in regard to questions of such great
importance to the welfare of the native populations and to the
maintenance of civilisation and peace.
V
The Allied and Associated Powers consider that all the possessions
and property of the German State in the territory of Kiaochow must
[Page 954] be treated on the same
footing as State property in all the other German overseas
possessions, and be transferred without compensation. In this
connection they recall the fact that Kiaochow, which was unjustly
torn from China, has been used by Germany as a military base in
pursuance of a policy which in its various manifestations has
constituted a perpetual menace to the peace of the Far East. In
these circumstances they see no reason why Germany should be
compensated for the loss of works and establishments and in general
for public property which in the hands of this Power have for the
most part been used merely as a means of carrying out its policy of
aggression.
In so far as concerns the railway and the mines that go with it,
referred to in Article 156, para. 2, the Allied and Associated
Powers hold that these should be considered as public property. They
would, however, be prepared, in the event of Germany adducing proof
to the contrary, to apply to such private rights as German nationals
may be able to establish in the matter, the general principles laid
down in the Conditions of Peace in respect of compensation of this
character.
VI
The Allied and Associated Powers are anxious that no misunderstanding
should exist with regard to the disposition of the property of
German missions in territory belonging to them or of which the
government is entrusted to them in accordance with the Treaty. They
have, therefore, explicitly stated that the property of these
missions will be handed over to boards of trustees appointed by or
approved by the Governments and composed of persons holding the
faith of the mission whose property is involved.
part v. military, naval and air
clauses
Section I. Military Clauses
I
The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their
requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with
the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her
policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards
that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek
to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and
which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to
promote.
[Page 955]
II
They must point out, however, that the colossal growth in armaments
of the last few decades was forced upon the nations of Europe by
Germany. As Germany increased her power, her neighbours had to
follow suit unless they were to become impotent to resist German
dictation or the German sword. It is therefore right, as it is
necessary, that the process of limitation of armaments should begin
with the nation which has been responsible for their expansion. It
is not until the aggressor has led the way that the attacked can
safely afford to follow suit.
III
The Allied and Associated Powers cannot agree to any alteration in
principle of the conditions laid down in Articles 159–180, 203–208
and 211–213 of the Treaty.
Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the
Allied and Associated Powers; she must agree to immediate abolition
of universal military service; a definite organisation and scale of
armament must be enforced. It is essential that she should be
subjected to special control as regards the reduction of her armies
and armaments, the dismantling of her fortifications, and the
reduction, conversion or destruction of her military
establishments.
IV
Whilst the Allied and Associated Powers regard the strict maintenance
of these principles as a sacred duty and refuse in any way to depart
from them, they are nevertheless willing in the interests of general
peace and the welfare of the German people to admit the following
modifications of the Military Clauses, Articles 159–180 of the
Treaty:
- (a)
- Germany will be allowed to reduce her Army more gradually
than at present stipulated, i. e. to a maximum of 200,000
men within 3 months; at the end of that 3 months and every
subsequent 3 months a Conference of Military experts of the
Allied and Associated Powers shall fix the strength of the
German Army for the coming three months, the object being to
reduce the German Army to the 100,000 men stipulated in the
Treaty as soon as possible, and in any case by the
expiration of the Law of the Reichswehr, i. e. by 31st March
1920.
- (b)
- The number of formations, officers or persons in the
position of officers, and civilian personnel shall be in the
same ratio to the total effectives laid down in (a) above as that laid down in the
Treaty.
- Similarly, the number of guns, machine guns, trench
mortars, rifles, and the amount of ammunition and equipment
shall bear the same [Page 956] ratio to the total amount allowed in (a) above as that laid down in the Treaty.
- (c)
- No deviation from the organisation in Armament laid down
in the present Treaty can be permitted until Germany is
admitted to the League of Nations, which may then agree to
such modifications as seem desirable.
- (d)
- All the remaining German war material shall be handed over
in the period fixed by the Treaty.
The periods laid down in the Treaty for the demolition of
fortifications will be modified as follows:—
“All fortified works, fortresses and land forts situated in
German territory west of a line traced 50 kilometres east of
the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.
“Those fortresses which are situated in territory not
occupied by the Allied Armies shall be disarmed in a period
of 2 months, and dismantled in a period of 6 months.
“Those which are situated in territory occupied by the Allied
Armies shall be disarmed and dismantled within the time
limits which shall be fixed by the Allied High Command: the
necessary labour being furnished by the German
Government.”
V
With the amendments and modifications enumerated in paragraph IV
above, the Military Clauses (Articles 159–180) and those affecting
the carrying out of the terms therein laid down (Articles 203–208
and 211–213) are to be maintained.
Section II. Naval Clauses
The conditions and proposals of the German Delegates relative to the
Naval Clauses cannot be entertained. All these Articles have been
carefully framed and must be accepted unconditionally. They are
based on the desire for a general limitation of the armaments of all
nations and at the same time leave to Germany the requisite naval
force for self-protection and police duties.
No negotiations are necessary with regard to this portion of the
Treaty, prior to its signature. All details can be settled by the
Naval Commission to be appointed subsequently in accordance with
Section IV of Part V.
There are no financial measures contemplated by the Allied and
Associated Powers in connection with the surrender of any of the
warships mentioned in the draft Treaty; they are required to be
handed over unconditionally.
[Page 957]
part vi. prisoners of war
The Allied and Associated Powers have nothing to add to their note of
May 20, 1919 on this subject.17
part vii
I. The Responsibility of Germany for
the War
The German Delegation have submitted a lengthy Memorandum in regard
to the responsibility of Germany for the initiation of the war.18 The burden of the
argument in this document is that at the very last moment of the
crisis the German Government endeavoured to induce moderation on the
part of an ally to whom she had previously given complete liberty of
action, and that it was the mobilisation of the Russian army which
finally made inevitable the outbreak of the general war.
The Allied and Associated Powers, however, wish to make it clear that
their view as to the responsibility for the war is not based merely
upon an analysis of the events which took place in the last critical
hours of the crisis which preceded the actual outbreak of
hostilities. They note that the German memorandum is largely
occupied with the discussion of one aspect of the European situation
in the years preceding the outbreak of the war. The observations
contained in it and the documents quoted will no doubt afford
valuable material for the historian of the future but they cannot
see that any new facts are brought to light or that any new
interpretation is given of facts already known which would in the
least modify the conclusions already arrived at. They are the more
inclined to take this view as they observe that there are
considerable discrepancies between the three versions of this
document which they have received. There is nothing in it which
shakes their conviction that the immediate cause of the war was the
decision, deliberately taken by those responsible for German policy
in Berlin and their confederates in Vienna and Budapest, to impose a
solution of a European question upon the nations of Europe by threat
of war and, if the other members of the concert refused this
dictation, by war itself instantly declared.
The German memorandum indeed admits without reserve the accuracy of
this view. The Serbian question was not, and never could have been,
purely an Austro-Hungarian question. It affected Germany. It
affected all the Great Powers. It was essentially a European
question, for it involved the control of the Balkans, and therefore
concerned the peace, not only of the Balkans, but of the whole of
Europe. [Page 958] It was impossible
to isolate it and the authors of the ultimatum of July 23 knew that
it could not be isolated.
If, therefore, the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments had
desired a pacific settlement, they would have consulted with the
other Powers whose interests were vitally affected, and only taken
action after making the utmost endeavour to arrive at an agreed
solution. Yet the Memorandum of the German Delegation explicitly
admits that the German Government authorised its ally to endeavour
to solve the Austro-Serbian question on its own initiative and by
war. “On the strength”, it says, “of statements received from the
Cabinet in Vienna, the German Government considered an Austrian
military expedition against Serbia essential for the preservation of
peace. The German Government considered itself obliged to take the
risk of Russian intervention with the resultant casus foederis. She gave her ally Austria a completely
free hand as to the nature of the demands to be made by her on
Serbia. When the ultimatum was followed by an answer which appeared
to Germany herself sufficient to justify the abandonment of the
expedition after all, she indicated this view to Vienna”.
The later action of the German Government was perfectly consistent
with this initial policy. It supported the rejection, without
consideration, of the extraordinary concessions made by Serbia in
response to the insolent and intolerable demands of the
Austro-Hungarian Government. It supported the mobilisation of the
Austro-Hungarian army and the initiation of hostilities, and
steadily rejected every proposal for conference, conciliation or
mediation, though it knew that once mobilisation and military action
were undertaken by any of the Great Powers it inevitably compelled a
response from all the rest and so hourly reduced the chances of
pacific settlement. Only at the eleventh hour, when all chance of
avoiding war had practically vanished, did the German Government
counsel moderation on her ally. Even on this single point in
Germany’s favour, the Memorandum of the German Delegates is forced
to admit a doubt. “The reason”, it says, “for the delay in the reply
of the Cabinet at Vienna to this proposal is not known to us”, and
then they go on to say in words which are underlined, “This is one
of the most vital points which still require elucidation”. May it
not be that, as was not uncommon with the German Foreign Office,
unofficial communications or a previous understanding between those
who had the real power, differed somewhat from the messages which
travelled over the official wires.
The German Government would now throw the blame for the failure of
the attempts to procure peace on the mobilisation of the Russian
army. They ignore that this was the immediate and necessary
consequence of the mobilisation of the Austrian army, and the
declaration [Page 959] of war on
Serbia, both authorised by Germany. These were the fatal acts by
which the decision was taken out of the hands of the statesmen and
control transferred to the military. It is on the German statesmen
that equally rests the responsibility for the hasty declaration of
war on Russia, when Austria herself was apparently hesitating, and
for the declaration of war on France. So great was the haste of the
German Government that when no plausible reason could be found,
allegations were invented, the complete falsity of which has long
ago been demonstrated. The German Delegation now admits that the
German Government “did not take the trouble to verify” the reported
facts which they published as justifying their declaration of
war.
After reading what the German Delegation has to say in self-defence,
the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the series of
events which caused the outbreak of the war was deliberately plotted
and executed by those who wielded the supreme power in Vienna,
Budapest, and Berlin.
The history of the critical days of July 1914, however, is not the
sole ground upon which the Allied and Associated Powers consider
that the responsibility of Germany for the war must be tried. The
outbreak of the war was no sudden decision taken in a difficult
crisis. It was the logical outcome of the policy which had been
pursued for decades by Germany under the inspiration of the Prussian
system.
The whole history of Prussia has been one of domination, aggression
and war. Hypnotised by the success with which Bismarck, following
the tradition of Frederick the Great, robbed the neighbours of
Prussia and forged the unity of Germany through blood and iron, the
German people after 1871 submitted practically without reserve to
the inspiration and the leadership of their Prussian rulers.
The Prussian spirit was not content that Germany should occupy a
great and influential place in a Council of equal nations to which
she was entitled, and which she had secured. It could be satisfied
with nothing less than supreme and autocratic power. At a time,
therefore, when the western nations were seriously endeavouring to
limit armaments, to substitute friendship for rivalry in
international affairs, and to lay the foundation of a new era in
which all nations should cooperate in amity in the conduct of the
world’s affairs, the rulers of Germany were restlessly sowing
suspicion and hostility among all her neighbours, were conspiring
with every element of unrest in every land, and were steadily
increasing Germany’s armaments and consolidating her military and
naval power. They mobilised all the resources at their command, the
universities, the press, the pulpit, the whole machinery of
governmental authority to indoctrinate their gospel of hatred and
force, so that when the time came the German people might [Page 960] respond to their call. As
a result in the later years of the 19th century, and during the 20th
century, the whole policy of Germany was bent towards securing for
herself a position from which she could dominate and dictate.
It is said that Germany developed her armaments in order to save
herself from Russian aggression. Yet it is significant that no
sooner was Russia defeated by Japan in the Far East and almost
paralysed by the subsequent internal revolution than the German
Government immediately redoubled its attempts to increase its
armaments and to domineer over its neighbours under the threat of
war. To them the collapse of Russia was not an occasion to try to
reduce armaments and bring peace to the world in concert with the
Western Powers. It was the opportunity to extend their own power.
Further the whole point of German organisation was aggressive. Their
scheme of railways, both east and west, their order of mobilisation,
their long concocted plan to turn the flank of France by invading
Belgium, the elaborate preparation and equipment, both within and
beyond her borders, as revealed on the outbreak of the war,—all had
aggression and not defence in view. The military doctrine that
Germany could only be defended by springing first upon her
neighbours was the excuse for demanding a military organisation and
a strategic plan which, when the time came, would enable them to
smash all resistance to the ground and leave Germany the undisputed
master both in the East and the West.
It is not the purpose of this Memorandum to traverse the diplomatic
history of the years preceding the war, or to show how it was that
the peace-loving nations of Western Europe were gradually driven,
under a series of crises provoked from Berlin, to come together in
self-defence. Autocratic Germany, under the inspiration of her
rulers, was bent on domination. The nations of Europe were
determined to preserve their liberty. It was the fear of the rulers
of Germany lest their plans for universal domination should be
brought to naught by the rising tide of democracy, that drove them
to endeavour to overcome all resistance at one stroke by plunging
Europe in universal war. The view of the Allied and Associated
Powers could not indeed be better expressed than in the words of the
German Memorandum itself: “The real mistakes of German policy lay
much further back. The German Chancellor who was in office in 1914
had taken over a political inheritance which either condemned as
hopeless from the start his unreservedly honest attempt to relieve
the tension of the internal situation, or else demanded therefor a
degree of statesmanship, and above all a strength of decision, which
on the one hand he did not sufficiently possess, and on the other,
he could not make effective in the then existing conditions of
German policy.”
[Page 961]
In the view, therefore, of the Allied and Associated Powers Germany’s
responsibility is far wider and far more terrible than that to which
the Memorandum of the German Delegation would seek to confine it.
Germany, under the inspiration of Prussia, has been the champion of
force and violence, deception, intrigue and cruelty in the conduct
of international affairs. Germany for decades has steadily pursued a
policy of inspiring jealousies and hatred and of dividing nation
from nation in order that she might gratify her own selfish passion
for power. Germany has stood athwart the whole current of democratic
progress and international friendships throughout the world. Germany
has been the principal mainstay of autocracy in Europe. And in the
end, seeing that she could attain her objects in no other way, she
planned and started the war which caused the massacre and mutilation
of millions and the ravaging of Europe from end to end.
The truth of the charges thus brought against them the German people
have admitted by their own revolution. They have overturned their
Government because they have discovered that it is the enemy of
freedom, justice and equality at home. That same Government was no
less the enemy of freedom, justice and equality abroad. It is
useless to attempt to prove that it was less violent and arrogant
and tyrannical in its foreign than it was in its internal policy, or
that the responsibility for the terrible events of the last five
years does not lie at its doors.
II. Penalties
The Allied and Associated Powers have given consideration to the
observations of the German Delegation in regard to the trial of
those chargeable with grave offences against international morality,
the sanctity of treaties and the most essential rules of justice.
They must repeat what they have said in the letter covering this
Memorandum, that they regard this war as a crime deliberately
plotted against the life and liberties of the peoples of Europe. It
is a war which has brought death and mutilation to millions and has
left all Europe in terrible suffering. Starvation, unemployment,
disease stalk across that continent from end to end, and for decades
its peoples will groan under the burdens and disorganisation the war
has caused. They therefore regard the punishment of those
responsible for bringing these calamities on the human race as
essential on the score of justice.
They think it not less necessary as a deterrent to others who, at
some later date, may be tempted to follow their example. The present
Treaty is intended to mark a departure from the traditions and
practices of earlier settlements which have been singularly
inadequate in preventing the renewal of war. The Allied and
Associated Powers [Page 962] indeed
consider that the trial and punishment of those proved most
responsible for the crimes and inhuman acts committed in connection
with a war of aggression, is inseparable from the establishment of
that reign of law among nations which it was the agreed object of
the peace to set up.
As regards the German contention that a trial of the accused by
tribunals appointed by the Allied and Associated Powers would be a
one-sided and inequitable proceeding, the Allied and Associated
Powers consider that it is impossible to entrust in any way the
trial of those directly responsible for offences against humanity
and international right to their accomplices in their crimes. Almost
the whole world has banded itself together in order to bring to
naught the German plan of conquest and dominion. The tribunals they
will establish will therefore represent the deliberate judgment of
the greater part of the civilised world. They cannot entertain the
proposal to admit to the tribunal the representatives of countries
which have taken no part in the war. The Allied and Associated
Powers are prepared to stand by the verdict of history as to the
impartiality and justice with which the accused will be tried.
Finally, they wish to make it clear that the public arraignment under
Article 227 framed against the German ex-Emperor has not a juridical
character as regards its substance but only in its form. The
ex-Emperor is arraigned as a matter of high international policy, as
the minimum of what is demanded for a supreme offence against
international morality, the sanctity of treaties and the essential
rules of justice. The Allied and Associated Powers have desired that
judicial forms, a judicial procedure and a regularly constituted
tribunal should be set up in order to assure to the accused full
rights and liberties in regard to his defence, and in order that the
judgment should be of the most solemn judicial character.
The Allied and Associated Powers add that they are prepared to submit
a final list of those who must be handed over to justice within one
month of the coming into force of the Treaty.
part viii. reparation
The Allied and Associated Powers, consistently with their policy
already expressed, decline to enter into a discussion of the
principles underlying the Reparation Clauses of the Conditions of
Peace, which have been prepared with scrupulous regard for the
correspondence leading up to the Armistice of November 11th, 1918,
the final memorandum of which, dated 5th November, 1918, contains
the following words:
“Further, in the conditions of Peace laid down in his address
to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, the President declared
that the [Page 963] invaded
territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed,
and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be
allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it
they understand that compensation will be made by Germany
for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies
and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by
sea, and from the air.”
To the extent that the German reply deals with practical phases of
the execution of the principles enunciated in the Conditions of
Peace, it appears to proceed on the basis of a complete
misapprehension, which is the more difficult to understand as the
inferences drawn and the statements made are wholly at variance with
both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty Clauses. For purposes
of clarification, however, and in order that there may be no
possible ground for misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated
Powers submit the following observations:
The vast extent and manifold character of the damage caused to the
Allied and Associated Powers in consequence of the war has created a
reparation problem of extraordinary magnitude and complexity, only
to be solved by a continuing body, limited in personnel and invested
with broad powers to deal with the problem in relation to the
general economic situation.
The Allied and Associated Powers, recognising this situation,
themselves delegate power and authority to a Reparation Commission.
This Reparation Commission is, however, instructed by the Treaty
itself so to exercise and interpret its powers as to ensure, in the
interest of all, an early and complete discharge by Germany of her
reparation obligations. It is also instructed to take into account
the true maintenance of the social, economic and financial structure
of a Germany earnestly striving to exercise her full power to repair
the loss and damage she has caused.
The provisions of Article 241, by which the German Government is to
invest itself with such powers as may be needed to carry out its
obligations, are not to be misconstrued as giving the Commission
powers to dictate the domestic legislation of Germany. Nor does
paragraph 12 (b) of Annex II give the
Commission powers to prescribe or enforce taxes or to dictate the
character of the German budget.
It is only to examine the latter for two specified purposes.
This is necessary in order that it may intelligently and
constructively exercise the discretion accorded to it in Germany’s
interest, particularly by Article 234, with regard to extending the
date and modifying the form of payments. The provisions of Article
240 with regard to the supply of information are similar in
character and purpose, and there should be little occasion for the
exercise of these powers when once the amount of the liability of
Germany is fixed, [Page 964] if
Germany is in a position to, and does, comply with the schedule of
payments which then will have been notified to her and with the
specific provisions of the several Annexes relative to reparation in
kind. It is further to be observed that the power of modification
accorded by the said Article 236 [234] is
expressly designed to permit of a modification in Germany’s interest
of a schedule of payments which events may demonstrate to be beyond
Germany’s reasonable capacity.
The Allied and Associated Powers vigorously reject the suggestion
that the Commission, in exercising the power conferred by Article
240 and by paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Annex IV, might require the
divulgence of trade secrets and similar confidential data.
In short the observations of the German Delegation present a view of
this Commission so distorted and so inexact that it is difficult to
believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully
examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for
interfering with German sovereignty. It has no forces at its
command; it has no executive powers within the territory of Germany;
it cannot, as is suggested, direct or control the educational or
other systems of the country. Its business is to fix what is to be
paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to report to the
Powers, whose Delegation it is, in case Germany makes default. If
Germany raises the money required in her own way, the Commission
cannot order that it shall be raised in some other way; if Germany
offers payment in kind, the Commission may accept such payment, but,
except as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot
require such a payment.
The German Observations appear to miss the point that the Commission
is directed to study the German system of taxation for the
protection of the German people no less than for the protection of
their own. Such study is not inquisitorial, for the German system of
taxation is not an object of curiosity to other Powers, nor is a
knowledge of it an end in itself; but if any plea of inability which
the German Government may advance is to be properly considered, such
a study is necessary.
The Commission must test whether a sincere application is being given
to the principle, accepted in the Observations, “that the German
taxation system should impose in general on the taxpayer at least as
great a burden as that prevailing in the most heavily burdened of
the States represented on the Reparation Commission”. If the German
resources are to be properly weighed, the first subject of inquiry
will be the German fiscal burden.
It is understood that the action necessary to give effect to the
provisions of Annex IV, relative to reparation in kind, will be
taken by Germany on its own initiative, after receipt of
notification from the Reparation Commission.
[Page 965]
The provisions of the Treaty are in no wise incompatible with the
creation by Germany of a Commission which will represent Germany in
dealings with the Reparation Commission and which will constitute an
instrumentality for such co-operation as may be necessary. The
Treaty specifically and repeatedly provides opportunities for the
German Government to present facts and arguments with respect to
claims and modes of payment, within the limits of the principles and
express provisions of the Treaty. This may be done through a
commission and no reason is perceived why such a commission could
not work in harmony with the Reparation Commission. Certainly this
is greatly to be desired. The Allied and Associated Powers are
therefore ready to agree to such a procedure as the following:
Immediately after the Treaty is signed, Germany may present, and the
Allied and Associated Powers will receive and examine, such
evidence, estimates and arguments as she may think fit to present.
Such documents need not be final but may be presented to the
Commission subject to corrections and additions.
At any time within four months of the signature of the Treaty,
Germany shall be at liberty to submit, and the Allied and Associated
Powers will receive and consider, such proposals as Germany may
choose to make. In particular, proposals will be received on the
following subjects and for the following purposes. Germany may offer
a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability, as defined in
Article 232, or in settlement of her liability under any of the
particular categories which have been decided upon and laid down.
Germany may offer, either to carry out by her own means the
restoration, and reconstruction, whether in part or in its entirety,
of one of the devastated areas, or to repair under the same
conditions certain classes [of] damage in particular regions or in
all the regions which have suffered from the war. Germany may offer
labour, materials or technical service for use in such work, even
though she does not execute the work herself. She may suggest any
practicable plan, category by category or for the reparations as a
whole, which will tend to shorten the period of enquiry and to bring
about a prompt and effectual conclusion.
Without making further specifications, it may be said in a word that
Germany is at liberty to make any suggestion or offer of a practical
and reasonable character for the purposes of simplifying the
assessment of the damage, eliminating any question or questions from
the scope of the detailed enquiry, promoting the performance of the
work and accelerating the definition of the ultimate amount to be
paid.
The necessary facilities for making reliable estimates of the offers
to be presented by her will be afforded to Germany at reasonable
times. Three conditions only are imposed upon the tender of these
proposals. [Page 966] Firstly, the
German authorities will be expected before making such proposals to
confer with the representatives of the Powers directly concerned.
Secondly, such offers must be unambiguous, and must be precise and
clear. Thirdly, they must accept the categories and the reparation
clauses as matters settled beyond discussion. The Allied and
Associated Powers will not entertain arguments or appeals directed
to any alteration.
Within two months thereafter, the Allied and Associated Powers will,
so far as may be possible, return their answer to any proposals that
may be made. It is impossible to declare in advance that they will
be accepted, and, if accepted, they may be subjected to conditions
which can be discussed and arranged. The Allied and Associated
Powers, however, declare that such proposals will be seriously and
fairly considered; no one could be better pleased than they if, in
the result, a fair, a speedy and a practical settlement were arrived
at. The questions are bare questions of fact, namely, the amount of
the liabilities, and they are susceptible of being treated in this
way. Beyond this, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot be asked
to go.
Even if no settlement were arrived at, it must be evident that the
early production of the German evidence would greatly abbreviate the
enquiry and accelerate the decisions. The German authorities have
had long occupation of a large part of the damaged areas and have
been over the ground, forwards and backwards, within the last twelve
or fifteen months. The Allied and Associated Powers have as yet had
no access to this mass of material.
It is obvious that, if the class of damages done in the devastated
areas can be dealt with in this fashion, the liability under the
other categories can be quickly established, for it depends on
statistics and particulars of a far simpler character. By giving a
satisfactory covenant themselves to execute the work of rebuilding,
the Germans could at once dispose of the only difficult or long
subject of inquiry.
The Allied and Associated Powers have to remark that in the
Observations submitted the German Delegation has made no definite
offer at all but only vague expressions of willingness to do
something undefined. A sum of 100,000,000,000 marks (gold) is indeed
mentioned, and this is calculated to give the impression of an
extensive offer, which upon examination it proves not to be. No
interest is to be paid at all. It is evident that till 1927 there is
no substantial payment but only the surrender of military material
and the devolution upon other Powers of large portions of Germany’s
own debt. Thereafter a series of undefined instalments is to be
agreed, which are not to be completed for nearly half a century. The
present value of this distant prospect is small, but it is all that
Germany tenders to the victims of her aggression in satisfaction for
their past sufferings and their permanent burdens.
[Page 967]
The Allied and Associated Powers will, however, make a declaration on
another point, as follows: The resumption of German industry
involves access by the German people to food supplies and by the
German manufacturers to the necessary raw materials and provision
for their transport to Germany from overseas. The resumption of
German industry is an interest of the Allied and Associated Powers
as well as an interest of Germany. They are fully alive to this fact
and therefore declare that they will not withhold from Germany
commercial facilities without which this resumption cannot take
place, but that, subject to conditions and within limits, which
cannot be laid down in advance, and subject also to the necessity
for having due regard to the special economic situation created for
Allied and Associated countries by German aggression and the war,
they are prepared to afford to Germany facilities in these
directions for the common good.
Meanwhile, the draft Treaty must be accepted as definitive and must
be signed. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot any longer delay
to assure their security. Germany cannot afford to deny to her
populations the peace which is offered to them. The Reparation
Commission must be constituted and must commence its task. The only
question open will be how best to execute the provisions of the
Treaty.
The foregoing should suffice to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
conditions under which Germany is to discharge her reparation
obligations, and how utterly unfounded are the criticisms in the
German reply. These are, indeed, explicable only on the theory that
the German plenipotentiaries have read into the Conditions of Peace,
in clear defiance of their express terms, an intention which is not
there, but which it would be not unnatural to see displayed by
victorious nations which have been the victims of cruelty and
devastation on a vast and premeditated scale. The burdens of Germany
undeniably are heavy, but they are imposed under conditions of
justice by peoples whose social well-being and economic prosperity
have been gravely impaired by wrongs which it is beyond the utmost
power of Germany to repair.
part ix. financial
clauses
Before examining each of the articles on which the German Delegation
has presented observations, the Allied and Associated Powers wish to
recall the reply made by M. Clemenceau in their name on May 22,19 to a note
from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau dated May 13,20 and especially
Paragraph XIII of this letter:
“All the nations of Europe have suffered losses, they are
bearing and will still bear for a long time burdens almost
too heavy for them. [Page 968] These burdens and these losses have been imposed on them
by the aggression of Germany. It is just that Germany, the
primary cause of these calamities, should repair them to the
full extent of her power. Her sufferings will be the result,
not of the Peace conditions, but of the acts of those who
provoked and prolonged the war. The authors of the war can
not escape its just consequences.”
Germany must accept burdens and very heavy burdens being laid on her;
financial obligations and guarantees taken by the Allied and
Associated Powers to obtain the payment of their claims.
Germany will be able to meet her financial obligations either by
means of property and resources that she possesses within the
Empire, or by means of property that she possesses abroad.
Within the Empire the Allied and Associated Powers have claimed a
charge only on the property and resources of the Empire and the
German states. Their right in this regard, resulting from the
financial clauses, has been limited as far as possible, and an
effort has been made to avoid giving it any vexatious character.
Finally, all exceptions compatible with the rights of the Allied and
Associated Powers have been granted, and these will permit the
economic interests and credit of Germany to be protected as far as
possible.
Outside the Empire, the Allied and Associated Powers have abstained
from claiming the transfer of German property and resources in
neutral countries; they ask only the cession of property which is
not indispensable to Germany’s existence and which can be given up
without causing any profound disturbance in her internal life.
In a word, in view of the burdens that Germany must assume, the
financial provisions adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers
spare the essential interests of Germany as far as possible.
1. The Allied and Associated Powers again assert their right to
obtain the payment of reparations and other charges resulting from
the Treaty, in priority to the settlement of all other debts of the
Empire or of the German States.
Nevertheless, they consider it proper to provide, in certain special
cases, for the granting of exceptions to the general principle thus
laid down, and they are ready to insert at the beginning of Article
248 the following sentence:
“Subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may
approve a first charge.”
This new stipulation will permit measures to be taken with a view to
protecting Germany’s credit as far as possible.
2. The provision prohibiting the export of gold is a guarantee for
the Allied and Associated Powers; the latter have not, however,
intended to use their right without reserve, and they have provided
that [Page 969] Germany may export
gold after receiving authorisation from the Reparation
Commission.
The latter will therefore have power to grant to the Reichsbank,
whenever it sees fit, “the right of export, when it is a question of
guarantees that this bank has furnished and that it could not
furnish by any other means”.
3. The military occupation constitutes for the Allied and Associated
Powers one of the essential guarantees which they require; there can
therefore be no argument about it.
The cost of maintenance of armies of occupation has always been borne
by the nation subject to the occupation; Germany applied this
principle in 1871 when she imposed on France the cost of the German
armies of occupation (Convention of Ferrières, March 11, 187121).
4. No distinction can be made between the war material lost by the
enemy in the course of military operations and the war material
surrendered in execution of an armistice which terminates these
operations. It is just therefore that the Reparation Commission
shall not credit Germany with the value of material thus
surrendered.
5. The provision inserted in Paragraph 2, of Article 251, grants, in
favour of the food supply of Germany, an exception to the order of
priority established by Paragraph 1 of the same article.
Moreover, it applies solely to the food supply effected through State
organisations, since no charge has been established upon the
property of German nationals.
This clause is established in favour of Germany, and if the Allied
and Associated Powers have reserved a right of control over the
German food supply effected through State organisations, it is
because it appears impossible to consent to so important an
exception to the principle laid down in Article 248, without
reserving control.
6. The partition of the pre-war debt of the German Empire and of the
German States will be made in proportion to the contributory power
of the various ceded territories. The determination of this
contributory power is obviously very delicate, in view of the
diversity of fiscal systems in the different German confederated
states. Therefore it has not been thought desirable to settle this
question at present, and it has been left to the Reparation
Commission to estimate which of Germany’s revenues will make it
possible to compare the resources of the ceded territories and those
of the Empire.
Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot consider the
assigning of a part of Germany’s war debt to the liberated
territories; such a division would in fact make the Powers receiving
these territories support a part of Germany’s war debt, which is
inadmissible.
[Page 970]
7. It cannot be contemplated that Poland should bear either directly
or indirectly the burden of a debt contracted to extend Prussian
influence at the expense of Polish rights and traditions.
8. The German colonies, having deficits, cannot possibly assume a
part of the German debt. It is to be noted moreover that a large
part of the expenses incurred in the German Colonies was military
and unproductive in character.
It would be unjust under these conditions to demand that the State
made a mandatory by the League of Nations should assume a debt that
the colony cannot support.
9. The Allied and Associated Powers have a right, after the events
that have happened since 1914, to demand that Germany be no longer
intimately involved in their financial and economic life, nor in
that of her former Allies, nor in that of Russia.
Moreover, it seems almost certain that Germany, in order to meet the
burden of reparations, will find herself obliged to alienate the
greater part of the foreign securities held by her nationals. The
protection of German holders, whose interests will by this fact be
very much reduced, would no longer justify German participation in
international organisations.
10. The German Delegation has presented in Annex II of these
remarks,22 as well as in a special note of May 29,
1919,23 a certain number
of observations.
The first relate to the transfer of sums deposited in Germany in the
name of the Ottoman Debt, of the Imperial Ottoman Government, or of
the Austro-Hungarian Government.
The details furnished by the German Delegation on certain transfers
effected in Germany necessitate two modifications of drafting, but
the Allied and Associated Powers maintain the principles of the
article in question.
In the first place, the Allied and Associated Powers have not lost
sight of the fact that the obligation assumed by the German
Government toward Turkey has for its counterpart the engagement of
the Turkish Government to reimburse Germany later for the sums
advanced by her. Article 259 must be compared with Article 261. The
latter provides that the German credit shall be transferred to the
Allied and Associated Powers.
In the second place, the Allied and Associated Powers have in their
possession evidence showing under what conditions transfers of gold
and silver were made in November, 1918, to the Turkish Ministry of
Finance.
[Page 971]
In the third place, they are of the opinion that if “no sum in gold
or any pledge has been transferred to the German Government nor to
the banks concerned, for the advances that Austria-Hungary has
received through the medium of German banks”, the provision in
paragraph 5 will be without effect, and consequently it cannot
justify any protest on the part of the German Delegation.
The other observations relate to the renunciation by Germany of the
Treaties of Bucarest24 and Brest-Litovsk.25
The German Delegation claims the annulment of the engagements
incumbent on Germany by reason of these Treaties, as well as of the
advantages stipulated in her favour.
These observations are not well founded.
In fact, Article 292, which the German Financial Delegation seems to
have overlooked, abrogates purely and simply these Treaties, of
which moreover the German Delegation declares (General Remarks, Part
VII) that “there can be no further argument,” since “Germany has
already renounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Peace of
Bucarest was never ratified.”
The Allied and Associated Powers have, moreover, searched in vain in
the Peace of Bucarest for “engagements made by Germany.”
11. The Allied and Associated Powers are of the opinion that the
cession of the rights and interests of German nationals in every
enterprise of public utility and in every concession in Russia and
in the countries formerly allies of Germany is essential for the
purpose of protection and reparation.
The Allied and Associated Powers have been able, moreover, to
appreciate, in the course of the war, what use Germany was capable
of making of the control she possessed over her allies and over
Russia, and they consider that they have the right to withdraw from
Germany all devolution of public authority in these countries.
12. The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to demand from
Germany the transfer of all her credits on Austria, Hungary,
Bulgaria and Turkey.
But Article 243 provides that the amount of these credits shall be
entered to Germany’s account under the category of reparations at
such value as the Reparation Commission shall deem suitable.
13. The obligation to pay in specie cannot be interpreted as an
obligation to pay in actual gold.
On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit that
Germany should pay “in the currency of the country in which the
injury has been committed”.
[Page 972]
The countries which have suffered heavy damage must, to rebuild their
ruins, have recourse to the aid of the Allied and Associated
countries, and will have to incur heavy expenditures abroad; it
would be inadmissible not to leave them the choice of claiming
payment in the currency of which they may stand in need.
Moreover, the bonds to be issued by Germany on account of the sums
due for reparation must have a very wide market, and their interest
must be payable in several currencies.
Finally, whenever it is a question of defining an obligation to pay,
it must be done in a fixed currency.
14. In a note of May 29, 1919, the German Delegation has made certain
observations relative to article 263.
The product of the sale of Sao Paolo Coffee at Trieste having been
deposited in the Bleichröder Bank, the Allied and Associated Powers
cannot accept the suggestion of the German Delegation that these
sums should not be included in Article 263.
At the same time the Allied and Associated Powers recognise that the
words “with interest at 5% from the day of deposit” should be
changed as follows: “with interest at the rate or rates agreed
upon.”
The Allied and Associated Powers are willing, moreover, to omit the
word “compulsory” from Article 263.
The German Government having refused to authorise the withdrawal of
these sums and having agreed to return them “intact” at the end of
the war, the Allied and Associated Powers must insist that the
reimbursement be effected at the rates of exchange existing at the
time that the deposits were made.
part x. economic clauses
I. Commercial Policy
The principles which the Allied and Associated Powers desire to bring
into application when the world returns to normal conditions are
those which President Wilson has enunciated on various occasions in
his speeches and which are embodied in Article 23 (e) of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
But it is clear that the pronouncements of President Wilson relative
to equality of trade conditions must be interpreted as relating to
the permanent settlement of the world, and can only be regarded as
applicable to a condition of things in which the League of Nations
is fully constituted, and the world has returned to normal
conditions of trade. In the meantime the establishment of a purely
transitory regime necessarily differing from that contemplated in a
final settlement is in no way in conflict with such ideas.
During this period “the equitable treatment for the commerce of [Page 973] all members of the League”
requires that Germany should temporarily be deprived of the right
she claims to be treated on a footing of complete equality with
other nations.
The illegal acts of the enemy have placed many of the Allied States
in a position of economic inferiority to Germany, whose territory
has not been ravaged, and whose plant is in a condition enabling
manufactures and trade to be at once resumed after the war. For such
countries, a certain freedom of action during the period of
transition is vitally necessary, but it is also necessary that the
Allied and Associted Powers should in the meantime be safeguarded
from the effects of special preferences or discriminations granted
by Germany to an Allied or Associated country or to any other
country. Hence during the transitory period formal reciprocity is
not practicable; and it is only equitable that the Allied and
Associated Powers should have for such period greater freedom to
regulate their commercial exchanges than is accorded to the authors
of the aggression. If it were otherwise, Germany would reap the
benefit of the criminal acts which she committed in the territories
she occupied with the object of placing her adversaries in a
condition of economic inferiority.
It is, therefore, a consideration for justice which has led the
Allied and Associated Powers to impose on Germany, for a minimum
period of five years, nonreciprocal conditions in the matter of
commercial exchanges. Articles 264 to 267, 323 and 327, drawn up on
this basis, are measures of reparation, the duration of which will
be determined by the League of Nations.
After the necessary period of transition is over, and when a reformed
Germany is admitted to membership of the League of Nations, the
Allied and Associated Powers will be able to co-operate with her in
arriving at a more permanent arrangement for the establishment of an
equitable treatment for the commerce of all nations.
No exception is taken by the German Delegation to the general
principle that during a transition period special arrangements are
necessary for the products of territories detached from Germany. In
the absence of detailed criticism, it must be assumed that no
serious objection is entertained to the provisions on this subject
which are contained in the Treaty of Peace.
The necessity of meeting the special conditions of the period of
transition has similarly inspired the provision ensuring the
application during a period of three years to imports of certain
products from Allied and Associated countries of the most favourable
rates of the German tariff which were in force in 1914. In this
matter certain products, the output of which, in countries bordering
on Germany, was specially adjusted with reference to German needs,
are temporarily assured of their former market.
[Page 974]
In order to enable Germany to establish such customs tariffs as she
may consider necessary, the Allied and Associated Powers have
limited to six months the period for which she is obliged to
maintain generally the most favourable rates of customs duty which
were in force for imports into Germany on the 31st July, 1914. Such
a period is absolutely necessary in order to avoid the economic
disturbance which an immediate change of tariff conditions would
cause.
II. Treaties
The general principles which underlie Section II of Part X of the
Conditions of Peace explain the terms thereof.
The Allied and Associated Powers are certainly of the opinion that
multilateral and bilateral treaties between peoples must exist in
times of peace, so that the principles of international law may be
enforced and normal international relations maintained. They have
therefore aimed at reapplying all multilateral treaties which seemed
to them to be compatible with the new conditions arising out of the
war.
As regards bilateral treaties, they have reserved for each of the
Allied and Associated Powers the right to decide the matter in
conformity with the principles of the Treaty of Peace.
But they could not permit the continuance of all the treaties which
Germany imposed on her allies, on her temporarily defeated
adversaries, and even in certain cases on neutral countries, with a
view to securing particularly favourable conditions and special
advantages of all kinds the maintenance of which is incompatible
with the re-establishment of the spirit of justice.
This principle necessarily involves the rejection of the theory put
forward by Germany in Section VII (Treaties) of the Remarks on the
Conditions of Peace, and obviates the necessity for any negotiations
on the matter. A general indiscriminate reapplication after the
conclusion of Peace of all multilateral and bilateral treaties, even
for a short time, cannot be accepted, and it is only just that the
Allied and Associated Powers should have reserved and should reserve
in the future the right to indicate which of these treaties with
Germany they intend to revive or to allow to be revived.
The above applies to the whole of the German remarks on Section II of
Part X of the Conditions of Peace, but these remarks call for the
following further observations:
1. The German Delegation seem to consider:
- (a)
- That, as a result of errors or omissions, the list of
multilateral treaties embodied in Article 282 is
incomplete.
- (b)
- That the contents and meaning of Nos. 7, 17, 19, 20, and
21 of this Article are doubtful.
- (c)
- Further, that difficulties may arise, as the result of the
individual reserves of States, which may limit the
application of certain revived multilateral treaties.
In reply to this, the Allied and Associated Powers would point out
that:
- (a)
- The German Government may, after the resumption of
diplomatic relations with the Allied and Associated Powers,
notify to them any subjects covered by non-revived
conventions with regard to which they desire new treaties to
be concluded or former agreements to be adapted.
- (b)
- The contents and meaning of the treaties numbered 7, 17,
19, 20 and 21 in Article 282 are not open to any doubt. As
regards No. 19 the list of Sanitary Conventions may be
completed as follows:
“Sanitary Conventions of the 3rd December, 1903,26 and the
preceding ones signed on the 30th January,
1892,27 the 15th April,
1893,28 the 3rd
April, 1894,29 and
the 19th March, 1897.”30
- (c)
- Subject to any provisions to the contrary inserted in the
Conditions of Peace, reserves which may have been made by
the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Peace when they signed
or adhered to the multilateral treaties revived by Section
II of Part X of the Conditions of Peace, retain their value,
such treaties reassuming their operation in the same
conditions as before the war. If the conditions of their
application are modified, a revision will automatically
follow.
2. The German Delegation states that the acceptance by Germany of
Articles 283 and 284 is incompatible with the dignity of an
independent people.
This opinion is based on a misunderstanding of the meaning and terms
of Articles 283 and 284. Germany merely undertakes by Article 283
not to refuse her consent to the conclusion by the new States of the
special arrangements referred to in the Postal and Telegraphic
Unions. It is not stipulated that the text of these arrangements
shall be dictated to her and that she must accept such text without
discussion. This Article merely prevents a systematic refusal to the
conclusion of such arrangements or insistence on requirements which
make their conclusion impossible.
Article 284 leaves to Germany the option of participating in the
drawing-up of the proposed new Radiotelegraphic Convention. There is
nothing to prevent her exercising this option if she so desires.
It is impossible to regard it as an extreme hardship that in matters
of this description affecting the peaceful intercourse of European
[Page 976] nations Germany should
be required to abstain from adopting an attitude which would
obstruct international communications. The Allied and Associated
Powers are, however, prepared to limit Germany’s obligation to be
bound by a new Radiotelegraphic Convention to the case where such a
Convention is concluded within five years.
3. The German objections to Article 289 appear to arise out of a
misunderstanding of its intention. Whilst the Allied and Associated
Powers could not agree to the revival of bilateral treaties or of
any clauses in bilateral treaties which are not in accordance with
the terms of the Peace Treaty itself, they are quite prepared to
give an assurance that this provision will not be arbitrarily used
for the purpose of splitting up bilateral treaties in such a way
that only the obligations should remain on one side and on the other
side only the rights. The Allied and Associated Powers will
themselves, through the League of Nations, exercise a surveillance
to ensure that the provisions of Article 289 are loyally carried
out. With this end in view, the Article is modified to read as
follows:
“Each of the Allied and Associated Powers, being guided by
the general principles or special provisions of the present
Treaty, shall notify to Germany the bilateral treaties or
conventions which such Allied or Associated Power wishes to
revive with Germany.
“The notification referred to in the present Article shall be
made either directly or through the intermediary of another
Power. Receipt thereof shall be acknowledged in writing by
Germany. The date of the revival shall be that of the
notification.
“The Allied and Associated Powers undertake among themselves
not to revive with Germany any conventions or treaties which
are not in accordance with terms of the present Treaty.
“The notification shall mention any provisions of the said
Conventions and Treaties which, not being in accordance with
the terms of the present Treaty, shall not be considered as
revived.
“In case of any difference of opinion, the League of Nations
will be called on to decide.
“A period of six months …”
Bilateral treaties between Germany and states which broke off
diplomatic relations with her but did not declare war are expressly
included in Article 289 on the same basis as treaties with those
states which did declare war. There is no universally recognised
rule of international law on the subject, [so] it is accordingly
open to the Allied and Associated Powers to deal with the matter in
the most convenient manner in the Peace Treaty.
4. The treaties referred to in Articles 290 and 292 are essentially
among those which Germany concluded by taking undue advantage of the
circumstances she herself created, the pressure she exercised, or
her temporary military preponderance. Whatever the consequences to
Germany of their abrogation, it is impossible to maintain them in
[Page 977] force after the
conclusion of a Treaty of Peace based upon the principles of
justice.
The Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit that the abrogation by
Germany of all treaties concluded with her former allies since the
1st August, 1914, and of all treaties concluded before or since that
date with Russia and states or governments whose territories
formerly made part of Russia and with Roumania, which is required by
Articles 290 and 292, must of necessity grievously jeopardise her
relations with these states. This abrogation is rendered necessary
by the vast political changes which have been brought about by the
war and by the fact that all treaties with Russia and states or
governments whose territories formerly made part of Russia and with
Roumania, concluded since the outbreak of war, must necessarily be
regarded as having been imposed by Germany on unwilling states. The
abrogation does not affect Germany’s freedom to enter into fresh
negotiations with these states for the conclusion of new
arrangements suitable to the altered conditions. By this means any
serious jeopardy to the resumption of friendly economic relations
can easily be avoided.
5. Any special negotiation regarding Articles 291 and 294 is
superfluous. The object of these Articles is clear and plain; the
Allied and Associated Powers establish equality as between
themselves and Germany by obtaining ipso
facto the benefit of the treatment accorded by her before
the 1st August, 1914, to her former allies and of the treatment
which for interested motives or for ends inimical to the interests
of the Allied and Associated Powers, she may have granted during the
war to Powers which have remained neutral.
german appendix on special legal
questions31
III. Resumption of Consular
Relations
The German Delegation requests reciprocity in respect of the right
reserved to the Allied and Associated Powers, under Article 279 of
the Peace Treaty, to place consuls in German ports and towns. The
unilateral character of this stipulation of Article 279 results from
the political activities of German Consuls and from the acts
committed by the Germans in the territories of certain Allied and
Associated Powers.
It should be added, however, that there is nothing in the Article to
prevent either the renewal under Article 289 of pre-war Consular
Conventions between individual Allied and Associated Powers and
Germany, or the conclusion of new arrangements between Germany and
such Powers for the admission of German Consular Officers into their
territory.
[Page 978]
IV. Treatment of Private
Property
The question of the treatment of private rights is dealt with in the
German Delegation’s Notes of the 22nd32 and
29th May33 and in the Annex
No. 1 to their Remarks on the Conditions of Peace.34 In addition, the
general objections set out in these documents are reproduced under
different forms in various parts of the Remarks.
i. questions of principle
The objections of principle to the Conditions of Peace put forward by
the German Delegation on this subject may be summed up as follows:
- (a)
- It is not legitimate to use the private property of German
nationals to meet the obligations of Germany.
- (b)
- The settlement of private rights is not made on the
principle of reciprocity.
- (c)
- German property should not be used as a guarantee for the
liabilities of the States allied to Germany.
- (d)
- The liquidations to be made by the Allied and Associated
Powers, in depriving the owner of the free disposition of
his property, are of a confiscatory character.
The answers of the Allied and Associated Powers to these objections
are as follows:
(a) As regards the first objection, they would
call attention to the clear acknowledgment by Germany of a pecuniary
obligation to the Allied and Associated Powers, and to the further
circumstance that the immediate resources of Germany are not
adequate to meet that obligation. It is the clear duty of Germany to
meet the admitted obligation as fully and as promptly as possible
and to that end to make use of all available means. The foreign
investments of German nationals constitute a class of assets which
are readily available. To these investments the Treaty simply
requires Germany to make prompt resort.
It is true that, as a general principle, a country should endeavour
to avoid making use of the property of a part of its nationals to
meet State obligations; but conditions may arise when such a course
becomes necessary. In the present war Allied Powers themselves have
found it necessary to take over foreign investments of their
nationals to meet foreign obligations and have given their own
domestic obligations to the nationals who have been thus called upon
to take a share, by this use of their private property, in meeting
the obligations of the State.
[Page 979]
The time has arrived when Germany must do what she has forced her
opponents to do. The necessity for the adoption of this course by
Germany is clearly understood by the German Peace Delegates, and is
accepted by them in the following passage, quoted textually from
their note of the 22nd May:
“The German Peace Delegation is conscious of the fact that
under the pressure of the burden arising from the Peace
Treaty on the whole future of German economic life, German
property in foreign countries cannot be maintained to its
previous extent. On the contrary, Germany, in order to meet
her pecuniary obligations, will have to sacrifice this
property abroad in wide measure. She is prepared to do
so.”
The fundamental objection mentioned above is completely answered by
the note itself.
(b) The German Delegation maintains in its
note of the 22nd May that there is only the appearance of
reciprocity in regard to the settlement of enemy property, and this
objection is developed in the Annex to the Remarks. The objection,
however, arises from a confusion between two entirely different
matters. As regards exceptional war measures taken in the different
countries in respect of enemy property there is a reciprocal
provision, these exceptional war measures being confirmed on both
sides. Quite a different matter is that of the mode in which enemy
property shall be dealt with thereafter. German property, as is
admitted in the German note, must serve towards meeting Germany’s
obligations to the Allies. The compensation to the German
property-owner must be made by Germany itself. In this respect there
can be no question of reciprocity.
(c) On the question whether German property
should serve as a guarantee for the liabilities of the States allied
with Germany, it is to be observed, on the one hand, that the
actions of Germany and her allies during the war have given rise to
complete solidarity between these Powers from the economic
standpoint. For instance, negotiations undertaken without scruple
between Germany and her allies have resulted in the division between
these countries of the proceeds of the Allied and Associated
property liquidated contrary to all right in the territories
occupied by the German troops. Further, the German authorities have
in several ways treated the Allied and Associated Powers as being
jointly concerned. For instance, they have seized French credit
balances in Belgian banks as a measure of reprisal against acts done
in other Allied States. They have similarly justified the
liquidation of French property in Germany on the ground that similar
measures have been taken against German property in other Allied
countries. Thus, the principle of joint liability to which Germany
now objects has been initiated by herself, and she has created a
situation which does not permit the Allied and Associated Powers in
practice [Page 980] to separate the
obligations of her allies from her own. Nevertheless the Allied and
Associated Powers are prepared to omit from the charge on the
property of German nationals the liability to satisfy the unpaid
debts of nationals of Powers allied with Germany.
(d) The method of using this property laid
down by the Treaty cannot be considered, either in principle or in
the method of its application, as a measure of confiscation. Private
German interests will only be injured by the measures contemplated
so far as Germany may decide that they shall be, since all the
proceeds of German property will be carried to the credit of
Germany, who is required to compensate her own nationals, and will
go to reduce her debt to the Allied and Associated Powers.
V. Debts
While reciprocity cannot be accorded in all respects, the Allied and
Associated Powers have nevertheless applied this principle wherever
it has been possible. Such is the case with regard to the Clearing
Office system provided in the Conditions of Peace. Reciprocity is
complete in so far as regards individuals. The system departs
therefrom only in so far as regards the non-payment to Germany of
balances which may become due by the Allied and Associated Powers,
and this provision is merely the application of the principle of the
retention of enemy property for payment of claims.
1. Provision of Article 296
(e), under which each
of the Allied and Associated Powers, but not Germany, is able to
decide whether the scheme is to be applied between Germany and
any Allied Power or not.
It is not possible to give both the Allied or Associated Powers and
Germany an option whether to adopt the scheme or not, for the result
might be that one Power would decide to adopt it and the other not
to adopt it.
2. Provision of Article 296
(d) that debts shall be
paid in the currency of the Allied or Associated Power concerned
at the pre-war rate of exchange.
Owing to the great depreciation in the value of the mark, some
hardship will necessarily result in the settlement of pre-war debts
whatever basis of settlement may be adopted. The method provided for
is as fair to both sides as could be devised. While under this
scheme an Allied creditor who is owed a sum in marks by a German
debtor will receive an equivalent amount in Allied currency at the
pre-war rate of exchange, a German creditor of an Allied debtor who
owes a sum in marks will also be credited with the amount of Allied
[Page 981] currency calculated at
the pre-war rate of exchange, so that reciprocity is accorded in
this respect.
3. Prohibition of direct
arrangements between debtors and creditors.
It appears that one of the objections to the prohibition of direct
agreements between debtors and creditors is that such prohibition
will prevent modification of the amount of the debts. An essential
part of the scheme is that debts shall be guaranteed by the
Governments concerned and paid in full, and no provision which would
enable debtors and creditors to agree to be satisfied with some
smaller amount than the full claim can be admitted.
Article 296, paras. 3 and
4.
4. The reserve contained in Article 296, paragraphs 3 and 4, provides
for a case in which the payment of interest on Government securities
shall have been suspended or deferred with regard to all the holders
of these Government securities whatever their nationality. The
clearing office system ought not to have the effect of allowing a
former enemy to receive interest when holders who are nationals of
the State by which the loan was issued or neutrals have not been
paid. This provision is reciprocal. Ex-enemy holders of similiar
securities will receive arrears of interest under the same
conditions as other holders.
Article 296 (b).
5. The German Delegation objects to the guarantee of the State for
the debts of its citizens only on the ground that reciprocity is not
given. Full reciprocity is given with regard to this guarantee. The
necessity for retaining any balance in favour of Germany arises, as
explained above, from the fact that the immediate resources of
Germany are not adequate to meet her obligations.
An explanation is desired of the terms “bankruptcy”, “failure”, and
“formal indication of insolvency”. These terms indicate conditions
in which it has been recognised, in accordance with the laws of the
State where a debtor resides, that he is not in a position to meet
his liabilities in full.
Article 296 (c).
6. As explained above, there is nothing inequitable in the provision
with regard to the currency and rate of exchange to be adopted for
payment of debts. It is further suggested in the German Note that
the method of settlement adopted will create a great demand for
bills of exchange in the currency of the Allied and Associated
Powers, and that this will necessarily lead to a further
depreciation of German currency. There is no reason to anticipate
such a result, for the balance due by Germany will in practice be
settled by crediting Germany with the proceeds of German property
liquidated in Allied or Associated States.
[Page 982]
Article 296 (d), last
paragraph.
7. As regards the rate of exchange in the case of new States, due
regard will no doubt be paid by the Reparation Commission, in fixing
the rate of exchange, to the provisions in force in the new States
as to the relations between its currency and the currency previously
existing in its territory.
Article 296 (e).
8. The German Delegation points out that a period of six months is
allowed within which any Allied or Associated State may decide to
adopt the clearing office scheme, and suggests that if it is to be
put into operation a speedy decision should be required. In this
respect satisfaction can be given to the German Delegation, and for
this purpose the period of six months can be reduced to one month
from the date of ratification of the Treaty of Peace by the
interested Power.
Article 296 (f).
9. This Article provides for the possibility of two Allied and
Associated States which have adopted as regards Germany the clearing
office system, agreeing that nationals of one in the territory of
the other shall be treated as nationals of the latter with regard to
the payment of their pre-war debts to Germans and the recovery of
debts owing to them by Germans.
Article 72 (Special Provisions with Regard to Alsace-Lorraine).
In fact and in law economic relations between Alsace-Lorrainers and
Germany have been suspended by the occupation and by the Armistice.
They will only be resumed at a later date.
It is therefore necessary that the debts of which the payment has
been suspended should be regulated by a special clearing office at a
fixed and reciprocal rate of exchange.
The only debts here in question are those between Alsace-Lorrainers
who acquire French nationality on the one hand, and the German
Empire, German States, and their nationals on the other hand.
VI. Property, Rights and
Interests
Articles 297 and 298.
The German Delegation refers in the first place to the observations
in its note of the 22nd May with regard to private property, rights
and interests. The Allied and Associated Powers have examined above
the principles involved in that note.
The Remarks of the German Delegation repeat the objection as to the
right reserved to the Allied and Associated Powers to liquidate
German property after the coming into force of the Treaty; to apply
measures of liquidation in territory detached from Germany; and to
[Page 983] avail themselves at
once of the advantages of the settlement provided for in the
Conditions of Peace.
It is sufficient to refer on this subject to the explanations already
given, pointing out that the use of property in the manner provided
is an essential means for the Allied and Associated States to
recover a part of their claim. It is necessary, therefore, for this
principle to be applied as widely as possible, and there can be no
question of limiting it to property in Allied territory as that
territory existed before the war, or to property which has already
been liquidated during the war.
Nevertheless it appears possible to provide a special regime in this
respect so far as regards the newly created Allied and Associated
Powers and those which are not entitled to reparation in accordance
with the Conditions of Peace.
So far as regards these Powers provision is now made that, without
prejudice to the rights given to the Reparation Commission by the
present Treaty, the proceeds of liquidation shall in certain cases
be paid direct to the owner. If on the application of the owner the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by Section VI, or an Arbitrator
appointed by that Tribunal, is satisfied that the conditions of the
sale or measures taken by the Allied or Associated Government by
which the liquidation has been effected, outside their general laws,
were unfairly prejudicial to the price obtained, they shall have
discretion to award equitable compensation to be paid by the Allied
or Associated Government concerned to the owner.
Certain provisions of Article 297 of the Conditions of Peace are
further made the subject of observations by the German Delegation
with regard to special matters.
1. The Note of the 22nd May refers to paragraph 10 of the Annex to
Section IV relating to the handing over of securities, certificates
and like documents of title with regard to property situated in
Allied and Associated countries. With regard to such delivery the
Allied and Associated Powers have simply adopted a different method
from that which Germany herself has adopted in like matters, but
with no variation of principle. Germany, in case of similar
liquidations of Allied property, gave new securities or certificates
to German or neutral nationals, excluding Allied or Associated
nationals from the companies or associations concerned. The Allies
have considered it preferable for the purpose of liquidating German
interests in Allied enterprises to require from Germany the direct
delivery of the securities and documents of title held by Germans.
This difference in method gives no reasonable ground for
complaint.
Article 297 (f) and (g).
2. The German Delegation asks for an explanation with regard to the
conditions in which nationals of Allied and Associated States who
[Page 984] are owners of property
which has been subjected to a measure of transfer in German
territory can require the restoration of such property. This power
is given to nationals of Allied and Associated States in the
territory of which legislative measures requiring the general
liquidation of enemy property were not in application before the
signature of the Armistice. It does not appear that this provision
can be misunderstood. Legislative measures requiring general
liquidation clearly mean those which, as in Germany, have been
passed by the legislative authority and were applicable to all the
property of nationals of an enemy State.
The restoration in specie has the effect of assisting in the
settlement of the compensation provided for nationals of Allied and
Associated Powers, and limiting the inconveniences falling upon
Germany from the depreciation of the mark.
3. The German Delegation also asks for explanations as to the
disposal of the proceeds of liquidations of German property.
Such disposal is clearly dealt with by Article 297 (h) and paragraph 4 of the Annex to that Article, giving
the Allied and Associated Powers the right to employ the proceeds of
these liquidations as there specified.
Annex, paragraph 1.
4. The proviso at the end of the first part of the paragraph that the
provisions of the paragraph shall not be held to prejudice the
titles to property heretofore acquired in good faith and for value
and in accordance with the laws of the country in which the property
is situate by nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, is
inserted in order to prevent the rights of Allied nationals being
prejudiced by the confirmation of action taken by the Allied and
Associated States. This proviso will not affect the rights of German
nationals.
Annex, paragraph 5.
5. The object of this paragraph is to require the restoration to the
virtual owner of trade-marks outside Germany, which, through
liquidation proceedings taken in Germany, have been transferred to
other persons. It may be pointed out that the operation of the
paragraph is limited to cases in which before the war the company
incorporated in an Allied or Associated State had rights to the use
of the trade marks or methods of reproduction referred to in the
paragraph, and that the German company will be allowed to continue
the use of the trade-marks in Germany and will also be able to
manufacture in Germany.
6. The German claim that the property of German institutions for
research and education shall be wholly exempt from liability to
liquidation cannot be conceded in view of the past activities of
some of the [Page 985] institutions
which nominally exist for the above purposes. Nevertheless, in the
exercise of their rights under Article 297 with regard to any
particular institution, the Allied and Associated Powers will have
full regard to the interests of the advancement of science and
education and of organisations bona fide limited to these
objects.
The following explanations should be added on certain points referred
to in the German Note of the 22nd May:
It is suggested in the German Note that the Allied and Associated
Governments reserve for themselves the right of extending the
process of liquidation to German property which may come within
their territory in the future. In explanation it may be said at once
that paragraph (b) of Article 297 will be
applied only to property as it exists on the coming into force of
the Treaty of Peace.
The German Delegation suggests that there may have been corrupt or
fraudulent machinations by persons in the Allied and Associated
States dealing with the liquidation of German property. The Allied
and Associated States are ready to give full assurance that
proceedings will be taken against persons who have committed
punishable offences in the liquidation of German property, and that
they will welcome any information and evidence which the German
Government can furnish in this respect.
Finally, the German Note states that it appears to be reserved to the
Allied and Associated Governments to reach arbitrary decisions as
regards the amount of the claims of their nationals in respect of
acts committed by the German Government between the 31st July, 1914,
and the date at which the respective Allied or Associated States
entered the war. The Allied and Associated Governments agree that,
so far as such claims are concerned, their amounts may be assessed
by an arbitrator appointed by M. Gustav Ador, or if M. Ador cannot
make the appointment, by an arbitrator appointed by the Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal.
VII. Contracts, Prescriptions and
Judgments
i. contracts
In the provisions of the Treaty the determination of the question of
the maintenance or dissolution of contracts depends on the fact of
trading between the parties being unlawful, because if such trading
was not unlawful the contract could have been completed.
The provisions with regard to contracts do not apply to contracts
between German nationals and the nationals of the United States of
America, of Brazil and of Japan, because the constitution and law of
those countries create difficulties in applying these provisions to
their nationals.
[Page 986]
It is suggested by the German Delegation that the continuance of
contracts between enemies is made dependent on the inclination of
the Allied and Associated States or of their nationals alone, but in
the first place the exception contained in paragraph (b) of Article 299 is limited to cases in
which the execution of a contract is required in the general
interest, and in the second place, the execution can only be
required by the Allied or Associated Government concerned and not by
a national of that State. The same paragraph also provides for
equitable compensation being granted where the maintenance of the
contract would, owing to the alteration of trade conditions, cause
one of the parties substantial prejudice.
It is suggested further that this provision would make German
contractual interests in the future a prey to the arbitrary will of
aliens, but in accordance with the terms of paragraph (b) the execution of a contract thus
maintained must be required within six months from the coming into
force of the Treaty.
The German Delegation suggests that the future treatment of prewar
contracts cannot be solved in one and the same way for all classes
of contracts, and it may be pointed out that certain classes of
contracts, which are specified in paragraph 2 of the Annex, are
excepted by that paragraph from the general rule of dissolution laid
down by Article 299.
Article 299 (d).
It is suggested that some particular favour is shown to inhabitants
of transferred territory who acquire the nationality of an Allied
Power, by excluding contracts between Allied nationals and such
persons from the general rule of dissolution of contracts. The
Treaty, which settles the relations between Allied nationals and
German nationals, has not to settle the question of the relations
between Allied nationals; this question is entirely a domestic
matter.
Annex, paragraph 12.
The rule laid down in this paragraph with regard to the cancellation
of groups of contracts with German life insurance companies is
perfectly equitable, for the German insurance company will get rid
of its liability on the policies by handing over the proportion of
its assets attributable to those policies.
Article 75.
The reasons of an economic character which require the cancellation
of contracts concluded before the war between nationals of enemy
Powers do not apply to contracts concluded during the war between
Alsace-Lorrainers who regain French nationality and Germans. The
maintenance of these contracts is accordingly provided for by the
Treaty. At the same time, reasons of a political character may
require [Page 987] the cancellation
by the French Government in the general interest of certain
contracts which were or may have been imposed on Alsace-Lorraine
manufacturers with a view to subjecting their interests to German
economic interests.
In order to avoid perpetuating the disturbance which cancellations of
this character might introduce into commercial relations, the
exercise of the right of cancellation has been limited to six
months. Nevertheless, the Allied and Associated Powers agree to add
to Article 75 the following provision:
“If the dissolution provided for in the second paragraph of
this Article would cause one of the parties substantial
prejudice, equitable compensation, calculated solely on the
capital employed without taking account of loss of profits,
shall be accorded to the prejudiced party.”
ii. prescriptions
Article 300 (b).
This provision applies to judicial or administrative measures of
execution which may have been taken in consequence of the
non-performance of any act or formality during the war.
Article 300 (d).
This provision applies to cases in which a contract has been
dissolved without resorting to any judicial or similar procedure.
The Allied and Associated Powers agree to the addition of the words
“between enemies” after the word “contract” in the first line of the
paragraph in order to limit definitely the application of the
paragraph to a contract between enemies.
It is suggested by the German Delegation that paragraph (d) is unnecessary, because of the provisions
of paragraph (c); but it should be pointed
out that paragraph (c) only deals with cases
in which rights have been prejudiced by measures referred to in
paragraph (b). Paragraph (d) is accordingly necessary.
iii. judgments
Article 302.
The Treaty provides that in certain cases Allied or Associated Courts
are competent to decide certain disputes, but this power is not
given to the German Courts. Reciprocity is not therefore possible
with regard to the execution of judgments or the application to the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal for compensation.
VIII. Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal
Article 304.
The suggestion that the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal
be extended may be answered as follows. The purpose of the Tribunal
[Page 988] is not only to decide
new rights arising under the Treaty, but also to provide a new forum
to which may be referred certain disputes concerning private rights
already in existence. As to these, the Courts of the Allied and
Associated Powers already have jurisdiction, and some of these
Powers find insuperable difficulties in attempting to deprive their
Courts of it. Under their systems of jurisprudence, and in existing
circumstances, they find no sufficient reason for excluding their
citizens from the access to their own courts which their laws now
afford. No new jurisdiction is conferred upon any such courts, and
German litigants are not prejudiced through the retention by such
courts of the jurisdiction which they now have.
Article 304 (f).
The German proposal to bring into accord the wording of Article 304
(f) and of paragraph 24 of the Annex to
Article 296, Section III may be accepted. For this purpose, the more
precise of the two versions should be selected, viz., “The High
Contracting Parties agree to regard the decisions of the Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal as final and conclusive, and to render them
binding upon their nationals.”
Annex, paragraphs 8 and
9.
Objection is raised by the German Delegation to the provision in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Annex to Article 304 providing that the
language of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and the place and time of
its sessions shall be determined by the Allied or Associated Power
concerned; in order to meet this objection the Allied and Associated
Powers agree that the language of the proceedings shall, unless
otherwise agreed, be English, French, Italian or Japanese as may be
determined by the Allied or Associated Power concerned, and that the
time and place of meeting shall be determined by the President of
the Tribunal.
Article 304 (g).
The Allied and Associated Powers further agree to accept the
suggestion of the German Delegation according to which the tribunals
and authorities of the High Contracting Parties will furnish to the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals direct all the assistance in their power,
particularly by transmitting notices and collecting evidence.
With regard to the German Note of the 29th May34a asking for information
as to the property of German nationals in Allied and Associated
countries, it is not possible to furnish a reliable estimate of the
value of such property, but the German Delegation no doubt has
information in its possession from the returns made to the German
Government.
[Page 989]
IX. Industrial Property
Article 306.
1. The term “ayants droit” in the French text
and “legal representatives” in the English text, used in Article 306
as having an identical meaning, ought to be understood: the first as
denoting the persons who legally represent the beneficiaries whose
rights they have acquired, whether by succession or any other
regular transfer, the second as signifying “heirs, executors and
assigns.”
2. The last paragraph of Article 306 relates only to cases where
German-owned companies and businesses have been, or will be
hereafter, liquidated under Article 297 of Section IV of the Treaty
(Property, Rights, and Interests). The provision, which moreover
corresponds to the measures taken by Germany in respect of property
belonging to nationals of the Allied and Associated States is,
therefore, limited to the businesses or companies which are, or will
be, in existence at the coming into force of the Treaty.
3. The Allied and Associated Powers are not prepared to grant the
request of the German Delegation for reciprocity in regard to the
maintenance of the legal and administrative acts taken by the
Governments during the war in respect of industrial, literary, and
artistic property. Certain Allied and Associated States have not
taken any measures of this kind, so that if reciprocity were
accorded it would be to the detriment of the rights of the nationals
of such States without any offset.
4. The clause providing that no action shall be brought by Germany or
her nationals in respect of the use during the war of her
industrial, literary or artistic property by the Government of any
Allied or Associated Power, or by any person acting on behalf or
with the assent of such Government is clearly a proper and necessary
clause providing for amnesty for all acts done by a Government or
its agents. The Allied and Associated Powers are not, however,
prepared to make the clause reciprocal, especially as they have no
knowledge as to the action which may have been taken by the German
Government with respect to the industrial, literary and artistic
property owned by their citizens.
As regards the disposition of funds arising from the use of
industrial property during the war, it should be pointed out that
the procedure in this matter must necessarily be the same as that
followed in regard to other debts.
5. The words “Unless the legislation of any one of the Allied and
Associated Powers otherwise directs” in the fourth paragraph of
Article 306 apply only to the legislation existing at the moment of
the signature of the Treaty of Peace. There is no objection, in
order to make this clear, to inserting the words “in force at the
moment [Page 990] of the signature of
the present Treaty” to qualify the word “legislation” in the first
phrase of the fourth paragraph of Article 306.
6. The differences between the expression “sums due or paid” on the
one hand and “sums produced” on the other, in the fourth paragraph
of Article 306, is explained by the fact that the effect of the
Allied emergency measures will continue and that sums will be paid
in the future, whereas the measures taken by Germany will cease to
have effect.
7. The fifth paragraph of Article 306, which provides that the Allied
and Associated Powers shall have the right to impose limitations,
conditions or restrictions on rights of industrial property owned by
Germans, has by no means for its object the outlawing of such
property or the confiscation of these rights.
- (a)
- It is intended, on the one hand, to reserve to the Allied and
Associated Powers the right to impose restrictions on
industrial, literary, and artistic property when considered
necessary for national defence or public interest. This right,
which Germany has reserved to herself by her domestic
legislation, is a general and continuing right, to be exercised
as occasion arises in respect of industrial, literary, and
artistic property acquired before or after the coming into force
of the Treaty of Peace.
- (b)
- It is intended, on the other hand, to retain the power to use
industrial, literary, and artistic property as a pledge for the
accomplishment of the obligations of Germany and for the
reparation of damages, in the same manner as it is proposed to
retain power to deal with other German property. But it is not
the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to utilise for
this purpose the industrial, literary, and artistic property
which may arise after the coming into force of the present
Treaty. Only the industrial, literary, and artistic property
arising before or during the war will be subjected by the Allied
and Associated Powers to limitations, conditions or restrictions
for assuring the fair treatment by Germany of the rights of
industrial, literary, and artistic property held in German
territory by their nationals or for securing the due fulfilment
of all the obligations undertaken by Germany in the present
Treaty.
To make clear the different treatment which they intend to accord to
property acquired before the coming into force of this Treaty and
that acquired thereafter, the Allied and Associated Powers are
prepared to add to the fifth paragraph of Article 306 the following
provision:
As regards the rights of industrial, literary, and artistic
property acquired after the coming into force of the present
Treaty, the above-mentioned right reserved by the Allied and
Associated Powers shall only be exercised in the case where
these limitations, conditions, or [Page 991] restrictions may be considered
necessary for national defence or in the public
interest.
The Allied and Associated Powers see no objection to making it clear
that the measures which can be taken under the fifth paragraph of
Article 306 will not be exercised without compensation to the German
beneficiaries of the rights, and with this object are prepared to
insert after the above-mentioned addition to this paragraph the
following new paragraph:
In the event of the application of the provisions of the
preceding paragraph by any Allied or Associated Power, there
shall be paid reasonable indemnities or royalties, which
shall be dealt with in the same way as other sums due to
German nationals are directed to be dealt with by the
present Treaty.
Article 307.
8. The German objection to the reservation by the Allied and
Associated Powers of freedom to apply their war legislation to
patents which may be revived under Articles 307 and 308 is based on
an exaggerated view of the effect of this provision, which would
probably affect only a small number of patents revived. All such
patents would, if they had been kept up, have been subject to
similar provisions during the war. The Allied and Associated Powers
are prepared to limit their rights in this matter to the grant of
licences, and for this purpose to insert the words “as to the grant
of licences” after the word “provisions” in the penultimate line of
the second paragraph of Article 307.
Article 310.
9. Since contracts for licences in respect of rights in industrial,
literary and artistic property should receive the same treatment as
other pre-war contracts, the same procedure should be applied to
them as is applied to contracts generally, as provided in Articles
299 to 305.
Article 311.
10. As regards the recognition and the protection of rights in
industrial, literary and artistic property belonging to Germans in
the territories separated from Germany, the following addition is
made to Article 311:
The rights of industrial, literary and artistic property
which are in force in the territories separated from Germany
in accordance with the present Treaty, at the moment of the
separation of these territories from Germany, or which will
be re-established or restored in accordance with the
provisions of Article 306 of the present Treaty, shall be
recognised by the State to which the said territory is
transferred and shall remain in force in that territory for
the same period of time given them under the German law.
[Page 992]
part xii. ports, waterways and
railways
The remarks of the German Delegation regarding the clauses affecting
communications (Part XII of the Conditions of Peace) are, for the
most part, too general to allow of a detailed reply, and, further,
are not in the nature of technical objections. On all points the
German Delegation seems to recognise that the proposed measures are
capable of practical application; its opposition is essentially one
of principle, both from the theoretical and the political point of
view.
These objections and criticisms can, indeed, be summarised as
follows:
In the first place, Germany considers her sovereign rights to be
infringed by any stipulation introducing into the regime of her
ports, navigable waterways and railways any kind whatever of
international control, and indeed, by any stipulation introducing
any definite contractual obligation in the Treaty of Peace. Further,
since Germany claims to enter the League of Nations forthwith on a
footing of complete equality with other peoples, she therefore
refuses to subscribe to any engagements which would not be imposed
on a basis of reciprocity, and immediately, on the Allied and
Associated Powers as on herself.
Opposition on points of detail and objection to the solution of
particular problems are explained only on the basis of these two
fundamental differences. Germany seems to agree as to the rules of
freedom of transit and international circulation, but directly the
question as to the measures necessary to secure the application
thereof on her territory is raised, she alleges either that she
cannot submit to a “meddling in her internal organisation as regards
railway traffic and working,” or that “the vital strength of German
coast towns is intentionally weakened by the Allied and Associated
Powers securing to themselves the right to use the ports and
navigable waterways exempt, in practice, from any German control,”
or, finally, that adhesion in advance to future international
conventions on means of communication is an affront to her dignity,
and that the provisions for the construction of railways and canals
on her territory are a violation of her independence. In other cases
(regime of tariffs on railways, equal treatment for all nations in
ports and on navigable waterways), she accepts the proposed
stipulations subject only to certain reserves and on condition of
immediate reciprocity on the part of the Allied and Associated
Powers. Similarly, it is noted that, with regard to the question of
Danzig, Germany declares herself ready to accord, to assure Poland
free access to the sea, facilities and advantages similar to those
which are asked from her at Hamburg and Stettin on behalf of the
Czecko-Slovak State; but without raising any [Page 993] objection of principle she claims to make the
matter in both cases the subject of and a counter in a special
negotiation with the interested parties only, without any
international guarantee. The regulation of the Elbe, the Danube, and
the Niemen, which also does not meet with any technical objections,
should for similar reasons be left to friendly agreements which
alone are compatible with the sovereign rights of the German
State.
The Covenant of the League of Nations refers specially in Article 23
(e) to “provision to secure and maintain
freedom of communications and of transit, and equitable treatment
for the commerce of all members of the League. In this connection
the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of
1914–1918 shall be borne in mind.” This freedom of communications
and equal treatment for all nations on the territory of Germany are
exactly those laid down and guaranteed in Part XII of the Conditions
of Peace. Until general conventions, which will be integral parts of
the statute of the League of Nations, can render possible a wider
application of these principles, it has appeared necessary to insert
at once the essential provisions of such general conventions in the
Treaty of Peace so that an enemy State may not, by future
obstructive procedure and for political reasons, prevent their being
put into force, and further to insist in advance that such general
conventions shall be accepted in their entirety in the future.
Provision is formally made for the extension of these provisions and
for the ultimate grant of reciprocity in respect of all such as are
capable of being made reciprocal, but only after five years, unless
the Council of the League of Nations decides to prolong that period.
It would not have been possible, by immediately granting equal
treatment to Germany, to allow her to profit indirectly from the
material devastation and the economic ruin for which her Government
and her armies are responsible. But at the end of this period
Germany will be able to claim on the territory of the Allied and
Associated Powers the application of those measures which she to-day
describes as constituting a meddling with her internal organisation
which cannot be borne, or, alternatively, she will herself cease to
be bound thereby.
Such are the principles which underlie and explain the texts
referring to the general regime of traffic on ways of
communications. The Allied and Associated Powers have in no case
attempted to prevent the legitimate use by Germany of her economic
independence, but have merely proposed to prevent the abusive use
thereof. Above all, they have aimed at securing freedom of
communications and transit to or from young landlocked States, which
in the absence of definite guarantees would have regained their
political independence only to fall once again under the economic
tutelage of Germany.
The same ideas have given rise to and inspired the solution of the
[Page 994] definite problems
raised by the organisation of the particular communication routes in
question.
Thus, the provisions regarding internal navigation routes apply only
to river systems which are all international as defined by the
Congress of Vienna and by later Conventions. The Oder, for example,
from its confluence with the Oppa, was declared international under
a Treaty between Austria and Prussia dated the 8th August, 1839; the
Tchecko-Slovak State possesses therefore a juridical interest in the
navigation régime of this river. Nor are the canals mentioned in the
Treaty the general canal system of Germany, but only (except in the
case of the Rhine-Meuse and Rhine-Danube navigable waterways) the
lateral canals constructed to duplicate or improve naturally
navigable sections of the same international rivers. It should be
noted in this connection that the Czecko-Slovak State declares
itself prepared to place under the administration of the
International Commission for the Oder a certain number of canals to
be constructed subsequently to extend this system of waterways
across its territory. Lastly, as regards the functions of the River
Commissions, these are limited to the practical application of the
principles laid down either in Articles 332 to 337 of the Treaty or
in a future International Convention which is subject to the
approval of the League of Nations. Their powers are not limited to
German territory but extend in all cases to the territory of at
least one of the Allied or Associated Powers. The
internationalisation of the Elbe is even extended to one of its
tributaries whose course lies solely within Czecko-Slovakian
territory, viz., the Vltava (Moldau) up to Prague. In conformity
with all precedents, the sole object of the regulation of navigation
on these rivers is to establish complete equality between the
subjects of all nations, and not to allow any riparian State to use
its geographical situation and the fact that a great route of
international communication passes through its territory as a means
of applying economic and political pressure on States dependent on
it. Delegates from non-riparian States are included in the River
Commissions as well as representatives of the riparian States, in
the first place as representing the general interest in free
circulation on the rivers regarded as transit routes, and, secondly,
so that within the River Commissions themselves they may act as a
check on the strongest riparian State abusing her preponderating
influence to the detriment of the others. For the same reason, in
deciding upon the number of representatives allotted to each
riparian State, the great factor of freedom of communication must
rank first.
The international regime has been, or is ultimately to be, extended
to certain connecting waterways. The Rhine-Meuse and the
Rhine-Danube waterways, the construction of which is contemplated,
and [Page 995] which are necessary
for the development of communication by inland navigation between
the North Sea and the Black Sea and to the vital economic interests
of Belgium and the New States of Eastern Europe, cannot be left
without guarantee under the sole control of Germany. The Kiel Canal,
which was built solely for military ends, and the administration of
which is left to Germany, must in future be open to international
navigation so that an easier access to the Baltic may be secured for
the benefit of all.
An undeniable regard for what is right underlies the provisions
relating to the use of the water-power of the Rhine on the
Franco-German frontier and those regarding the cession of railway
material which, nevertheless, Germany describes as contrary to
justice.
The use of the water-power of the Rhine is, indeed, left entirely in
the hands of France, on whose territory almost all the works will be
carried out; the building of weirs on either bank by two States who
are necessarily competitors could only result in interference with
the navigability of the river and with the free exercise of the
right of passage by all interested parties, and would diminish the
economic yield from the use of the power. But France undertakes to
pay Germany the share due to her by natural right in the use of the
power, that is, one-half of the value of the power produced after
deducting the cost of the works.
As to the cession of railway material, including the cessions to
Poland, it is obvious that in making a fair distribution of the
available rolling-stock among the States concerned special account
must be taken of the necessity of the resumption of normal working
conditions. It is certainly the intontion of the Allied and
Associated Powers that the condition in which railways and
rolling-stock should be handed over is the actual condition in which
such railways and rolling-stock happened to be at the time of the
signature of the Armistice; with the exception, however, as regards
the cession of rolling-stock, of cases where expert commissions
might decide otherwise on account of the allocation of repair shops
resulting from the territorial clauses.
The Allied and Associated Powers are therefore fully convinced that
the principles of these clauses, based on the desire to guarantee
the free regime of international routes of communication against all
obstacles, are those on which the Armistice was based and which have
governed the preparation of the Treaty of Peace. Nevertheless,
actuated by the spirit of justice which has always guided the work
of the Peace Conference, they have endeavoured to ascertain after a
further careful and detailed examination of the provisions what
alterations could equitably be made therein without infringing in
any way the principles set out above, and as a result the following
amendments have been introduced:
[Page 996]
The freedom of transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany
is more clearly defined.
The number of representatives from Germany on the Commission for the
Oder is increased from one to three.
Measures are taken to ensure the representation of Germany at the
Conference which will be charged with the duty of establishing a
definitive statute for the Danube.
The (future) Rhine-Danube canal is to be subjected merely to the
regime applicable to waterways declared to be international.
The provisions relating to the possibility of an International
Commission being required for the Kiel Canal, and a large part of
the provisions relating to railways to be constructed on German
territory, are deleted.
part xiii. labour
The observations put forward by the German Delegation with reference
to the Labour section of the Treaty contain practically nothing
which has not already been included in the two notes previously
submitted by that Delegation on the 10th and 22nd May 1919,35 to which
full and detailed replies were sent on the 14th and 28th May.36 The Allied and Associated Powers do not
consequently think it desirable to resume the examination of the
questions already dealt with in these notes and in the replies which
have been made to them.
With reference to the point concerning the protection of labour in
ceded territories, Article 312 of the Treaty expressly stipulates
for such protection by means of conventions to be concluded between
Germany and the States concerned. Further provision, however, has
been made for carrying into effect the intention of this article by
inserting in it a plan for reference to impartial technical
commissions of all cases in which an early settlement is not reached
by direct negotiation.
part xiv. guarantees
The German Delegation observe in their remarks on the conditions of
peace: “Only a return to the immutable principles of morality and
civilization to sanctity of treaties would render it possible for
mankind to continue to exist.”
After four and a half years of war which was caused by the
repudiation of these principles by Germany, the Allied and
Associated Powers can only repeat the words pronounced by President
Wilson, on September 27, 1918: “The reason why peace must be
guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises
have proved untrustworthy.”
