Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/99½
CF–99A
Notes of a Meeting Held in the Foyer of the Senate House in the
Chateau at Versailles, on Saturday, June 28, 1919, at 6 p.m.
Paris, June 28, 1919, 6 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- Mr. Philip Kerr.
- France
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secretaries. |
| Captain A. Portier, |
| Professor P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
1. With reference to C. F. 96 B., Minute 1,1
President Wilson read aloud a re-draft of the
proposed statement to the Italian Government, prepared by Mr.
Balfour.
Note. During the Meeting Baron Makino and Baron
Sonnino arrived, but Mr. Lloyd George left the room to explain to them
that the subject under consideration was Declarations by France and
Great Britain on the one hand, and by the United States of America, on
the other hand, to the new Italian Delegation, and they withdrew. Asia Minor: Proposed Statement to the New Italian
Delegation
The above statement was approved, subject to some small amendments the
most important of which was the omission of a reference to the
Dodecanese, which, it was considered, might be interpreted as a
repudiation of the Treaty of London.2
The draft as finally approved is attached in Appendix I. Sir Maurice
Hankey was instructed to obtain the signature of Mr. Lloyd George before
his departure, and subsequently that of M. Clemenceau, who undertook to
communicate it to the Italians.
President Wilson said he was forwarding a
separate statement, which he intended should contain a reference to the
Dodecanese, as he was not bound by the Treaty of London.
Villa Majestic, Paris, 28 June, 1919.
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Appendix I to CF–99A
[Redraft by Mr. Balfour of Statement
to the Italian Delegation]
The change in the Italian Delegation has occurred at a moment in
which the associates of Italy were feeling considerable anxiety with
regard to the part she was playing in the common cause. While
nothing could be more friendly than the personal relations which
have united the representatives of the Five Powers through many
months of anxious discussion, and while we gladly recognise the aid
and cooperation which the Italian Delegation have rendered in the
framing of the peace with Germany, we feel less happy about the
general course of the negotiations affecting other aspects of the
world settlement.
There is no doubt that the present uncomfortable condition of affairs
is largely due to the complications which the development of
political and military events has brought about since the Treaty of
London was signed in 1915. Since then the aspect of the world has
changed. The Treaty was contracted with Russia, France and Britain,
but Russia is no longer in the war. It contemplated a victorious
peace with the Austro-Hungarian Empire; but while victory of the
completest kind has been achieved, the Austro-Hungarian Empire has
ceased to exist. It assumed that if Turkey was completely defeated,
fragments of the Turkish Empire might be assigned to the victors;
but while Turkey has indeed been completely defeated, and the alien
peoples which she misgoverned are to be separated from her Empire,
they are not to be handed over in possession to the conquerors,
while any spheres of influence which the latter may acquire will be
held by them not independently, but as Trustees or mandatories of
the League of Nations. In 1915 America was neutral; but in 1917 she
entered the war unhampered by any Treaty, and at a period when the
development of this order of political ideas, to which she gave a
most powerful impulse was in process of rapid accomplishment.
It is not surprising that the situation thus created presents
complexities which only the utmost good-will and the most
transparent loyalty can successfully deal with. The Treaty of London
with which the history may be said to open was from the very
beginning not strictly observed. Italy had undertaken to employ all
her resources in prosecuting the war in common with her Allies
against all their enemies. But she did not declare war on Germany
for more than a year, and she took no part in the war against
Turkey. By the Treaty of London, the central portion of Albania was
to be made into an autonomous State under Italian protection; while
northern and southern Albania were under certain circumstances to
fall respectively to Serbia and Greece. But in 1917 Italy declared a
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Protectorate over the
whole country—a Protectorate which she seems to have exercised ever
since. By the Treaty of London Fiume was, with Italy’s consent,
assigned to Croatia. But since the armistice, Italy has been
accumulating troops in that neighbourhood and local laws appear to
have been promulgated in the name of the Italian King. Meanwhile
America, which, unlike France and Britain, was not a party to the
Treaty of London, has, in conformity with the general principles of
settlement on which all the Allied and Associated Powers, including
Italy, are agreed, declined to hand over reluctant Slav majorities
in the Eastern Adriatic to Italian rule; and no arrangement on this
vexed question has been arrived at.
Evidently the situation thus described is one of peculiar difficulty;
but we feel bound to add that the difficulties have been greatly
augmented by the policy pursued in Asia Minor by the Italian
Government and Italian troops. This matter, as perhaps Your
Excellency is aware, was the subject of warm debate in the Council
of Four. President Wilson, Monsieur Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George
complained in the strongest terms of the proceedings at Scala Nuova
and elsewhere in South-Western Anatolia. They drew the sharpest
contrast between the policy of the Greek Government, which moved no
troops except with the cognisance, and usually at the request of the
Allied and Associated Powers, including, of course, Italy herself,
while Italy, which was one of those Powers, and as such cognisant of
all that was being done by her friends, landed troops and occupied
important positions without giving the least inkling of her
proceedings to those whose counsels she shared, whose general policy
she professed to support, but whose remonstrances on this point she
persistently ignored.
We find it difficult fully to understand this action on the part of a
friendly Power. At first sight it might seem to be animated by the
idea that territories occupied by troops of a given nationality
would be assigned to that nationality by the final terms of Peace.
But this has never been the view of the other Allied and Associated
Powers, and we had the best reason for supposing that it was not the
view of Italy. We venture to quote a paragraph on the subject to
which the Italian Representative gave his adhesion:—
“No State will be rewarded for prolonging the horrors of war
by any increase of territory; nor will the Allied and
Associated Powers be induced to alter decisions made in the
interests of Peace and justice by the unscrupulous use of
military methods”.3
It is needless to say that we have not made the recital of our common
difficulties for any other purpose than to contribute to their
removal. The Treaty of London, the Anglo-French Declaration of
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November, 1918, President
Wilson’s fourteen points all bear on the situation, all have in
different ways to be considered when Italy is discussing with her
Allies and Associates the aspects of the final settlements which
most nearly concern her. But they cannot be debated as contracts
susceptible only of a strict legal interpretation. Italy herself has
not so treated them; and if her partners attempted the task an
amicable settlement would seem beyond the wit of man. For, as has
been pointed out, they were framed in different periods in a rapidly
changing world and under the stress of widely different motives.
They could not be and are not in all respects consistent. They are
in part obsolete or obsolescent, and cannot in their entirety be
carried out. What in these circumstances seems to be required is a
re-survey of the whole situation. Let the four Great Powers of the
West, America, France, Britain and Italy, consider together with a
fresh mind and perfect frankness, whether some solution cannot be
found which is consistent both with the material interests of Italy,
her enduring aspirations and the rights and susceptibilities of her
neighbours. The difficulties in the way of such a solution may be
great. But they should not be insuperable. We feel, however,
compelled to add that it is wholly useless in our judgment to
discuss Peace Terms in Paris as friends and associates, while one of
our number is elsewhere pursuing an independent and even
antagonistic course of action. If, for example, Italy insists, after
our earnest protests, on maintaining troops in Anatolia, it can only
be because she intends to obtain by force all she claims to be hers
by right. This is quite inconsistent with genuine alliance; its
inevitable end is complete isolation. It is for Italian statesmen to
say whether or not this is in Italy’s interests. To us and the world
the loss will be immense, for the aid which Italy can render to
mankind by helping in the establishment of a durable Peace through
international co-operation is beyond price. To Italy it will mean
the loss of all claim to further assistance or aid from those who
were once proud to be her associates. To us such a consummation
seems to be disastrous, but if Italian policy runs its course
unchanged it seems also to be inevitable.
