Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/78
CF–78
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, June 21, 1919, at 4 p.m.
Paris, June 21, 1919, 4 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- The Rt Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M.
- France
- Italy
- Japan
Sir Maurice Hankey |
} |
Secretaries. |
M. di Martino |
M. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
1. The Council had before them a letter addressed by Marshal Foch to the
President of the Council on the 18th June, 1919, No. 3051, (Appendix I)
raising the following two questions:
- (1)
- Whether the United States of America would Military clauses be
represented on the Commission of Control for Military Clauses.
Commission of Control for Military
Clauses
- (2)
- Whether Belgium should be entitled to be represented on this
Commission.
President Wilson said he much regretted it
would not be possible for him to make any appointments of United States’
officers to the Commission before the ratification of the Treaty. As
soon as the Treaty of Peace was ratified by the Government of the United
States however he would be prepared to make appointments.
Mr. Balfour suggested that it was not a matter
of great moment, provided that the United States Government had means of
knowing what was being done by their associates. They could do this by
attaching liaison officers to the various Missions.
(It was agreed
- (i)
- That M. Clemenceau should reply to Marshal Foch:
- (a)
- That the United States of America would not be represented
on the Commission of Control for the Military Clauses until
after the ratification by her of the Treaty of Peace with
Germany.
- (b)
- That he was inviting Belgium to be represented on the
Commission.
- (ii)
- That the President of the Council should send a communication to
the Belgian Government inviting them to nominate a representative on
the Commission.)
2. The Council had before them a Report of the Commission of Prisoners of
War on the Commission and Sub-Commissions for the Repatriation of
Prisoners of War under the Treaties of Peace.
M. Clemenceau asked that the subject might be
postponed as he wished to examine the Report. Commission and Sub-Commissions for the Repatriation of Prisoners of
War
3. Mr. Balfour read a draft letter to the
Turkish Government which he had prepared at the request of the Council
of Ten, made at a short unrecorded meeting after the hearing of the
Turkish the Turkish Delegation on Tuesday, June 17th. (Appendix II.)
Draft Letter to the Turkish Delegation
The draft letter was approved. He (Mr. Balfour) said that although this
fully represented his own views, there were some people who did not
share these. He mentioned in particular Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of
State for India, who had sent him a long memorandum of criticisms. Mr.
Montagu, however, represented an entirely different school of policy,
and was strongly opposed to the removal of the Turks from
Constantinople.
M. Sonnino pointed out that the Memorandum did
not attack Moslems but only the Ottomans.
President Wilson said he had these points in
his mind throughout the reading of the Memorandum, and he could not find
anything against the Moslems. It was merely an indictment against the
Turkish rule. He subscribed to the letter with great satisfaction.
The Memorandum was unanimously agreed to, subject to authority being
given to Mr. Balfour to make such drafting alterations as he might
consider desirable, and subject to a reservation which Mr. Balfour
(particularly in view of Mr. Montagu’s objections) asked for; namely,
that the reply should not be dispatched until it had been approved by
Mr. Lloyd George.
(It was agreed that when Mr. Lloyd George had given his assent, the
letter should be signed by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Council, and
sent to the Turkish Delegation.)
4. During the meeting M. Clemenceau received a dispatch to the effect
that M. Nitti and M. Tittoni were forming a Government in Rome.
At this point the Council adjourned to the upstairs room for a discussion
with experts in regard to Klagenfurt and Carinthia, which is recorded as
a separate meeting.1
Reported Changes in the Italian Government
Villa Majestic, Paris, 21 June, 1919.
[Page 577]
Appendix I to CF–78
WCP–1034
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies,
General Staff, 1st Section, G. Q. G. A.,
18 June,
1919
Translation
No. 3051
From:—Marshal Foch, Commanding-in-Chief, The Allied
Forces.
To:—The President of the Council, President of the
Peace Conference.
The Commission of Control for the Military Clauses provided for by
the draft Treaty of Peace should be ready to begin its operations
immediately the Treaty is signed.
For this purpose, I called a meeting of the Military representatives
of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. As the result of this
meeting, at which representatives of these Powers, with the
exception of the United States, were present, a draft was adopted
laying down the conditions in which the Commission and various
Sub-Commissions of Control for the Military Clauses, would be
formed.
As regards the United States, General Bliss has informed me that no
decision has yet been taken in regard to the participation of the
United States in this Mission of Control.
On the other hand, Belgium, although not designated by the draft
Treaty of Peace as having a right to representation on the
Commission of Control, is clearly very specially concerned with the
execution of the Military Clauses.
I therefore have the honour to request you to be so good as to raise
this question with the Supreme Council of the Governments and to
inform me:—
- (1)
- Whether the United States will be represented on the
Commission of Control for the Military Clauses.
- (2)
- Whether Belgium should be invited to be represented on
this Commission.
In view of the urgent necessity of preparing forthwith the entry into
operation of the Commission of Control, I should be grateful if you
would kindly acquaint me with your reply as soon as you can possibly
do so.
Appendix II to CF–78
M–295
Draft Answer to the Turks
The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have read
with the most careful attention the Memorandum presented to
[Page 578]
them by Your Excellency on
June 17th,2 and, in accordance with
the promise then made, desire now to offer the following
observations upon it.
In your recital of the political intrigues which accompanied Turkey’s
entry into the war, and of the tragedies which followed it, Your
Excellency makes no attempt to excuse or qualify the crimes of which
the Turkish Government was then guilty. It is admitted directly, or
by implication, that Turkey had no cause of quarrel with the Entente
Powers; that she acted as the subservient tool of Germany; that the
war, begun without excuse, and conducted without mercy, was
accompanied by massacres whose calculated atrocity equals or exceeds
anything in record of history. But it is argued that these crimes
were committed by a Turkish Government for whose misdeeds the
Turkish people are not responsible; that there was in them no
element of religious fanaticism; that Moslems suffered from them not
less than Christians; that they were entirely out of harmony with
the Turkish tradition, as historically exhibited in the treatment by
Turkey of subject races; that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire
is necessary for the religious equilibrium of the world; so that
policy, not less than justice, requires that its territories should
be restored undiminished, as they existed before war broke out.
The Council can neither accept this conclusion nor the arguments by
which it is supported. They do not indeed doubt that the present
Government of Turkey profoundly disapproves of the policy pursued by
its predecessors. Even if considerations of morality did not weigh
with it, (as doubtless they do), considerations of expediency would
be conclusive. As individuals its members have every motive as well
as every right to repudiate the actions which have proved so
disastrous to their country. But, speaking generally, every nation
must be judged by the Government which rules it, which directs its
foreign policy, which controls its armies; nor can Turkey claim any
relief from the legitimate consequences of this doctrine merely
because her affairs at a most critical moment in her history had
fallen into the hands of men who, utterly devoid of principle or
pity, could not even command success.
It seems, however, that the claim for complete territorial
restoration put forward in the Memorandum is not based merely on the
plea that Turkey should not be required to suffer for the sins of
her Ministers. It has a deeper ground. It appeals to the history of
Ottoman rule in the past, and to the condition of affairs in the
Moslem world.
[Page 579]
Now the Council is anxious not to enter into unnecessary controversy,
or to inflict needless pain on Your Excellency and the Delegates who
accompany you. It wishes well to the Turkish people, and admires
their excellent qualities. But they cannot admit that among these
qualities are to be counted capacity to rule over alien races. The
experiment has been tried too long and too often for there to be the
least doubt as to its result. History tells us of many Ottoman
successes and many Ottoman defeats:—of nations conquered and nations
freed. The Memorandum itself refers to the reductions that have
taken place in the territories recently under Ottoman sovereignty.
Yet in all these changes there is no case to be found, either in
Europe or Asia or Africa, in which the establishment of Ottoman rule
in any country has not been followed by the diminution of its
material prosperity, and a fall in its level of culture; nor is
there any case to be found in which the withdrawal of Ottoman rule
has not been followed by a growth in material prosperity and a rise
in the level of culture. Neither among the Christians of Europe, nor
among the Moslems of Syria, Arabia and Africa, has the Ottoman Turk
done other than destroy what he has conquered; never has he shown
himself able to develop in peace what he has won by war. Not in this
direction do his talents lie.
The obvious conclusion from these facts would seem to be that, since
Turkey has, without the least excuse or provocation, deliberately
attacked the Entente Powers and been defeated, she has thrown upon
the victors the heavy duty of determining the destiny of the various
populations in her heterogeneous Empire. This duty the Council of
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to carry out as
far as may be in accordance with their wishes and permanent
interests. But the Council observe with regret that the Memorandum
introduces in this connection a wholly different order of
considerations based on supposed religious rivalries. The Turkish
Empire, is, it seems, to be preserved unchanged, not so much because
this would be to the advantage either of the Moslems or of the
Christians within its borders, but because its maintenance is
demanded by the religious sentiment of men who never felt the
Ottoman yoke, or have forgotten how heavily it weighs on those who
are compelled to bear it.
But surely there never was a sentiment less justified by facts. The
whole course of the War exposes its hollowness. What religious issue
can be raised by a war in which Protestant Germany, Roman Catholic
Austria, Orthodox Bulgaria and Moslem Turkey, banded themselves
together to plunder their neighbours? The only flavour of deliberate
fanaticism perceptible in these transactions was the massacre of
Christian Armenians by order of the Turkish Government. But Your
Excellency has pointed out that, at the very same time and by the
[Page 580]
very same authority,
unoffending Moslems were being slaughtered in circumstances
sufficiently horrible, and in numbers sufficiently large to
mitigate, if not wholly to remove, any suspicion of religious
partiality.
During the War, then, there was little evidence of sectarian
animosity on the part of any of the Governments, and no evidence
whatever so far as the Entente Powers were concerned. Nor has
anything since occurred to modify this judgement. Every man’s
conscience has been respected; places of sacred memory have been
carefully guarded; the States and peoples who were Mahomedan before
the War are Mahomedan still. Nothing touching religion has been
altered, except the security with which it may be practised: and
this wherever Allied control exists has certainly been altered for
the better.
If it be replied that the diminution in the territories of a historic
Moslem State must injure the Moslem cause in all lands, we
respectfully suggest that in our opinion this is an error. To
thinking Moslems throughout the world the modern history of the
Government enthroned at Constantinople can be no source of pleasure
or pride. For reasons we have already indicated, the Ottoman Turk
was there attempting a task for which he had little aptitude, and in
which he has consequently failed. Set him to work in a territory
peopled by men of his own blood and faith, under new conditions less
complicated and difficult, with an evil tradition of corruption and
intrigue severed, perhaps forgotten, why should he not add lustre to
his country, and thus indirectly to his religion, by other qualities
than that courage and discipline which he has always so
conspicuously displayed?
Unless we are mistaken, Your Excellency should understand our hopes.
In an impressive passage of Your Memorandum, you declare it to be
Your country’s mission to devote itself to “an intensive economic
and intellectual culture”. No change could be more startling or
impressive: none would be more beneficial. If Your Excellency is
able to initiate this great process of development in men of Turkish
race, You will deserve, and will certainly receive, all the
assistance we are able to give you.