Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/74


Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, June 17, 1919, at 4 p.m.

  • Present
    • United States of America.
      • President Wilson.
    • British Empire
      • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
    • France
      • M. Clemenceau.
    • Italy
      • M. Sonnino.
    • Japan
      • H. E. Baron Makino.
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } Secretaries.
M. di Martino.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter.

1. (It was agreed that the Convention in regard to the Rhine should be published.) Publication of the Rhine Convention

2. The Council had before them a Draft Treaty with Poland submitted by the Committee on New States. (Appendix I.)*

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the Council ought to hear a long memorandum he had received from M. Paderewski on the subject. Draft Treaty With Poland Submitted by the Committee on New States; M. Paderewski’s Letter

President Wilson then read M. Paderewski’s memorandum. (Appendix II.)

After the reading of the memorandum, Mr. Lloyd George said that this was a fundamental challenge to the whole of the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Small States. He did not feel himself competent to examine it in detail and suggested it should be referred to the Committee on New States.

President Wilson said that the point about the memorandum which struck him was the statement that we were claiming more for the Germans in Poland than for the Poles in Germany. This was a serious indictment. He recalled that some years ago, the United States had denounced a Treaty with Russia at considerable inconvenience, because of the ill-treatment by Russia of Jews who were citizens of the United States. They had taken this action on the ground not that Jews had been maltreated but that American Jews were being maltreated, that is to say, distinctions were being made between American [Page 530] citizens which were not recognised in the United States. Here, there was a danger of imparting to the Jews a corporate capacity.

Mr. Lloyd George said there was also something in the contention that a separate organisation for Jewish schools would tend to create a separate nation of the Jews in Poland rather than unity. This would lend itself to German intrigue.

President Wilson then put the other side of the question. There was no doubt that Roumania had done disgraceful things to the Jews in spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. If the minorities could be ill-treated without provision for appeal, they would derive no advantage from the Treaty. Roumania had broken the Treaty of Berlin in this respect again and again with impunity. Hence, it was necessary to provide for some appeal. In reply to M. Sonnino, he said that, if these provisions were adopted, Jews in the United States would be able to bring sufficient influence to bear to call the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to the matter. What these people feared was interference with their internal affairs.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia had been called into existence by the Great Powers and could not live without these Powers. Consequently, they were not quite in the position of the old established States.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed to refer M. Paderewski’s memorandum to the Committee on New States to consider the objections raised to their Treaty and to see whether some of these objections could not be met.)

3. The attention of the Council was drawn to the alternative drafts put forward in regard to Article 13 of the draft treaty with Poland.

(It was agreed that States only, and not individuals should have the right of appeal to the Permanent with Poland Court of International Justice, and consequently that the draft proposed by the French, British and Japanese Delegations should be adopted.) Articles 13 of the Draft Treaty With Poland

4. M. Sonnino suggested that the Memorandum in Appendix III, Farther Questions which he read, should be referred to the Committee New states. Further Questions Referred to the Committee on New States

(This was agreed to.)

5. The Council had before them a note from the Supreme Economic Council1 raising the question as to whether, after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary. Blockade on Hungary and Bolshevik Russia

President Wilson pointed out that a legal blockade could not be established after peace had been made.

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Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Germany would receive all the hides and flax of Russia which were important to all the nations of Europe. This raised the question as to whether the whole of the commerce of Russia was to be left to German exploitation. If he were quite convinced, which he was not, that the Bolsheviks could be crushed in the present year, he might be willing to make a special effort. This led to a discussion on the subject of the prospects of the Bolsheviks, in the course of which President Wilson read a note from General Bliss pointing out that Koltchak’s troops had evacuated 15,000 square miles and were steadily retreating from the line of the Volga. That the fall of Petrograd was not imminent since the Esthonians refused to advance until they were recognised. There had been an uprising on Koltchak’s lines of communication. In Eastern Siberia, Koltchak depended upon Horvat2 and Semen-off,3 while in Central Siberia he depended on Allied troops.

President Wilson then read Para. 7 of the note from the Supreme Economic Council, in which was recommended the abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption of trade with Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George said the real difficulty was how to answer a question in Parliament or an interpellation in the Chamber. How was a question to be answered “Is it permissible to trade with Russia?” Was he to reply “Yes” or “No” to that question.

President Wilson asked if Great Britain was at war with Bolshevik Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that hostilities were going on at Archangel.

President Wilson said that this did not constitute a legal state of war, since there had been no formal declaration of war. Consequently, there was no legal basis for a blockade. His reply to such a question would be that there was no legal warrant for estranging trade, and that the signature of Peace removed the legal basis.

Mr. Lloyd George compared the decision to what had occurred in past days between Great Britain and Spain, when we had attacked Spanish colonies and seized their ships, while keeping our ambassador at the Court of Madrid. What would his reply be if he was asked whether British subjects could buy flax and sell boots? If he replied “No”, then the Germans would get the trade.

President Wilson said his reply would be that there was no legal basis for preventing it, but that traders would do it at their risk.

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Sir Maurice Hankey asked what answer he was to give to the note from the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Lloyd George said that an answer must be given. The question arose as to whether a blockade should be maintained in the Baltic. It was necessary to prevent the smuggling of arms from Germany to Bolshevik Russia by sea. It would be difficult for the Germans to send war material across Poland and the Baltic provinces, but it would not be so difficult to send it by sea.

(After some further discussion it was agreed that the answer should be in the following sense—

After the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary, but the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council is approved, that there should be an abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council should be asked, however, to examine as to whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevik Russia.)

6. Arising out of the previous discussion of the subject of the Blockade,

President Wilson said that Mr. Hoover had reported to him that the Allied Maritime Transport Council had issued an order that all Allied ships on completing discharge of cargo should leave German ports, and that no more ships of the Allied and Associated Powers should proceed to German ports. One result had been that several United States’ ships had been detained in British ports. These ships were carrying foodstuffs, not for Germany’s use, but for Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. It had never been found possible to build up ten days’ reserve in Czecho-Slovakia, and the stoppage of these ships was a very serious matter. He himself had advised Mr. Hoover to demand the immediate release of these ships, as his Government were prepared to run the risk of their being held up in German ports. The action that had been taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Council really amounted to a reimposition of the Blockade, notwithstanding that it had been decided that the blockade was not to be imposed unless and until a further order was given. United States Shipping Detained in Great Britain

Mr. Lloyd George said he had only heard of the matter for the first time this afternoon. He understood, however, that the Allied Maritime Transport Council was an Inter-Allied body, and that this decision had been taken for the purpose of avoiding the seizure of Allied shipping in German ports, and that the United States representative had been present and had agreed in the decision.

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President Wilson said he had just ascertained from Mr. Hoover that the United States representative had stated he could not acquiesce without Mr. Hoover’s instructions.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he could not understand this action being taken unless at least the United States representative had said he could only agree subject to confirmation.

President Wilson pointed out that this action had been taken a week before the Germans had to state whether they would sign.

Mr. Lloyd George said that unless ample warning had been given there would not have been time to extricate the ships, since it would take them some time to discharge. He understood that Lord Robert Cecil was the Chairman of this Committee.

Sir Maurice Hankey said he believed the action had been taken by the Executive of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and not by the Council itself.

President Wilson said it was no good the Council taking decisions in regard to the Blockade, when these subordinate bodies took action without their authority. He had told Mr. Hoover that he was to protest against the detention of the American ships, as he was not willing to impose privation on the population of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.

M. Clemenceau said that the Allied Maritime Transport Council appeared to have acted outside its authority, but nevertheless he could not consider it as altogether unfortunate.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that the threat of the Blockade might provide an additional inducement for the Germans to sign, and he undertook to make immediate enquiries and to take the necessary action for the release of the United States ships.

Note: Mr. Lloyd George immediately after the Meeting instructed his private secretary to telephone to London to order the release of the United States’ ships.

7. The Council had before them a Note from the Superior Blockade Council on the suggested agreement by Austria regarding trade with Hungary and Germany. (Appendix IV).

(It was agreed that no decision in regard to this could be taken without further explanation of what was intended.) Proposed Agreement by Austria Regarding Trade With Hungary and Germany

8. M. Sonnino said that the Austrian Delegation was already beginning to send in Notes, and this raised the question of the machinery of the Peace Conference for dealing with them.

(It was agreed that the Notes should be referred Delegation to the same Commissions as had been established to deal with Notes from the German Delegation.) Method of Dealing With Replies From the Austrian Delegation

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9. M. Sonnino raised the question of the position of the military officers of the Allied and Associated Powers, who had been sent to Klagenfurt. He understood that the Yugo-Slavs had, notwithstanding the communications from the Allied and Associated Powers, pushed on and compelled the Austrians to accept an armistice, under the terms of which they had to evacuate Klagenfurt. The four military officers had found the Yugo-Slavs in possession of Klagenfurt. They had no authority to order them to go out. The Yugo-Slavs were there and would probably refuse to go unless these officers were given general authority to insist upon the execution of the orders of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. If this were not done, it would be very little use arranging for the Plebiscite. Carinthia: The Armistice

President Wilson said that personally he was of opinion that both forces ought to withdraw. The military officers ought not to be told until the Governments had been communicated with. He suggested that a communication should be made, both to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to the Austrians, informing them that they were expected to withdraw from the territory in question, the boundaries of which should be stated.

The question having been raised as to who should keep order in the withdrawal of the above forces,

Mr. Lloyd George said it would be no use to put in Italian troops to keep order, as the Jugo-Slavs would oppose them.

M. Sonnino said that Italy had no desire for a permanent occupation of the Klagenfurt region.

President Wilson suggested that the maintenance of order should be left to the local police forces.

(It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to formulate a demand to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to the Austrian Government, informing them that the forces of both States should be withdrawn from the Klagenfurt area, the boundaries of which should be described in the despatch. A copy of the despatch should be sent to the military officers on the spot of the Allied and Associated Powers.)

10. President Wilson said that on enquiry he found that it was very difficult for him to send United States troops to occupy Upper Silesia during the plebiscite. Once peace was declared the United States troops had to be with-drawn. Upper Silesia: Occupation During the Plebiscite

Villa Majestic, Paris, 17 June, 1919.

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[The draft treaty with Poland which was to form appendix I to CF–74 does riot accompany the minutes of this meeting.]

Appendix II to CF–74


report of committee on new states

Memorandum by M. Paderewski

The Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference appreciates the high importance of the confirmation of the sovereignty and independence of the Polish State through a treaty between the principal Powers and Poland. But precisely from the point of view of the sovereign rights of Poland, the Delegation considers it to be a duty to present its objections to the introduction in the Treaty with Germany, of article 93. according to which Poland should admit the intervention of the Chief Powers in her internal affairs. Poland has already experienced the nefarious consequences which may result from the protection exercised by foreign Powers over ethnical and religious minorities. The Polish Nation has not forgotten that the dismemberment of Poland was the consequence of the intervention of foreign powers in affairs concerning her religious minorities, and this painful memory makes Poland fear the external ingérence into internal matters of State more than anything.

This fear has been recently once more confirmed by the unanimous vote of the Polish Diet. Whilst requiring the Government to prepare without delay the schemes of laws respecting the rights of the minorities, the Diet has, at the same time, finally declared its opposition to any foreign intervention.

Poland will grant full rights of citizenship to all her subjects, but will demand in return that all citizens should develop a consciousness of their duties towards the State. This, however, can not be attained should the rights granted to minorities be imposed on the Polish State, and if those minorities, feeling themselves under external protection were thus encouraged to lodge their complaints against the State, to which they belong before a foreign court of appeal. This would fatally provoke excitement against the minorities and would become the cause of incessant unrest.

Polish-Jewish relations.

We have to note with regret that the relations between the Jewish and Christian population in Poland have lately become strained. To those who are acquainted with the evolution of the Jewish question in Poland, this is a surprising phenomenon. The Polish nation with whom the Jews, chased from Germany, had found refuge for several [Page 536] centuries and all facilities for organizing their religious life, wished towards the end of the 18th Century to emancipate these Jews, relegated to their ghettos, and even after the loss of its independence attempted to grant them the full measure of civil rights. The Polish-Jewish relations during the whole of the 19th Century were distinguished by good understanding. The present discord is caused by the attitude adopted by the Jews who, considering the Polish cause as being a lost one, on many occasions sided with Poland’s enemies.

This policy of the Jews called forth a change of public opinion against them. However, the reconstruction of the Polish State which must be admitted by the Jews as an established fact, will allow the Polish nation, whose existence will no longer be imperilled by their hostility, to return to her ancient principles respecting the Jewish question. The relations between Jews and Poles will be automatically established, within a short time, in a normal way, to the satisfaction of both parties; whereas protection granted to the Jewish population in Poland, through transferring the question on to international ground, can but create difficulties.

The representatives of Poland admit equal rights, based on the principles of freedom, to all citizens, without distinction of origin, creed or language, admitting at the same time the necessity of guaranteeing these principles by the Polish Constitution. Poland of The representatives of Poland must however firmly stipulate against any clauses of the Treaty which would cause prejudice to the sovereignty of the Polish the essence and form of the Polish Constitution and which would submit for approval to the Council of the League of Nations the eventual modifications of the said constitution. Imposition on Poland of Obligations Prejudicing the Essence and From of Her Constitution

To place one special part of the Polish Constitution under the protection of the League of Nations and demand the consent of its Council (para. 13 to 14 of the scheme of the Treaty) is equivalent to regarding the Polish nation as a nation of inferior standard of civilization, incapable of ensuring to all its citizens the rights and civic liberties and ignorant of the conception of the duties of a modern State. The Polish State, sovereign in principle, would thus be permanently placed under the control of the Powers: every modification control of the Constitution which is the expression of the sovereign will of the people would be submitted in as far as concerns the obligations stipulated in the scheme of the Treaty, to the examination and approval of the Council of the League. Permanent Control of the Powers Over Poland

In reality, the will of one member of the Council, could hamper any development of the Polish Constitution, which the vital needs of the country might require.

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The constitutional principles, stipulating the rights of minorities, as well as the Constitution, as a whole, will contain in Poland alike to other States guarantees of inviolability. Laws, decrees, and administrative acts which are contrary to the Constitution will have no validity. The organisation of the political authorities and the corresponding political and judicial guarantees will constitute a sufficient safeguard of inviolability of the fundamental laws. Guarantees Concerning the Inviolability of the Constitution

Art. 14 of the scheme of the Treaty concerning the approval of Constitutional modifications by the Council of the League of Nations, as well as the clause of Art. 1 according to which the stipulations of the Treaty, which are to form part of the Constitution, fall under the jurisdiction of the League, must accordingly be struck out as being prejudicial to the sovereignty of Poland.

While all the scheme of Constitution laid before the Diet, and all declarations voted as well as all special laws passed originate from the idea of equal rights of all citizens; while legislative motions concerning national minorities who form the bulk of the population of a given territory guarantee to these minorities an extensive autonomy; the scheme of the treaty puts to doubt the value of the leading ideas which have hitherto directed the Polish State. This scheme appears to aim at depriving the principles of equality, stated in the Constitution of their character of free expression of national will, tending to represent them as the result of the imposed demands of Foreign Powers, who retain for themselves the right of control. Art. 1 refers to: “the desire (of Poland) to conform her institutions to the principles of liberty and justice, also to give a sure guarantee to all the inhabitants of the territories over which she has assumed the sovereignty”, as if Poland were a state without a past or constitutional traditions for the first time aware of the principles of justice and freedom. Precisely the living traditions of the former Polish State, which had outdistanced others in the matter of assuring equality of political rights to all its citizens, without distinction of origin, language, or creed, and had opened its doors for the sects persecuted in the neighbouring states and assured a refuge to the Jews banished from the West,—these traditions have helped to sustain amongst the Poles the consciousness of their nationality. Poland expresses the ardent desire that the principles of freedom should be universally applied to the minorities. Poland promises to realise the stipulations concerning their rights which the League of Nations will recognize as being obligatory for all States belonging to the League, in the same way as with regard to the protection of labour. The Equality of Rights of All Citizens

The regulation, by the Treaty of details concerning Jewish schools and the right of use [of] the Jewish language in the Courts of Justice, [Page 538] seems to be especially inappropriate, considering that, at the present time, the Jewish question in Poland is a question of violent dissension among the Jewish population itself. One part of the Jewish population only demands complete equality of rights for people of Jewish origin. This has been granted them. The others demand a separate religious organisation, endowed by the State with political, national, social, economic, cultural and linguistic attributions, which would transform the Jews into an autonomous Nation. Some Jews consider the Jewish dialect used by the majority of Jews in Poland and which is a corrupted German as spoken in the middle ages, as inadequate to modern intellectual requirements, and merely adaptable to the germanisation of Jews, when cultivated in schools. Others, on the contrary, wish to regard it as their national language, whereas a part of the Jewish population tends to revive the ancient Hebrew tongue. The actual State of transitions of the Jewish question scarcely allows the national and linguistic rights of the Jews in Poland to be determined. There is no doubt, that the stipulations proposed with regard to the rights of the Jewish population will call forth a deep resentment on that part of the Jewish population, which whilst attached to its religion, considers itself as being of Polish nationality and is anxious to avoid a conflict with the Poles about national and linguistic rights. Jewish Opposition in Poland

The fact that the proposed stipulations may in future have a fatal influence on Polish internal relations, cannot be sufficiently emphasized. The school authorities for the whole population are controlled by the Polish Government. In the meantime, Article 10 of the Treaty creates one or several special school committees for the Jewish population, as strictly religious institutions, to be appointed by the Jewish communities, independently of the Government and recognizes their right to organise and manage the Jewish schools. Such a privilege must needs call forth analogous demands on the part of organisations of other creeds and may lend to the establishment of schools, specially reserved to scholars of a given faith, and tend to the creation of strictly religious education,—which would contribute to deepen religious divergencies in Poland. This article is inadmissible, as it would bring about the breaking up of the political organisation, into religious organisations, having public rights, privileged from an administrative point of view, as was the case in the middle ages. It is also contrary to the modern tendency of all States of using schools as a means of producing citizens brought up in a certain spirit of unity and social solidarity. This tendency must be specially adopted by the Polish State, which is being formed by the [Page 539] reunion of regions having been for over a century under foreign and decidedly hostile influences. Independent Management of Jewish Schools

Article 9 is no less likely to cause general discontentment, as it creates a certain privilege in favour of the ethnical, linguistic and religious minorities, assuring them “an equitable part in the revenues and attribution of sums which could originate from public funds, ministry departments, municipal, or other budgets having educational, religious or charitable aims”. Considering that the above-mentioned minorities will at the same time have the right of taking the advantage of educational or charitable institutions destined to the population as a whole and kept up on State communal or other funds; a privileged minority would in this way get more advantage out of public funds than the generality of the inhabitants. In the same way Article 12 justly assuring to the Jews the right to celebrate their Sabbath can become a cause of conflict between them and the Polish population, as the clause, according to which: “Jews will not be obliged to accomplish any acts constituting a violation of their Sabbath” can authorise them to refuse public service as civil officials (State service, railways or commons) or in the Army. Privilages of Minorities

The Great Powers by refusing to grant to the Polish State the necessary time to experience in the Jewish question the methods of civic equality, the efficiency of which have been recognised by the United States, Great Britain, France and Problem Italy, and by distinguishing with the aid of special privileges the Jewish population from their fellow-citizens—create a new Jewish problem assuming thereby before humanity a heavy responsibility instead of contributing to solve the problem peacefully, they complicate it in an unforeseen way. It is to be feared that the Great Powers may be preparing for themselves unwelcome surprises, for taking into consideration the migratory capacities of the Jewish population, which so readily transports itself from one State to another, it is certain that the Jews, basing themselves on precedent thus established, will claim elsewhere the national principles which they would enjoy in Poland. The Creation of a New Problem

The motives for which clauses concerning Polish nationalities (art. 2–5) should be inserted in a special Treaty between the Great Powers and Poland, and in the fundamental laws of the Polish Constitution are not clear. The Treaty with Germany (Art. 90–91) solves the question in as far as the population of Polish territories acquired by Prussia is concerned. This question is to be solved in the same way in the Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Russia. All questions concerning Polish nationality will then be avoided and the stipulations of the present Treaty will be superfluous. Right of Citizenship

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The Treaty of the Principal Powers with Poland stipulates, as far as we understand, the general directing principles of the relation to national minorities, it being the tendency of the scheme to create fundamental laws of these principles, laws which would be an immutable part of the Constitution, a declaration of rights (paragr. 13). The Treaty, however, places amongst these fundamental principles such administrative and Government details as, for instance, the organisation of the school system, the re-partition of education and charity funds (paras. 9–10) which cannot be entered as the fundamental laws of a Constitution. Constitutional Rights and Administrative Details

Finally, we trust that the stipulations of the scheme of the Treaty do not embrace the German population in Poland. After the conclusion of Peace, a large proportion of Polish population will remain within the German Empire. Formerly, the Polish population in Germany was not only deprived of equality of rights, but was submitted to a rigorous system of exceptional laws and administrative decrees, aiming at the extermination of the Polish element. The Peace Treaty does not impose on the Germans any obligation of granting equality of rights to the Poles of the Empire. The linguistic rights of the Poles in the Courts of Justice, the possibility of keeping Polish schools with the aid of State and Communal funds, are not guaranteed therein. The treatment of the Polish minorities in Germany and of the German minorities in Poland cannot therefore be considered on the basis of reciprocity. As the Peace Treaty with Germany does not contain any clauses guaranteeing the rights of Polish minorities, it would be unjust that the Treaty of the Principal Powers with Poland should ensure to the Germans in Poland, in addition to an equality of rights, the privilege of making use of the German language in the Polish Courts of Justice, as well as of keeping up schools of German language out of public funds. Rights of Germans in Poland

Whilst handing in the present answer to the scheme of the Treaty, the Polish Delegation points out that in this matter, wherein the internal legislation of Poland is concerned, the Diet and the Government of Poland are in the first place entitled to express their opinion.

The scheme of the Treaty has been sent to them.

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Appendix III to CF–74


commission of the new states

convention with poland

Note by M. Sonnino for the Council of Four

The Commission of the New States has drawn up the rules which are to be dictated to Poland, and is now examining those further measures which should be agreed on with the Poles.

Nothing has yet been decided about the rules for regulating the reciprocal relations between the ex-Austrian subjects who become Polish citizens, and the other ex-Austrian subjects who became citizens of other Allied States. Special rules on this subject are absolutely essential, as it is a case of relations differing somewhat from those between Poland and the other territories which never formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, relations indeed which are more frequent and important than the others.

It is a question of pending contracts, of foreclosures, of debts, of insurance business, of assessment of pensions, of repartition of funds and property held in common, of restitution of works of art, of tariff regulations, of customs duties, etc.

It is a question of safeguarding by reasonable arrangements important existing interests; and of not disturbing the status quo too abruptly.

It is therefore urgent that Council of Four should instruct the Commission for the New States to deal with these special questions.

Appendix IV to CF–74


Note From Superior Blockade Council for Council of Heads of States

Proposed Agreement by Austria Regarding Trade With Hungary and Germany

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Economic Council at its meeting of June 2, 1919, the Superior Blockade Council recommend to the Council of the Heads of States that when the Financial and Reparation Clauses are delivered to the Austrian Delegates, they be informed that they are required to agree to the following stipulations, which should be signed and delivered in the form of a separate note from the Austrian Delegates:—

  • “1. The Government of Austria will, unless otherwise requested by the Associated Governments of the United States, Great Britain, [Page 542] France, and Italy, continue effectively to prohibit the importation, exportation and transit of all articles between Austria and Hungary and to maintain such prohibition up to the time of the formal acceptance by the Government of Hungary of such terms of peace as shall be proposed by the Associated Governments.
  • “2. The Government of Austria will, unless otherwise requested by the Associated Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, continue effectively to prohibit the importation, exportation and transit of all articles between Austria and Germany and to maintain such prohibition up to the time of the formal acceptance by the Government of Germany of the terms of peace proposed by the Associated Governments”.

Paris, June 7, 1919.

  1. Will be forwarded later. [Footnote in the original. The text of the draft treaty referred to does not accompany the minutes of this meeting.]
  2. The text of this note does not accompany the minutes of this meeting.
  3. Gen. Dmitri L. Horvat, Russian Governor and General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway; High Commissioner of the Kolchak government for the Far East.
  4. Gen. Gregory Semenoff, Ataman of the Far Eastern Cossacks.