Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/74
CF–74
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, June 17, 1919, at 4 p.m.
Paris, June 17, 1919, 4 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- France
- Italy
- Japan
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secretaries. |
| M. di Martino. |
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
1. (It was agreed that the Convention in regard to the Rhine should be
published.) Publication of the Rhine
Convention
2. The Council had before them a Draft Treaty with Poland submitted by
the Committee on New States. (Appendix I.)*
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the Council
ought to hear a long memorandum he had received from M. Paderewski on
the subject. Draft Treaty With Poland Submitted by
the Committee on New States; M. Paderewski’s Letter
President Wilson then read M. Paderewski’s
memorandum. (Appendix II.)
After the reading of the memorandum, Mr. Lloyd
George said that this was a fundamental challenge to the whole
of the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Small
States. He did not feel himself competent to examine it in detail and
suggested it should be referred to the Committee on New States.
President Wilson said that the point about the
memorandum which struck him was the statement that we were claiming more
for the Germans in Poland than for the Poles in Germany. This was a
serious indictment. He recalled that some years ago, the United States
had denounced a Treaty with Russia at considerable inconvenience,
because of the ill-treatment by Russia of Jews who were citizens of the
United States. They had taken this action on the ground not that Jews
had been maltreated but that American Jews were being maltreated, that
is to say, distinctions were being made between American
[Page 530]
citizens which were not recognised in the
United States. Here, there was a danger of imparting to the Jews a
corporate capacity.
Mr. Lloyd George said there was also something
in the contention that a separate organisation for Jewish schools would
tend to create a separate nation of the Jews in Poland rather than
unity. This would lend itself to German intrigue.
President Wilson then put the other side of the
question. There was no doubt that Roumania had done disgraceful things
to the Jews in spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. If the
minorities could be ill-treated without provision for appeal, they would
derive no advantage from the Treaty. Roumania had broken the Treaty of
Berlin in this respect again and again with impunity. Hence, it was
necessary to provide for some appeal. In reply to M. Sonnino, he said
that, if these provisions were adopted, Jews in the United States would
be able to bring sufficient influence to bear to call the attention of
the Council of the League of Nations to the matter. What these people
feared was interference with their internal affairs.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Poland and
Czecho-Slovakia had been called into existence by the Great Powers and
could not live without these Powers. Consequently, they were not quite
in the position of the old established States.
(After some further discussion, it was agreed to refer M. Paderewski’s
memorandum to the Committee on New States to consider the objections
raised to their Treaty and to see whether some of these objections could
not be met.)
3. The attention of the Council was drawn to the alternative drafts put
forward in regard to Article 13 of the draft treaty with Poland.
(It was agreed that States only, and not individuals should have the
right of appeal to the Permanent with Poland Court of International
Justice, and consequently that the draft proposed by the French, British
and Japanese Delegations should be adopted.) Articles
13 of the Draft Treaty With Poland
4. M. Sonnino suggested that the Memorandum in
Appendix III, Farther Questions which he read, should be referred to the
Committee New states. Further Questions Referred to
the Committee on New States
(This was agreed to.)
5. The Council had before them a note from the Supreme Economic
Council1 raising the question
as to whether, after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by
Germany, measures are still to be taken to prevent commodities from
reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary. Blockade on
Hungary and Bolshevik Russia
President Wilson pointed out that a legal
blockade could not be established after peace had been made.
[Page 531]
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Germany would
receive all the hides and flax of Russia which were important to all the
nations of Europe. This raised the question as to whether the whole of
the commerce of Russia was to be left to German exploitation. If he were
quite convinced, which he was not, that the Bolsheviks could be crushed
in the present year, he might be willing to make a special effort. This
led to a discussion on the subject of the prospects of the Bolsheviks,
in the course of which President Wilson read a note from General Bliss
pointing out that Koltchak’s troops had evacuated 15,000 square miles
and were steadily retreating from the line of the Volga. That the fall
of Petrograd was not imminent since the Esthonians refused to advance
until they were recognised. There had been an uprising on Koltchak’s
lines of communication. In Eastern Siberia, Koltchak depended upon
Horvat2 and
Semen-off,3 while in Central Siberia he
depended on Allied troops.
President Wilson then read Para. 7 of the note
from the Supreme Economic Council, in which was recommended the
abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating
a resumption of trade with Russia.
Mr. Lloyd George said the real difficulty was
how to answer a question in Parliament or an interpellation in the
Chamber. How was a question to be answered “Is it permissible to trade
with Russia?” Was he to reply “Yes” or “No” to that question.
President Wilson asked if Great Britain was at
war with Bolshevik Russia.
Mr. Lloyd George replied that hostilities were
going on at Archangel.
President Wilson said that this did not
constitute a legal state of war, since there had been no formal
declaration of war. Consequently, there was no legal basis for a
blockade. His reply to such a question would be that there was no legal
warrant for estranging trade, and that the signature of Peace removed
the legal basis.
Mr. Lloyd George compared the decision to what
had occurred in past days between Great Britain and Spain, when we had
attacked Spanish colonies and seized their ships, while keeping our
ambassador at the Court of Madrid. What would his reply be if he was
asked whether British subjects could buy flax and sell boots? If he
replied “No”, then the Germans would get the trade.
President Wilson said his reply would be that
there was no legal basis for preventing it, but that traders would do it
at their risk.
[Page 532]
Sir Maurice Hankey asked what answer he was to
give to the note from the Supreme Economic Council.
Mr. Lloyd George said that an answer must be
given. The question arose as to whether a blockade should be maintained
in the Baltic. It was necessary to prevent the smuggling of arms from
Germany to Bolshevik Russia by sea. It would be difficult for the
Germans to send war material across Poland and the Baltic provinces, but
it would not be so difficult to send it by sea.
(After some further discussion it was agreed that the answer should be in
the following sense—
After the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are
not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik
Russia or Hungary, but the recommendation of the Supreme Economic
Council is approved, that there should be an abstention from any
positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption of such
trade. The Supreme Economic Council should be asked, however, to examine
as to whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for
preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to
Bolshevik Russia.)
6. Arising out of the previous discussion of the subject of the
Blockade,
President Wilson said that Mr. Hoover had
reported to him that the Allied Maritime Transport Council had issued an
order that all Allied ships on completing discharge of cargo should
leave German ports, and that no more ships of the Allied and Associated
Powers should proceed to German ports. One result had been that several
United States’ ships had been detained in British ports. These ships
were carrying foodstuffs, not for Germany’s use, but for Poland and
Czecho-Slovakia. It had never been found possible to build up ten days’
reserve in Czecho-Slovakia, and the stoppage of these ships was a very
serious matter. He himself had advised Mr. Hoover to demand the
immediate release of these ships, as his Government were prepared to run
the risk of their being held up in German ports. The action that had
been taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Council really amounted to a
reimposition of the Blockade, notwithstanding that it had been decided
that the blockade was not to be imposed unless and until a further order
was given. United States Shipping Detained in Great
Britain
Mr. Lloyd George said he had only heard of the
matter for the first time this afternoon. He understood, however, that
the Allied Maritime Transport Council was an Inter-Allied body, and that
this decision had been taken for the purpose of avoiding the seizure of
Allied shipping in German ports, and that the United States
representative had been present and had agreed in the decision.
[Page 533]
President Wilson said he had just ascertained
from Mr. Hoover that the United States representative had stated he
could not acquiesce without Mr. Hoover’s instructions.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he could not
understand this action being taken unless at least the United States
representative had said he could only agree subject to confirmation.
President Wilson pointed out that this action
had been taken a week before the Germans had to state whether they would
sign.
Mr. Lloyd George said that unless ample warning
had been given there would not have been time to extricate the ships,
since it would take them some time to discharge. He understood that Lord
Robert Cecil was the Chairman of this Committee.
Sir Maurice Hankey said he believed the action
had been taken by the Executive of the Allied Maritime Transport
Council, and not by the Council itself.
President Wilson said it was no good the
Council taking decisions in regard to the Blockade, when these
subordinate bodies took action without their authority. He had told Mr.
Hoover that he was to protest against the detention of the American
ships, as he was not willing to impose privation on the population of
Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.
M. Clemenceau said that the Allied Maritime
Transport Council appeared to have acted outside its authority, but
nevertheless he could not consider it as altogether unfortunate.
Mr. Lloyd George agreed that the threat of the
Blockade might provide an additional inducement for the Germans to sign,
and he undertook to make immediate enquiries and to take the necessary
action for the release of the United States ships.
Note: Mr. Lloyd George immediately after the
Meeting instructed his private secretary to telephone to London to order
the release of the United States’ ships.
7. The Council had before them a Note from the Superior Blockade Council
on the suggested agreement by Austria regarding trade with Hungary and
Germany. (Appendix IV).
(It was agreed that no decision in regard to this could be taken without
further explanation of what was intended.) Proposed
Agreement by Austria Regarding Trade With Hungary and
Germany
8. M. Sonnino said that the Austrian Delegation
was already beginning to send in Notes, and this raised the question of
the machinery of the Peace Conference for dealing with them.
(It was agreed that the Notes should be referred Delegation to the same
Commissions as had been established to deal with Notes from the German
Delegation.) Method of Dealing With Replies From the
Austrian Delegation
[Page 534]
9. M. Sonnino raised the question of the
position of the military officers of the Allied and Associated Powers,
who had been sent to Klagenfurt. He understood that the Yugo-Slavs had,
notwithstanding the communications from the Allied and Associated
Powers, pushed on and compelled the Austrians to accept an armistice,
under the terms of which they had to evacuate Klagenfurt. The four
military officers had found the Yugo-Slavs in possession of Klagenfurt.
They had no authority to order them to go out. The Yugo-Slavs were there
and would probably refuse to go unless these officers were given general
authority to insist upon the execution of the orders of the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers. If this were not done, it would be very
little use arranging for the Plebiscite. Carinthia:
The Armistice
President Wilson said that personally he was of
opinion that both forces ought to withdraw. The military officers ought
not to be told until the Governments had been communicated with. He
suggested that a communication should be made, both to the Government of
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to the Austrians,
informing them that they were expected to withdraw from the territory in
question, the boundaries of which should be stated.
The question having been raised as to who should keep order in the
withdrawal of the above forces,
Mr. Lloyd George said it would be no use to put
in Italian troops to keep order, as the Jugo-Slavs would oppose
them.
M. Sonnino said that Italy had no desire for a
permanent occupation of the Klagenfurt region.
President Wilson suggested that the maintenance
of order should be left to the local police forces.
(It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to
formulate a demand to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, and to the Austrian Government, informing them that the
forces of both States should be withdrawn from the Klagenfurt area, the
boundaries of which should be described in the despatch. A copy of the
despatch should be sent to the military officers on the spot of the
Allied and Associated Powers.)
10. President Wilson said that on enquiry he
found that it was very difficult for him to send United States troops to
occupy Upper Silesia during the plebiscite. Once peace was declared the
United States troops had to be with-drawn. Upper
Silesia: Occupation During the Plebiscite
Villa Majestic, Paris, 17 June, 1919.
[Page 535]
[The draft treaty with Poland which was to form appendix I to CF–74
does riot accompany the minutes of this meeting.]
Appendix II to CF–74
M–283
report of committee on new
states
Memorandum by M. Paderewski
The Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference appreciates the high
importance of the confirmation of the sovereignty and independence
of the Polish State through a treaty between the principal Powers
and Poland. But precisely from the point of view of the sovereign
rights of Poland, the Delegation considers it to be a duty to
present its objections to the introduction in the Treaty with
Germany, of article 93. according to which Poland should admit the
intervention of the Chief Powers in her internal affairs. Poland has
already experienced the nefarious consequences which may result from
the protection exercised by foreign Powers over ethnical and
religious minorities. The Polish Nation has not forgotten that the
dismemberment of Poland was the consequence of the intervention of
foreign powers in affairs concerning her religious minorities, and
this painful memory makes Poland fear the external ingérence into internal matters of State more than
anything.
This fear has been recently once more confirmed by the unanimous vote
of the Polish Diet. Whilst requiring the Government to prepare
without delay the schemes of laws respecting the rights of the
minorities, the Diet has, at the same time, finally declared its
opposition to any foreign intervention.
Poland will grant full rights of citizenship to all her subjects, but
will demand in return that all citizens should develop a
consciousness of their duties towards the State. This, however, can
not be attained should the rights granted to minorities be imposed
on the Polish State, and if those minorities, feeling themselves
under external protection were thus encouraged to lodge their
complaints against the State, to which they belong before a foreign
court of appeal. This would fatally provoke excitement against the
minorities and would become the cause of incessant unrest.
Polish-Jewish relations.
We have to note with regret that the relations between the Jewish and
Christian population in Poland have lately become strained. To those
who are acquainted with the evolution of the Jewish question in
Poland, this is a surprising phenomenon. The Polish nation with whom
the Jews, chased from Germany, had found refuge for several
[Page 536]
centuries and all
facilities for organizing their religious life, wished towards the
end of the 18th Century to emancipate these Jews, relegated to their
ghettos, and even after the loss of its independence attempted to
grant them the full measure of civil rights. The Polish-Jewish
relations during the whole of the 19th Century were distinguished by
good understanding. The present discord is caused by the attitude
adopted by the Jews who, considering the Polish cause as being a
lost one, on many occasions sided with Poland’s enemies.
This policy of the Jews called forth a change of public opinion
against them. However, the reconstruction of the Polish State which
must be admitted by the Jews as an established fact, will allow the
Polish nation, whose existence will no longer be imperilled by their
hostility, to return to her ancient principles respecting the Jewish
question. The relations between Jews and Poles will be automatically
established, within a short time, in a normal way, to the
satisfaction of both parties; whereas protection granted to the
Jewish population in Poland, through transferring the question on to
international ground, can but create difficulties.
The representatives of Poland admit equal rights, based on the
principles of freedom, to all citizens, without distinction of
origin, creed or language, admitting at the same time the necessity
of guaranteeing these principles by the Polish Constitution. Poland
of The representatives of Poland must however firmly stipulate
against any clauses of the Treaty which would cause prejudice to the
sovereignty of the Polish the essence and form of the Polish
Constitution and which would submit for approval to the Council of
the League of Nations the eventual modifications of the said
constitution. Imposition on Poland of Obligations
Prejudicing the Essence and From of Her Constitution
To place one special part of the Polish Constitution under the
protection of the League of Nations and demand the consent of its
Council (para. 13 to 14 of the scheme of the Treaty) is equivalent
to regarding the Polish nation as a nation of inferior standard of
civilization, incapable of ensuring to all its citizens the rights
and civic liberties and ignorant of the conception of the duties of
a modern State. The Polish State, sovereign in principle, would thus
be permanently placed under the control of the Powers: every
modification control of the Constitution which is the expression of
the sovereign will of the people would be submitted in as far as
concerns the obligations stipulated in the scheme of the Treaty, to
the examination and approval of the Council of the League. Permanent Control of the Powers Over
Poland
In reality, the will of one member of the Council, could hamper any
development of the Polish Constitution, which the vital needs of the
country might require.
[Page 537]
The constitutional principles, stipulating the rights of minorities,
as well as the Constitution, as a whole, will contain in Poland
alike to other States guarantees of inviolability. Laws, decrees,
and administrative acts which are contrary to the Constitution will
have no validity. The organisation of the political authorities and
the corresponding political and judicial guarantees will constitute
a sufficient safeguard of inviolability of the fundamental laws.
Guarantees Concerning the Inviolability of
the Constitution
Art. 14 of the scheme of the Treaty concerning the approval of
Constitutional modifications by the Council of the League of
Nations, as well as the clause of Art. 1 according to which the
stipulations of the Treaty, which are to form part of the
Constitution, fall under the jurisdiction of the League, must
accordingly be struck out as being prejudicial to the sovereignty of
Poland.
While all the scheme of Constitution laid before the Diet, and all
declarations voted as well as all special laws passed originate from
the idea of equal rights of all citizens; while legislative motions
concerning national minorities who form the bulk of the population
of a given territory guarantee to these minorities an extensive
autonomy; the scheme of the treaty puts to doubt the value of the
leading ideas which have hitherto directed the Polish State. This
scheme appears to aim at depriving the principles of equality,
stated in the Constitution of their character of free expression of
national will, tending to represent them as the result of the
imposed demands of Foreign Powers, who retain for themselves the
right of control. Art. 1 refers to: “the desire (of Poland) to
conform her institutions to the principles of liberty and justice,
also to give a sure guarantee to all the inhabitants of the
territories over which she has assumed the sovereignty”, as if
Poland were a state without a past or constitutional traditions for
the first time aware of the principles of justice and freedom.
Precisely the living traditions of the former Polish State, which
had outdistanced others in the matter of assuring equality of
political rights to all its citizens, without distinction of origin,
language, or creed, and had opened its doors for the sects
persecuted in the neighbouring states and assured a refuge to the
Jews banished from the West,—these traditions have helped to sustain
amongst the Poles the consciousness of their nationality. Poland
expresses the ardent desire that the principles of freedom should be
universally applied to the minorities. Poland promises to realise
the stipulations concerning their rights which the League of Nations
will recognize as being obligatory for all States belonging to the
League, in the same way as with regard to the protection of labour.
The Equality of Rights of All
Citizens
The regulation, by the Treaty of details concerning Jewish schools
and the right of use [of] the Jewish language in the Courts of
Justice,
[Page 538]
seems to be
especially inappropriate, considering that, at the present time, the
Jewish question in Poland is a question of violent dissension among
the Jewish population itself. One part of the Jewish population only
demands complete equality of rights for people of Jewish origin.
This has been granted them. The others demand a separate religious
organisation, endowed by the State with political, national, social,
economic, cultural and linguistic attributions, which would
transform the Jews into an autonomous Nation. Some Jews consider the
Jewish dialect used by the majority of Jews in Poland and which is a
corrupted German as spoken in the middle ages, as inadequate to
modern intellectual requirements, and merely adaptable to the
germanisation of Jews, when cultivated in schools. Others, on the
contrary, wish to regard it as their national language, whereas a
part of the Jewish population tends to revive the ancient Hebrew
tongue. The actual State of transitions of the Jewish question
scarcely allows the national and linguistic rights of the Jews in
Poland to be determined. There is no doubt, that the stipulations
proposed with regard to the rights of the Jewish population will
call forth a deep resentment on that part of the Jewish population,
which whilst attached to its religion, considers itself as being of
Polish nationality and is anxious to avoid a conflict with the Poles
about national and linguistic rights. Jewish
Opposition in Poland
The fact that the proposed stipulations may in future have a fatal
influence on Polish internal relations, cannot be sufficiently
emphasized. The school authorities for the whole population are
controlled by the Polish Government. In the meantime, Article 10 of
the Treaty creates one or several special school committees for the
Jewish population, as strictly religious institutions, to be
appointed by the Jewish communities, independently of the Government
and recognizes their right to organise and manage the Jewish
schools. Such a privilege must needs call forth analogous demands on
the part of organisations of other creeds and may lend to the
establishment of schools, specially reserved to scholars of a given
faith, and tend to the creation of strictly religious
education,—which would contribute to deepen religious divergencies
in Poland. This article is inadmissible, as it would bring about the
breaking up of the political organisation, into religious
organisations, having public rights, privileged from an
administrative point of view, as was the case in the middle ages. It
is also contrary to the modern tendency of all States of using
schools as a means of producing citizens brought up in a certain
spirit of unity and social solidarity. This tendency must be
specially adopted by the Polish State, which is being formed by the
[Page 539]
reunion of regions
having been for over a century under foreign and decidedly hostile
influences. Independent Management of Jewish
Schools
Article 9 is no less likely to cause general discontentment, as it
creates a certain privilege in favour of the ethnical, linguistic
and religious minorities, assuring them “an equitable part in the
revenues and attribution of sums which could originate from public
funds, ministry departments, municipal, or other budgets having
educational, religious or charitable aims”. Considering that the
above-mentioned minorities will at the same time have the right of
taking the advantage of educational or charitable institutions
destined to the population as a whole and kept up on State communal
or other funds; a privileged minority would in this way get more
advantage out of public funds than the generality of the
inhabitants. In the same way Article 12 justly assuring to the Jews
the right to celebrate their Sabbath can become a cause of conflict
between them and the Polish population, as the clause, according to
which: “Jews will not be obliged to accomplish any acts constituting
a violation of their Sabbath” can authorise them to refuse public
service as civil officials (State service, railways or commons) or
in the Army. Privilages of Minorities
The Great Powers by refusing to grant to the Polish State the
necessary time to experience in the Jewish question the methods of
civic equality, the efficiency of which have been recognised by the
United States, Great Britain, France and Problem Italy, and by
distinguishing with the aid of special privileges the Jewish
population from their fellow-citizens—create a new Jewish problem
assuming thereby before humanity a heavy responsibility instead of
contributing to solve the problem peacefully, they complicate it in
an unforeseen way. It is to be feared that the Great Powers may be
preparing for themselves unwelcome surprises, for taking into
consideration the migratory capacities of the Jewish population,
which so readily transports itself from one State to another, it is
certain that the Jews, basing themselves on precedent thus
established, will claim elsewhere the national principles which they
would enjoy in Poland. The Creation of a New
Problem
The motives for which clauses concerning Polish nationalities (art.
2–5) should be inserted in a special Treaty between the Great Powers
and Poland, and in the fundamental laws of the Polish Constitution
are not clear. The Treaty with Germany (Art. 90–91) solves the
question in as far as the population of Polish territories acquired
by Prussia is concerned. This question is to be solved in the same
way in the Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Russia. All questions
concerning Polish nationality will then be avoided and the
stipulations of the present Treaty will be superfluous. Right of Citizenship
[Page 540]
The Treaty of the Principal Powers with Poland stipulates, as far as
we understand, the general directing principles of the relation to
national minorities, it being the tendency of the scheme to create
fundamental laws of these principles, laws which would be an
immutable part of the Constitution, a declaration of rights (paragr.
13). The Treaty, however, places amongst these fundamental
principles such administrative and Government details as, for
instance, the organisation of the school system, the re-partition of
education and charity funds (paras. 9–10) which cannot be entered as
the fundamental laws of a Constitution. Constitutional Rights and Administrative Details
Finally, we trust that the stipulations of the scheme of the Treaty
do not embrace the German population in Poland. After the conclusion
of Peace, a large proportion of Polish population will remain within
the German Empire. Formerly, the Polish population in Germany was
not only deprived of equality of rights, but was submitted to a
rigorous system of exceptional laws and administrative decrees,
aiming at the extermination of the Polish element. The Peace Treaty
does not impose on the Germans any obligation of granting equality
of rights to the Poles of the Empire. The linguistic rights of the
Poles in the Courts of Justice, the possibility of keeping Polish
schools with the aid of State and Communal funds, are not guaranteed
therein. The treatment of the Polish minorities in Germany and of
the German minorities in Poland cannot therefore be considered on
the basis of reciprocity. As the Peace Treaty with Germany does not
contain any clauses guaranteeing the rights of Polish minorities, it
would be unjust that the Treaty of the Principal Powers with Poland
should ensure to the Germans in Poland, in addition to an equality
of rights, the privilege of making use of the German language in the
Polish Courts of Justice, as well as of keeping up schools of German
language out of public funds. Rights of Germans
in Poland
Whilst handing in the present answer to the scheme of the Treaty, the
Polish Delegation points out that in this matter, wherein the
internal legislation of Poland is concerned, the Diet and the
Government of Poland are in the first place entitled to express
their opinion.
The scheme of the Treaty has been sent to them.
[Page 541]
Appendix III to CF–74
M–284
commission of the new
states
convention with poland
Note by M. Sonnino for the Council of
Four
The Commission of the New States has drawn up the rules which are to
be dictated to Poland, and is now
examining those further measures which should be agreed on with the Poles.
Nothing has yet been decided about the rules for regulating the
reciprocal relations between the ex-Austrian subjects who become
Polish citizens, and the other ex-Austrian subjects who became
citizens of other Allied States. Special rules on this subject are
absolutely essential, as it is a case of relations differing
somewhat from those between Poland and the other territories which
never formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, relations indeed
which are more frequent and important than the others.
It is a question of pending contracts, of foreclosures, of debts, of
insurance business, of assessment of pensions, of repartition of
funds and property held in common, of restitution of works of art,
of tariff regulations, of customs duties, etc.
It is a question of safeguarding by reasonable arrangements important
existing interests; and of not disturbing the status quo too abruptly.
It is therefore urgent that Council of Four should instruct the
Commission for the New States to deal with these special
questions.
Appendix IV to CF–74
M–250
Note From Superior Blockade Council
for Council of Heads of States
Proposed Agreement by Austria
Regarding Trade With Hungary and Germany
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Economic Council at
its meeting of June 2, 1919, the Superior Blockade Council recommend
to the Council of the Heads of States that when the Financial and
Reparation Clauses are delivered to the Austrian Delegates, they be
informed that they are required to agree to the following
stipulations, which should be signed and delivered in the form of a
separate note from the Austrian Delegates:—
- “1. The Government of Austria will, unless otherwise
requested by the Associated Governments of the United
States, Great Britain,
[Page 542]
France, and Italy, continue
effectively to prohibit the importation, exportation and
transit of all articles between Austria and Hungary and
to maintain such prohibition up to the time of the
formal acceptance by the Government of Hungary of such
terms of peace as shall be proposed by the Associated
Governments.
- “2. The Government of Austria will, unless otherwise
requested by the Associated Governments of the United
States, Great Britain, France and Italy, continue
effectively to prohibit the importation, exportation and
transit of all articles between Austria and Germany and
to maintain such prohibition up to the time of the
formal acceptance by the Government of Germany of the
terms of peace proposed by the Associated
Governments”.
Paris, June 7, 1919.
