Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/73½
CF–73B
Notes of a Meeting Held at Mr. Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot,
Paris, on Tuesday, June 17, 1919, at 3 p.m.
Paris, June 17, 1919, 3 p.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- France
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.—Secretary. |
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
1. Mr. Lloyd George showed to his two
colleagues a memorandum written by General Sir Henry Wilson.
M. Clemenceau said that he had seen Marshal
Petain in the morning. He had told him exactly what had occurred with
Marshal Foch on the previous day. Marshal Petain had said he was not
surprised. Marshal Foch had communicated to Marshal Petain part of his
plan and Marshal Petain thought it rather rash in parts. Of course, M.
Clemenceau commented, their natures were quite different. Marshal Petain
was wise, prudent, square and rather on the cautious side. He recalled
that, when Marshal Foch had been appointed, Marshal Petain had advised
him to insist on seeing his plans before they were carried out, but when
he had shown to Marshal Petain a year ago the plan that Marshal Foch
worked out for a continued offensive against the Germans, he had replied
that it was a very fine thing, and that with Marshal Foch’s initiative
and drive it ought to work out. Marshal Petain’s view on the present
situation was that Marshal Foch’s plan should be executed, but with
prudence, but, in making this observation, he had remarked that he only
knew the French Army’s part in the plan and did not know the part of the
British and American Armies. Action in the Event of
the Germans Refusing To Sign
Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson said that neither did they.
M. Clemenceau said he had then asked Marshal
Petain to return to Chantilly, where he had a first rate Chief of the
General Staff, and study the plan with great care as far as he knew it
and then come back to report to him. Later in the day, he, himself, had
received Marshal Foch’s plan.
Marshal Foch’s plan was then read aloud. (Appendix I.)
[Page 524]
After the reading of the plan, President Wilson
said that it left the Council exactly where they were yesterday, with
the substitution of an armistice for the previously proposed separatist
policy. An armistice was not the business of the Governments but of the
military authorities.
M. Clemenceau agreed, and did not think the
Council could take any part in it. He remarked that, when Marshal Foch
had been told yesterday that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson
would, if it were essential, ask their Legislatures for more troops,
Marshal Foch had not replied. He was particularly anxious not to have
any trouble with Marshal Foch before the Germans had given their reply
and hence he saw no need to rush matters. He asked if, in the meanwhile,
the British Navy could prepare to do something against Dantzig.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he had already
enquired into this when there was a question of landing the Poles there,
and he had been told that it was heavily fortified and that the ships
could do nothing. He suggested that orders to Marshal Foch should be
carefully prepared and signed by the Council of Five, instructing him
that his objective in the event of the Germans refusing to sign was
Berlin and the object to get peace signed. It should be stated that the
aim of the Allied and Associated Powers is to get peace signed, and that
the centre of Government was to be the military objective. Copies should
be given to General Pershing and General Robertson. He suggested that
someone with a military mind should prepare it, in order that it might
be framed like a military order with an unmistakable meaning, such as
Marshal Foch would understand.
M. Clemenceau undertook to prepare a document
and to let his colleagues have it on Thursday night.
2. In reply to a question by Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson said that if the Germans signed the peace he
proposed to return to the United States as soon as possible, in order to
Movements get the Treaty through the Senate. President Wilson’s Movements
Mr. Lloyd George said he had received a well
considered memorandum from a Member of the British Delegation Staff,
urging that the Austrian Treaty should be amended with the object of
detaching Austria from Germany. He undertook to give a copy to President
Wilson. The Detachment of Austria From
Germany
Villa Majestic, Paris, 17 June, 1919.
[Page 525]
Appendix I to CF–73B
Commander in
Chief of the Allied Armies,
General Staff, Section
I,
Paris, June 17, 1919.
Note From Marshal Foch
No. 3025
Renewal of the Offensive:
The offensive of the Allied Armies is ready to start again on the day
prescribed by the Governments: the armies, ready a first time for
May 20th, have been prepared again as a consequence of the orders
given by Marshal Foch June 14th, and confirmed the 16th. The
operations, except for an order of the Governments to the contrary,
will commence the day they have indicated, June 23rd, 7 p.m.
This offensive will be undertaken and followed according to the
program studied by the Commanders in Chief of the Allied Armies on
April 24th, disclosed to the Heads of Governments May 10th, and
ordered for the Commanders in Chief by this joint directory on May
20th, that is to say, in the direction of Weimar and Berlin, in
order to force the German Government to sign the peace.
It is difficult to foresee at what point of this movement we shall
obtain peace, and whether it will be necessary or not to go to
Berlin to overthrow the German Government.
But, it is certain that as fast as our advance forward proceeds, it
will be burdened by an occupation in the rear, all the more
difficult because the populations passed through, having recovered
their masculine character, are, if not strongly held in check, able
to form important centers of conflict, insurrection, or simply of
strikes of an embarrassing nature, to weaken and even to stop the
advance of Allied Armies or to interfere with their
communications.* It is naturally impossible to
estimate the magnitude of the difficulties that we shall encounter
and accordingly the cost of occupation which they will require of
us. But, forthwith, it is important to lessen as many as possible of
these costs—with the consequence that it is necessary, in order to
lighten our burden from the weight of the populations, that we be
able, on the way, to bring to peace: the Grand Duchy of Baden,
Württemberg, Bavaria.
This result should be obtained by the maneuver indicated in paragraph
2 of the plan described above: “Employ force in the valley of the
Main in order to separate northern Germany from southern Germany.”
[Page 526]
It is to exploit
completely the strategic action of separation by:
- 1.
- A separation maneuver which, with successive armistices, stops
hostilities in the conquered zones;
- 2.
- And, equally, a military action of reduction and of occupation
of southern Germany based on French forces marching from the
Black Forest and Italian forces marching from the Inn.
This preoccupation with realizing materially the results to be
obtained implies neither irresolution nor tardiness in the march
toward the final objective. The commander wishes simply, as such is
his duty, not to neglect any trump nor to permit any cause of
weakness behind him.
Finally, in assembling the military operations to be brought against
Germany, there is reason for counting very highly upon our Czech and
Polish allies, it being a question whether to have the Czech forces
intervene offensively in German territory or support the Polish Army
in the conflict which seems to be ready for it.
Delivering the blow, as rapidly as possible, in the valley of the
Main assures our communications by railroad with Czechoslovakia and
Poland. It unites into a single theater of operations the concert of
countries which are able to move against Germany. It renders
possible, against the heart of Germany, a concentric action, well
integrated, coordinated, and supported—and moreover the
revictualling of these countries, a portion of which is done at
present by the railway lines which the renewal of hostilities will
close for us.
In conclusion, the advance, in leaving the Rhine, with the forces
which are at our disposal, will offer much more of a chance of
arriving at its destination, Berlin, if we shall have detached as
quickly as possible from the German bloc the southern
constituencies; if we shall have, with this objective, forced the
southern states out of the war by successive armistices, which I
request the Governments henceforth to envisage; if we shall have
extended a hand by the Main, to the Czechs and Poles, with the
purpose of an advance ultimately converging upon Berlin.
As it appears:
- The commencement of our offensive is assured;
- Its outcome cannot be guaranteed a priori.
It will be greatly facilitated by the conditions enumerated
above.
I have the honor of requesting the Governments to try to consider
these seriously and to inform me if they share this point of
view.
[Page 527]
No. 2583
Commander in Chief of the Allied
Armies,
General Staff, Section I,
May 20, 1919
Instructions Only for the High
Command
I. The German Government refusing to sign the preliminaries of peace,
it is necessary, in order to break its resistance and to impose on
them the peace, to aim at this resistance where it exists, Weimar,
Berlin, with military means indisputably superior.
For this objective:
Move in the direction of Weimar, Berlin, centers of German
resistance, the forces of the Allied Armies, the greatest strength
possible starting from the nearest points, Mayence, Coblenz,
Cologne, by the shortest route.
II. Thus organized and launched in this direction, with its flanks
well covered by the Main on the south, the Lippe on the north, the
forces of the Allied Armies will realize already in the course of
the movement results of a nature to weaken the German State:
In reducing decidedly its territory to the South, for the
attack in the valley of the Main will separate northern
Germany from southern Germany;
In reducing considerably its economic means in the north by
the occupation of the basin of the Ruhr.
III. Perhaps the German Government, thus deprived of an important
part of its means of resistance, will be willing to submit without
more delay to the conditions of the entente.
In this case the Allied Armies, if they are halted, will remain
always covered on their flanks by the Main on the south, the Lippe
on the north.
IV. Having the Allied forces on a war footing permits the execution
of this plan of operations. They comprise from the beginning:
37 divisions of infantry and 5 divisions of cavalry*
[Page 528]
of which it would be sufficient to maintain in place
for the occupation of the Rhenish country about:
which would leave available for the first
operations:
31 divisions of infantry and 5 divisions of cavalry.
Namely:
| A French force |
12 divisions of infantry |
2 divisions of cavalry |
Operating south of the general line: Coblenz, Limburg,
Giessen, Risenach. |
| A United States force |
2 United States divisions of
infantry. |
1 French division of
cavalry. |
Operating north of and including the line mentioned
above and south of the line: Remagen, Siegen, Brilon
Beverungen. |
| A British force |
6 divisions of infantry |
1 British division of
cavalry. |
Operating north of and including the line mentioned
above and south of the line Dusseldorf (to the
Belgians), the road Dusseldorf-Ratingen, Ruffrath
[Richarth?], Hattingen, Witten, Hörde, Unna, Dinker,
Lippborg, this route entirely to the Belgians. |
| A Franco-Belgian force. |
3 Belgian divisions of
infantry. |
1 Belgian division of
cavalry. |
Operating between the last line mentioned above and
the Lippe. |
|
2 French divisions ol
infantry. |
|
|
| in general reserve (6 divisions of infantry)
at the disposition of the Commander in Chief of the
Allied Armies. |
3 French divisions of
infantry. |
|
In the region of Mainz. |
| 2 British divisions of
infantry. |
|
In the region of Cologne. |
| 1 French division of
infantry. |
|
In the region of Neuss. |
|
31 divisions of infantry |
5 divisions of cavalry |
|
| Copies for: |
General |
|
Headquarters by Commander Les Cannes. |
| General |
|
Pershing, by Cycliste. |
| General |
{ |
Michel |
| Gillain by Belgian Mission. |
| General |
|
Robertson by General Grant. |
| General |
|
Fayolle by General Paquette. |
