Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/61
CF–61
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, June 12, 1919, at 11 a.m.
Paris, June 12, 1919, 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
- France
- Italy
- Japan
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. |
} |
Secretaries. |
| Count Aldrovandi. |
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—Interpreter. |
1. The attached instructions to the Drafting Committee (Appendix Eastern
I) were approved and initialled by the four Heads of States. Eastern Frontiers of Germany: Instructions to Drafting
Committee
It was also agreed that the plebiscite should be held under the auspices
of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and not under the League
of Nations.
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify this decision to the
Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.)
2. (It was agreed to discuss this question in the situation afternoon,
when a further report would be available from the Foreign Ministers.)
Military Situation in Hungary
3. The Council had before them a draft,1 prepared by
Mr. Philip Kerr and submitted by Mr. Lloyd George, of a reply to Herr
Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter covering the German counter proposals.
In the course of the discussion a number of alterations were made in the
draft. The great majority of these were purely drafting and verbal
alterations. The following alone raised questions of principle:— Rejoinder to the German Counter proposals.
The Saar Valley.
M. Clemenceau produced a fresh draft, as he
wished to avoid raising again the question of the boundaries of 1814.
This had already
[Page 325]
been the
cause of some agitation in France and he did not wish to include
anything which would raise it again.
(M. Clemenceau’s draft was accepted.)
Memel.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that this
paragraph had been left blank, because the point had not yet been
decided and he had not been able to give Mr. Kerr any instructions.
Baltic Provinces.
An addition proposed by Mr. Kerr, calling attention to the high handed
German action in the Baltic Provinces, was not accepted as it was not
considered relevant.
Reparation.
Under this heading, it was pointed out that the draft as originally
worded contained an admission that the Allied and Associated Powers were
not claiming the utmost to which they were entitled.
Mr. Lloyd George and M.
Clemenceau both thought that this would raise political
difficulties in their respective countries.
President Wilson pointed out, however, that the
object of the letter was rather to show the Germans the intentions of
the Allied and Associated Powers than for home consumption.
(It was agreed to substitute some such phrase as the following:—
“They confined the payments payable by Germany to certain
specific categories clearly justified by the terms of the
Armistice.”)
Another sentence added under the heading, Reparation, was the following:—
“and to make proposals thereafter within four
months of the signing of the Treaty for a settlement of the
claims under each of the categories.”
League of Nations.
(The following draft, based on a proposal made to Mr. Lloyd George by Mr.
Bonar Law, was approved as an addition:—
“The German revolution was postponed until the last moments of
the war, and there is as yet no guarantee that it represents a
permanent and fundamental change.”)
President Wilson only consented to the use of
the word “fundamental” under pressure, as he considered that, strictly
speaking, it did not convey what it was meant to say. He preferred some
such term as “more than formal.” Under strong pressure from Mr. Lloyd
George and M. Clemenceau, however, he gave his assent.
Last page of the Memorandum.
(It was agreed that the period allowed to the Germans within which to
give their final answer should be five instead of seven days.
[Page 326]
M. Clemenceau explained that five days was all that the Germans
desired.
A copy of the letter, as finally approved, will be found in Appendix
II.)
4. Baron Makino said he was willing to have the
despatch of the Allied and Associated Powers2
published, together with Admiral Koltchak’s reply.3 He suggested, however, that Admiral some
indication should be given to the press that Admiral Koltchak’s reply
was considered satisfactory. Russia: Admiral
Koltchak’s Reply
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that a reply in this
sense should be sent to Admiral Koltchak, which could be published.
(Mr. Philip Kerr was instructed to draft a reply, but no final decision
was taken as to publication.)
5. There was a short discussion in regard to a second document, prepared
by Mr. Philip Kerr and presented by Mr. Lloyd George, dealing with the
Responsibility of Germany for the War and the Legal Basis of the Peace
Negotiations.4 This document, like
Mr. Kerr’s previous document, had been circulated by Mr. Lloyd George on
the previous day. Responsibility of Germany for the
War, and the Legal Basis of the Peace Negations
M. Clemenceau said he would like to reserve
this paper for the present. The Germans had issued a White Book, in
which they accused the French of having violated the frontier very many
times. He thought that this document should rebut the statements in the
White Book. He liked the document well enough as a magazine article, but
did not consider it so vigorous as the other. He thought the tendency
would be for it to weaken the first document.
President Wilson said that he was well
satisfied with the document so far as it went. He felt a little,
however, that it might be unwise to go into the historical argument
without making it more complete. The document had conveyed a slight
feeling of inadequacy. It would not prove satisfactory to the future
historian. If, however, it were only intended to reassure our own people
that the Germans were not believed, this moderate statement was,
perhaps, sufficient. He did not feel quite happy, however, about an
argument that was incomplete.
M. Clemenceau said it could not be made
complete unless it was expanded into a large volume. In France, at any
rate, there was no necessity for such a document, as the facts were
perfectly well understood.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the same was true in
Great Britain, but he did not like to leave the German note without some
reply.
[Page 327]
President Wilson suggested that, since all that
was required was to let the Germans know that we denied their
allegations, the document might be considered adequate. Moreover,
perhaps something was to be said for it on the ground of its quietness.
As a general traverse of the German argument, it was sufficient. He
proposed that it should be accepted, subject to the possibility of
change before being sent in.
Mr. Lloyd George supported this view. If the
Germans declined to sign and an advance by the Army was necessary, it
might be necessary to stir up public opinion again to a certain
extent.
M. Clemenceau asked for it to be reserved for
the present, while he obtained a translation of the German White Book.
He asked Sir Maurice Hankey to put himself in communication with the
Secretary-General on this matter.
6. The Council had before them the reply to the German proposals on the
subject of the League of Nations proposed by Colonel House, Lord Robert
Cecil, M. Leon Bourgeois and their associates. (Appendix III.) League of Nations: Draft Reply Proposed by the
Commission
President Wilson read this document.
(It was agreed to substitute for the first paragraph a fresh paragraph
proposed by President Wilson, adding at the end the following sentence:—
“Provided these necessary conditions are
assured, they see no reason why Germany should not become a
member of the League in the early future.”
The second and third paragraphs were approved without alteration.
The last paragraph was approved, except the last 5 lines, for which was
substituted the following:—
“It goes without saying that the realisation of
this programme will depend in large part on the satisfactory
carrying out by Germany of its own engagements.”
A copy of the document as finally approved is contained in Appendix
IV.)
7. The Committee had before them the Report of the Commission on the Left
Bank of the Rhine.5 As, however,
the English copy of the Report did not reach Mr. Lloyd George before the
meeting, the Report was not discussed in detail. Occupation of the Left Bank of the Rhine
Mr. Lloyd George said he would like to raise
the whole question both as to the period of occupation and the numbers
of troops. The question of the régime to be adopted would follow from
this. If the
[Page 328]
occupation was
for a prolonged period, the conditions should be gentle. If for a short
period, the conditions by Germany on France in 1871 would be very
suitable. He would like to ask the Military Authorities the question as
to whether they would prefer a short period with stringent conditions or
a long period with weak conditions.
M. Clemenceau was unwilling to consult the
military. He hoped that his colleagues would not ask him to make any
change in the existing agreement.
President Wilson asked if M. Clemenceau would
be willing to give an undertaking to reconsider the question within a
short period.
M. Clemenceau said that among the Allies, he
was willing to say that he would be prepared to reconsider it after the
lapse of a certain time, provided the Germans gave satisfactory
guarantees and assurances that they would carry out the Treaty. He was,
however, not willing to say this to Germany.
Mr. Lloyd George said he would like to consider
this proposal. His difficulty was to get the occupation clauses accepted
by Parliament. They would say—”Why do you want both occupation and
guarantee”. He was in a real difficulty here. To show how strong the
feelings of his colleagues were, he read a memorandum by Mr. Barnes on
the subject which he subsequently handed to M. Clemenceau (Appendix 5).
He instructed Sir Maurice Hankey to check the statement which Mr. Barnes
had attributed to Marshal Foch. He asked whether M. Clemenceau would
allow him to make a statement to Parliament about the understanding
between the Allies. This, of course, would be after the signature of
Peace but would indicate to the Germans the intention.
M. Clemenceau, after leaving the room to
consult Mr. Loucheur said that he and M. Loucheur had come to the
conclusion that it was a question of drafting. Both he and M. Loucheur
were of one mind that it would be impossible to concede to the Germans a
reduction in the period of occupation. He was prepared, however, to do
his best in the delicate matter of drafting a statement which could be
used by Mr. Lloyd George in Parliament.
Mr. Lloyd George said that a prolonged
occupation was not really necessary for the protection of France. It was
insisted on mainly for political reasons. If the occupation was to be
for a prolonged period it should be made as harmless as possible. He
wished to utter a warning (and he intended to make a formal protest on
the subject) that a prolonged occupation would be a great peril to
France and a prolonged peril to the Peace of Europe.
M. Clemenceau said he could not accept that
point of view. It was necessary that the German people should see a
Foreign Army on German
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soil as
a guarantee for the payment of the indemnity. He himself could remember
the German occupation in 1871 and what a relief it had been when the
Germans left. They had not moved a man until the last penny was paid. An
occupation was necessary as a reminder to the Germans that they owed
money which they should pay.
In regard to the French army, he felt sure that it would obey all orders
while in the occupied territories and the French Government did not mean
to interfere in any way with the people. While he could not accept and
must altogether repudiate Mr. Lloyd George’s point of view, he was
prepared to agree on his conclusions. He would go so far as to say that
if the proposals of the Commission were approved by his Colleagues, he
would accept them, though he himself, however, thought personally that a
shorter formula might be devised. He was ready to examine the question
with his Colleagues.
(The discussion on this subject was adjourned.)
8. President Wilson read the draft reply to the
German Note prepared by the appropriate Commission on the subject of the
territory of the Saar Basin (Appendix 6). The Note Note was approved,
subject to the following alterations:— The Saar
Valley. Reply to the German Note
6th paragraph, 10th line: for “law” put “order”.
Delete the following words:—
“By no means followed that it is an Arbitrary
Government nor (as the German Note suggests) that it is the French
Government which will be in power. The Commission …”
The sentence would then read as follows;—the words underlined6
being an addition:—
“It is true that the Governmental Commission to
which belongs the Supreme Authority will not be directly
responsible to a Parliamentary Assembly, but it will be
responsible to the League of Nations and not
to the French Government. The arrangement made will
afford ample safeguards against any abuse of the Power entrusted
to it; the Commission will besides
etc.”
Add at the end of the Note, the following sentence:—
“The German Note constantly overlooks the fact
that the whole arrangement is temporary, and that at the end of
15 years the inhabitants will have a full and free right to
choose the sovereignty under which they are to live.”
A copy of the Note as finally approved is attached in Appendix 7.
Villa Majestic, Paris, 12 June, 1919.
[Page 330]
Appendix I to CF–61
eastern frontiers of
germany
Instructions to the Drafting
Committee
The Drafting Committee is instructed to revise the Treaty of Germany,
in accordance with the attached copy of the Report of the Committee
on the Eastern Frontiers of Germany dated June 10th, 1919,7 to the following extent:—
- 1.
- By introducing the revised definition of the boundary of
Germany with Poland in Appendix 1.
- 2.
- By introducing in the Treaty of Peace Articles based on the
draft in Appendix II relative to the carrying out of a
plebiscite in Upper Silesia, the text being amended as in
manuscript.
- 3.
- By introducing an Article based on the Economic Clause on page
5.
- 4.
- By introducing an Article based on the Financial Clause on
page 5, which is to be made applicable to all territory
transferred from German to Polish sovereignty.
- W. W.
- G. C.
- D. LlG.
- V. E. Or.
June 12, 1919.
Appendix II to CF–61
M–256
Draft Letter
The Allied and Associated Powers have given the most earnest
consideration to the observations of the German Delegation8 on the draft Treaty of
Peace. The reply protests against the peace both on the ground that
it conflicts with the terms upon which the Armistice of November
11th, 1918, was signed, and that it is a peace of violence and not
of justice. The protest of the German Delegation shows that they
utterly fail to understand the position in which Germany stands
to-day. They seem to think that Germany has only to “make sacrifices
in order to attain peace”, as if this were but the end of some mere
struggle for territory and power. The Allied and Associated Powers
therefore feel it necessary to begin their reply by a clear
statement of the judgment of the war which has been formed by
practically the whole of civilised mankind.
In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers the war which began
on August 1st, 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity
[Page 331]
and the freedom of peoples
that any nation, calling itself civilised, has ever consciously
committed. For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the
Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance in Europe.
They were not satisfied with that growing prosperity and influence
to which Germany was entitled, and which all other nations were
willing to accord her, in the society of free and equal peoples.
They required that they should be able to dictate and tyrannise to a
subservient Europe, as they dictated and tyrannised over a
subservient Germany. In order to attain their ends they used every
channel with which to educate their own subjects in the doctrine
that might was right in international affairs. They never ceased to
expand German armaments by land and sea, and to propagate the
falsehood that it was necessary because Germany’s neighbours were
jealous of her prosperity and power. They sought to sow hostility
and suspicion instead of friendship between nations. They even
developed a system of espionage and intrigue which enabled them to
stir up internal rebellion and unrest and even to make secret
offensive preparations, within the territory of their neighbours
whereby they might, when the moment came, strike them down with
greater certainty and ease. They kept Europe in a ferment by threats
of violence and when they found that their neighbours were resolved
to resist their arrogant will, they determined to assist their
predominance in Europe by force. As soon as their preparations were
complete, they decided, in conjunction with a subservient colleague,
to declare war at 48 hours’ notice over a matter which could not be
localised and had long been a subject of European concern, knowing
perfectly well that this almost certainly meant a general war. In
order to make doubly sure, they refused every attempt at
conciliation and conference until it was too late, and the world war
was inevitable for which they had plotted, and for which alone among
the nations they were adequately equipped and prepared.
Germany’s responsibility, however, is not confined to having planned
and started the war. She is no less responsible for the savage and
inhuman manner in which it was conducted. Though Germany was itself
the guarantor of Belgium, the rulers of Germany violated, after a
solemn promise to respect it, the neutrality of this unoffending
people. Not content with this they deliberately carried out a series
of promiscuous shootings and burnings with the sole object of
terrifying the inhabitants into submission by the very Rightfulness
of their action. Their conduct of the war was animated by exactly
the same disregard for humanity or law. They were the first to use
poisonous gas, notwithstanding the appalling suffering it entailed.
They began the bombing and long distance shelling of towns for no
military object, but solely for the purpose of reducing the morale
of their opponents by striking at their women and children. They
[Page 332]
commenced the submarine
campaign with its piratical challenge to international law, and its
destruction of great numbers of innocent passengers and sailors, in
mid ocean, far from succour, at the mercy of the winds and the
waves, and the yet more ruthless submarine crews. They drove
thousands of men and women and children with brutal savagery into
slavery in foreign lands. They allowed barbarities to be practised
against their prisoners of war from which the most uncivilised
peoples would have recoiled. The conduct of Germany is almost
unexampled in human history. The terrible responsibility which lies
at her doors can be seen in the fact that not less than seven
million dead lie buried in Europe, while more than twenty million
others carry upon them the evidence of wounds and sufferings,
because Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to
war.
The Allied and Associated Powers believe that they will be false to
those who have given their all to save the freedom of the world if
they consent to treat this war on any other basis than as a crime
against humanity and right.
This attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers was made perfectly
clear to Germany during the war by their principal statesmen. It was
defined by President Wilson in his speech of September 27th
1918,9 and explicitly and
categorically accepted by the German people as a principle governing
the peace:—
“If it be in truth,” he said, “the common object of the
Governments associated against Germany and of the nations
whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the
coming settlement a secure and lasting peace, it will be
necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall
come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price,
that will procure it, and ready and willing also to create
in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it
can be made certain that the agreement of the peace will be
honoured and fulfilled. That price is impartial justice in
every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is
crossed; and not only impartial justice, but also the
satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt
with.”
It was set forth clearly in a speech of the Prime
Minister of Great Britain dated 14th December 1917:—10
“There is no security in any land without certainty of
punishment. There is no protection for life, property or
money in a State where the criminal is more powerful than
the law. The law of nations is no exception, and, until it
has been vindicated, the peace of the world will always be
at the mercy of any nation whose professors have assiduously
taught it to believe that no crime is wrong so long as it
leads to the aggrandisement and enrichment of the country to
which they owe allegiance. There have been many times in the
history of the world criminal States. We are dealing with
one of them now. And there will always be criminal states
until the reward of international crime
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becomes too precarious to make
it profitable, and the punishment of international crime
becomes too sure to make it attractive.”
It was made clear also in an address of Monsieur
Clemenceau of September 1918:—11
“What do they (the French soldiers) want? What do we
ourselves want? To fight, to fight victoriously and
unceasingly, until the hour when the enemy shall understand
that no compromise is possible between such crime and
‘justice’
Similarly, Signor Orlando speaking on October 3rd, 1918,
declared:—12
“We shall obtain Peace when our enemies recognise that
humanity has the right and duty to safeguard itself against
a continuation of such causes as have brought about this
terrible slaughter; and that the blood of millions of men
calls not for vengeance but for the realisation of those
high ideals for which it has been so generously shed. Nobody
thinks of employing—even by way of legitimate
retaliation—methods of brutal violence or of overbearing
domination or of suffocation of the freedom of any
people—methods and policies which made the whole world rise
against the Central Powers. But nobody will contend that the
moral order can be restored simply because he who fails in
his iniquitous endeavor declares that he has renounced his
aim. Questions intimately affecting the peaceful life of
Nations, once raised, must obtain the solution which Justice
requires”.
Justice, therefore, is the only possible basis for the settlement of
the accounts of this terrible war. Justice is what the German
Delegation asks for and says that Germany had been promised. Justice
is what Germany shall have. But it must be justice for all. There
must be justice for the dead and wounded and for those who have been
orphaned and bereaved that Europe might be freed from Prussian
despotism. There must be justice for the peoples who now stagger
under war debts which exceed £30,000,000,000 that liberty might be
saved. There must be justice for those millions whose homes and
land, ships and property German savagery has spoliated and
destroyed.
That is why the Allied and Associated Powers have insisted as a
cardinal feature of the Treaty that Germany must undertake to make
reparation to the very uttermost of her power, for reparation for
wrongs inflicted is of the essence of justice. That is why they
insist that those individuals who are most clearly responsible for
German aggression and for those acts of barbarism and inhumanity
which have disgraced the German conduct of the war must be handed
over to a justice which has not been meted out to them at home.
That, too,
[Page 334]
is why Germany
must submit for a few years to certain special disabilities and
arrangements. Germany has ruined the industries, the mines and the
machinery of Belgium, Northern France, and Poland, not during
battle, but with the deliberate and calculated purpose of enabling
her own industries to seize her neighbours’ markets before their own
industries could recover from the devastation thus wantonly
inflicted upon them. Germany has despoiled her neighbours of
everything she could make use of or carry away. Germany has
destroyed the shipping of all nations in the high seas, where there
was no chance of rescue for their passengers and crews. It is only
justice that restitution should be made and that these wronged
peoples should be protected for a time from the competition of a
nation whose industries are intact and have even been fortified by
machinery stolen from occupied territories. If these things are
hardships for Germany, they are hardships which Germany has brought
upon herself. Somebody must suffer for the consequences of the war.
Is it to be Germany or the peoples she has wronged?
Not to do justice to all concerned would only leave the world open to
fresh calamities. If the German people themselves, or any other
nation, are to be deterred from following the footsteps of Prussia;
if mankind is to be lifted out of the belief that war for selfish
ends is legitimate to any State, if the old era is to be left behind
and nations as well as individuals are to be brought beneath the
reign of law, even if there is to be early reconciliation and
appeasement, it will be because those responsible for concluding the
war have had the courage to see that justice is not deflected for
the sake of convenient peace.
It is said that the German Revolution ought to make a difference and
that the German people are not responsible for the policy of the
rulers whom they have thrown from power. The Allied and Associated
Powers recognise and welcome the change. It represents a great hope
for peace, and a new European order in the future. But it cannot
affect the settlement of the war itself. The German Revolution was
stayed until the German armies had been defeated in the field, and
all hope of profiting by a war of conquest had vanished. Throughout
the war, as before the war, the German people and their
representatives supported the war, voted the credits, subscribed to
the war loans, obeyed every order, however savage, of their
government. They shared the responsibility for the policy of their
government, for at any moment, had they willed it, they could have
reversed it. Had that policy succeeded they would have acclaimed it
with the same enthusiasm with which they welcomed the outbreak of
the war. They cannot now pretend, having changed their rulers after
the war was lost, that it is justice that they should escape the
consequences of their deeds.
[Page 335]
II
The Allied and Associated Powers therefore believe that the peace
they have proposed is fundamentally a peace of justice. They are no
less certain that it is a peace of right on the terms agreed. There
can be no doubt as to the intentions of the Allied and Associated
Powers to base the settlement of Europe on the principle of freeing
oppressed peoples and re-drawing national boundaries as far as
possible in accordance with the will of the peoples concerned, while
giving to each facilities for living an independent national and
economic life. If there is any doubt upon this point they would
refer to the section of the attached Memorandum which deals with the
legal basis of the peace.13
Accordingly the Allied and Associated Powers have provided for the
reconstitution of Poland as an independent state with “free and
secure access to the sea”. All “territories inhabited by indubitably
Polish populations” have been accorded to Poland. All territory
inhabited by German majorities, save for a few isolated towns and
for colonies established on land recently forcibly expropriated and
situated in the midst of indubitably Polish territory, have been
left to Germany. Wherever the will of the people is in doubt a
plebiscite has been provided for. The town of Danzig has been
constituted as a free city, so that the inhabitants are autonomous
and do not come under Polish rule and form no part of the Polish
state. Poland has been given certain economic rights in Danzig and
the city itself has been severed from Germany because in no other
way was it possible to provide for that “free and secure access to
the sea” which Germany has promised to concede. The justification
for the proposals can be seen from the following table:—14
The German counter proposals entirely conflict with the agreed basis
of peace. They provide that great majorities of indisputably Polish
population shall be kept under German rule. They deny secure access
to the sea to a nation of over twenty million people, whose
nationals are in the majority all the way to the coast, in order to
maintain territorial connection between East and West Prussia, whose
trade has always been mainly sea-borne. They cannot, therefore, be
accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers. At the same time in
certain cases the German Note has established a case for
rectification which will be made (see Appendix)15 and in view of the
German contention that Upper Silesia though inhabited by a two to
one majority of Poles (1,250,000 to 650,000, 1910 German census)
wishes to remain a part
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of
Germany they are willing that the question of whether or not Upper
Silesia should form part of Germany or of Poland, should be
determined by the vote of the inhabitants themselves.
In regard to the Saar basin the régime proposed by the Allied and
Associated Powers is to continue for fifteen years, this arrangement
they considered necessary both to the general scheme for reparation,
and in order that France may have immediate and certain compensation
for the wanton destruction of her Northern coal mines. The district
has been transferred not to French sovereignty, but to the control
of the Society of the League of Nations. This method has the double
advantage that it involves no annexation, while it gives possession
of the coal field to France and maintains the economic unity of the
district, so important to the interests of the inhabitants. At the
end of fifteen years the mixed population which in the meanwhile
will have had control of its own local affairs under the governing
supervision of the League of Nations, will have complete freedom to
decide whether it wishes union with Germany, union with France, or
the continuance of the régime provided for in the Treaty.
As to the territories which it is proposed to transfer from Germany
to Denmark and Belgium, some of these were robbed by Prussia by
force, and in every case the transfer will only take place as the
result of a decision of the inhabitants themselves taken under
conditions which will ensure complete freedom to vote.
Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the
native inhabitants of the German colonies are strongly opposed to
being again brought under Germany’s sway, and the record of German
rule, the traditions of the German Government and the use to which
these colonies were put as bases from which to prey upon the
commerce of the world, make it impossible for the Allied and
Associated Powers to return them to Germany, or to entrust to her
the responsibility for the training and education of their
inhabitants.
For these reasons the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that
their territorial proposals are in accord both with the agreed basis
of peace and are necessary to the future peace of Europe. They are
therefore not prepared to modify them except in the respects laid
down.
III
Arising out of the territorial settlement are the proposals in regard
to international control of rivers. It is clearly in accord with the
agreed basis of the peace that inland states should have secure
access to the sea along rivers which are navigable to their
territory. In the case therefore of four international rivers, the
Allied and Associated Powers propose to place these waterways under
control of international
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boards. They believe that this arrangement is vital to the free life
of the inland states. They do not think that it is any derogation of
the rights of the other riparian states. If viewed according to the
discredited doctrine that every state is engaged in a desperate
struggle for ascendency over its neighbours, no doubt such an
arrangement may be an impediment to the artificial strangling of a
rival. But if it be the ideal that nations are to co-operate in the
ways of commerce and peace, it is natural and right. The provisions
for the presence of representatives of the League of Nations on the
boards is security that the river boards will consider the interests
of all. A number of modifications however have been made in the
original proposals, the details of which will be found in the
attached memorandum.16
IV. Economic and
Financial
Under the heading of economic and financial clauses the German
Delegation appear to have seriously misinterpreted the proposals of
the Allied and Associated Powers. There is no intention on the part
of the Allied and Associated Powers to strangle Germany or to
prevent her from resuming her proper place in international trade
and commerce. Provided that she abides by the Treaty of Peace, and
provided also that she abandons those aggressive and exclusive
traditions which have been apparent in her business no less than her
political methods the Allied and Associated Powers intend that
Germany shall have fair treatment in the purchase of raw materials
and the sale of goods, subject to those temporary provisions already
mentioned in the interests of the nations ravaged and artificially
weakened by German action. It is their desire that the passions
engendered by the war should die as soon as possible, and that all
nations should share equally in the prosperity which comes from the
honest supply of each others needs. They wish that Germany shall
enjoy this prosperity like the rest, though much of the fruit of it
must necessarily go for many years to come, in making reparation to
her neighbours for the damage she has done. In order to make their
intention clear, a number of modifications have been made in the
financial and economic clauses of the Treaty, details of which will
be found in the memorandum attached.16 But the principles upon which the Treaty is
drawn must stand.
Reparation
The German Delegation have greatly misinterpreted the Reparation
proposal of the Treaty. They confine the amounts payable by Germany
to certain specific categories clearly justified by the terms of the
armistice. They do not provide for that interference in the
[Page 338]
internal life of Germany
by the Reparation Commission which is alleged. They are designed to
make the payment of that reparation which Germany must make as easy
and convenient to both parties as possible and they will be
interpreted in that sense. The Allied and Associated Powers
therefore are not prepared to modify them.
But they recognise with the German Delegation, the advantage of
arriving as soon as possible at the fixed and definite sum which
shall be payable by Germany and accepted by the Allies. It is not
possible to fix this sum to-day, for the extent of damage and the
cost of repair has not yet been ascertained. They are therefore
willing to accord to Germany all necessary and reasonable facilities
to enable her to survey the devastated and damaged regions, and to
make proposals thereafter within four months of the signing of the
Treaty for a settlement of the claims under each of the categories
of damage for which she is liable. If within the following two
months an agreement can be reached, the exact liability of Germany
will have been ascertained. If agreement has not been reached by
then, the arrangement as provided in the Treaty will be executed.
Full details will be found in the annexed memorandum.18
League of Nations
The Allied and Associated Powers have given careful consideration to
the request of the German Delegation that Germany should be admitted
to the League of Nations as one of the conditions of peace. They
regret that they cannot accede to this request. The German
revolution was postponed to the last moments of the war and there is
as yet no guarantee that it represents a permanent change. In the
present temper of international feeling, it is impossible to expect
the free nations of the world to sit down immediately in equal
association with those by whom they have been so grievously wronged.
To attempt this too soon would delay and not hasten that process of
appeasement which all desire. But the Allied and Associated Powers
believe that if the German people prove by their acts that they
intend to fulfill the conditions of the peace, and that they have
abandoned for ever those aggressive and estranging policies which
caused the war, and have now become a people with whom it is
possible to live in neighbourly good fellowship, the memories of the
past years will speedily fade, and it will be possible within a
reasonable time to complete the League of Nations by the admission
of Germany thereto. It is their earnest hope that this may be the
case. They believe that the prospects of the world depend upon the
close and friendly cooperation of all nations in adjusting
international questions and promoting
[Page 339]
the welfare and progress of mankind. But the
early entry of Germany into the League must depend principally upon
the action of the German people themselves.
Conclusion
In conclusion the Allied and Associated Powers must make it clear
that this letter and the memorandum attached constitute their last
word. They have examined the German observations and counter
proposals with earnest attention and care. They have, in
consequence, made important modifications in the Draft Treaty. But
in its fundamental outlines they stand by the Treaty. They believe
that it is not only a just settlement of the great war, but that it
provides the basis upon which the peoples of Europe can live
together in friendship and equality. At the same time it creates the
machinery for the peaceful adjustment of all international problems
by discussion and consent, and whereby the settlement of 1919 itself
can be modified from time to time to suit new facts and new
conditions as they arise. It is frankly not based upon a general
condonation of the events of 1914–1918. It would not be a peace of
justice if it were. But it represents a sincere and deliberate
attempt to establish “that reign of law, based upon the consent of
the governed, and sustained by the organised opinion of mankind”
which was the agreed basis of the peace.
As such it must be accepted or rejected as it now stands. The Allied
and Associated Powers therefore require a declaration from the
German Delegation within five days as to whether they are prepared
to sign the Treaty as now amended. If they are willing to do so,
arrangements will be made for the immediate signature of the Peace
of Versailles. If they refuse the armistice will terminate and the
Allied and Associated Powers will take such steps as they think
needful to enforce their terms.
Villa Majestic, Paris, June 12, 1919.
Appendix III to CF–61
WCP–970
The League of Nations: Proposed Reply
to the German Proposals
- 1.
- It has never been the intention of the Allied and Associated
Powers that Germany should be indefinitely excluded from the
League of Nations. On the contrary, it is their hope that the
League will as soon as possible include all nations that can be
trusted to carry out the obligations accepted by Members of the
League. As soon as they are satisfied that Germany possesses a
stable government which has given clear proofs of its intention
to observe its international obligations
[Page 340]
arising out of the Treaty of Peace and to
take the necessary steps towards disarmament, the principal
Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to support Germany’s
candidature for admission to the League, and they see no reason,
provided these necessary steps are taken, why Germany should not
become a Member of the League in the early future.
- 2.
- The Allied and Associated Powers do not consider that an
addition to the Covenant in the sense of the German proposals
regarding economic questions is necessary. They would point out
that the Covenant already provides that “subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of international conventions
existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the
League . . . . will make provision to secure and maintain
freedom of communications and of transit, and equitable
treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League”, and
that a General Convention with regard to Transit questions is
now being prepared. So soon as Germany is admitted to the
League, she will enjoy the benefits of these provisions.
- 3.
- The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to accord to
Germany guarantees, under the protection of the League of
Nations, for the educational, religious and cultural rights of
German Minorities in territories hitherto forming part of the
German Empire. They take note of the statement of the German
Delegates that Germany is determined to treat foreign minorities
within her territory according to the same principles.
- 4.
- The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to
the German Delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations
provides for “the reduction of national armaments to the lowest
point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by
common action of international obligations”. They recognise that
the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own
disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a
general reduction of armaments; they intend to open negotiations
immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of
such general reduction, and they hope that substantial progress
will have been made when the Assembly of the League meets for
the first time, as is intended, in October of the present year.
The actual execution of any scheme that may be adopted must
depend largely on the satisfactory fulfillment by Germany of the
disarmament terms of the present Treaty.
Villa
Majestic, Paris,
11 June,
1919.
[Page 341]
Appendix IV to CF–61
WCP–970 (revised)
The League of Nations.—Reply to the
German Proposals
(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers on 12th June, 1919)
1. The pact of the League of Nations constitutes for the Allied and
Associated Powers the base of the Treaty of Peace. They have weighed
with care all its terms. They are convinced that it brings into the
relations of peoples, for the benefit of justice and of peace, an
element of progress which the future will confirm and develop.
The Allied and Associated Powers have never, as the text itself of
the Treaty proves, had the intention of indefinitely excluding
Germany or any other power from the League. They have taken measures
accordingly which apply as a whole to the states which are not
members and which fix the conditions for their subsequent
admission.
Every country whose government shall have clearly proved its
stability, as well as its desire to observe its International
obligations—particularly those obligations which result from the
Treaty of Peace—will find the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
disposed to support its demand for admission to the League.
In that which especially concerns Germany it goes without saying,
that the events of the last five years are not of a nature to
justify, at the present time, an exception to the general rule which
has just been mentioned. Its case demands a definite test. The
length of this delay will depend on the acts of the German
Government, and it is within the choice of that Government, by its
attitude towards the Treaty of Peace, to shorten the period of
waiting which the Allied and Associated Governments may consider it
necessary to fix, without any intention of prolonging it unduly.
They see no reason, provided these necessary conditions are assured,
why Germany should not become a member of the League in the early
future.
2. The Allied and Associated Powers do not consider that an addition
to the Covenant in the sense of the German proposals regarding
economic questions is necessary. They would point out that the
Covenant already provides that “subject to and in accordance with
the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to
be agreed upon, the Members of the League . . . . . will make
provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of
transit, and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of
the League”, and that a General Convention with regard to Transit
questions is now being prepared. So soon as Germany is admitted to
the League, she will enjoy the benefits of those provisions.
[Page 342]
3. The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to accord to Germany
guarantees, under the protection of the League of Nations, for the
educational, religious and cultural rights of German Minorities in
territories hitherto forming part of the German Empire. They take
note of the statement of the German Delegates that Germany is
determined to treat foreign minorities within her territory
according to the same principles.
4. The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the
German Delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides
for “the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action
of international obligations”. They recognise that the acceptance by
Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will
facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of
armaments; they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view
to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction. It
goes without saying that the realisation of this programme will
depend in large part on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of
its own engagements.
Villa
Majestic, Paris,
12 June,
1919.
Appendix V to CF–61
WCP–963
period of occupation of
germany
(Note by Mr. Barnes)
I had no opportunity this afternoon of raising the question of the
army of occupation and I desire to do so by way of memorandum. I see
no reason for 15 years’ occupation of German territory and I want to
say that in my opinion it is:—
- (1)
- Contrary to our understanding prior to coming to Paris. On
the 3rd December last Marshal Foch said that after the
signature of peace occupation might have to be continued for
one year. When asked by the Prime Minister whether this
estimate took into account an occupation of German provinces
with a view to the collection of an indemnity, he said he
was not considering that. His proposal was for one year. In
laying down the terms of reference to the Committee
appointed on the 24th December [sic]
to consider reparation,19 the
Prime Minister made the condition that an army of occupation
in Germany was not to be involved for its collection. Why
then are we being committed to this 15 years instead of the
one year?
- (2)
- Quite unnecessary. Germany is under obligation if the
peace terms are signed to disband her army and demolish her
fortifications within a few months. I can understand the
need for an army of occupation till these things are done,
but after that, I can see no reason for it at all, and I
have heard no reason put forward. Since we came here an
undertaking has been given to France that in the event of
unprovoked aggression upon her, America and Great Britain
will assist her to resist. Why both the undertaking and the
occupation I am quite at a loss to understand. It is
scarcely conceivable that Germany could be in a position to
make war upon France in the next 15 years. But, that the
armies should be on the spot, ready to carry out the
undertaking, would seem to me to be the only
justification—or rather the only explanation—for the army of
occupation.
- (3)
- Not only useless but also dangerous. An army of occupation
is sure to provoke hostile feelings on the part of the
population among whom it is quartered, and hostile feelings
may readily pass into hostile actions. The French soldiery
are probably the least suitable persons in the world to
occupy German territory because of the bitterness between
the two races. An army of occupation in these circumstances
is calculated to make that provocation certain against the
consequences of which we, in common with America, may be
called upon to guard France.
And over and above these three points there might be added the
question of expense. It is now to be limited, as I understand, to 12
millions yearly, and so far as that goes I admit it is an
improvement upon what had been put forward. Provision is also
made—so far as it can be made—against military law being applied to
the civilian population and that I also admit is a very wholesome
alteration upon the terms as first crudely put forward. But I see no
reason for a lengthy occupation at all.
G. N. B[arnes]
Paris
, 10
June, 1919.
Appendix VI
WCP–952
Draft Reply
No. 7.
Territory of the Saar
Basin
The question of the territory of the Saar Basin has already been the
subject of an exchange of notes with the German Delegation.20 The fresh observations
contained in the German communication seem
[Page 344]
to show such a misconception of the spirit and
object of this section of the Treaty that it appears useless further
to discuss them.
The object and will of the Allies have twice been stated: first, in
the Treaty itself in which it is said (Articles 45 & 46) that
Germany accepts the provisions in question “as compensation for the
destruction of the coal mines in the north of France and as part
payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage
resulting from the war . . . . . . . and in order to assure the
rights and welfare of the population:” and again, in the Note of May
24th,21 which said “The Allied and
Associated Governments have chosen this particular form of
reparation because it was felt that the destruction of the mines in
the north of France was an act of such a nature that a definite and
exemplary retribution should be exacted; this object would not be
obtained by the mere supply of a specified or unspecified amount of
coal. This scheme therefore, in its general provisions, must be
maintained, and to this the Allied and Associated Powers are not
prepared to agree to any alternative.”
On the other hand, the German Delegation declares that “the German
Government refuses to carry out any reparation which would have the
character of a punishment.” The German conception of justice seems
then to exclude a notion which is nevertheless essential to any just
settlement and a necessary base of any eventual reconciliation.
The Allied and Associated Powers, in deciding the form of reparation
to be exacted, have wished to choose one which, by its exceptional
nature, should constitute, it is true for a short time only, a clear
and visible symbol. They have at the same time meant to secure in
the case of this reparation a pledge which can at once be taken and
which avoids the risks emphasized by the German Empire itself.
On the other hand, they have taken the greatest care to protect the
inhabitants of the region itself from any material or moral injury.
The interests of these people have been scrupulously respected in
every particular and their condition has been improved.
The frontiers of the district have been determined just so as to
affect with the least possible degree, existing administrative units
and the every day life of this population whose character is so
complex. Care has been taken expressly to maintain the
administrative system in its entirety as regards civil and criminal
jurisdiction and taxation. The people keep their local assemblies,
their religious liberties, their schools and the use of their
language. All existing safeguards are maintained in favour of the
workers and the new laws will conform to the principles
[Page 345]
adopted by the League of
Nations. It is true that the Governmental Commission to which
belongs the supreme authority, will not be directly responsible to a
parliamentary assembly, but it by no means follows that it is an
arbitrary government, nor (as the German note suggests) that it is
the French Government which will be in power. The Commission will be
responsible to the League of Nations, an arrangement which will
afford ample safeguards against any abuse of the power entrusted to
it; it will, besides, be obliged to take the opinion of the elected
representatives of the district before making any change in the laws
or imposing any new tax. The revenue from taxation is to be entirely
devoted to payment of local expenses and, for the first time since
the annexation of this district to Prussia and Bavaria, which was
carried out by force, the people will have a government on the spot
which knows no other liability or interest than the care for their
well being. The Allied and Associated Powers are entirely confident
that the inhabitants of the district will have no reason to consider
the new administration to be more distant than was that of Berlin
and Munich.
Appendix VII to CF–61
WCP–952 (Revise)
territory of the saar
basin
Reply Approved by the Council of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers on 12 June, 1919
The Saar Valley has already been the subject of an exchange of notes
with the German Delegation. The new observations contained in the
German communication seem to show so complete a misapprehension of
the spirit and purpose of this section of the Treaty that further
discussion appears to be useless.
The purpose and decision of the Allies have twice been stated, first
in the text of the Treaty itself, in which (Articles 45 and 46)
Germany is to accept the provisions in question “as compensation for
the destruction of the coal-mines in the North of France and as part
payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage
resulting from the war, and … in order to assure the rights and
welfare of the population”; and secondly, in the note of May 24th,
“The Allied and Associated Governments have chosen this particular
form of reparation because it was felt that the destruction of the
mines in the North of France was an act of such a nature that a
definite and exemplary retribution should be exacted; this object
would not be obtained by the mere supply of a specified or
[Page 346]
unspecified amount of
coal. This scheme, therefore, in its general provisions, must be
maintained, and on this the Allied and Associated Powers are not
prepared to agree to any alternative”.
The German Delegation, on the other hand, declares that “the German
Government refuses to carry out any reparation which will have the
character of a punishment”. The German idea of justice appears then
to be one which excludes a conception which is essential to any just
settlement and a necessary basis for reconcilation.
It has been the desire of the Allied and Associated Powers in
determining upon the form of reparation to be imposed to choose one
which, by its exceptional nature, will be for a limited period a
definite and visible symbol. At the same time, they intended, by
assuring themselves of the immediate possession of a security for
reparation, to escape the risks to which the German memoir itself
has drawn attention.
On the other hand they have exercised the greatest care in order to
avoid inflicting on the inhabitants of the district itself any
material or moral injury. In every point their interests have been
most scrupulously guarded, and in fact their condition has been
improved.
The frontiers of the district have been precisely determined so as to
secure the least possible interference with the present
administrative units or with the daily vocations of this complex
population. It is expressly provided that the whole system of
administration of criminal and civil law and of taxation shall be
maintained. The inhabitants are to retain their local assemblies,
their religious liberties, their schools and the use of their
language. All existing guarantees in favour of the working
population are maintained, and the new order will be in accordance
with the principles adopted by the League of Nations. It is true
that the Governing Commission, with which the final control rests,
will not be directly responsible to a Parliamentary Assembly, but it
will be responsible to the League of Nations and not to the French
Government. The arrangement made will afford an ample guarantee
against the misuse of the power which is entrusted to it; but, in
addition, the Governing Commission is required to take the advice of
the elected representatives of the district before any change in the
laws can be made or any new tax imposed. The whole revenue derived
from taxation will be devoted to local purposes and for the first
time since the forcible annexation of this district to Prussia and
to Bavaria, the people will live under a Government resident on the
spot which will have no occupation and no interest except their
welfare. The Allied and Associated Powers have full confidence that
the inhabitants of the district will have no reason to regard the
new administration under which they will be placed as
[Page 347]
one more remote than was
the administration which was conducted from Berlin and Munich.
The German Note constantly overlooks the fact that the whole
arrangement is temporary, and that at the end of 15 years the
inhabitants will have a full and free right to choose the
sovereignty under which they are to live.
