Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/32
CF–32
Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson’s House in the Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 26, 1919, at 11 a.m.
Paris, May 26, 1919, 11 a.m.
- Present
- United States of America
- British Empire
- The Rt Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
- France
- Italy
| Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B. |
} |
Secretarties |
| Count Aldrovandi. |
| Prof. P. J. Mantoux—Interpreter. |
1. The Council had before them a letter addressed to Colonel House by
Lord Robert Cecil, dated 24th May, on the subject of Aerial Navigation.
(Appendix I.) In this letter, Lord Robert Cecil asked for certain
amendments to the Covenant of the Nations which should be considered as
drafting changes. Alteration in Covenant of League of
Nations: Aerial Navigation
President Wilson expressed the view that these
might be regarded as drafting alterations.
(It was agreed:—
That the Drafting Committee should be instructed to make the following
amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations:—
| Art. I, Para. 2, last line. |
} |
for “military and naval” substitute “military,
naval and air.” |
| Art. VIII, last para, last line. |
| Art. IX, last line. |
| Art. XVI, Para. 2, 3rd line, for “military or
Naval” substitute “military, naval or air.” |
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to prepare an instruction to the
Drafting Committee for the initials of the Four Heads of
Governments.)
2. With reference to C. F. 30, Minutes 2 & 3,1 the attached errata
to the Treaty of Peace with Germany (Appendix II) were initialled by the
Four Heads of Governments. Errata in Economic clauses
of German Treaty
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate them to the
Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)
[Page 26]
3. With reference to C. F. 31, Minute 1,2
Sir Maurice Hankey stated that the Japanese
Delegation had agreed to the draft despatch to Admiral Koltchak
(Appendix III), subject to two very small amendments, namely, in
paragraph 2 instead of the words “they are now being pressed to withdraw
etc.,” was substituted the following: “some of the Allied and Associated
Governments are now being pressed to withdraw etc.,” and paragraph 4
instead of the words “the last year” was substituted “the last 12
months.” Russia: Policy of Allied & Associated
Powers
(These alterations were approved and the letter was signed by the Four
Heads of States. The letter was then taken by Mr. Philip Kerr to the
Japanese Embassy, where it was signed by the Marquis Saionji. Sir
Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate the letter to the
Secretary-General with instructions to dispatch it, in the name of the
Conference to Admiral Koltchak.
Note. The Marquis Saionji, when appending his
signature, particularly asked that the letter should not be published
until a reply was received. Sir Maurice Hankey made a communication in
this sense to the Secretary-General.)
4. The general clauses, namely, Articles 47 to 50 of the military, naval
and air clauses for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty, which had
previously been initialled by the other three Heads of Governments, were
initialled by M. Orlando, withdrew his previous objections. General Clauses of the Military, Naval & Air Terms
With Austria
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward them to the
Secretary-General, for the information of the Drafting Committee.)
5. The letter from the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain contained in
Appendix IV was read.
Mr. Lloyd George said he thought a different
procedure ought to be adopted with Austria from that adopted with
Germany. The two cases were not really comparable. The Austro-Hungarian
Empire had broken up, one half was friendly, and the other half,
consisting of Austria and Hungary, he believed at any rate was not
unfriendly. They were not in the same category as Prussia. Consequently,
would it not be worth while, he asked, to give a different reply to what
had been given to Germany? In his view, the question of compensation and
the question of the military terms could not be ready for some time,
perhaps 9 or 10 days. But a good many parts of the Treaty were ready,
for example, the boundaries with Austria and with Hungary. Letter From Austrian Delegation
President Wilson said that the southern
boundary of Austria was not yet ready.
Mr. Lloyd George said it could be settled in a
very short time. Ports, Waterways and Railways were ready, as were the
Economic
[Page 27]
Clauses. He suggested
that these should be handed to the Austrians, but that the question of
reparation and the military clauses should be reserved and that the
experts of the Allied and Associated Powers should be asked to meet the
Austrian experts in regard to these. He did not mean that the Council of
Four itself should meet the Austrians, but that our experts should meet
their experts in regard to compensation and the military terms, which
they should discuss with them on general lines.
M. Clemenceau said that the experts would
require very precise instructions.
President Wilson said that we knew exactly what
the experts thought on the subject. He then read a weekly list of
outstanding subjects which had been prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey. He
noted Sir Maurice Hankey’s statement that no communication had been made
to the Drafting Committee about the boundaries between Italy and
Austria.
Mr. Lloyd George suggested that these should be
settled today.
President Wilson said that, according to his
recollection, there had been a general understanding that Austria should
be treated somewhat differently from Germany. Consequently, he agreed
with Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal to get the experts together.
M. Orlando asked if it would not be possible to
have these questions roughly settled. He thought the outstanding
questions could be arranged in 2 or 3 days, and then the negotiations
could start. The difference of treatment to the Austrian Delegation
would not be well understood in Italy, where Austria had always been
regarded as the principal enemy. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had
dissolved and the different States forming out of it were regarded with
mixed feelings by Italy, some friendly and some otherwise. Austria,
however, was regarded as the principal enemy. To adopt a different
procedure would create a very painful impression in Italy. It would be
felt there that the Italian contest with Austria was not taken very
seriously. He agreed that in very rapid decision was necessary, but he
did not see why one or two questions should not be left in suspense
while proposals as to the remainder of the Peace Treaty were handed to
the Austrians. To adopt a totally different procedure would create a
very bad impression in Italy without any useful result. [If] In 3 or 4
days, a sufficient portion of the Treaty could be assembled and handed
to the Austrians, so as not to give an impression of a piecemeal
presentation, he would not object.
Mr. Lloyd George said that Italy must really
understand the fact that the peace of Austria was entirely different
from that of Germany. Supposing Bavaria and Saxony had broken off from
Prussia before the war came to an end and had perhaps even fought
against Prussia, it would have been impossible for the Allies to take
the line
[Page 28]
they had. For one
thing, there would have been no representatives of the German Empire to
meet. Consequently, a different line must be pursued and he could not
see why Italy should not agree to a different procedure. He doubted if
either the question of the military terms or the compensation could be
settled in 3 or 4 days. If so, the settlement would be a bad one.
M. Clemenceau said that he was ready to make
every effort to meet M. Orlando, because he had learned from experience
that, when the Allies were not in agreement with Italy, the immediate
result was anti-French and sometimes even pro-German demonstrations in
Italy that were extraordinarily disagreeable. He wanted, above all
things, to avoid any differences with Italy. When, however, M. Orlando
suggested that it had been agreed to adopt the same procedure for
Austria as that for Germany, this was not the fact. M. Orlando had not
been present when the decision had been taken, for reasons over which
his colleagues had no control. It was in his absence that the new
procedure had been agreed on. All he sought was a reasonable agreement
in a reasonable way. The Austrian Peace was very different from, and, in
many respects, much harder to arrive at, than the German, for the reason
that the country had fallen to pieces, raising all sorts of questions of
boundaries and there were conflicts arising on the Polish front and
elsewhere in the late Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Istria, he learned
that trenches and barbed wire were being put up by both sides. President
Wilson had come to Europe with a programme of peace for all men. His
ideal was a very high one, but it involved great difficulties, owing to
these century old hatreds between some races. We had in Central Europe
to give each what was his due not only between them, but even between
ourselves. For example, to take the question of disarmaments. M. Orlando
had been good enough to visit him on the previous day to discuss the
question of Dalmatia; but the Yugo-Slavs would not agree to disarm
themselves while Italy adopted her present attitude. He, himself, was
not in a position to oppose Italy in this matter, because France had put
her signature to the Treaty of 1915,3 but it was not
a question that could be decided in two or three days. Referring again
to M. Orlando’s visit, he said the principal subject for discussion had
been the anti-French manifestations in Italy. M. Orlando said that there
was an improvement, but since then he had received two despatches from
M. Barrère,4 which indicated the situation to be worse. There
was a pronounced pro-German propaganda in Italy, where
[Page 29]
enormous sums were being expended by
Germany. All this ought to be stopped and there was only one way to stop
it. It was necessary to have the courage to tackle and solve the most
difficult questions as soon as possible. It was not at all easy to do so
and could only be done if M. Orlando would take the standpoint that he
must preserve the Entente with his Allies. He recalled that, in the
previous weeks, he had a serious disagreement with Mr. Lloyd George on
the question of Syria when both had spoken very frankly. Nevertheless,
both had concluded by saying that they would not allow their differences
to upset the Entente. The same was not said in certain quarters in
Italy. Hence, he maintained that these questions could not be settled in
three days. Consequently, it was impossible to meet the Austrians with a
complete Treaty as had been done in the case of the Germans. If M.
Orlando would agree, he thought a start might be made by getting
discussions between the experts, which would gain time. It was very hard
to settle all these extraordinarily difficult questions rapidly.
President Wilson adhered to his principles as applicable to the Austrian
Treaty. France and Great Britain admitted the principles, but also did
not deny that they were bound by their signature of the Treaty of 1915.
If M. Orlando wanted a settlement, he must discuss it with the supreme
desire to maintain the Entente and meanwhile a plan must be found to
keep the Austrian Delegation quiet. We should tell them that the Treaty
was not ready, but that it would be useful to have certain discussions
with their experts. He did not want to embarrass M. Orlando in Italy and
if this would be the result, he would withdraw every word he had said,
but he was very anxious that the Austrian Delegates should not return to
Vienna.
M. Orlando thanked M. Clemenceau most sincerely
for what he had said, which was absolutely frank and clear. He did not
wish to refer in detail to the troubles in Italy. The impressions he had
received from Italy differed from M. Barrère’s reports, which, according
to his own account, were exaggerated. Nevertheless, he did not deny that
the situation in Italy was extraordinarily grave. It could be excused
and justified if it was recalled how Mr. Lloyd George before his visit
to London had informed his colleagues that if he had to return to
England without being able to show a considerable step towards peace,
the position would be very serious. It was exactly the same now in
regard to Italy. The trouble there arose from uncertainty. Once the
Italian claims were settled, it would be found that Italy was as
sincerely loyal to the cause of the Entente as before. He was absolutely
sure that the present disquieting phenomena in Italy were due to anxiety
and uncertainty. Like M. Clemenceau, he, himself, had decided to remain
always with the Entente and to run all the personal risks involved. He
felt he
[Page 30]
could not be accused of
adopting too uncompromising a spirit. He had always made every effort to
reach an agreement, including the recent conversations with Colonel
House and Mr. Miller,5 where he had discussed proposals involving
very grievous renunciations by Italy. He thanked M. Clemenceau for his
courageous words in favour of tackling the main problems, difficult and
complex as they were. But, having regard to the excitement of public
opinion, he asked why this should be still further excited by questions
of procedure. In the present exciting state of affairs and in view of
the exasperation in Italy, if questions of procedure were added, an
irritation would be caused which would produce an effect contrary to
what was desired. This was his only reason for anxiety.
President Wilson asked whether M. Orlando in
his remarks had not really suggested the way out. He had suggested to
say to the Austrians that by Wednesday or Thursday all matters would be
laid before them which could be settled directly, but that some
questions that could not be settled directly would be reserved.
M. Orlando said that President Wilson had
correctly interpreted his views and he would accept his suggestions.
Mr. Lloyd George said it only remained to
divide the Treaty of Peace into two categories.
President Wilson said he had assumed that the
only reserved questions would be the military terms and reparation.
Sir Maurice Hankey said that Mr. Headlam-Morley
had come to him that morning and had told him that the Economic Clauses
were based on the assumption that Austria was to be a continuation of
the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, but that the Financial Clauses were
drawn on the assumption that Austria was a new state. He had urged that
the whole Treaty of Peace wanted examination from this point of
view.
Mr. Lloyd George questioned whether Mr.
Headlam-Morley’s description of the Economic Clauses was correct.
(It was agreed:—
That the Treaty of Peace should be handed to the Austrians in the course
of the present week, but that the military terms and reparation clauses
should be reserved for discussion with Austrian experts.
Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft a reply to the Austrian
Delegation to give effect to this decision.)
6. President Wilson drew attention to a copy of
a letter he had
[Page 31]
received, which
had been addressed by the Secretary-General to Mr. Barnes in regard to
the participation of Germany in the new Organisation contemplated for
Labour. From this letter he read the following extract:— Labour Organisstion. Admission of German
Representatives
“Consequently, I would be grateful to you for informing the
Washington Conference that Germany will be admitted after the
closing of the Conference, and under conditions expressed in the
letter of May 15th of the Labour Commission.”5a
This letter, President Wilson pointed out, did not carry
out the decision of the Council, which had merely consisted in a
recommendation to the Labour Conference at Washington that Germany
should be admitted, but had left the final decision to the
Conference.
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to call the attention of the
Secretary-General to this error.)
7. A letter was read from Marshal Foch somewhat in the Allowing sense:—
Action in the Eyent of the Germans Refusing To
Sign
At the Meeting of the 19th inst. the Council communicated to the
Marshal a decision that after May 27th the Army under his command
should be ready to advance, in the event of the German reply calling
for immediate action. He was instructed to make his dispositions so
that the advance might be in the best possible conditions. This
implied the following:—
- (i)
- Administrative measures to ensure that the effectives were
completed, by bringing back personnel on leave.
- (ii)
- Tactical movements; that is to say, concentration of all
the necessary forces.
- (iii)
- Not to keep the troops waiting too long in expectation of
movements; that is to say, it was desirable to take the last
measures as late as possible, and not more than three days
before they should be executed.
He recalled that he had been instructed to delay
until May 30 the final measures so far as the French Army was
concerned. Tactical measures, however, must begin on May 27th, hence
it was necessary that he should receive orders before 4 p.m. today,
so that he could either give a counter order or confirm his previous
orders. Consequently, he asked to have May 30th confirmed as the
date on which he was to resume his march, or otherwise.
President Wilson suggested the reply should be
that three days’ notice would be given to Marshal Foch as soon as the
Council knew if action was necessary.
Mr. Lloyd George and M.
Clemenceau agreed.
(M. Clemenceau undertook to instruct Marshal Foch accordingly.)
[Page 32]
8. M. Clemenceau said he had received a letter
from Dr. Benes, who wanted to be heard on the Military and Financial
questions. Austrian Treaty; Military and Financial
Questions. Application From Dr. Benes To Be Heard
(It was agreed that Dr. Benes should be heard, and Sir Maurice Hankey was
instructed to draft a reply.)
9. M. Clemenceau handed Sir Maurice Hankey a
Note prepared for the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers by the Council of Foreign Ministers, dealing with Boundaries in
the Banat. Boundaries of the Banat
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to translate and circulate the
Note.)
10. M. Clemenceau handed Sir Maurice Hankey a
letter received from the Marquis Saionji, asking that in ordinary
circumstances Japanese Request Japan might be represented on the Council
of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Japanese Request To Be Represented on the Council of Four
(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft a polite reply to the effect
that Japan would be invited whenever questions particularly affecting
her were under consideration.)
11. M. Clemenceau read a Note from the
Secretary-General, suggesting that the letter forwarded by the German
Delegation on May 17th5b
concerning provisions contained in Article 438 of the Conditions of
Peace (Religious Missions) should be referred to the Committee appointed
to deal with political questions outside Europe, composed of Messrs.
Beer (America), Macleay (British Empire), de Peretti (France), della
Torretta (Italy), Chinda (Japan). German Letter in
Regard to Religious Missions
(This proposal was approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to
notify the Secretary-General accordingly.)
12. A letter from the German Delegation, dated May 24th, on the subject
of responsibility for the consequences of the war and reparation, was
read. (Appendix V). Letter From the German Delegation
on the Subject of Responsibility and Reparation
(It was agreed that the letter should be sent to the Commission dealing
with Reparations in the Austrian Treaty, which should be asked to advise
the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to the
nature of the reply to be sent.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, May 26, 1919.
[Page 33]
Appendix I to CF–32
[Lord Robert Cecil to Colonel E. M.
House]
Dear Colonel House: The Inter-Allied Aerial
Commission now sitting in Paris has almost finished its work on a
Convention which lays down a body of Air regulations and which
establishes an International Commission for Air Navigation. I found
on reading through the draft of their Convention that they had made
no reference whatever to the League of Nations. This I consider most
unfortunate and I have therefore pressed General Seely, who is the
chief British representative on this Aerial Commission, to persuade
his colleagues to adopt the following changes, to which I attach
considerable importance:
- Art. 35. “There shall be
instituted, under the name of the International Commission
for Air Navigation and as part of the
organisation of the League of Nations, a Permanent
Commission, etc. …”
- Art. 38. “In the case of a
disagreement of two or more States relating to the
interpretation of the present Convention, the question in
dispute shall be determined by the
Permanent Court of International Justice to be
established by the League of Nations. Until the
establishment of this Court, such questions shall be
determined by arbitration.”
General Seely has undertaken to secure the assent of his colleagues
to these changes, but would be glad to be able to say that he puts
them forward by the wish of President Wilson and myself. Knowing
that the President shares my view of the importance of bringing all
such international bodies into close connection with the League, I
have ventured to tell General Seely that I think he may use the
President’s name as well as my own in support of these changes. I
should be glad to hear from you that I am not mistaken in what I
take to be the President’s view, and that General Seely may have
authority to use his name.
In return for doing this, however, General Seely wishes me to propose
again some very small amendments to the Covenant which I personally
think ought to have been made before as drafting changes. They are
as follows:—
| Art. 1 Para 2. last line. |
} |
for “military and naval” substitute
“military, naval land air”. |
| Art. VIII. last para, last line. |
| Art. IX. last line. |
| Art. XVI. Para 2. 3rd line, for “military or
naval” substitute “military, naval or air”. |
I am sure that anyone who remembers the discussions of the League of
Nations Commission on the point would agree that these are
[Page 34]
purely drafting amendments.
But they cannot now be made without a decision of the Council of
Four. Would you be good enough to ask the President, if he approves
of them, to put them forward, and to secure the consent of the
Council of Four to their insertion?
It is a small point, but one that has a special importance in view of
the present political situation in England, and I should be most
grateful if the President could see his way to do what I
suggest.
Yours very sincerely,
Appendix II to CF–32
Errata in Economic Clauses of German
Treaty
(a) Annex to Articles 297 and 298, add at the
end of paragraph 1 the words:—
“nor to such of the above-mentioned measures
as have been taken by Germany or the German authorities
since the 11th November, 1918, all of which measures shall
be void”.
(b) Annex to Articles 297 and 298, paragraph
14. Add, after the words “rate of exchange”, the words “of
interest”.
(c) Article 282.
(i) Modify No. 19 as follows:—
“Sanitary Convention of the 3rd December, 1903, and the
preceding Conventions signed on the 30th January, 1892, 15th
April 1893, 3rd April 1894, and the 19th March 1897”.
(ii) Insert as No. 26,
“Convention of the 12th June 1902 as to the protection of
minors”.
The object of this erratum was to include items which had been
omitted from the German Treaty by an oversight.
(d) Article 286. Omit the words “the agreement
of the 14th April 1891 regarding the suppression of false
indications of origin of goods; the agreement of 14th April 1891
concerning the international registration of trade marks”.
M–190 (Final Revise)
Appendix III to CF–32
Despatch to Admiral Koltchak
The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it
is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they
propose to pursue in regard to Russia.
[Page 35]
It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated
Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia.
Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of
assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the
struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from
German rule, and in order to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks from the
danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces. Since
the signature of the Armistice on November 11th, 1918, they have
kept forces in various parts of Russia. Munitions and supplies have
been sent to assist those associated with them at a very
considerable cost. No sooner, however, did the Peace Conference
assemble than they endeavoured to bring peace and order to Russia by
inviting representatives of all the warring Governments within
Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a
permanent solution of Russian problems. This proposal and a later
offer to relieve the distress among the suffering millions of Russia
broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept
the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while
negotiations or the work of relief was proceeding. Some of the
Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw
their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground
that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early
settlement. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance
on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it
will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government, and
peace.
The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally
that the object of the policy is to restore peace within Russia by
enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs
through the instrumentality of a freely elected Constituent Assembly
and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the
settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian
state and its relations with its neighbours through the peaceful
arbitration of the League of Nations.
They are convinced by their experiences of the last twelve months
that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealings with the
Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist
the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with
munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the
government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite
guarantees that their policy has the same objects in view as that of
the Allied and Associated Powers. With this object they would ask
Admiral Koltchak and his Associates whether they will agree to the
following as the conditions upon which they accept continued
assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.
[Page 36]
In the first place, that, as soon as they reach Moscow they will
summon a Constituent Assembly elected by a free, secret and
democratic franchise as the Supreme Legislature for Russia to
which the Government of Russia must be responsible, or if at
that time order is not sufficiently restored they will summon
the Constituent Assembly elected in 1917 to sit until such time
as new elections are possible.
Secondly, that throughout the areas which they at present control
they will permit free elections in the normal course for all
local and legally constituted assemblies such as municipalities,
Zemstvos, etc.
Thirdly, that they will countenance no attempt to revive the
special privileges of any class or order in Russia. The Allied
and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn
declaration made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates that
they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They
feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this
and other internal questions must be left to the free decision
of the Russian Constituent Assembly; but they wish to be assured
that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil
and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no
attempt to reintroduce the regime which the revolution has
destroyed.
Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be
recognised, and that in the event of the frontiers and other
relations between Russia and these countries not being settled
by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the
League of Nations.
Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Esthonia,
Latvia. Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories
and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement
will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of
Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government
of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous
and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and
Associated Governments.
Sixthly, that as soon as a Government for Russia has been
constituted on a democratic basis, Russia should join the League
of Nations and co-operate with the other members in the
limitation of armaments and of military organisation throughout
the world.
Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral
Koltchak on November 27th, 1918. in regard to Russia’s national
debts.
The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to learn as soon as
possible whether the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his
associates are prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether
in the event of acceptance they will undertake to form a single
Government and army command as soon as the military situation makes
it possible.
- G. Clemenceau
- D. Lloyd George
- V. E. Orlando
- Woodrow Wilson
- Saionji
[Page 37]
Appendix IV to CF–32
St.
Germain, May 24, 1919.
[The Austrian Chancellor (Renner) to the President of
the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]
Prot. No. 92
Mr. President: By the note from the French
Mission at Vienna of May 2, the Government of the German Austrian
Republic was informed that the Supreme Council of the Allied and
Associated Powers had decided to invite it to present itself at St.
Germain-en-Laye on Monday, May 12, to examine the peace
conditions.
The Government of German Austria—after having assured itself of the
consent of the National Assembly—hastened to appoint its
plenipotentiaries and to organize its delegation.
Considering the extreme importance of the peace negotiations to save
the country and to re-establish the material life of the nation, the
Government has appealed to the collaboration of important
functionaries of the state, of jurisconsults and experts in
political science, as well as of representatives of the provinces,
without taking account of the vital interests of the administration
which brought them into power.
The Delegation arrived on May 14, at St. Germain-en-Laye.
In conformity with the invitation of the President of the Peace
Congress, the full powers were submitted on the 19th to the
President of the Committee on Credentials, and on the 22d the full
powers of the other Powers assembled at Paris, on recognition of the
fact that they were in good and due form, were submitted to the
Military Mission of the French Republic at St. Germain-en-Laye.
Since that time no communication on the opening of negotiations has
come to the German Austrian Delegation.
Now, the long delay in the coming of peace raises in the mind of the
people of German-Austria an uneasiness all the more serious as its
prolongation seems incomprehensible to the masses and must
necessarily provoke all sorts of rumors and fears. Such a state of
public opinion gives rise to serious apprehensions on the subject of
the maintenance of peace and order in our country, notably in the
great industrial centers, as well as in the contested districts,
either occupied by a neighboring state or exposed to military
invasion. This condition of uncertainty may offer favorable ground
for an irritation of the masses, in which unhealthy ideas may
ferment.
The German Austrian Delegation wishes also to add that the expenses
entailed by the long stay of a large number of functionaries in a
foreign country are out of proportion to our economic situation,
[Page 38]
which is more than
precarious and which is well known to the Allied Powers.
The German Austrian Delegation therefore appeals to the courtesy of
the President of the Peace Congress to request the opening of
negotiations with German Austria as soon as possible.
It seems, in fact, consistent with the intentions of this High
Assembly not to adjourn before reaching a decision on which depends
the fate and the future of a nation now suffering in uncertainty and
anguish.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high
consideration.
Appendix V to CF–32
Versailles, May 24, 1919.
responsibilities
Translation of Note From Herr
Brockdorff-Rantzau [to the President of
the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]
Sir: The contents of your Excellency’s note
of 20th inst.7,
concerning the question of Germany’s responsibility for the
consequences of the war, have shown the German Peace Delegation that
the Allied and Associated Governments have completely misunderstood
the sense in which the German Government and the German nation
tacitly gave their assent to the note of Secretary of State Lansing
of November 5th 1918.8 In order to clear up this
misunderstanding the German Delegation find themselves compelled to
remind the Allied and Associated Governments of the events which
preceded that note.
The President of the United States of America had several times
solemnly declared that the world-war should be terminated not by a
Peace of Might, but by a Peace of Right, and that America had
entered the war solely for this Peace of Right. For this war-aim the
formula was established:
“No annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages”. On the other
hand, however, the President demanded the unconditional restitution
of the violated Right. The positive side of this demand found
expression in the fourteen points which were laid down by President
Wilson in his message of January 8th 1918.9 This message contains
[Page 39]
two principal claims
against the German nation: firstly, the surrender of important parts
of German territory in the West and in the East on the basis of
national self-determination; secondly, the promise to restore the
occupied territories of Belgium and the North of France. Both
demands could be acceded to by German Government and the German
Nation, as the principle of self-determination was concordant with
the new democratic constitution of Germany, and as the territories
to be restored had by Germany’s aggression, undergone the terrors of
war through an act contrary to the Law of Nations, namely by the
violation of Belgium’s neutrality.
The right of self-determination of the Polish nation had, as a matter
of fact, already been acknowledged by the former German Government,
just the same as the wrong done to Belgium.
When, therefore, in the note the Entente transmitted by Secretary of
State Lansing on November 5th 1918 to the German Government, a more
detailed interpretation was given of what was meant by restoration
of the occupied territories, it appeared from the German point of
view to be a matter of course that the duty to make compensation,
established in this interpretation, could not relate to territories
other than those the devastation of which had to be admitted as
contrary to Right, and the restoration of which had been proclaimed
as a war-aim by the leading enemy statesmen. Thus President Wilson,
in his message of January 8th 1918. expressly termed the reparation
of the wrong done to Belgium as the healing act without which the
whole structure and validity of international law would be for ever
impaired. In a like manner the English Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd
George, in his speech held in the House of Commons on October 22nd
1917 proclaimed:10
“The first requirement always put forward by the British
Government and their Allies has been the complete
restoration, political, territorial and economic, of the
independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be
obtained for the devastation of its towns and provinces.
This is no demand for war indemnity, such as that imposed on
France by Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the
cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to
another.”
What is here said of Belgium, Germany had to acknowledge also with
regard to the North of France, as the German armies had only reached
the French territories by the violation of Belgium’s neutrality.
It was for this aggression that the German Government admitted
Germany to be responsible: it did not admit Germany’s alleged
[Page 40]
responsibility for the
origin of the war or for the merely incidental fact that the formal
declaration of war had emanated from Germany. The importance of
State Secretary Lansing’s note for Germany lay rather in the fact of
the duty to make reparation not being limited to the restoration of
material value, but being extended to every kind of damage suffered
by the civilian population in the occupied territory, in person or
in property, during the continuance of warfare, be it by land, by
sea or from the air.
The German nation was certainly conscious of the one-sidedness in
their being charged with the restoration of Belgium and Northern
France, but being denied compensation for the territories in the
East of Germany which had been invaded and devastated by the forces
of Russian Tsarism, acting on a long premeditated plan. They have,
however, acknowledged that the Russian aggression must, according to
the formal provisions of the Law of Nations, be placed in a
different category from the invasion of Belgium, and have therefore
desisted from demanding compensation on their part.
If the Allied and Associated Governments should now maintain the view
that compensation is due for every act contrary to the Law of
Nations which has been committed during the war, the German
Delegation does not dispute the correctness in principle of this
standpoint; they beg, however, to point out that in such case,
Germany also has a considerable damage-account to set up and that
the duty to compensate incumbent on her adversaries—particularly in
respect of the German civilian population, which has suffered
immeasurable injury from starvation owing to the Blockade, a measure
opposed to the Law of Nations—is not limited to the time when actual
warfare was still being carried on from both sides, but has special
effect in regard to the time when a one-sided war was being waged by
the Allied and Associated Powers against a Germany which had
voluntarily laid down arms. This view of the Allied and Associated
Governments, at any rate, departs from the agreement which Germany
had entered into before the Armistice was concluded. It raises an
endless series of controversial questions on the horizon of the
Peace negotiations and can only be brought to a practical solution
through a system of impartial international arbitration, an
arbitration as provided for in Article 13, part [para.] 2, of the Draft of the Conditions of Peace. This
clause prescribes:
“Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any
question of international law, as to the existence of any
fact which if established would constitute a breach of any
international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of
the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared
to be among those which are generally suitable for
submission to arbitration.”
[Page 41]
Your Excellency has further pointed out in your note of the 20th
instant that according to the principle of international law no
nation could, through an alteration of its political form of
government or through a change in the persons of its leaders, cancel
an obligation once incurred by its government. The German Peace
Delegation is far from contesting the correctness of this principle;
they also do not protest against the execution of the agreement
introduced by the former government in their proposal of October 5th
1918,11 but they do take objection
to the punishment, provided for by the Draft of the Peace Treaty,
for the alleged offences of the former political and military
leaders of Germany. The President of the United States of America on
December 4th 1917 declared12 that the war should not end in vindictive
action of any kind, that no nation or people should be robbed or
punished because the irresponsible rulers of the country had
themselves done deep and abominable wrong. The German Delegation
does not plead these or other promises to evade any obligation
incumbent on Germany by the Law of Nations, but they feel entitled
to call them to memory if the German nation is to be held
responsible for the origin of the war and made liable for its
damages.
Whilst the public negotiations immediately preceding the conclusion
of the Armistice were still going on, the German nation was promised
that Germany’s lot would be fundamentally altered if it were severed
from the fate of its rulers. The German Delegation would not like to
take your Excellency’s words to mean that the promise made by the
Allied and Associated Governments at that time was merely a ruse of
war employed to paralyse the resistance of the German nation, and
that this promise is now to be withdrawn.
Your Excellency has finally contended that the Allied and Associated
Governments had the right to accord to Germany the same treatment as
had been adopted by her in the Peace Treaties of Frankfort13 and Brest Litowsk.14 The German
Delegation for the present refrains from examining in what respects
these two Acts of Peace differ from the present Peace Draft, for it
is now too late for the Allied and Associated Governments to found a
claim of right on these precedents. The moment for so doing had come
when they had before them the alternative of accepting or rejecting
the fourteen points of the President of the United States of America
as a basis of Peace. In these fourteen points the reparation of the
wrong done in 1870/1871 was expressly demanded and the Peace of
Brest Litowsk was
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spoken of
as a deterrent example. The Allied and Associated Governments at
that time declined to take a peace of violence of the past as a
model.
The German nation never having assumed the responsibility for the
origin of the war, has a right to demand that it be informed by its
opponents for what reasons and on what evidence these conditions of
Peace are based on Germany being to blame for all damages and all
sufferings of this war. It cannot therefore consent to be put off
with the remark that the data on the question of responsibility
collected by the Allied and Associated Governments through a special
Commission are documents concerning those Governments alone. This, a
question of life or death for the German nation, must be discussed
in all publicity; methods of secret diplomacy are here out of place.
The German Government reserve to themselves the liberty of reverting
to the subject.
Accept [etc.]
