Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/44

BC–37

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Present Also Present
America, United States of America, United States of
Mr. R. Lansing M. O. T. Crosby
Mr. E. M. House
Secretary British Empire
Mr. L. Harrison Sir Eyre Crowe, K.C.B.
British Empire France
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P. M. Klotz
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. Italy
Secretaries H. E. M. Crespi
Lt. Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, K.C.B. Japan
Sir P. Loraine, Bt. H. E. Baron Makino
France H. E. M. Matsui
M. Pichon
M. Tardieu
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn
Italy
H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of Lieut. Burden
British Empire Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
France Captain A. Portier
Italy Lieut. Zanchi
Japan M. Saburi
Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux

(1) Mr. Balfour said he wished to raise a small matter which required decision. The Portuguese Government had expressed to him its very strong feeling of pain that it was the only nation, which had suffered at the hands of Germany, and yet had no representative on the Allied Commission on Reparation. The coasts of Portugal had been bombarded; Portuguese ships had been sunk; and the Portuguese [Page 84] African Colonies had been overrun by the enemy, consequently, Portugal had claims against Germany, and it was extremely hard that she was not represented on the Allied Commission which had been appointed to examine and report on the amount for reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay. Claims by Portugal for Representation on Allied Commission on Reparation

M. Pichon confirmed the fact that Portugal had submitted a complaint as soon as the composition of the Allied Commission on Separation had been announced. He (M. Pichon) personally had no objection to Portugal being duly represented.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether under the circumstances Brazil also should not be granted representation. Brazil had lost ships, sunk by German submarines. It would be difficult, therefore, to grant representation to Portugal without at the same time doing the same for Brazil.

Baron Sonnino enquired what was the composition of the Allied Commission on Reparation.

M. Klotz explained that in accordance with the Resolution passed by the Conference on Thursday, January 23rd, 1919,1 it was decided that a Commission should be appointed of not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and not more than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Serbia and Roumania. Subsequently, both Portugal and Czecho-Slovakia had claimed the right of representation. The Conference had decided to admit the claims of Czecho-Slovakia, but not those of Portugal, and accordingly two Czecho-Slovak representatives at present formed part of the Commission. Should the Conference now decide to accede to Portugal’s request she should be given two representatives; the number allotted to all other small Powers represented.

Mr. Balfour expressed the view that the claims of Portugal were as great as, if not greater than, those of Bohemia, which had been granted. Bohemia had not become a belligerent until the very end of hostilities; whereas Portugal had fought throughout the war, and had suffered just those kind of damages which called for reparation.

(It was agreed that Portugal should have the right to nominate not more than two representatives to serve on the Allied Commission on Reparation.

It was also agreed that an invitation should be sent to Portugal to attend the next meeting of the Allied Commission on Reparation to be held on Monday next, February 24th, at 10.30 a.m.)

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(2) Mr. Balfour asked permission to move the following resolution:—

  • “(1) Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present Naval, Military and Air Conditions of Peace, to Germany at an early date, the Conference agrees that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of other preliminary Peace Terms with Germany and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed. Procedure of Conference: (a) Mr. Balfour’ First Proposal
  • (2) The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the Naval, Military and Air Conditions, shall cover the following points:—
    (a)
    The approximate future frontiers of Germany:
    (b)
    The financial arrangements to be imposed on Germany:
    (c)
    Our economic relations with Germany after the war:
    (d)
    Responsibility for breaches of the Laws of War.
  • (3) In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of Peace with Germany.”

A general feeling of impatience was now becoming manifest in all countries on account of the apparent slow progress the Conference was making in the direction of Final Peace. It would be folly to ignore altogether the danger that feeling might produce. It would be realised that abstract questions, (such as the Financial Arrangements and Economic Relations), did not touch the hearts and interests of families; but the question of demobilisation did touch them very nearly. Now, the progress of demobilisation depended very largely on the final Military Terms to be imposed on Germany. A short time ago the Conference had agreed that it could not continue to add month by month new terms and conditions to the Armistice. It had been agreed that the Military Terms to be imposed on Germany should be drawn up in the form of a final scheme, which would definitely regulate her future armament. That problem had been occupying the attention of the Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council who were now almost prepared to present their final report. He realised that it would probably take some time for the Conference and for the Governments of the Great Powers to consider the military report. Nevertheless the Naval and Military Terms of Peace appeared to be in advance of all other [Page 86] questions, such as frontiers, future economic relations, and attempts to bring to justice criminals, who had abused the Laws of War. That being the case, if the final Military Proposals were shortly to be ready for consideration by the Conference, should not advantage be taken of that fact to obtain an important instalment of the Preliminary Peace? If that instalment were carried, it would be possible for the Allies subsequently to impose on Germany all the other terms that might be considered just and fitting. His proposal did not imply that he did not consider it to be of the first importance to press on all the other enquiries mentioned in his draft note, namely:—

  • The approximate future frontiers of Germany,
  • The Financial Arrangements to be imposed on Germany.
  • Economic Relations with Germany after the War, and
  • The Responsibility for Breaches of the Laws of War.

In fact, in order to help on the acceleration, which he desired, the last paragraph of his draft note proposed that the various Commissions dealing with those questions should send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. He was in no way prejudiced as regards the date given, but from the information which he had received it appeared very hopeful that by the 8th March next the various Commissions would be in a position to submit their reports.

In conclusion, he wished to add that he had that morning, in company with M. Pichon, discussed the question with M. Clemenceau, who inclined to the view that the Naval and Military Terms of Peace should not be separated from the other aspects of the case. M. Clemenceau was extremely anxious to expedite matters but he thought that end would be best obtained by waiting until a conclusion had been reached on all subjects. M. Clemenceau held the view that if the stimulus towards a rapid decision were removed by the acceptance of the Naval and Military Terms by Germany, the other questions would be delayed for an infinity of time by small controversies. M. Clemenceau held, therefore, that the end desired would best be obtained by treating all questions abreast rather than by taking up questions one by one as they reached maturity. Personally, he (Mr. Balfour) was in favour of his own proposal, but he would be glad to hear the views of his colleagues. Perhaps M. Pichon would confirm his report of M. Clemenceau’s views.

M. Pichon agreed that Mr. Balfour had correctly interpreted M. Clemenceau’s views. M. Clemenceau held that the whole of the Preliminary Peace Terms should be pressed forward with as little delay as possible in order to take full advantage of the present situation in Germany. In this opinion M. Clemenceau was supported by Marshal Foch and his military advisers.

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Mr. House said he was very glad to see that the Conference intended to bring about as soon as possible a Preliminary Peace. In his opinion, the Peace Negotiations should have commenced on November 11th last, directly after the signing of the first Armistice. He had always felt that delay could only be favourable to Germany, and the longer the signing of Peace were postponed, the more chance would there be of circumstances becoming less favourable to the Allies. In regard to the two proposals now before the Conference, very severe military terms would have to be imposed on the Germans. And, he thought, the Germans would be more inclined to accept those conditions if, at the same time, the whole Peace Terms were made known to them. The Germans would then be made fully cognisant of their position.

M. Sonnino said that he had no objections to raise against the proposal to speed up as much as possible the settlement of Peace Preliminaries. But he must draw attention to the fact that Germany alone had so far been mentioned (e. g. the military conditions to be imposed on Germany, the economic, financial conditions to be imposed on Germany, &c.), and all other questions were presumably to be adjourned indefinitely. Now, the other questions were frequently just as complicated and contained elements even more dangerous than those included in the German settlement. In the case of Germany, as a matter of fact, the Allies were faced by one enemy only with whom an Armistice had been signed, with whom negotiations were being carried on, and by whom certain terms had already been accepted. For Italy, the Austrian question was more complicated in that the former Austrian Empire was now divided into various states, some of whom were friendly, others semi-friendly and others hostile. The Austrian question was, therefore, a delicate and awkward one to settle.

Should the military, economic and financial conditions to be imposed on Germany first be settled, what would happen to the other questions requiring settlement? He felt compelled to ask that question in the interests of his own country. Germany was an enemy of Italy, and the Italians had fought against her. But Italy also had another enemy, Austria and in fighting her she had borne the full burden of the war. The Russian question, which had given rise to an infinity of dangers during the last few months must also not be lost sight of.

What guarantees, what pledges would Italy have that all these other questions would be dealt with? It seemed to him that Mr. Balfour’s proposal would have the effect of adjourning all those other questions indefinitely.

Mr. Balfour had said that the German question should first be settled and then demobilization could proceed. But when the British Army had been demobilized, and the American Army had gone home, Italy [Page 88] would be left to face alone a difficult situation. What would she be able to do? Whatever conditions the Allies might impose on Germany, she would be able to start again as soon as she saw fit, and no-one would be there to prevent her doing so. He (M. Sonnino) agreed that everything possible should be done to hasten the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace. Some time had perhaps been wasted. That had been inevitable. But, in his opinion, the conditions of peace to be imposed on all enemy countries should be drawn up as quickly as possible and presented for acceptance. Otherwise, a separate peace having been made with Germany, the Allies might a few days later find themselves at war with half of Austria and perhaps also with Russia. What forces would the Allies then possess with which to defend themselves and what would be the final consequences?

Mr. Lansing expressed the view that it would be a mistake to treat the military terms of peace as distinct from the other terms of peace. He would prefer to embody all the terms of a preliminary peace in one document: a separate Treaty being made with each of the enemy countries on identic lines.

As soon as the future frontiers of the territories of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey had been fixed, the state of war with the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs would ipso facto also cease and, at the same time, peace would have been made with the principal enemies.

He was strongly of the opinion that when peace terms came to be discussed with Germany, a complete document should be presented including everything and not merely a few Naval, Military and other conditions. He thoroughly agreed with M. Clemenceau’s viewpoint.

M. Tardieu said that Baron Sonnino had displayed considerable anxiety at the proposal that the final military terms of peace should be forthwith imposed on Germany, for the reason that demobilisation in that quarter would ensue. That question had already been considered by the Supreme War Council and their military advisers were about to produce a definite scheme. The Conference was now asked to decide whether other questions, financial and economic questions, should be added to the military terms in order to present to the Germans at one time the whole of the Preliminary Peace Terms. In his opinion, the military situation would remain the same whether the financial or economic conditions were added to the military terms to be imposed on Germany, or not. He agreed with Baron Sonnino that after the conclusion of the preliminary peace with Germany, difficult questions would still remain to be settled with other enemy countries. Nevertheless it would be agreed that all other problems would become easier of solution once peace with Germany had been concluded. For instance, the question of German Austria would become easier to solve after the frontiers of Germany had been fixed. Similarly, the conclusion of peace with Germany would remove one [Page 89] of the disturbing factors in the Russian situation. Consequently, he thought it would be possible to reconcile the two proposals before the Conference, namely, Mr. Balfour’s proposal for a separate peace with Germany, and Baron Sonnino’s desire to include all enemy countries. Meanwhile, he would urge all the commissions and Committees to expedite the submission of their reports with as little delay as possible.

Me. Balfour pointed out that the third paragraph of his draft note covered the last point raised by M. Tardieu.

Mr. House enquired whether the final military terms would be embodied in the Armistice, or in the Final Peace Treaty.

Mr. Balfour thought that Mr. House’s question did not arise out of the proposals now being discussed, since the present Armistice could be terminated at three days’ notice.

M. Pichon thought the Conference should consider first of all the German question, because it was, as M. Tardieu had said, the principal and the essential question . . . . . .

M. Sonnino here interjected “for you”.

M. Pichon, continuing, said that he thought it was the principal and essential question for the Italians also, because Germany was the principal enemy. Furthermore, the conditions under which the last armistice had been renewed must be considered. Germany had been told that the Armistice would be renewed for a short term only, and the Allied military experts had been instructed to draw up and submit the final naval and military Terms of Peace, for the consideration of the Conference.

Mr. Balfour’s proposal, which he (M. Pichon) thoroughly approved of, could very well be said to cover the points raised by M. Sonnino. The sole object of Mr. Balfour’s proposal was to complete the military terms to be imposed on Germany by the addition of economic and financial clauses, the whole of which document would thus constitute the Preliminaries of Peace. The whole situation with Germany was, at the present moment, extremely serious and delicate, and it might become very unfavourable to the Allies if, after having announced to the Germans the fact that the final conditions would shortly be sent, the Allies found themselves unable to do so. Further, public opinion expected that this should be done, and great disappointment would arise should the Conference fail to keep its engagements, for the public considered that all other problems were bound up in the settlement of the German question. He thought it would be impossible to settle all the peace questions relating to every enemy country at one time. But as soon as the German question had been settled, he agreed the Conference could at once devote its attention to the settlement of the problems relating to Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary; though, as regards the latter country, which had no Government, [Page 90] he did not know with whom the Allies could discuss conditions. To sum up, however, he thought the Conference should at once settle the German problem, and immediately afterwards the Austrian. In his opinion, the Conference would only be complying with public opinion, and with the necessities of the present moment by adopting the procedure suggested by Mr. Balfour.

Mr. House enquired whether the Conference agreed to accept M. Clemenceau’s proposal that all the terms of Peace should be dealt with together, instead of first dealing with the Military Terms.

Mr. Balfour said he would be prepared to accept that proposal provided it expressed the unanimous view of the Conference.

Baron Sonnino said that when last treating the question of the Armistice, the Conference had decided to invite the Allied military advisers to propose final Military Terms of Peace. The reason then given for agreeing to that procedure had been the desire to settle the military question with as little delay as possible. Firstly, in order to remove once for all, the necessity for the constant renewal of the Armistice and, secondly, also because once the military terms had been accepted by Germany it would be easier later on to impose all other necessary conditions. On that occasion, M. Orlando supported by President Wilson, had asked that the same procedure should be followed in regard to Austria-Hungary. That proposal had also been accepted, and consequently no distinction had then been made between the two cases of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The two cases could not, therefore, now be separated, thereby creating a dangerous distinction. He, M. Sonnino, fully agreed that everything should be done to speed up the settlement of all questions. He would prefer first to get the military conditions out of the way, after which all the rest could be examined together. But, if the Conference decided to make a distinction and to separate the German question from the Austro-Hungarian question, and let everything else slide, the situation so created would spell revolution in Italy. Such a procedure would mean an indefinite prolongation of the Peace Negotiations with all other enemy countries: Italy would be obliged to keep up armaments whilst the other Allies were demobilising, thus bringing about in Italy a state of general discontent which could not with safety be allowed to continue.

In order to show a conciliatory spirit, he would be prepared, however, to accept the proposal made by Mr. Balfour on the understanding that whenever the word “Germany” appeared in his draft note, the words “and Austria-Hungary” should be added. Otherwise the words “enemy powers” should be substituted for “Germany”. As far as the military conditions were concerned, he held the view that it would be preferable to settle the military terms at once, as the allies would then be in a position to impose on the enemy the [Page 91] economic, financial and other conditions which might be considered just and equitable.

Mr. House thought that the peace terms to be imposed on all enemy Powers should be worked out simultaneously. Eventually, when the Conference met to decide the final Peace Terms, all the belligerents would be able to attend at the same time.

M. Sonnino agreed to accept that proposal. He asked that the words “Austria-Hungary” should be added after the word “Germany” wherever it occurred in Mr. Balfour’s note. Otherwise, “enemy countries” could be substituted for “Germany.”

(b) Mr. Balfour’s Second Proposal Mr. Balfour said that the Conference had a most important question to decide. He fully agreed with Baron Sonnino that other questions should not be delayed, whilst the questions with Germany were being settled. All he pleaded for was that the Conference should at all events get through with Germany with all due speed: that the settlement of Germany should not be held up until the more complex problems of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria had been solved. The latter questions were, no doubt, fully as important, but the German question was more ripe for decision. Baron Sonnino had expressed the view that after Germany had been got out of the way, serious military troubles would arise with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In his opinion that was a delusion. It was very difficult to believe that military troubles would arise in those countries once peace had been concluded with Germany. He (Mr. Balfour) was willing to accept any course that would not delay peace with Germany. If other cases could be got ready at the same time, so much the better: but it was essential that settlement with Germany should not be postponed until all other questions were ripe for settlement. In conclusion, he wished to ask the Conference to accept the following re-draft of his note:—

  • “1. Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present naval, military and air conditions of peace to Germany at an early date, the Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of Preliminary Peace Terms and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.
  • 2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover the following points:—
    (a)
    the approximate future frontiers of enemy countries;
    (b)
    the financial arrangements to be imposed on enemy countries;
    (c)
    our economic relations with enemy countries after the war;
    (d)
    responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
  • 3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested [Page 92] that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Germany.
  • 4. The Conference are of opinion that the question relating to the preliminary peace with Germany shall not be held up till the questions relating to other enemy countries are determined.”

Baron Sonnino said he had two observations to offer to Mr. Balfour’s proposal. He would first deal with a question of secondary importance, but it would be recollected that the Conference had decided on M. Orlando’s proposition, to instruct their Military Advisers to draw up the final Military and Naval terms with Germany and Austria-Hungary. He would therefore ask that the first paragraph should be made to read as follows:—“Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present Naval, Military and Air conditions of Peace to Germany and Austria-Hungary at an early date, the Conference agree, etc.”

The second and more important question he wished to raise had reference to paragraph 4. He could only see in it an invitation to all Commissions to expedite the solution of questions dealing with Germany to the exclusion of all other questions. If paragraph 4 had any meaning at all, it could only mean that henceforth the Conference would push on Peace with Germany and the rest could wait. Otherwise it had not raison d’être. In his opinion, it was an invitation to the Conference to postpone all other questions with the exception of those relating to Germany.

(c) Mr. House’s Proposal Mr. House said he would suggest going back to Mr. Balfour’s original proposition regarding Germany, and similar proposals would be drawn up for the other enemy countries, with such alterations as might be necessary. The Conference would then, without delay, appoint the necessary Committees to deal with the various questions which still required to be examined and reported on.

M. Tardieu thought that M. Sonnino was mistaken in his interpretation of paragraph 4 of Mr. Balfour’s new draft proposal. It was not suggested that settlement with Germany should be expedited to the exclusion of a settlement with other enemy countries. It would be relatively easier to make peace with a country like Germany, which still existed as a whole, rather than with Austria-Hungary, which had now disintegrated into a number of entities, partly friendly, partly hostile. For this reason he wished strongly to support Mr. House’s proposal.

M. Sonnino held that the same result would be obtained by accepting Mr. Balfour’s amended text with the omission of paragraph 4.

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Mr. Lansing suggested that the first paragraph of Mr. Balfour’s first proposal should be made to read as follows:—

(d) Mr. Lansing’s Proposals “The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of Preliminary Peace Terms and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.”

If so corrected the whole note would yield a text that would be made to apply to all enemy countries, a separate resolution being drawn up for each country.

M. Sonnino said he would gladly accept the first paragraph as just amended by Mr. Lansing. That being done, he would further be prepared to accept Mr. Balfour’s original draft, provided the words “enemy countries” were substituted for “Germany” in paragraph 2 and provided the last two words “with Germany” were omitted from paragraph 3. He clearly understood that under these conditions paragraph 4, proposed by Mr. Balfour, would disappear. In his opinion, there was no reason why Germany should go ahead of all other enemy countries, though it would be in the competence of the Conference at any moment to dispose of any set of subjects which might be ripe for solution. The inclusion of paragraph 4, as he had already stated, could only be interpreted as an invitation to delay all other subjects except those dealing with Germany.

Mr. Balfour said that he could not admit the inference. Paragraph 4 of his Draft Resolution did not imply that the Conference took no further interest in Austria-Hungary. It merely said that the Conference was of the opinion that the questions relating to the preliminary peace with Germany should not be held up until the questions relating to other enemy countries were determined. The view therein expressed in reality constituted the main part of the policy he wished to recommend to the Conference. Paragraph 3 of the Draft Resolution laid down that the consideration of all subjects should be speeded up. But, on the other hand, it was most important to get a preliminary peace with Germany as soon as possible. He felt that on that point Baron Sonnino and he himself held quite different views. The arrangements to be made with other countries should not be stopped on account of Germany; but, on the other hand, other countries should not prevent a settlement being reached with Germany.

M. Sonnino said that all he asked for was that no statement should be made to the effect that German questions should have preference over all others. Naturally, when reports were submitted by Committees, the Conference could decide to dispose of them irrespective of the enemy country involved. Otherwise, he feared the Committees would be influenced by the adoption of any resolution, such as had been proposed by Mr. Balfour.

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Mr. Lansing thought that the Conference had lost sight of his proposals to have separate identic resolutions in respect of each enemy country.

Mr. Balfour understood that to mean that separate Commissions would have to be appointed dealing with each enemy country. He wished to enquire whether it would be possible to man all such Commissions, not only as regards the settlement of frontiers, but also as regards economic, finance and other questions.

Mr. House said the American Delegation would be in a position to do so.

M. Pichon said that it was highly desirable to hasten on as soon as possible the settlement of all questions with Germany. That was the basis of the proposal made by Mr. Balfour. All information received from sure sources in Germany seemed to point to the fact that the present moment was particularly favourable for an immediate settlement. Therefore the present opportunity of reaching a settlement with Germany should not be allowed to pass, and it was essential that the various Commissions dealing with financial, economic and all other questions should also submit their reports without delay.

M. Sonnino had said that the Allied military advisers were ready to submit the final military terms to be imposed on Germany. He thought that only emphasised the fact that the other Commissions should rapidly come to a conclusion, so that, with as little delay as possible, the Allies might be in a position to present their preliminary peace terms to the Germans. That would not, however, in any way retard the examination of problems concerning Austria-Hungary and other enemy countries.

He (M. Pichon) thought M. Sonnino was mistaken in thinking that the Conference proposed to separate the two problems of Germany and Austria-Hungary in order to hasten the solution of the one at the expense of the other. He thought, however, the proposition that all questions concerning Germany should come first would be unanimously accepted, both on account of its situation and on account of promise made at the last renewal of the armistice.

These, then, were the reasons in favour of giving the German question priority; these were the reasons which had led Mr. Balfour to make his proposal. The Conference had never for a moment dreamt of adjourning or retarding the consideration of all other questions. But the settlement of the German question was urgent.

M. Sonnino said that the Allies had only had one front during the war; were now two or three fronts to be created during the peace? He could not consent to that. He quite understood the necessity for pushing on the settlement of the final terms to be [Page 95] imposed on Germany; but if the German question were detached from the rest of the questions which called for settlement, that would be like constituting a second front, and he could never accept a proposal of that kind. Such a procedure would have most deplorable and most disastrous results in Italy, for it would be impossible to keep such decisions from the ears of the public.

If the Conference persisted in its intention, he (M. Sonnino) could not prevent it: each member must vote as he thought best; but he could not approve a decision which would constitute a positive menace to his own country.

He would not be opposed to priority being eventually given to the German questions, if those were the first to become ripe for solution. But he could not agree that a condition to that effect should be made in advance.

Lord Milner enquired whether it would not be more important than anything else for the Conference to devote its time to a consideration of the final naval and military terms with Germany, provided the reports of the military advisers were ready. Once an agreement was reached on that subject, one compartment of the peace work would be finally dispensed with, even though the decisions reached were not at once presented to Germany.

Mr. House persisted in his opinion that the Conference should go back to Mr. Balfour’s original proposal as regards Germany, and then pass similar resolutions as regards Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. He thought no one could object to that procedure.

Mr. Balfour thought that a decision had been reached that the Conference would not proceed with the military terms of peace as a separate proposition, and he regretted that M. Sonnino had again referred to that proposal. M. Clemenceau objected to it, and he (Mr. Balfour) did not wish to insist. In any case, it was a relatively small matter. The question of real importance was whether the Conference should decide to press on all questions leading to peace with Germany without getting entangled with all other questions relating to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. He felt very strongly on that point and urged his colleagues to accept the proposals contained in the fourth paragraph of his revised note.

M. Sonnino enquired whether Mr. Balfour would agree to accept Mr. House’s and Mr. Lansing’s proposal.

Mr. Balfour said he preferred his own draft, but he would accept Mr. House’s proposal merely with a view to reach a unanimous agreement.

M. Pichon said he would accept Mr. House’s proposal for the reason given by Mr. Balfour.

[Page 96]

M. Sonnino also expressed his willingness to accept Mr. House’s proposal as an act of conciliation. He understood that four texts would be prepared, identic in form, except that a different enemy country would be mentioned in each. The note would, in each case, commence with the words: “The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary peace terms, etc.”

Baron Makino enquired whether the approximate future frontiers of Germany, referred to in paragraph 2 (a), included the German colonies.

Amendments to Paragraph 2 of Mr. Balfour’s First Proposal Mr. Balfour replied that it was intended to include the colonies.

Baron Makino thought that, in that case, leased territories of Germany should also be included.

Mr. Lansing proposed that paragraph 2 (a) should be made to read “The approximate future frontiers of Germany and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe”, the words “and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe” being omitted from the texts relating to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Lansing further proposed that the first part of paragraph 2 should be made to read as follows: “The preliminary peace terms, other than naval, military and air conditions, should cover, inter alia, the following points.”

(This was agreed to.)

M. Klotz suggested that paragraph 2 (b) should be made to read: “the financial conditions to be imposed on. …”

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Lansing next proposed that paragraph 2 (c) should be made to read: “the economic conditions to be accorded to. …”

(This was agreed to.)

M. Matsui enquired, with reference to paragraph 2 (a), whether that would include all rights, such as rights over the railways and mines in China acquired by Germany.

Mr. Balfour thought that the words “inter alia” would cover such questions.

Mr. Lansing agreed, and remarked that the words “inter alia” would also cover the question of prisoners of war, which he had intended to raise separately.

(It was agreed that texts of the following draft Note, relating respectively to Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, should be prepared and distributed that evening, for consideration at the next meeting of the Conference:—

  • “1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without [Page 97] delay to the consideration of preliminary peace terms with … and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.
  • 2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover inter alia the following points:—
    (a)
    the approximate future frontiers of . . . . . . (for Germany only: and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe);
    (b)
    the financial conditions to be imposed on . . . . . .;
    (c)
    the economic conditions to be accorded to . . . . . .;
    (d)
    responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
  • 3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating those subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in those cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with . . . . . .”)

3. M. Pichon suggested that the statement of the Albanian claims should be heard on Monday, as well as a French statement relating to Morocco.

Agenda for Next Meeting Mr. Balfour said that he wished another question to be entered on the agenda for the next meeting, namely, the sending of troops to Poland. Very strong recommendations had been received on this subject from the British members of the Allied Commission in Poland.

M. Pichon pointed out that this question had been referred to the Polish Commission sitting in Paris. The reports received from the Polish Commission in Poland had been transmitted to the Commission in Paris, which had been created with a view to co-ordinating the information received from Poland.

Mr. Balfour said that he understood that the Commission on Poland in Paris were ready to submit a report on the subject of the sending of troops to Poland.

M. Pichon agreed that under the circumstances the Committee would be invited to bring their report on the despatch of troops to Poland on Monday, as well as any other questions ready for discussion.

(It was agreed that the following questions should be placed on the Agenda Paper for the Meeting to be held on Monday afternoon, February 24th, at 3 p.m.:—

1.
Procedure of Conference.
2.
Statement of the Albanian claims.
3.
Despatch of troops to Poland.

[Page 98]

(4) On the proposal of Mr. Lansing, the following resolution was accepted:—

Creation of a Neutral Zone in Carinthia “In view of the fact that disorders have arisen in Carinthia as result of the absence of a definite boundary between the territories of the German-Austrians and the Yugo-Slavs,

It is agreed

That the question of the establishment of a neutral zone between the two peoples be referred to the same Military Committee charged with the investigation of establishing neutral zones in the Banat and. Transylvania, (Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles).”

(The Meeting then adjourned until Monday, February 24th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

  1. See BC–8, vol. iii, p. 698.