Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/10
FM–10
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, April 30, 1919, at 3 p.m.
| Present | Also Present |
| America, United States of | America, United States of |
| Hon. R. Lansing | Admiral W. S. Benson |
| Secretary | Dr. R. H. Lord |
| Mr. L. Harrison | Mr. Morison |
| British Empire | Mr. Whitehouse |
| The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P. | Mr. Rogers |
| Secretaries | British Empire |
| Mr. H. Norman | Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B. |
| Mr. E. Phipps | Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G. |
| France | France |
| M. Pichon | Admiral de Bon |
| Secretaries | M. Laroche |
| M. de Bearn | Capt. Levavasseur |
| M. de St. Quentin | Lieut. de V. Odend’hal |
| Japan | Japan |
| H. E. Baron Makino | M. Yamakawa |
| Secretary | M. Kawai |
| M. Saburi |
Joint Secretariat
| British Empire | Capt. E. Abraham. |
| France | Capt. A. Portier. |
| Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck. | |
1. M. Pichon said that the first item on the Agenda had been brought forward at the request of the British Delegation.
Policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in the Baltic States Mr. Balfour said he was surprised to hear this. The matter, no doubt, was one of great importance which should be discussed at an early date. The British Delegation felt that matters should not be left as they were and it appeared that the American Delegation shared the same feeling. All he had before him, however, was the report made by Messrs. Lord and Morison, American Members of the Russian Section of the Territorial Division. (For Report, see Appendix [Page 642] “A”.) All the recommendations in this report he was not quite prepared to accept. It would be necessary for the British Delegation to examine the proposals seriatim.
Mr. Lansing said that the report had been prepared for the use of the American Delegation alone. It was still under consideration. The questions involved had a large political bearing and he was not, himself, prepared to discuss the matter at the present meeting, until it had been thoroughly considered by the American Delegation.
Mr. Balfour said that he was quite ready to make certain observations on the proposals, if it was so desired.
Mr. Lansing said that he would prefer postponement.
(It was then agreed that the question be postponed to a later meeting and that the subject should be brought on the Agenda at the instance of the American Delegation. Mr. Balfour observed that, as the situation was critical, it would be desirable that a decision should be taken as early as possible.)
2. M. Pichon read the following memorandum, presented by the French Delegation:—
Organization of Temporary Regime in Slesvig After the Conclusion of Peace “The French Delegation considers it advisable to draw the attention of the British Delegation to the fact that the articles of the Treaty of Peace concerning Slesvig contain provisions regarding decisions which the Allied and Associated Governments must take before the execution of this Treaty.
The question concerns the formation of an International Commission composed of five members, three to be appointed by the Allied and Associated Governments and the remaining two by the Norwegian and Swedish Governments respectively. This Commission would have general powers of administration and would, therefore, be responsible for the maintenance of order within the zone evacuated by the Germans.
The French Delegation considers that it would be advisable to come to an immediate agreement regarding the choice of the three Governments nominated by the Allied and Associated Governments to appoint delegates to the Commission—which, in the opinion of the French Delegation, should be the American, British and French Governments. A decision on the matter should be speedily reached.
The appointment of the Norwegian and Swedish members might be postponed until the signature of the Treaty of Peace. Opinions should, however, be taken at once to see whether the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments at Christiania and Stockholm should be asked to request the Norwegian and Swedish Governments, immediately after such signature, each to appoint a delegate to the International Commission.
A more urgent question is that of the composition of the Allied forces intended to maintain order in the part of Slesvig evacuated by the Germans, until the allotment of the territory in which the plebiscite will be taken.
[Page 643]The report of the Commission1 suggests (in accordance with the request of the Danish Government) that Allied naval forces, accompanied by landing parties, should be sent to the port of Flensborg. The troops required for maintaining order would be divided up according to the Commission’s instructions.
The French Delegation considers that it would also be advisable to decide which Powers should send ships, the number thereof, and the strength of the landing parties.
The Danish Government considered that 1,000 men would suffice, but Germany has, during the last few weeks, brought about a state of affairs in Slesvig which might render a larger number necessary.
This question should be urgently referred to the naval experts now in Paris, in order that they might come to an agreement regarding the steps to be taken.
They should be informed that the Allied ships should arrive at Flensborg immediately after signature of the Treaty of Peace, without waiting for the ratification thereof—as evacuation must take place ten days after its signature, and the population must also be reassured and a régime instituted in Slesvig which will stop German machinations.
The French Delegation is of the opinion that these various questions could usefully form the subject of discussion at one of the earliest meetings of the Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.”
He asked if any member had any objections to raise to these proposals.
Mr. Balfour expressed the opinion that the sooner an invitation was sent to Sweden and Norway the better.
M. Pichon explained that it had been thought desirable not to make a formal invitation until the signature of the Treaty. An informal request, however, might be sent immediately.
Mr. Balfour questioned whether it would not be advisable to consult the military as well as the naval experts. He thought that the question of policing the area was rather a military than a naval one.
M. Pichon said that, as the main item would be the occupation of the port of Flensborg, he thought that the naval forces would probably be adequate.
Admiral de Bon said that in the policing of the coast the Navies could assist, but it was obvious that the Military would have to play the main part on shore.
Mr. Lansing suggested that the naval experts be asked to decide among themselves whether they could undertake the whole operation. If not, the military authorities might be asked to supply any supplementary forces required.
Admiral de Bon said that it would save time for the naval and military experts to meet at once.
Mr. Lansing said that, if the proposal was that the operation should be primarily a naval one and that a naval officer should be in general [Page 644] charge, it was desirable that the military contribution should be clearly subordinate. A joint meeting of the military and naval experts at the start might produce a different impression. He suggested that the naval experts, without referring the matter again to the Council, should call in their military colleagues, should they find that they could not undertake the whole task themselves.
Admiral de Bon said that he anticipated that a considerable force would be required and that the naval authority would inevitably be compelled to apply to the military authorities for assistance. It did not seem likely that the British Fleet would be able to spare a large detachment, and the American Navy and the French would only be able to send small ships. Hence, it appeared to him from the very outset clear that military aid would be required.
(It was then decided that the naval advisers of France, Great Britain and the United States of America should meet to devise means of carrying out the policy outlined in the memorandum. They should, if necessary, confer with the military advisers of the same Powers, with the object of supplementing naval by military effort on land. The memorandum quoted above was adopted.)
3. Draft Article for Treaty of Peace Relating to Treaty Concluded Between the French republic and the Prince of Monaco on July 17th, 1918 M. Pichon said that a Treaty had been signed between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, copies of which had been circulated to the various Delegations. (See Appendix “B”.) At the time had been signed, there was a fear that the German branch of the dukes of Urach might urge their claim to the succession. The Treaty had then been made by common accord between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, ensuring that his successor should be his grand-daughter. It would be necessary to guarantee this Treaty by an article recording the fact that the High Contracting Parties had cognisance of the agreement.
Mr. Lansing enquired whether the High Contracting Parties were asked to recognise the validity of the Treaty.
M. Pichon replied that they were only asked to recognise that they had taken cognisance of the Treaty.
Mr. Lansing said that he could see no reason why the Allies should not go further and recognise the Treaty.
(It was then decided unanimously that an article to the following effect should be included in the Supplementary Clauses of the Treaty of Peace:—
“The High Contracting Parties recognise the Treaty signed by the Government of the French Republic on July 17th, 1918, with His Serene Highness, the Prince of Monaco, defining the relations between France and the Principality.”)
4. Question of German Submarine Cables Mr. Lansing said that Article 38 of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses had been, he understood, drafted on the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour after a long discussion on March 24th.2 The record of the meeting was that, “in order to meet the general view, Mr. Balfour proposed the following resolution:—
“The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her own expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables, or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers.”
Article 38 as at present drafted did not appear to him to carry out the purpose of this resolution, which had only been adopted by the meeting as reconciling the two sides of the controversy, if this were the correct interpretation of the expression “to meet the general view.” He had interpreted the resolution as meaning that the German cables would be return[ed] to Germany subject to her repairing them at her own expense. She could clearly not be expected to spend money on repairing cables for the exclusive benefit of other parties. The same, he had concluded, was to apply to diverted cables. The resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour had been reached after a very long discussion and after the legal experts had failed to discover any law applicable to the point. The matter, he thought, had been made quite clear by the question of Baron Makino, recorded in the minutes of March 24th, as to whether the resolution as drafted might not be interpreted to mean that all cables might be returned to Germany. The answer to this question, he had presumed, was in the affirmative, and he knew that the President of the United States was strongly of this opinion. Article 38 of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses was drafted as follows:—
“Submarine Cables. Germany will be at liberty to repair at her own expense the German submarine cables which have been merely cut during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers and are not being utilised.
She will similarly be at liberty to replace at her own expense all portions of cables which, after having been cut, have been removed, or without having been removed, are at present being utilised by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers. In such cases the cables or portions of cables which have been removed or utilised remain the property of the Allied and Associated Powers.
Consequently, the German cables or portions thereof mentioned below, which have been removed or utilised by the Allied and. Associated Powers, will not be restored.
Emden-Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo.
Emden-Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest.
[Page 646]Emden-Teneriffe: from off Dunkerque to off Teneriffe.
Emden-Azores (1): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.
Emden-Azores (2): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.
Azores-New York (1): from Fayal to New York.
Azores-New York (2): from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax.
Teneriffe-Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia.
Monrovia-Lome:
| from about | { | lat.: 2°30′N.; |
| long.: 7°40′W. of Greenwich; | ||
| to about | { | lat.: 2°20′N.; |
| long.: 5°30′W. of Greenwich; | ||
| and from about | { | lat.: 3°48′N.; |
| long.: 0°00′. | ||
| to Lome. |
Lome-Duala: from Lome to Duala.
Monrovia-Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco.
Constantinople-Constantza: from Constantinople to Constantza.
Chefoo-Tsingtao-Shanghai: from Tsingtao to Chefoo and from Tsingtao to Shanghai.
Yap-Shanghai, Yap-Guam and Yap-Menado (Celebes): from Yap-Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island and from Yap Island to Menado.
These provisions do not affect the rights of the German owners of other cables or portions of cables.
In no case can the landing rights of any cable which remains German be reinstated on territory under the authority of an Allied and Associated Power without a new licence.”
With reference to the last clause of the first paragraph, he questioned whether there were any such cables not utilised by any of the Allied and Associated Powers. The second paragraph appeared to be in accord with Mr. Balfour’s resolution. The third paragraph appeared to cover all the cables under consideration, and the conclusion was that none would go back to Germany save those between Germany and Great Britain. He would like to ask Mr. Balfour if he thought this paragraph accorded with the resolution of March 24th.
Mr. Balfour said that if he re-called aright the policy he had proposed on March 24th, it was that if any of the Allied or Associated Powers had only cut a German cable, Germany could repair that cable at her own expense and make use of it. If any of the Allied or Associated Powers had removed a section of German cable and used it elsewhere, Germany could not claim the return of that section but could replace it at her own expense.
The broad principle, therefore, appeared to be that Germany might, if she chose, at her own expense restore her cables to their pre-war state. She could not make the Allies responsible for the damage done to them during the war or ask them to restore any portion of her cables they had removed, nor could she claim control of any cable line [Page 647] set up by any of the Allies and partly composed of pieces of German cables.
Mr. Lansing agreed. It followed that the list given in Article 38 should be eliminated, as well as the paragraph immediately preceding the list. America was not prepared to yield the cable line from New York to the Azores merely because the Allies had diverted it. America would prefer to see the line between Monrovia and Pernambuco in German hands than cede it to any of the Allied Powers.
Mr. Balfour said that the British Government did not wish to tamper with property in cables. He understood that American subjects owned considerable shares in many of the trans-Atlantic cables.
Mr. Lansing said that these lines, however, were not controlled by America.
Admiral de Bon said that originally it had been thought that the matter could be settled on military considerations. Legal questions had then been raised and referred to legal experts. Their deliberations had not materially altered the position. Military considerations were therefore still in possession of the field. He admitted that the offer of returning the cables to Germany was an empty offer. The case specially referred to by Mr. Lansing was that of the cable between Monrovia and Pernambuco. This cable had been lifted and altered by the French Navy in agreement with Great Britain before Brazil and the United States had come into the war. The work was complete when the United States declared war on Germany. The United States had then requested the French Government not to make use of the altered cable. France, though she had acquired the cable in a perfectly regular manner as a war measure, and although she had spent money on it and taken war risks to effect the work, agreed to make no use of it. Under ordinary circumstances, France would have acquired a right to the cable. Failing this, she should at least be entitled to reparation for the cost and risk entailed. There was no legal argument against this contention. But for the request of the American Government by cutting it again and linking it to a French cable line, for instance, that running from Konakri, France might have diverted this line and thereby acquired complete title to it. The French Government, however, though they were not precluded by any question of right, had deferred to the wishes of the United States. If the American Government were unwilling to allow France to keep this cable, the case was a special one. Setting this case aside, the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour could stand. It restored no other cables to Germany, as all other German cables had been cut, moved or utilised. He suggested, therefore, that this particular case should be studied in isolation and in reference to the question of reparation. It appeared clear to him that Germany could not be given cables on which any of the Allies had spent money.
[Page 648]Mr. Lansing pointed out that France had perhaps the right to cut this cable as an act of war. He would point out, however, that it was a neutral cable, though worked by Germans. It was a fair legal question whether the cutting of a cable between two neutral countries was a legitimate act of war. An act of war was not just because it cost money, and did not ipso facto give a title to recompense. If so, all the costs of the war would fall on Germany alone. The American position was one of strong opposition to this point of view. Costs of war had been excluded from the bill to be presented to Germany. It was now proposed to keep a cable between two neutral countries merely because its ownership was German.
Admiral de Bon said he could not quite agree with Mr. Lansing. He thought that the facts were not quite in accordance with the view he had expressed. The cable, far from being neutral, had been of such interest to the Germans that they had sent a submarine to bombard the cable station at Monrovia after the capture of the cable. If, as Mr. Lansing admitted, the French Navy had a right to cut the cable as an act of war, it could also have utilised portions of it to attach it to a French line, and, had it done so, it would have been entitled to retain possession of the pieces removed. Only the wish expressed by the American Government had prevented France from carrying this out. The case was therefore a special case that ought to be treated separately from the rest.
Mr. Lansing said that the case might be a special one, but it was not therefore a strong one. The whole question of the right of a belligerent to cut a cable between two neutral countries was open to legal argument. This, however, was related to the past, and he did not wish to raise the question. In any case, he did not think that the cutting of such a cable or the use of it gave rise to any right to its retention or, as an alternative, to compensation.
M. Pichon said that there was apparently no means of reconciling the two views. The divergence, however, appeared only to relate to one cable.
Admiral de Bon said that all other cases save this were disposed of. Briefly, the Allies kept all the cables, and Germany had a right to make new ones.
Mr. Lansing pointed out that even this right was denied the Germans by the last paragraph of Article 38.
Admiral de Bon pointed out that the Germans before the war could not land a cable on the territory of any power without the authority of that power. It was hardly credible that the war should have given them rights which they were not entitled to before.
Mr. Lansing said that each Government did as a matter of fact preserve its right to give or refuse a licence. It was unnecessary to bind the Governments by a Treaty.
[Page 649]Admiral de Bon said that the meaning of this paragraph was that the rights enjoyed by Germany before the war had been terminated by the war.
Mr. Balfour said that he could not see that any valuable advantage was gained by this paragraph. If all German rights had been abolished by the war, they could only be renewed by fresh licences. Presumably the Germans had landing rights in Great Britain. If so, they could not revive them except by the consent of the British Government.
Mr. Lansing said that if this paragraph be left out, old rights could be revived without the necessity of granting new ones. For instance, in the case of the Azores, Great Britain had acquired exclusive landing rights. If Portugal had the right to renew previous grants, the United States could have a cable to the Azores.
Mr. Balfour said that he was unable to follow this argument. He was prepared to accept the first and second paragraphs of Article 38 and the penultimate paragraph. He would agree to the suppression of the remainder. A decision on this matter was urgent, and he was prepared to do this without waiting to consult jurists.
Mr. Lansing said that he had certain amendments to offer regarding the first two paragraphs. He would present them at the meeting if so desired, and Mr. Balfour could have an opportunity of consulting lawyers before accepting them.
Mr. Lansing suggested the excision in the first paragraph of the word “merely”, and at the end of the paragraph of the words “and are not being utilised”.
Admiral de Bon said that the first paragraph in any case did not control the fate of the Monrovia-Pernambuco cable, unless it be admitted that this cable was being utilised by reason of the operations performed on it by the French Navy.
Mr. Lansing said that this did not constitute utilisation.
Admiral de Bon pointed out that France was about to make use of this cable when the United States Government intervened.
Mr. Lansing asked whether Admiral de Bon would favour the suppression of the last words of paragraph 1.
Admiral de Bon said he would not. The paragraph would then give Germany the right to re-establish all her cables.
Mr. Balfour said this was so, provided the expense were borne by Germany.
Admiral de Bon said it must be clearly understood that Germany was not entitled to use any portion of the old cables, except any portions directly on the bed of the ocean. In a word, the old German system no longer existed, as the Allies had captured it. Germany could create a new system if she so desired.
Mr. Lansing said that it was a question for each power to decide [Page 650] whether or not previous German landing rights should be granted anew or not. As to depriving the Germans of their property in cables, he was opposed to doing any such thing as much as to depriving Germany of ships necessary to carry German mails.
Admiral de Bon said that any mention of a German right to retain cables implied that Germany at the present moment had any. In point of fact, she had none. He would not be prepared at the present time to take from Germany any cables she might have, but, as she had lost them all during the war, the case did not arise.
Mr. Lansing observed that this applied to the control of cables, but not to property rights in cables. Ownership titles to cables existed in Germany at the present time. This was the point of view of the American Delegation, and the point of view he was instructed by the President to maintain.
Admiral de Bon said that this theory would lead to giving a predominant importance to the interests of private owners of cables in Germany. If so, the Allies would be under the obligation of repairing their property for them and making good all the damage done to it during the war. This would be the consequence of the theory advocated by Mr. Lansing.
Mr. Lansing observed that reparation for acts of war could only be demanded by the victor and not by the vanquished.
Admiral de Bon agreed, and said that it was for this reason that the Allies had maintained they owed nothing to Germany for seizing the cables.
Mr. Lansing said that his amendment to the second paragraph would make it read as follows:—
“She will similarly be at liberty to replace at her own expense all portions to cables which, after having been cut, have been removed or diverted by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers. In such case the portions of cables which had been removed or, from the point of cutting, have been newly laid remain the property of the Allied and Associated Powers.”
Mr. Balfour said that he was unable to accept these amendments immediately. He adhered to the statement of policy made by him at the beginning of the meeting which he understood both Mr. Lansing and Admiral Benson had agreed to. He wished to see that policy framed in legal language.
Admiral Benson said that the whole trouble arose from the phrase in Mr. Balfour’s resolution of March 24th:—
“which, after having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers”.
To give effect to this clause the numeration in Article 38 had been made. If the matter were again to be referred to the Drafting Committee he thought it desirable that the principles should be clearly expressed by the Council.
[Page 651]Admiral de Bon said that in his opinion the list did no harm.
M. Pichon observed that it included the cable from Monrovia to Pernambuco.
Admiral de Bon said that the difficulty regarding this line lay between two Associated Powers, not between the belligerents on one side and the belligerents on the other. For the purpose of the Treaty it would be sufficient to say that this cable would not be restored to Germany—its ultimate fate would be settled among the Powers.
Mr. Lansing said that the cable was German property in the hands of France, and now not even in French hands but derelict in the sea.
Admiral de Bon said that its last possessors were the French. It had only not been made use of at the request of the United States.
Mr. Lansing said that France had no license to land a cable either in Liberia or Brazil.
Admiral de Bon said that had this objection been made earlier the cable would have been diverted and attached to the French line. Had this been done, France would have been incontestibly master of the cable.
Mr. Lansing said that the points of view were diametrically diverse. The United States considered these cables were German property which would revert to their owners. The Treaty should allow Germany to resume control provided she made the necessary repairs. He could not recede from this position which had been adopted that very day at a meeting between himself and President Wilson. He, therefore, thought the question should be referred to the Council of the Heads of the States as he could see no other way out of the dilemma.
Admiral de Bon said that he also could see no other way. He wished to state, however, that the only reason for the dilemma was that the United States wished a particular cable to be treated differently from the rest. France had obtained possession of this cable by regular means and could have made use of it. This was a question he thought that might be settled between France and the United States, and he wished to add that should France be deprived of it he would feel that a damage was being done to France. The cable would be taken from France for the advantage of Germany. This was the feeling that he, personally, would preserve.
M. Pichon suggested that the case of this particular cable should be reserved, and that a formula be found to cover the remaining cases.
Mr. Balfour suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to put in more adequate terms the policy he had previously suggested and which had obtained general agreement.
[Page 652]Mr. Lansing said that the Drafting Committee could not be asked to lay down a policy.
Mr. Balfour said it would only be asked to find words for a policy previously laid down.
Mr. Lansing said that the policy had obviously been one which the Drafting Committee was unable to understand. He would ask Mr. Balfour whether the amendments he had suggested did not fulfil this policy.
Mr. Balfour said that if the amendment suggested by Mr. Lansing were accepted the result would be that parts of the cables now in use by the Allied Powers would become German again. While not objecting to the re-establishment by Germany of her pre-war system, the British Delegation did object to the destruction by Germany of systems established at British expense, partly out of elements taken from the German lines. The Germans might restore all their previous systems if they wished. No doubt this would lead to a duplication of lines, but Great Britain had no wish to monopolise the cables of the world.
Admiral Benson said that it might be well to quote concrete instances. There were two cables from the Azores to the United States. The end of one of them had been cut off some 600 miles from the American coast, and the line had been connected with Halifax. The second had been diverted and used in the English Channel. What America understood was that Germany might replace the portions removed and thereby resume possession of the whole line. The only portion that remained British was that portion connecting Nova Scotia and the point at which the cable had been cut in the Atlantic. The same would apply to the cable from Emden to the Azores which had been cut and diverted to Brest. All the Germans had to do was to reconnect. They were not bound to make a new cable from the Azores to Emden, or from the Azores to New York.
Mr. Balfour said he could not quite take this view. All would agree that the multiplication of cables would be for the benefit of the world. Some German cables had been cut and diverted during the war. They had not been destroyed. There were at the present time the same number of cables as before the war, though some had been diverted to other places and worked under new control. There was no objection to the restoration of the old lines, but this should not be done at the expense of new ones. Should Great Britain accept Admiral Benson’s theory, there would be a piece of cable in British possession from Halifax to a point of junction with an old German line in the Atlantic, and this piece, after the Germans had reconnected their line would be of no conceivable use to anyone at all. If any portion of the world’s cables were to be made derelict it should be the German portion and not the British. It was admitted [Page 653] that Germany might use derelict cables to restore her own system, but not that she might do so at the expense of any cables used by the Allies. As a result of the war France and Great Britain were richer in cables, but the world was no worse off. If the German cables were to be restored, it must be at Germany’s expense. He was, therefore, at variance with Admiral Benson.
Mr. Lansing said that if Mr. Balfour’s procedure were adopted, the United States of America would lose direct contact with Europe through the Azores. The line would be controlled by the British and French. The American view was that when an Allied Government had cut or diverted a cable at its own expense, Germany might repair the link up to the point of cutting. The Allied Power could then if it liked remake the main part. Otherwise cables became spoils of war.
Mr. Balfour said he thought this was re-opening a question which had been settled. Inasmuch as capture conferred title to the pieces removed from a German cable, cables were spoils of war.
Mr. Lansing said he did not agree. His theory was that the equivalent of the piece removed had been destroyed in war. He pointed out that when the Azores line had been diverted, the United States, then neutral, was deprived of the use of the cable; no compensation for this deprivation was offered.
Admiral de Bon said that confusion arose through the mingling of two questions. One was the question of restoring cables to Germany, and the other was the establishment of communication between the United States and Europe. The first could be settled by making it quite clear that Germany would not resume control of her cables. The second could be settled between the powers concerned.
Mr. Lansing said he did not agree that no cables should be restored to Germany. He, therefore, reiterated his proposal that the question be referred to the Council of the Heads of States, and suggested that his amendment should be submitted to them at the same time.
(It was therefore decided to refer the question, together with the record of the discussion, to the Council of the Heads of States.)
Baron Makino said that he had not taken part in the discussion, but as the whole question of principle had been raised, and as the question was being referred to the Council of Heads of States, he would wish to be present in order to state the case for Japan.
(This was agreed to.)
5. The Island of Yap Mr. Lansing said that there was a question connected with that of submarine cables which he would like on a future occasion to discuss. The question was whether in the interests of cable communication it would not be desirable that the Island of Yap be internationalised, and administered by an international commission in control of the cable lines.
[Page 654]Baron Makino stated that the Island was at present occupied by Japan. Japan would, therefore, have a good deal to say on this question. There were agreements entered into by Japan regarding the status of the Island. The question raised by Mr. Lansing affected that status, and he regarded the suggestion as a very grave matter. In his opinion before deciding the question of cable control, the question of the status of the Island should be settled.
Mr. Lansing said that he had raised the question though it was not on the agenda in order to give warning that the question was in his mind and that he would propose it for discussion at a later time. He would suggest that it was not necessary to maintain that all the Islands must have the same status. The Island of Yap might be held to constitute a special case.
Baron Makino said that he wished it to be understood his point was that the status of the Island itself should be decided before the question of the cables, which constituted only a minor element in the problem.
Mr. Balfour agreed that the status of the Island was a matter of great importance. He did not think, however, that the question of cables could be deferred, as it must be settled in time for the Treaty with Germany. Germany could be required to give up all title to the Island; its status thereafter could be discussed amongst the Allies.
Baron Makino said he had no objection whatever to the settlement of the cables in as much as this question affected the Treaty with Germany.
6. Procedure for Interpretation of the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace Mr. Lansing observed that some of the Reparation Clauses in the Treaty were clauses with a continuing effect which might last for 30 years. It had been proposed that the interpretation of these clauses whenever difficulties arose should be left to a Reparation Commission, representing the Five Powers. It had further been proposed that the interpretation must be unanimous. It was probable that the representatives on such a Commission would not be jurists. He thought it would be far better to appoint a single judge, whose finding should be final on all points of interpretation. He would, himself, suggest that this function of arbiter be exercised by the Lord Chief Justice of England.
Mr. Balfour said that he had had no notice of this proposal and asked whether Mr. Lansing had circulated any memorandum on the subject.
M. Pichon said that he was also taken unawares by this proposal. He would like time to consider it and asked Mr. Lansing to set forth his reasons on paper.
Mr. Balfour asked whether this provision would have to be inserted in the Treaty.
[Page 655]Mr. Lansing said that the Germans would have to agree to it. He agreed, however, to circulate a memorandum on the subject.
7. Publication of Treaty Baron Makino asked whether the text of the Treaty would be made public when it was handed to the Germans. Peace was to be established when the Treaty was ratified, and it was the general hope that this would be achieved in one or two months after the signature. He pointed out that it would take a long time to telegraph the whole Treaty in cipher to Japan. It would take less time should the Treaty be made public and should it be possible to telegraph it en clair.
Mr. Balfour thought that it would be possible to telegraph the Treaty en clair the day it was communicated in a plenary session to the Powers with special interests.
Baron Makino further asked that the French Government should facilitate the telegraphing of the Treaty to Japan.
M. Pichon undertook to do this.
Mr. Lansing said that the Treaty would be telegraphed to the State Department in Washington and that he would arrange that it be communicated to the Japanese Ambassador who would be able to forward it thence to Japan. He would ask, however, that the Treaty be not made public until communicated to the Germans.
(This was agreed to.)
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Paris, 30th April, 1919.
[Page 657]