Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/9

FM–9

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation of the Foreign Ministers, Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, April 26th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 26, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Capt. McNamee } For Question I. Colonel Gorrell Lieut. Kiely
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison
British Empire	Dr. Lord. For Questions II–V.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, K. G.	Mr. Beer. For Question VI.
Secretaries	Rear Admiral Long } For Question VIII. Brig. Gen. McKinstry
Mr. H. Norman
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.	British Empire
France	Maj. Gen. W. Thwaites
M. Pichon	Capt. E. H. Tindal Atkinson
Secretaries	Mr. H. J. Paton
M. Arnavon	Mr. E. H. Carr
Capt. de Saint Quentin	Sir H. J. Read
M. de Bearn	Mr. H. A. Payne
Japan	Mr. E. F. Wise
H. E. Baron Makino	France
Secretary	M. Simon
M. Kawai	M. J. Cambon
	General Le Rond
	M. Hermitte
	Lieut. de Percin
	Capt. Roper
	M. de Peretti
	M. M. G. Cahen
	Japan
	Lt. Col. Ninomiya

Joint Secretariat

United States of America	Col. U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Maj. A. M. Caccia.
France	Capt. A. Portier.
Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck.

[1.] Clauses Relating to the Right of Aerial Transit Over Enemy Territory After the Conclusion of Peace M. Pichon, having declared the Meeting open, said that the first item on the Agenda paper related to the right of aerial transit over enemy territory after the conclusion of Peace. The question had come under discussion at the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (I. C. 176),¹ and the draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty with the omission of the second sentence in Article 3 had been adopted, subject to the agreement of Mr. Lansing.

Mr. Lansing said that his chief objection to the proposed articles was that there was no reciprocity about them; Germany was given no rights and it appeared as though the Allied Governments were trying to suppress all economic aerial activity on her part. He thought this was an unfair attitude to assume, and he did not see why Germany was not given the right to pass through the air of other countries when the Allies reserved for themselves full powers to use the air routes of Germany.

M. Pichon invited attention to Clause 5 of the draft Articles under consideration which read as follows:—“As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy through Germany, treatment according [accorded] to aircraft of the most favoured nation”.

Capt. Roper explained that the Aeronautical Commission in drafting these regulations had not intended to suppress Germany’s commercial aerial activity. Indeed, that was not a question which the Commission could have dealt with, as it constituted a political matter which fell outside its functions. The Commission had originally intended to put a stop to all German aerial activity, but the Supreme Council had disapproved of any such arrangement. The object the Commission had kept in view in drafting the Articles under consideration had not been to interfere with Germany’s freedom of the air; but to prevent her from interfering with the free passage of Allied and Associated aircraft over German territory.

Lord Hardinge explained that from a military point of view it was realised that aeroplanes used for commercial purposes could easily be converted to warlike purposes. He invited attention, however, to Clause 7 of the draft articles, wherein it was clearly laid down that as soon as Germany entered the League of Nations she would obtain the same facilities as were at present claimed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. Pichon added that under Article 7, Germany could also at any moment ask to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation, and she would thereby obtain the facilities now claimed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Mr. Lansing pointed out that the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made no provision for a former enemy country to become a party to that Convention. In this connection he invited attention to Article 40 of the Convention.

Capt. Roper explained that that Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission in drafting these articles had confined itself to aeronautical matters. It could not take cognisance of political matters. The Commission had provided for the participation of neutral countries in the Convention: but the question as to whether enemy countries should also be permitted to adhere to the Convention was a political matter and consequently the Commission did not feel authorised to determine the conditions under which enemy countries could become parties to the Convention.

Mr. Lansing said that the fact remained that no provision had been made for Germany to become a party to the Convention.

M. Pichon pointed out that it would be difficult to make provisions to cover every possible case; but it had been clearly stated in the draft articles under consideration that with the consent of the Allied and Associated States, Germany would be permitted to adhere to the Convention.

Mr. Lansing thought that this regulation by itself would not suffice unless a similar provision were entered in the Convention relating to Air Navigation.

M. Pichon pointed out that Germany would also be entitled to adhere to the Convention as soon as she gained admittance to the League of Nations.

Mr. Lansing inquired what would happen if Germany never joined the League of Nations.

M. Pichon thought that she would in that case hardly be qualified to be a party to the Convention.

Mr. Lansing said that the crux of the whole matter lay in the fact that Germany would not be entitled to participate in the Convention until she became a member of the League of Nations, and her entry into the latter would depend upon the assent of her economic rivals, who would necessarily be opposed to her obtaining any aerial commercial privileges.

Captain Roper thought that some confusion appeared to exist between the Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, submitted by the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission, and the Convention relating to International Air navigation. The latter Convention merely dealt with the regulation of air traffic. Neutrals were entitled to adhere to that Convention by a simple declaration of their intention to do so; but enemy countries could only be admitted with the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments. The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission had attempted to draft certain regulations to cover the period between the signature of the Treaty of Peace and Germany’s adhesion to the international air navigation Convention. During that period it was essential that the Allied and Associated Governments should have the free use of the air routes across Germany without any possibility of interference by the enemy countries. Accordingly, the Aeronautical Commission in the first place, submitted to the Supreme Council a recommendation to that effect. Subsequently, under instructions from the Supreme Council, that recommendation had been put into the form of the seven Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace, which were now under consideration. He would point out, however, that the seven Articles in question were intended to deal merely with the intermediary period above-mentioned.

Mr. Lansing maintained that no method had been established whereby Germany could become a party to the air navigation Convention.

Captain Roper replied that in accordance with draft Article 7, Germany could become a party to the Convention either by gaining admittance to the League of Nations, or by making a demand to adhere to the Convention.

Mr. Lansing enquired why Allied aircraft should not be permitted to participate in commercial enterprises in Germany.

Captain Roper drew attention to Article 5, wherein it was clearly stated that:—

“As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy throughout Germany treatment according [accorded] to aircraft of the most favoured nation”.

He thought that Article covered the particular point raised by Mr. Lansing.

Mr. Lansing held that the words “in transit” should specifically be mentioned.

Mr. Pichon thought that the words “internal air traffic … throughout Germany” would be interpreted to mean “in transit”.

Mr. Lansing expressed the view that Article 5 would give tremendous opportunities for smuggling.

Captain Roper thought that the same objection would apply to Allied aircraft flying from one Allied country to another in transit through a third Allied country.

Mr. Lansing disagreed and pointed out that in accordance with the Convention the Allied Powers had a right to signal to Allied craft to land; whilst Germany would have no such power.

Captain Tindal Atkinson asked permission to make certain explanations in regard to the draft Articles under consideration.

The first Article was intended to deal with aircraft entering Germany from foreign countries and calling at two or more places. All such aircraft would be under the type of control that Germany might wish to impose on its own aircraft.

Article 2 had been inserted not so much with the object of securing to the Allied and Associated States the right of flying about over Germany, without reciprocity, as to obtain free transit through Germany to eastern countries, such as Poland, Czecho Slovakia, and so on.

Article 5 had been drawn up to meet a special case. In accordance with the International Air Navigation Convention, any country could reserve to itself the right of traffic between two national aerodromes. The regulations contained in Article 5 were extremely moderate. The Allied and Associated States thereby merely claimed that their aircraft should enjoy throughout Germany the privileges accorded to aircraft of the most favoured nation in regard to internal commercial air traffic while leaving to Germany the right of “cabotage”. He thought Mr. Lansing’s objection in regard to the control of aircraft in transit over Germany was fully met by inference in Article 1. In his opinion, it would be impossible, without reproducing all the Articles of the International Air Navigation Convention, to cover all matters, and in the draft Articles under consideration an attempt had merely been made to cover the principal points.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether the draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace were to be imposed for purely military or for economic purposes.

Captain Tindal Atkinson said he would explain the reason for the exclusion of Germany from the Convention. The Aeronautical Commission had originally passed a Resolution to the effect that owing to the great danger due to the facility of converting commercial craft into military craft, the use of aircraft in Germany for a given period should be entirely suppressed. That proposal had been rejected by the Supreme Allied Council. Consequently, in order to keep some control over German aircraft activity for a period of time, the exclusion of Germany from the Convention had been contemplated by the inclusion of Article 40 of the Convention. He admitted that the Article in question would have the effect of placing Germany into a ringed fence. That is to say, she would not be able to fly outside her own frontiers. But he maintained that this Article had been inserted not with any object of obtaining economic profit for the Allied and Associated Governments, but with the object of securing free transit across Germany, which, in his opinion, constituted a far more valuable asset.

M. Pichon inquired whether Mr. Lansing had any formal objection to offer to the draft Articles as they now stood.

Mr. Lansing replied that he seriously objected to Article 7, namely:—

“The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until such time as Germany is admitted either to the League of Nations or by consent of the Allied and Associated States is permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States.”

Furthermore, under the draft Articles, Germany would be compelled to allow all aircraft to fly freely across Germany. On the other hand, she would have no power over such, aircraft whilst in German air and she could not signal to Allied machines to land. In his opinion, this would be a source of smuggling since false signals and markings could be used.

Captain Roper explained that the draft Articles submitted by the Aeronautical Commission were merely proposals and the Council naturally had full power to modify them in any manner it thought best in order to prevent any injustice being done. On the other hand, he maintained that Article 7 was of the greatest importance since the whole of the clauses hung on it. That clause alone provided for the intermediary period between the signing of the Treaty of Peace and the time when Germany would adhere to the Convention. Furthermore, he would invite attention to the fact that Article 7 had been unanimously adopted by all the representatives, including the technical American experts.

Mr. Lansing, nevertheless, objected to it. He proposed that Article 7 should be amended to read as follows:—

“The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until 1st January, 1923, provided that unless prior to that time enemy countries admitted either to the League of Nations or by consent of the Allied and Associated States are permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States.”

He considered that some definite period of time should be laid down.

(The amendment to Clause 7 proposed by Mr. Lansing was agreed to.)

Mr. Lansing, continuing, said that he still awaited an answer as to whether the draft Articles under consideration dealt with a Military or an economic question. In his opinion, that constituted a vital matter.

Lord Hardinge thought that the draft Articles related partly to both.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether it was really purposed to discourage the manufacture of aircraft in Germany.

M. Pichon pointed out that in the Military terms of Peace, a clause had been inserted dealing with the subject of aircraft.

Mr. Lansing held that if the Articles under consideration dealt with a Military matter, all the provisions should apply only to craft that were public property, the property of the State.

Lord Hardinge proposed, in order to meet Mr. Lansing’s objections in regard to Articles 1 and 2, that the following additional clause should be inserted after Clause 3:—

(New Clause 4.)

“The rights of passage, transit, and landing provided in clauses 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the observance by the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States of such necessary regulation[s] as Germany may impose in the interests of her own municipal legislation, but such regulations shall be applied without obstruction to German aircraft, and to the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States.”

Mr. Lansing said he would accept the proposed new clause.

Captain Roper pointed out that in accordance with draft Article 6 the Germans undertook to adopt measures to ensure that every German aircraft flying over German territory, should comply with the rules as to lights and signals, rules of the air, and rules for air traffic on and in the vicinity of aerodromes, contained in the Convention relating to International Air Navigation, made between the Allied and Associated States. He thought that Lord Hardinge’s proposal was in conflict with the rule he had just mentioned.

Mr. Lansing thought that no inconsistency really existed since the Germans were required to accept the rules on this subject laid down by the Convention.

(It was agreed to accept Lord Hardinge’s proposed new clause.)

Mr. Lansing, continuing, said he would ask the Council to consider the period after 1923, or after the adhesion of Germany to the League of Nations or to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation. In that connection he wished to propose the following addition to Clause 7, namely:—

“Provided that if at the end of the period stated any Powers shall not have been admitted to the League of Nations nor permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to national air navigation, any obligations then imposed upon the enemy countries shall be reciprocal between former enemy countries and Allied and Associated Governments, both as to rights and privileges.”

Captain Roper gathered that this additional clause would place Germany on the same footing as the Allied and Associated Powers, after the 1st January, 1923. He thought if that date coincided with the one fixed by the other Commissions, it would be acceptable; otherwise, in his opinion, the question should be referred to the heads of Governments for decision.

Mr. Lansing explained that the 1st January, 1923, had been selected as it was the first day on which any nation a party to the Convention relating to Aerial Navigation could denounce its adherence to the same.

Captain Roper explained that the date in question had been chosen on account of the uncertainties connected with the advances which might be made in aircraft developments in the near future. An early date had to be selected, otherwise the Convention might, in the distant future, be found to be no longer in agreement with the altered circumstances. In other words the date had been fixed purely for technical reasons.

M. Pichon thought it would be very difficult to fix a régime to be applied in 1923 in view of the great changes that might occur in aircraft development. In his opinion, this question should be left to be settled by the League of Nations should it then be in existence; otherwise the matter would, when the time came, have to be settled by the Allied and Associated Governments. He (M. Pichon) was quite willing to accept Mr. Lansing’s amendment to the first part of Article 7 limiting the obligations imposed on Germany to 1923, but he could not accept Mr. Lansing’s proposals to add a new paragraph to Article 7 relating to reciprocity. He understood, however, that it had been agreed that the Allied and Associated Governments should reserve to themselves the right of determining the régime to be applied to Germany after the 1st January, 1923.

Lord Hardinge thought that the aerial situation might by 1923 have so greatly changed that it would be unwise for the Governments at present to say what should then be done. He wished to invite attention to the fact that the parties to the Convention were first entitled to denounce their adhesion to the Convention on the 1st January, 1923.

Captain McNamee called attention to the fact that in 1923 Germany would under the Articles as they stood at present be free to refuse the right of flight to the Allies across her territory.

Mr. Lansing expressed his willingness to withdraw his proposed addition to Article 7 and so to omit all reference to reciprocity.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Lansing, continuing, proposed that the Drafting Committee of the Commission framing the Convention on International Air Navigation should be instructed to redraft Article 40 of the Convention so as to permit Germany and other enemy countries to adhere under certain conditions to the Air Convention should they so desire.

(This was agreed to.)

(The following draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty were adopted:—

1. “The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall be accorded full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Germany, and shall while exercising any rights of passage or landing in Germany enjoy full national treatment particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

2. The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall, while in transit to any other State, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany without landing, subject to such regulations as Germany may establish which will De applicable to the aircraft of both Germany and the Allied and Associated Governments.

3. All aerodromes in Germany open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.

4. The rights of passages, transit and landing provided for in Clauses 1, 2 and 3, are subject to the observance by the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States of such necessary Regulations as Germany may enforce in the interests of her own Municipal legislation, but such regulations shall be applied without obstruction to German Aircraft and to the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States.

5. All certificates of nationality, certificates of air worthiness, certificates of competency and licenses, issued or rendered valid by any of the Allied or Associated States shall be recognised by Germany as valid and as equivalent to corresponding certificates and licenses issued to German aircraft.

6. As regards internal commercial air traffic the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy throughout Germany treatment accorded to aircraft of the most favoured nation.

7. Rules as to Lights & Signals Germany undertakes to adopt measures to ensure that every German aircraft flying above its territory shall comply with the Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the vicinity of aerodromes contained in the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made between the Allied and Associated States.

8. The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until 1st of January, 1923, unless prior to that time Germany is admitted to the League of Nations or, by consent of the Allied and Associated States, is permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States.[”]

It was also agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Commission framing the convention on International Air Navigation should be instructed to redraft Article 40 of the Convention so as to permit Germany and other enemy countries to adhere under certain conditions to the air convention, should they so desire.)

2. M. Pichon called on M. Cambon to explain his proposals relating to the amalgamation of the Warsaw Commission with the Commission on Polish Affairs.

Eventual Amalgamation of the Warsaw Commission With the Commission on Polish Affairs M. Cambon said that M. Noulens had explained to him in his own name and that of his colleagues on the Warsaw Commission, the desire that the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission sent to Warsaw under his presidency should be amalgamated. The Commission on Polish Affairs, which he had informed of this, considered that it was not entitled to modify, on its own initiative, its own composition, which had been settled by the Supreme Council itself. It wished therefore that the question asked by M. Noulens should be referred to the Supreme Council for decision.

Lord Hardinge expressed the view that the mandate accorded to M. Noulens’ Commission had come to an end. Consequently the British Delegation thought that Polish Affairs had best be left entirely in the hands of the existing Commission on Polish Affairs, which sat here in Paris under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon.

Mr. Lansing said he personally objected strongly to increasing the size of Commissions, if it could possibly be avoided. He considered that M. Cambon’s Commission on Polish Affairs could, if it so desired, confer with the individual members of M. Noulens’ Commission. That is to say, in his opinion, M. Noulens’ Commission should be dissolved and individual members could be called by M. Cambon’s Commission to give evidence, if so required.

(This was agreed to.)

(It was agreed that the Warsaw Commission presided over by M. Noulens should forthwith be dissolved.)

3. M. Cambon said that the following note had been drawn up and distributed to all Members present:—

“The work of the Commission on Polish Affairs in considering the frontiers of Poland has reached the following stage:

(a) Note From the Commission on Polish Affairs Asking for Instructions Regarding the Frontiers To Be Assigned to Poland in Eastern Galicia Proposals in regard to the frontier between Poland and Germany were submitted in Report No. 1 dated March 12, 1919;

(b) Proposals in regard to the frontier between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State were submitted in the note dated April 6, 1919, which was presented jointly by the Commissions on Polish and Czecho-Slovak Affairs;

(c) Proposals in regard to the Eastern frontier of Poland north of the latitude of Kholm were submitted in Report No. 2 dated April 21, 1919. No proposal has been made in regard to a frontier south of this latitude owing to the close connection between this part of the frontier and the frontier to be determined in Eastern Galicia;

(d) In regard to Eastern Galicia the Commission consider themselves at present debarred from making any definite recommendation as to the frontier in view of the decision taken by the Supreme Council at the meeting on the 19th March, 1919² that the Polish and Ukrainian Representatives should not be heard with regard to their respective claims in Eastern Galicia until the cessation of hostilities between the Polish and Ukrainian troops in that region.

In view of the constitution at Paris of an Inter-Allied Commission to establish an armistice between the Polish and Ukrainian troops there appear to be grounds for hoping that a truce may be arranged in the near future, and accordingly, that it would be possible for the Commission to undertake the description of the frontier in Eastern Galicia.

Elsewhere, the Commission has been guided primarily by ethnic considerations modified to a certain extent by various economic factors and the necessities of transport.

In regard to Galicia, however, if primarily ethnographical considerations were followed it is certain that in spite of the large Polish minority in Eastern Galicia the frontier of Poland would run west of Lemberg, unless an area containing a Ruthenian majority were to be assigned to Poland.

This question thus introduces problems of general policy involving consequences of the utmost gravity. Several solutions may be considered, namely; the creation of an independent state, the establishment of an autonomous state under the control of the League of Nations, the partition of Eastern Galicia between Poland and the Ukraine. Either of these might, owing to the attraction which Russia would undoubtedly exercise upon a weak Slav State, result in the extension of the Russian frontier to the Carpathians.

On the other hand, it may be thought desirable to consider the political advantage which might result from the establishment of a common frontier between Poland and Roumania while securing for Eastern Galicia adequate guarantees in the way of local autonomy.

The Commission is of opinion that it is not possible to settle the frontiers of Poland in this region without determining at the same time the future status of Eastern Galicia. Considering that this question goes somewhat beyond its original mandate, the Commission respectfully approaches the Supreme Council with the request that it may be given:

Either explicit instructions as to the basis on which to carry out its work in this region; Or a new mandate authorising it to proceed with the study of this question.”

Mr. Lansing thought it would be wise for the Commission on Polish Affairs to continue its study with an extension of authority, which would empower it to consider the question not only from the ethnic, economic and strategic point of view, but also from all other standpoints, and since political questions were involved, their deliberations should be especially confidential.

Lord Hardinge said that he did not oppose Mr. Lansing’s views, but he thought the question raised was so important as to be too big for a Commission to settle. In his opinion, the Commission could be asked to make a recommendation, but it could not be expected to settle the question.

Mr. Lansing agreed. He had not intended to suggest that the Commission should “settle” the question. In his opinion, the Commission should not even make a recommendation: it should only make a full report clearly indicating the possible solutions, taking into consideration all the different aspects of the case.

Lord Hardinge thought the only objection to that proposal was the great delay that would be incurred, as time was now so short.

M. Cambon explained that no-one belonging to the Commission had ever suggested doing more than submitting a report, which would naturally be dealt with in the most confidential manner. The Commission would work as rapidly as possible; but he wished to invite the attention of the Council to the fact that the question under discussion did not concern the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The question related to Austria and Russia. Therefore, without wishing in any way to criticise the work of the Supreme Council, he thought he would be a bold man who would attempt to fix the date when the Russian question would finally come under settlement. For two months he had been trying to obtain permission to interview the Lithuanian representatives in Paris, but so far he had received no mandate.

M. Makino said he was prepared to accept Mr. Lansing’s proposal.

(It was agreed to authorise the Commission on Polish Affairs to proceed with the study of the frontier to be assigned to Poland in Eastern Galicia and to submit a full report.)

4. Note From the Commission on Polish Affairs Asking Whether It Should Hear Representatives of the Russian Political Conference M. Cambon said that the Commission on Polish Affairs had now reached the study of the future frontiers between Poland and Russia. All possible information had been collected, but so far no representative of Russia had been heard. There existed in Paris at the present moment a Russian Political Conference under the presidency of Prince Lvoff, which represented all Anti-Bolshevik parties in Russia. This conference had asked to be heard, and he was authorised by his Commission to inquire whether this could be done. In this connection he wished to invite attention to the fact that during the last few days an incident had occurred which had a direct bearing on the question he now put to the Council. The Commission on Polish Affairs having advised the Supreme Council that it would be advisable in continuance of its work to hear the Warsaw representatives and that it was not its intention to call them together unless otherwise instructed by the Supreme Council; the Council of Foreign Ministers had decided at their meeting on April 15th³ to instruct the Commission on Polish Affairs to continue its study of the territorial questions relative to Poland. The Commission on Polish Affairs decided under these conditions that the Sub-Committee specially charged with the preliminary study of the Eastern Frontier of Poland would call before it the Eurasian [?] representatives delegated by the Lithuanian Assembly, namely, Dr. Walderman [Voldemar] and Mr. Ytchas. These gentlemen had appeared on the 23rd April in compliance with a summons addressed to them. They had immediately read a letter addressed to the President of the Peace Conference which had been circulated.⁴ After having taken cognisance of this document the Sub-Committee had unanimously agreed that the hearing of Dr. Walderman [Voldemar] and Mr. Ytchas should be postponed and they accordingly withdrew immediately. The Commission on Polish Affairs, therefore, now requested the Supreme Council to instruct them as to the action to be taken in regard to the Lithuanian representatives and as to the answer to be given them. The Commission on Polish Affairs also considered it its duty to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the fact that the work relative to the Eastern Boundaries of Poland would be greatly facilitated by hearing the competent Russian representatives. But the Commission did not consider itself authorised to take a decision on its own account in regard to this matter and begged the Supreme Council to inform it as soon as possible if it might convoke the members of the Russian Political Conference now convened in Paris.

Mr. Lansing enquired what was going to be done about the Lithuanians.

M. Cambon thought that the Commission could only wait until the attitude of the Lithuanians had somewhat changed. The Commission on Polish Affairs had been appointed to consider Polish interests. The Commission was naturally anxious to hear the views of all people surrounding Poland, but the Lithuanians had stated that they were not prepared to give information to the Commission on Polish Affairs, as they wished a special Commission to be appointed to deal only with Lithuanian affairs. He thought under these circumstances, it would be unwise for the Allied and Associated Governments to give way to their pretensions.

M. Pichon said that on the 23rd April, 1919, a letter had been addressed by the Lithuanian Delegation to the President, M. Clemenceau, the concluding paragraph of which read as follows:—

“In spite of the difficulties above-mentioned the Delegation has decided to send the Members summoned by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference with instructions to give to the Commission on Polish Affairs all information relating to the frontiers between Lithevia [Lithtunia] and Poland”.

M. Cambon said that under these circumstances the Commission on Polish Affairs should now proceed to hear the Lithuanians.

Mr. Lansing thought that instructions should be issued to the Commission on Polish Affairs to call in, and obtain the evidence of, any individual Russians that might be able to give information on the subjects under consideration; but the Commission should not give a hearing to any Russian Delegation or Commission, as such.

(It was agreed that the Commission on Polish Affairs should hear the Lithuanian Delegates and also individual Russians who might be able to give information on the question relating to the Eastern Frontiers of Poland.)

5. M. Cambon said that the following report dated April 10th, 1919, had been submitted to the Conference by the Conference [sic] by the Commission on Polish Affairs:—

Proposals To Address a Warning in the Name of the Conference to the Polish and Lithuanian Governments to Refrain From Hostilities at Vilna and Grodno “As a result of recent successes gained over the Bolsheviks, the Polish troops on the one hand, and the Lithuanian troops on the other, are at the present moment, at a short distance from one another. The animosity existing between the Lithuanians and the Poles and the occupation by the latter of a part of the Province of Grodno, which the Lithuanians claimed gave cause to fear that an armed conflict between the two parties might take place. The Commission on Polish Affairs considered that it would be advisable to take steps immediately to relieve a situation which threatened to provoke a serious incident similar to those which had taken place between the Poles and Lithuanians [Ukrainians] in the region of Lemberg. With a view to avoiding such an occurrence, the Commission on Polish Affairs had the honour to recommend to the Supreme Council of the Conference that Marshal Foch be instructed to study means to prevent a conflict between the Lithuanians and Poles, either by bringing about a direct agreement between the Polish and Lithuanian military leaders, or by establishing a line of demarcation which both parties should agree not to cross, or by any other arrangement likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between the Poles and Lithuanians and if possible to assure their union against their common adversaries, the Bolsheviks.[”]

Mr. Lansing said he had a decided objection to offer to this question being dealt with as a purely military matter, since, in his opinion, at the present moment, it was far more a political question. An Inter-Allied Military Commission was at present on its way to Warsaw, and its work should now be permitted to proceed without hindrance. In his opinion, the Lithuanian Delegation here in Paris, as well as the Polish Delegates, could be informed that whatever decision might be reached at the present moment would in no way affect the final issue.

Lord Hardinge explained that a few days ago the British Foreign Office had received from Warsaw information similar to that contained in the note read by M. Cambon. Mr. Balfour had asked him to see the Polish representative here in Paris in order to point out to him the grave situation that would be caused by the outbreak of hostilities in Grodno, and to have instructions issued to the Polish Armies. As a result he (Lord Hardinge) had seen M. Zaleski and he had done his utmost to persuade him to approach M. Paderewski in order to put a stop to all hostile operations in the direction of Grodno. The bad effect which the outbreak of any conflicts in that region would have, now that the Polish question had come under discussion at the Peace Conference, were explained to M. Zaleski. If the Polish Government would agree to take action as suggested, he promised that similar warnings would also be issued to the Lithuanians not to attack the Poles in the direction of Vilna, and not to interfere with the transportation of supplies for Poland along the lines of communication between Grodno and Vilna. M. Zaleski had listened with great interest to these remarks and, in reply, had stated that the relations between the Poles and Lithuanians had recently greatly improved. He had agreed to lose no time in placing the matter before M. Paderewski with a recommendation that he should issue the necessary instructions.

Baron Makino said he was prepared to accept Mr. Lansing’s proposals.

Mr. Lansing said that his proposal implied that the Council should issue the necessary notifications to the Polish and Lithuanian Delegates here in Paris.

M. Pichon pointed out that similar measures to those indicated by Lord Hardinge had apparently also been taken, independently, by each of the Allied Governments.

Mr. Lansing proposed that in addition to the note to be issued by the Council to the Polish and Lithuanian Delegates in Paris, the Allied and Associated Governments should also notify their respective representatives in Warsaw to use their good offices to obtain the cessation of hostilities, with a view to an agreement being reached between Poles and Lithuanians in the regions of Vilna and Grodno.

(It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should notify the Polish and Lithuanian representatives in Paris that whatever arrangements might be reached at the present moment in order to avoid hostilities in the regions of Vilna and Grodno, would in no way affect the final decision.

It was also agreed that the Allied and Associated Governments should notify their respective representatives in Warsaw, to use their good offices with a view to an agreement being reached between the Poles and the Lithuanians in the regions of Vilna and Grodno in order to avoid hostilities.)

6. Clauses Relative to the Disposal of the German Colonies M. de Peretti said that the Committee appointed to draft clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty, dealing with the question of the disposal of German Colonies, had received instructions to take up all such special cases regarding German Colonies not already covered by other Commissions. As a result the following clauses had been drafted for insertion in the Peace Treaty.

clauses relating to the german colonies to be inserted in the preliminaries of peace

Article I. Germany renounces in favour of the five Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her oversea possessions.^*

Article II. All movable and immovable property in such territories belonging to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass to the Government exercising authority over these territories, in the same manner and upon the same terms as such property passes in the case of territory ceded to an Allied or Associated Power. The decision of the local Courts in any dispute as to the nature of such property shall be final.

Article III. The provisions of Section … Part I (Commercial Relations) and Part IV (Property, Rights and Interests, Article B, paragraphs (b), (c) and (i)) shall apply in the case of these territories whatever be the form of Government adopted for them.

Article IV. The Government exercising authority over such territories may make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the repatriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade or exercise a profession in them.

Article V. The provisions of article 13 of Annex A of the Report of the Financial Commission shall apply in the case of all agreements concluded with German nationals for the construction or exploitation of public works in the German oversea possessions, as well as any sub-concessions, or contracts resulting therefrom which may have been made to or with such nationals.

Article VI. Germany hereby undertakes to pay, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the French Government and approved by the Permanent Reparation Commission, reparation for damage suffered by French nationals in the Cameroons or the frontier zone, by reason of the acts of the German civil and military authorities and of German private individuals during the period from 1 January, 1900, to the 1st August, 1914.

Article VII. Germany renounces all rights under the Conventions of the 4th November, 1911,⁵ and the 28th September, 1912.⁶ She undertakes to pay to the French Government, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by that Government and approved by the Permanent Reparation Commission, all the deposits, credits, advances, etc., which may have been effected by virtue of these Acts in favour of Germany.

Article VIII. Germany undertakes to accept and observe the provisions made or to be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, or certain of them, with any other Power with regard to the trade in Arms and Spirits as well as the matters dealt with in the General Act of Berlin of 26th February, 1885, and the General Act of Brussels of 2nd July, 1890.

Article IX. The inhabitants of the former German oversea possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories.

M. de Peretti continuing said that these articles would not apply to the province of Shantung, which would be dealt with separately. The Japanese representative on his Committee had enquired whether the nations acquiring former German territory would have to take over part of the German National Debt. The Committee had agreed that this question did not fall within its province: but it had been decided to bring the question to the notice of the Supreme Council.

Baron Makino said he accepted the clauses relating to the German colonies, subject to the reservation made by the Japanese representative.

(It was agreed that the above clauses relating to the German colonies be adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace.)

(7) M. Pichon said that the Supreme War Council had referred to the Supreme Economic Council the following item for consideration and report:—

Report of the Committee of the Supreme Economic Council, in Reference to Revictualling of Bavaria “Whether, having regard to the terms of the Brussels Agreement, it is economically possible to send food independently to Bavaria, apart altogether from the political expediency of doing so.”

To that enquiry the following reply dated 8th April, 1919 had been received from the Supreme Economic Council:—

“Without expressing opinion on the political aspects of this question, the Supreme Economic Council is of opinion that the course proposed would not be from the point of view of food and finance desirable, nor, so far as they can see, possible. But, if any definite proposal for carrying it out is placed before them, they will be ready to give it their consideration.”

M. Pichon, continuing, said that he thought the Meeting should merely take note of the answer submitted by the Supreme Economic Council.

(This was agreed to.)

(8) M. Georges Cahen read the following report of the Commission on Prisoners of War:—

“The Commission on Prisoners of War, constituted on the 21st April, 1919, met on the 22nd April, and on account of the urgency of its task, has continued its deliberations daily until the 26th April.

Report of the Inter-Allied Committee of Naval and Military Representatives on the Repatriation of Prisoners The Governments of the five great Allied and Associated Powers were represented as follows:—

General MacKinstry	}	United States of America.
Admiral Long
General Thwaites	}	British Empire.
Admiral Hope
M. Georges Cahen (Directeur au Ministère de la Guerre)	}	France.
Lieut. de Fabre
General Calcagno	}	Italy.
Admiral Grassi
Lieut. Col. Ninomiya	}	Japan.

The Commission not having received clearly defined instructions, devoted its first deliberations to defining its task. According to the instructions received by the American and British Delegations all questions of a financial character were to be disregarded, such as claims formulated by the Allied and Associated States, whether under the head of regulation of accounts for the maintenance of prisoners of war, or under the head of restitution of costs of relief occasioned by the presence of Allied and Associated prisoners in Germany, or under the head of reparation for damages caused to the states by the presence of their nationals in captivity: claims of a pecuniary character formulated by ex-prisoners of war belonging to the Allies (reimbursement of money or compensation due for damages).

These problems, as a matter of fact, have been examined and specially treated by the Commission on Reparation.

At the suggestion of the American Delegation, furthermore, it was considered that it was better for the Commission to put aside any examination of the penalties to be imposed on German Authorities alleged to be guilty of mal-treatment of Allied or Associated prisoners of war during their captivity. The responsibility of the authors of crimes or offences contrary to International Law is the subject of special stipulations presented by another Commission.

The Commission has thus found itself led to limit its examination to executive measures appropriate to ensure the repatriation of German prisoners, and to the questions raised by the captivity in Germany of Allied and Associated nationals who have been repatriated.

On these different points the five delegations have been sufficiently fortunate to arrive at a unanimous agreement, and it is the text of the Articles thus adopted that the Commission has the honour to submit to the approbation of the Conference:—

(1) The repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in the conditions fixed by Article — of the present Treaty, be carried out by a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the one part and of the German Government on the other part.

In each of the Allied and Associated countries a Sub-Commission, composed exclusively of representatives of the country and of delegates of the German Government, shall regulate details of execution.

(2) From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German Authorities, the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their homes by the said Authorities.

Those amongst them whose pre-war domicile was in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation of the Allied and Associated Governments.

(3) The whole cost of repatriation from the outset shall be borne by the German Government who shall also provide such land or sea transport, including working personnel, as may be considered necessary by the Commission referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

The foregoing paragraph shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to May 1st, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

(5) Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

(6) Until the German Government has taken all the measures required by Clause — of the present Treaty (providing for the surrender of prisoners alleged to be guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity), the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right to detain in custody such prisoners of war of the rank of officer as they may in their discretion select.

(7) a. The German Government undertakes to receive on its territory all individuals liable to repatriation without discrimination.

b. Prisoners of war, or other German nationals, who do not desire to be repatriated, may be excluded from repatriation, but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them, or to send them to a neutral country, or to allow them to reside in their territories.

The German Government undertakes to take no special proceedings against such individuals or their families, and to exercise no repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever on this account.

(8) The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German subjects or adherents in their hands conditional on the immediate notification and release by the German Government of any prisoners of war, subjects or adherents of the Allied and Associated Governments, who may still be in Germany.

(9) The German Government undertakes:

(i) to give every facility to Commissions of Enquiry into the cases of the missing: to furnish them with all necessary means of transport: to allow them access to all such places as camps, prisons, hospitals, etc., and to place at their disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate their enquiries.

(ii) to impose penalties upon any German officials or private persons who shall have concealed the presence of any Allied or Associated subjects or adherents, or neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

(10) The German Government undertakes to restore without delay, from the time that the present treaty comes into force all articles, cash, securities and documents which have belonged to Allied or Associated subjects and adherents and which have been taken possession of by the German Authorities.

(11) The graves of prisoners and interned civilians, subjects or adherents of the respective belligerents, who have died in captivity shall be properly maintained as provided for by Clause—of the present Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments on the one hand and the German Government on the other hand mutually undertake furthermore:

(i) to furnish a complete list of the dead, together with all information useful for identification.

(ii) to furnish all information as to the number and location of graves of all those who have been buried without identification.

The seven first articles relate to the repatriation of German prisoners: they reserve for the decision of the Allied and Associated Governments the question of fixing the date of repatriation of the prisoners, as also the determination of the conditions which shall govern this repatriation. It is possible, indeed, to contemplate a repatriation which might be simultaneous for all the Allied and Associated Powers, or on the other hand a repatriation which, for special reasons of an economic, geographical or political character, might be delayed in the case of those countries of the Entente which have experienced more than the others the damages of the war. This repatriation may be definitively fixed, or on the other hand it may be made subject to the supply of civilian labour by way of substitution. It may commence from the date of the signature of the Peace, or it may be delayed until the Peace Treaty is ratified.

The Commission have abstained from drafting the clause referred to in Article 1 on account of doubt as to the decisions of the Council of Four on the conditions under which prisoners of war shall be repatriated. If the Council of Four decide not to retain prisoners of war for work in devastated regions, and not to require Germany to furnish civilian labourers for that purpose, the American, British and Japanese Delegations would recommend that that clause provide that the repatriation of prisoners of war commence as soon as possible after the signature of the Peace Treaty, and be carried out with the utmost rapidity. The French Delegation were of opinion that the question was essentially a governmental one. The French Delegation did not feel itself qualified in the absence of precise instructions, to examine it, and they could not fall in with the above suggestion for fear that this suggestion would be interpreted as forestalling the decision that might be arrived at on the question of demanding from Germany a supply of labour for the purpose of restoring the devastated region. The Commission has taken for granted the utilisation of an Inter-Allied organisation in which representatives of the German Government would find a place in order to ensure the execution of any decisions that may thus be arrived at. In each country Sub-Commissions shall be permanently entrusted with the carrying out of all difficulties of a technical nature.

Charging Germany with all expenses occasioned by such repatriation, and obligation on her part to furnish means of transport, measures to be taken both as regards prisoners under sentence and prisoners who decline to be repatriated, such is the object of the provisions concerning German prisoners of war.

As regards nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers it has seemed necessary to the Commission that the Treaty of Peace shall sanction the measures already imposed on Germany in the Armistice Convention, that all guarantees be taken in favour of nationals who have returned from captivity to ensure that their just claims are satisfied, to ensure decent burial for those who died without returning to their homes, bearing in mind the general text which is to be included in the Treaty as regards all soldiers fallen in enemy territory. This is the object of paragraphs one and two of Article 11 of the text. The Commission further considered it essential to set forth and strengthen the undertakings by the German Government for the purpose of facilitating the search for missing men.

In the short space of time granted to it, the Commission considered it its duty to settle likewise the essential dispositions concerning the lot of prisoners of war, without tying themselves down to questions of detail which will be settled by the Commissions referred to in Article 1 of the draft, and without entering on an examination of the essential problems which might have occupied it if it had not thought that its new work would overlap that of other Commissions, or if it had not been thought well to reserve settlement thereof for the Governmental authorities”.

Mr. Lansing congratulated the Commission on the success of its work, and the clear statement made by it. He must confess, however, that he was at a loss to understand why there should be any hesitation in saying that the prisoners would be repatriated as soon as possible after the ratification of peace. In his opinion, anyone retained for forced labour after the signature of peace would be a slave, and such action would constitute a reproach to the nation who enforced any such regulation. If their own Government liked to say that their own people should do work which would be credited as reparation, that would be quite a different thing. But, a foreign Government could not take prisoners and convert them into slaves. Such action would be abhorrent to his own country, and he was sure it would be so also to the French, and British, and Japanese nations. Therefore, he recommended that a definite statement should be inserted in Clause 1 to the effect that upon the establishment of peace, prisoners would be returned as soon as possible.

M. Pichon said that in principle he fully agreed with Mr. Lansing, and he was sure France had no intention of retaining prisoners of war after peace had been signed. But it seemed to him that this was a question which must be referred to the Council of Four for decision. He undertook, in doing so, to transmit to the President of the Council, the views expressed by Mr. Lansing.

Lord Hardinge intimated that he shared Mr. Lansing’s views.

M. Pichon added that on the understanding that the question would be submitted to the Council of Four, he also was agreed with Mr. Lansing’s way of thinking.

Mr. Lansing asked that whatever was reported to the Council of Four should previously be shown to him in order that there should be no possibility of error in his statement. Furthermore, he wished to call attention to something of a similar character in Article 6, namely, to the provision that hostages should be retained. He thought that such action would be contrary both to Military and to International Law. Sooner or later, Germany would have to be trusted to fulfill her obligations, and, if she failed, in this, she must be made to suffer; but he did not think it right that innocent individuals should be made to suffer. He thought that in proposing forced labour and the retention of hostages, the Allied and Associated Governments would be manifesting the same spirit that the Germans had displayed in Belgium.

M. Cahen said that this Article had been suggested by the British representatives. It had not been contemplated to punish individuals nor to retain them for specially harsh treatment. What the Commission had had in mind was to give validity to what had been attempted by an Article in another part of the Treaty of Peace relative to the punishment of persons guilty of special atrocities. Consequently, the Article under consideration was merely intended to give sanction to that idea, and to give practical effect to a decision which had been reached, elsewhere. Accordingly, it had been proposed that hostages should be retained until the people guilty of offences against the laws of humanity had been surrendered by Germany.

Lord Hardinge stated that the British Delegation considered it very necessary to retain the means of making the Germans surrender certain officers, who had been guilty of atrocities. If this right to retain individual prisoners of war were not retained, the Allies would have no practical power to force the German Government to deliver the guilty people.

M. Pichon thought that this Article was in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Four, which contemplated the punishment of persons guilty of crimes.

Mr. Lansing doubted whether such a step had been contemplated. It seemed to him a method similar to that by which Bolshevist officers were kept at their posts, owing to hostages being taken from their families. To him the idea of hostages was abhorrent, especially in time of peace; the taking of hostages had been bad enough during the war, and all the Allied Governments had complained of the practice even then.

M. Pichon said that unless such an Article were adopted, the Allied and Associated Governments would be deprived of the means of obtaining the surrender of guilty persons such as the officers who had participated in the murder of Captain Fryatt.

Mr. Lansing asked whether if these criminals were not delivered, it was intended to keep the innocent hostages forever.

M. Cahen explained that two reasons had influenced the Commission in accepting the clause under discussion. In the first place, it would be noticed that officers alone had been referred to, because the atrocities as a whole had only been committed by a certain military caste, who had worked hand in glove. For this reason, it had been clearly stated that officers alone should be selected by the Allied and Associated Governments for detention as hostages. Consequently, the persons so selected would be those who had approved of the commission of such atrocities. In other words, the persons so selected would indirectly be responsible for the crimes committed. In the second place, the insertion of a clause as suggested would constitute the only method of preventing the clauses of the Treaty relating to the surrender of persons alleged to be guilty of offences against laws and customs of war from becoming inoperative.

Mr. Lansing said that he appreciated the reason for this Article, and the argument, but he was strongly opposed to it. Why not for the same reason retain hostages to ensure the fulfilment of every Article of the Treaty? If there were doubt as to Germany’s good faith in accepting one Article, her good faith in accepting any or all Articles might equally be doubted. He could not consent to this Article. He understood that a Commission was working or was about to begin work on a study of the means of obtaining guarantees for the fulfilment of all the conditions of the Treaty of Peace, and he thought this question should also be referred to that Committee, to whom it really belonged. But he would most strongly urge the rejection of any proposal to retain hostages after the signature of Peace, as such a proposal would be contrary to the principles of civilized war and the laws of humanity.

Lord Hardinge said that pending the substitution of a clause by some other Commission, which would ensure the same results as were obtained by the Article under discussion, he could not agree to the omission of the Article from the Treaty of Peace.

Mr. Lansing said that under the circumstances the only course would be to submit the two questions relating to slavery and to hostages to the Council of Four.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Lansing, continuing, proposed that the second paragraph of Article 1 should be made to read somewhat as follows:—

“On the part of each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission composed exclusively of representatives of the respective Power and of delegates of the German Government shall regulate the details of execution for the return of prisoners”.

(This was agreed to.)

(It was agreed to adopt the following Articles, with the proviso that Article 1, relating to the repatriation of German prisoners, and Article 6, relating to the detention of hostages, should be referred to the Council of Four for decision:—

“(1) The repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in the conditions fixed by Article — of the Present Treaty, be carried out by a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the one part and of the German Government on the other part.

On the part of each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission, composed exclusively of representatives of the respective Power and of delegates of the German Government, shall regulate details of execution for the return of prisoners.

(2) From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German Authorities, the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their house by the said Authorities.

Those amongst them whose pre-war domicile was in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation of the Allied and Associated Governments.

(3) The whole cost of repatriation from the outset shall be borne by the German Government who shall also provide such land or sea transport, including working personnel, as may be considered necessary by the Commission referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

The foregoing paragraph shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to May 1st, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

(5) Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

(6) Until the German Government has taken all the measures required by Clause — of the present Treaty (providing for the surrender of prisoners alleged to be guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity), the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right to detain in custody such prisoners of war of the rank of officer as they may in their discretion select.

(7) a. The German Government undertakes to receive on its territory all individuals liable to repatriation without discrimination.

b. Prisoners of war, or other German nationals, who do not desire to be repatriated, may be excluded from repatriation, but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them, or to send them to a neutral country, or to allow them to reside in their territories.

The German Government undertakes to take no special proceedings against such individuals or their families, and to exercise no repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever on this account.

(8) The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German subjects or adherents in their hands conditional on the immediate notification and release by the German Government of any prisoners of war, subjects or adherents of the Allied and Associated Governments, who may still be in Germany.

(9) The German Government undertakes:

(i) to give every facility to Commissions of Enquiry into the cases of the missing: to furnish them with all necessary means of transport: to allow them access to all such places as camps, prisons, hospitals, etc., and to place at their disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate their enquiries.

(ii) to impose penalties upon any German officials or private persons who shall have concealed the presence of any Allied or Associated subjects or adherents, or neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

(10) The German Government undertakes to restore without delay, from the time that the present Treaty comes into force all articles, cash, securities and documents which have belonged to Allied or Associated subjects and adherents and which have been taken possession of by the German Authorities.

(11) The graves of prisoners and interned civilians, subjects or adherents of the respective belligerents, who have died in captivity shall be properly maintained as provided for by Clause — of the present Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments on the one hand and the German Government on the other hand, mutually undertake furthermore:

(i) to furnish a complete list of the dead, together with all information useful for identification.

(ii) to furnish all information as to the number and location of graves of all those who have been buried without identification.”

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 27th April, 1919.

Annexure “A”

Paris, 23rd April, 1919.

24, rue Bayard, Paris.

Tel. Passy 19–62

Telegraphic address. Lietuva–Paris.

No. 759

To His Excellency,
The Chairman of the Peace Conference.

Sir: The Lithuanian delegation begs to submit to you the following statement, requesting you to lay it before the Peace Conference.

The Secretariat General of the Peace Conference called Messieurs Voldemar and Ytchas to come before it 23rd April, for the purpose of giving to the sub-Commission on Polish affairs at the Peace Conference statistical, ethnographic, economic and other information which they were capable of giving upon the Lithuanian territory. This is the first step of the Peace Conference towards a solution of the Lithuanian question. We rejoice in it, and thank the Conference.

Nevertheless, we cannot conceal the apprehensions caused by the method used by the Peace Conference in studying the Lithuanian question. Our apprehensions are caused by the fact that the sub-commission on Polish affairs is taking up the study of our question in its entirety. There is surely nothing surprising in the fact that this commission is interesting itself in the facts concerning the frontier to be traced between Lithuania and Poland. Nevertheless, in leaving the sub-commission the liberty of taking up the Lithuanian question in all its complexity, there is the risk that the impression will be created that this question is only a corollary of the Polish question; in other words, that the Peace Conference has already decided upon the future of Lithuania by attaching it to Poland. This impression will have still more foundation if it is borne in mind that the Poles have not ceased to claim the annexation of Lithuania to Poland under some form. In any case, it is certain that the Poles will give this interpretation to the examination of the Lithuanian question by the Conference and will use it for their propaganda. The result will be the increasing of the Lithuanian-Polish tension.

Moreover, the Lithuanian question has an especial importance in the policy of Eastern Europe, for it directly concerns the interests of the three great neighbouring States, Poland, Germany and Russia; and when it is considered that Lithuania has for centuries been a great and powerful centre of culture, the inevitable conclusion is reached that only the creation of a Lithuanian Commission analogous to the Polish Commission, should be instituted for an equitable settlement of the Lithuanian question. The creation of a Commission of this kind would not risk engendering misunderstandings, for it would not have the slightest influence upon the future decisions of the Conference.

Finally, we must express the regret that liberty has not been accorded to the Lithuanian Delegation to appoint itself the members who are to give the information in question. The choice of the Secretariat General could easily have fallen upon Delegates who were less qualified than others to elucidate the desired question.

In spite of the inconveniences raised above, the Delegation has resolved to send the members called by the Secretariat of the Peace Conference instructing them to furnish to the sub-commission on Polish Affairs all information relative to the frontiers between Lithuania and Poland.

Accept [etc.]

A. Voldemar

President of the Delegation

P. Klimas
Secretary

1. FM–8, p. 602.
2. See BC–53, p. 405.
3. See FM–4, p. 565.
4. For letter of April 23, 1919, see annexure “A,” infra.
5. The question of Shantung is dealt with in another Article of the present Treaty. [Footnote in the original.]
5. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. civ, p. 956.
6. Ibid., vol. cvi, p. 974.