Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/5
FM–5
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 17th April, 1919, at 3 p.m.
| Present | Also Present |
| America, United States of | America, United States of |
| Mr. R. Lansing | Mr. Beer |
| Mr. Brown Scott | British Empire |
| Secretary | Mr. C. J. B. Hurst |
| Mr. L. Harrison | Mr. L. C. Christie |
| British Empire | France |
| Sir Robert Borden | M. Fromageot |
| Lord Hardinge | M. de Peretti |
| Secretaries | Italy |
| Mr. H. Norman | M. Ricci-Busatti |
| Sir P. Loraine, Bt. | M. Piacentini |
| France | |
| M. Pichon | |
| Secretaries | |
| M. Arnavon | |
| Cdr. de St. Quentin | |
| Italy | |
| H. E. Baron Sonnino | |
| Secretary-General | |
| Count Aldrovandi | |
| Secretary | |
| M. Bertele | |
| Japan | |
| H. E. Baron Makino | |
| H. E. Viscount Chinda | |
| Secretaries | |
| M. Nagaoka | |
| M. Kawai |
Joint Secretariat
| America, United States of | Lieut. C. G. Burden. |
| British Empire | Captain E. Abraham. |
| France | Captain A. Portier. |
| Italy | Lieut. Zanchi. |
| Japan | M. Saburi. |
| Interpreter:—M. Cammerlynck | |
1. Insertion of an Article in the Treaty of Peace Regarding Opium Traffic M. Pichon said that the Drafting Committee had circulated a number of draft articles for the Treaty of Peace: the first for consideration was that relating to the Opium Convention. The following draft article was before the meeting:—
“Germany undertakes to ratify forthwith the Opium Convention signed at The Hague on January 23rd, 1912, and as soon as possible thereafter to sign the special protocol for putting the Convention into force, which was agreed at The Hague in accordance with the resolution adopted by the third International Opium Conference held in that city June 18–25, 1914.
Furthermore, Germany recognises that her signature of the special protocol referred to above entails an obligation to put the Convention of 1912 into force and to enact the necessary legislation within three months after the coming into force of this treaty; such legislation will be communicated to the Allied and Associated towers.”
M. Fromageot explained that the majority of the Drafting Committee had been unable to give effect to the American proposal that all the Allied and Associated Powers which had not hitherto signed or ratified the Convention should agree to sign and ratify it in the Treaty. It was considered by the Committee that such a clause had no right place in a Treaty as between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany. It should properly form the subject of an agreement among the Allied and Associated Powers independently.
Mr. Lansing pointed out that the Convention had been signed more than 7 years ago. It had hitherto failed to obtain ratification, and, saving in the United States, the requisite legislation to give effect to it had not been undertaken. The present, he thought, was a fitting opportunity to put the Convention into operation. Should this opportunity not be taken, the inference would be that some Governments among the Allied and Associated Powers were reluctant to act. He believed that this inference would be unfair, but it would nevertheless be made. He therefore urged most earnestly that this opportunity of enforcing the Convention be seized, and he believed that the American proposal for general ratification was the simplest method. The objections to this course appeared to him to be of a purely technical order and he thought they should be waived.
Sir Robert Borden said that he concurred with Mr. Lansing in the view that the Convention should be put into force at the earliest moment and he was ready to adopt any method which might conduce to that end. He understood, however, that in the view of the Drafting Committee, a separate understanding among the Allied and Associated Powers was a better method than that suggested by Mr. Lansing. He would point out that Mr. Lansing’s statement that only the United States had taken any steps to give effect to the Convention was not strictly accurate, as effect had been given to it in the United Kingdom [Page 568] and in India by the Defence of the Realm Act. This, indeed, was only a war measure, which, to be perpetuated, would require further legislation, but he was confident that this legislation would be undertaken.
M. Pichon suggested that the adoption of the Opium Convention should be made a condition of admission to the League of Nations. A clause to this effect could be added to the Covenant.
Mr. Lansing objected that this would involve still further postponement, which, after 7 years’ delay, was to be deprecated. He failed to see that any matter which was for the good of the world was unfitting for a Treaty of Peace.
M. Fromageot asked leave to explain the view taken by the Drafting Committee. An undertaking as between the Allies only appeared unsuitable in a document regulating the relations of the Allies and Germany. The Convention, moreover, as between the Allied and Associated Powers was one which could not even remotely affect German interests.
Mr. Lansing said that he regretted he was unable to agree. He thought that it was quite right to insert reciprocal agreements in a Treaty of Peace, as well as obligations imposed on the enemy.
Baron Sonnino said that he was inclined to agree with Mr. Lansing. If the Allied and Associated Powers meant to force Germany to undertake this engagement, there seemed no good reason why they should not undertake it among themselves. History furnished many examples of reciprocal arrangements included in Treaties.
Sir Robert Borden agreed. He thought each Power could engage to introduce legislation with the object of ratifying the Convention.
M. Pichon suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to draw up another clause embodying the views of Mr. Lansing, Baron Sonnino and Sir Robert Borden.
Mr. Lansing said that the advantage of such a clause would be that all Nations signing the Treaty which had not signed the Convention would thereby be compelled to adhere to the latter. Thus the maximum number of adhesions would be secured.
Baron Makino said that he must make the same reservation as he had made previously regarding the time within which ratification was undertaken, as the Japanese legislature met only in the Spring. It would, therefore, be impossible for Japan to undertake to ratify the Convention within three months. He wished the Drafting Committee to take this into consideration.
Mr. Lansing expressed his agreement with Baron Makino that nothing should be done to embarrass legislation in the various Allied countries. There should be a reasonable time limit assigned for ratification. He would suggest, in this connection, that the term be one year.
(This was agreed to and it was decided that the Drafting Committee [Page 569] should add a paragraph embodying the views expressed in the foregoing discussion.)
2. The following draft article was before the meeting and was adopted without discussion:—
“Belgium. Treaties of 1839.
Draft Article in Regard to Belgium Germany, recognising that the treaties of April 19, 1839, which established the status of Belgium before the war, no longer conform to the requirements of the situation, consents to the abrogation of the said treaties and undertakes to recognise whatever conventions may be entered into by the Five Allied and Associated Powers, or by any of them, in concert with the Governments of Belgium and of the Netherlands, to replace the said treaties of 1839.
If her formal adhesion should be required to such conventions or to any of their stipulations Germany undertakes immediately to give it.”
3. The following draft article was before the meeting:—
Draft Article in Regard to General Renunciation “In territory outside her frontiers as fixed by the present treaty, Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges in territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the Five Allied and Associated Powers or the other belligerent Powers who sign this treaty.
Germany undertakes immediately to recognise and to conform to the measures which may be taken now or in the future by the Five Allied and Associated Powers in agreement where necessary with the Powers in order to carry the above stipulation into effect.
In particular Germany declares her acceptance of the following provisions relating to particular questions:—[”]
Baron Makino asked, with reference to the last paragraph, whether particular questions were reserved.
M. Pichon replied in the affirmative.
M. Fromageot said that the Drafting Committee had thought that the general formula proposed would fulfill the desires of the Council. It covered all the rights of Germany in or over Allied and Associated countries, as well as special rights in Colonies and any such countries as Siam, Liberia and Shan Tung. As regards Liberia, Germany would have to sign certain special clauses relating to finance and economic rights. There might be further rights of a special character which were introduced by the last paragraph in the draft article. The paragraph had been put in these terms as the Committee itself did not know exactly what provisions it would have to cover. It had appeared to the Committee, however, that there were many possible contingencies for which a general heading must be found.
Mr. Lansing said he was prepared to agree to the proposed article, but suggested that the last paragraph be reserved until it appeared clear that special clauses would be required.
[Page 570]M. Pichon pointed out that certain special clauses would be required in respect to Egypt and Morocco.
Baron Makino observed that he must insist on the reservations made by the Japanese Delegation in respect to Shan Tung and Kiau Chau. He had on a previous occasion drawn attention to the fact that Japan claimed all the rights acquired by Germany from China.
Mr. Lansing inquired whether these rights were claimed by Japan from China or from Germany.
Baron Makino replied that they were claimed from Germany.
Mr. Lansing said that in the event of special treatment being required for Shan Tung, he would ask the Japanese Delegation to propose a special clause. Once a precise text was before the meeting, it would be possible to debate on the reservation made. At present he was not aware of its purport.
Baron Makino reminded the meeting that towards the end of January, he had presented the Japanese claims in a general statement.1 He had then declared that the claims would subsequently be presented in such a form as to be introduced into the treaty. He proposed, therefore, to bring forward a few articles embodying these claims. All he meant by recalling his reservations was to give notice that he proposed to put forward these articles.
Mr. Lansing then suggested that these draft articles be submitted together with the agenda for the next meeting of the Council, in order that time for their consideration before the meeting might be gained. He suggested that a similar course might be followed with regard to Egypt and Morocco.
Baron Makino observed that the Japanese statement had been made before the Council of Ten, and that it had been understood that the draft articles for the Treaty of Peace should also be submitted to that Council. In consequence, he thought that it would be right that the Council of Ten and not the present Council should take this matter into consideration.
Mr. Lansing enquired whether there was to be another meeting of the Council of Ten.
Mr. Pichon said that the meetings of this Council had become rare and that he had no notice of any future meeting. The procedure proposed, therefore, might delay a decision for a considerable time.
Baron Makino said that he was engaged in certain pourparlers which he thought might lead to an early settlement of the question.
Mr. Lansing then suggested that the General Renunciation clause be accepted, with the proviso that any Power wishing to put forward special cases should do so as early as possible.
Baron Makino agreed, with the reservation previously stated.
[Page 571](The General Renunciation Article, as quoted above, was then adopted.)
4. Sir Robert Borden asked whether the case of Morocco came under the general clause.
Special Articles Relating to Egypt & Morocco M. Sonnino, referring to the draft article prepared by the Drafting Committee, and appended to these Minutes (See Annexure “A”), observed that at the previous Meeting it had been pointed out that the transference from the Sultan of Turkey to the British Government of the former’s powers respecting free navigation of the Suez Canal was irrelevant to a Treaty of Peace with Germany. No such objection had been raised to the insertion of a provision relating to the capitulations and to the recognition of a British Protectorate. He now saw in the draft an additional article providing for the transference of all German goods, moveable and immoveable, to the Egyptian and Moroccan Governments, respectively, and for the sale by auction in favour of these Governments of private property belonging to German subjects. This was an entirely new provision, and had not appeared in the draft concerning Egypt which had previously been submitted to the Council (See Clause 4 of Annexure “A”).
M. Fromageot said that the Drafting Committee had not taken upon itself to introduce a new clause. This clause had been adopted in regard to Morocco, and the Committee had taken the view that the same provisions mutatis mutandis, should be made to apply in the case of Egypt. Moreover, the clause was introduced by a proviso that it was subject to any adverse ruling by the Commission on Reparations or by the Economic and Financial Commissions. In so far as the clause affected Morocco he pointed out that the Italian Representative on the Committee had given his consent.
M. Sonnino said that in his opinion the provision was contrary to all international law.
Mr. Lansing said that it amounted to confiscation of private property and that he objected to this clause.
Sir Robert Borden said that whatever was adopted in regard to Egypt must be subject to the general principle approved by the Economic Commission. He believed that they had taken the view that enemy private property in Allied countries could be liquidated and the proceeds utilised for the satisfaction of the claims of Allied subjects. The German Government would have to indemnify the victims. Any surplus that might remain after satisfying individual claims would be set off against the general claim against Germany or accounted in the bill for reparation. If this were the general principle there would be no objection to the special article framed regarding Egypt and Morocco.
[Page 572]M. Pichon suggested that the article in question be reserved until the Council knew what general principles had been adopted by the Commissions on Reparation and Finance.
Mr. Lansing suggested that the article be referred to the Economic and Financial Commissions in order that they should not overlook the point.
Sir Robert Borden observed that the general principles adopted by these Commissions would be examined by the Council of Four and then remitted to the Drafting Committee which would then harmonise all the special clauses.
Mr. Lansing enquired whether Morocco had been at war with Germany.
M. Pichon said that as Moroccan troops had fought against Germany it was clear that Morocco had been at war.
M. Sonnino said that he was not quite sure what decision had been taken by the Economic Commission. He believed that the decision was that each Power might liquidate enemy property within its territory to recoup the losses of its subjects. In other words, liberty was given to each Power to do this if it thought fit in extreme cases. In the article under consideration more than this was stipulated. The Allied and Associated Powers said that in Morocco this was to be done. In consequence, they committed themselves a great deal further than the Commission had recommended. In his view the proceeding suggested was a barbarous one, and he was unwilling to take the responsibility of decreeing in Egypt or Morocco what he would not allow in his own country.
Sir Robert Borden said he quite agreed that nothing should be done in Egypt that was not done in other countries.
M. Sonnino suggested that for the word “seront” in the second paragraph of the proposed article, the words “pourront être” be substituted.
Mr. Lansing asked whether the stipulation proposed concerned Tangier and the rights possessed by Germans there.
M. de Peretti replied in the affirmative. He said that the Moroccan Commission had been unanimous on this point. The private property of Germans there would be dealt with in the same way as German private property in European countries. If the proceeds were assigned to the Governments ordering the sale, the proceeds of the sale of such property in Morocco would accrue to the Shereefian Government. If, on the other hand, a general pool were constituted, among the Allies, the proceeds would be included in that pool. The utilisation of the proceeds therefore depended on the decision of the Economic and Financial Commissions. He understood that the same procedure would be followed in the United States.
[Page 573]Mr. Lansing said that the United States would only hold such property as security and would, if it were unnecessary to hold it, return it to the owners. This procedure had been followed in respect to the Boxers. He objected to the mention of any special category and was of the opinion that the whole subject should be covered by a general clause. Everything concerning the liquidation of private property in Egypt or Morocco should be deleted. The general principles should be determined by the Economic and Financial Commissions.
Sir Robert Borden suggested that the decision of the Council should be that the clauses relating to liquidation of German private property in Egypt and Morocco should be reserved, pending the formulation of a general clause. All the stipulations of Articled should therefore be eliminated.
M. de Peretti observed that the last paragraph of the article regarding mining rights should be accepted, as there was a Tribunal of Arbitration at work on the subject, the labours of which should not be interrupted.
(It was then decided that the draft articles contained in Annexure “A” should be sent back to the Drafting Committee for revision in view of the preceding discussion. Article 4 was provisionally eliminated in as far as it related to the liquidation of private property until the general principle on this subject had been formulated.)
M. Fromageot pointed out that the recognition clause which was to be enforced on Germany regarding the Protectorate of Egypt did not ipso facto imply the recognition of that Protectorate by other signatories of the Treaty. A separate convention, therefore, would be necessary to bring about such recognition.
5. M. Pichon observed that the Drafting Committee was not ready with the draft on this subject.
Draft Articles Relating to Prize Court Decisions M. Fromageot explained that the Committee was faced by difficulties not of form but of substance. The various delegations were not in agreement. Some were of opinion that past and future decrees of Allied and Associated Prize Courts should be accepted by Germany. Some thought that only past decisions should be taken into consideration. It was hardly possible to make a draft until the delegations had come to an agreement. Furthermore, some delegations wished to retain seizures made without reference to Prize Courts as security. Other delegations did not agree with this point of view. Some delegations were of opinion that German Prize Court Decrees should be challenged and made subject to revision by the Five Powers, whatever the nationality of the persons party to the case. This view was not accepted by all. The Committee therefore felt that it would be useless to propose a draft until agreement had been reached.
[Page 574]Mr. Lansing remarked that the American Delegation wanted a clause recognising the validity of seizures of German ships and cargoes which had not been subjected to Prize Court orders. It would be impossible to obtain orders from Prize Courts relating to such seizures, as, after the cessation of war, American Prize Courts automatically ceased to function. On the other hand, the Government of the United States did not wish such seizures to be invalidated by decrees of German Courts.
Sir Robert Borden said he did not feel he had authority to accept the American proposal without the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom, as it appeared to involve the suppression of Prize Courts immediately after the cessation of war. Referring to the last paragraph of the American proposal (See I. C. 171, Minute 7)2 Sir Robert Borden observed that the liquidation of those properties would apparently be covered by the general clauses to be framed by the Economic and Financial Commissions.
M. Pichon said that he thought no decision could be taken by the Council on this subject, and suggested that reference be made to a Commission composed of one Naval expert and one jurist from each of the Five Powers. Their report could be subsequently considered by the Council.
Mr. Lansing said that he was himself prepared to decide the question forthwith. He was willing, however, to postpone the decision until each representative had consulted his own experts.
M. Sonnino said that Prize questions were so complex that he would prefer that they should be referred to a Commission. Mr. Lansing was himself no doubt an expert, and might perhaps consent to be Chairman of the Commission.
M. Pichon remarked that if each representative consulted his own experts, they would at their next meeting face one another with divergent views. It would be far better for the experts to arrive at an agreement before the discussion was resumed at the Council.
Sir Robert Borden observed that the substance of the third paragraph was under consideration by the Reparation Commission. The only matter about which he felt some concern was that the American proposal, as he understood it, tended to abolish the action of Prize Courts, on the termination of war, in other countries as in the United States.
Mr. Lansing said that this was not a necessary consequence of accepting paragraph 3.
Sir Robert Borden further pointed out that it must be decided whether German Prize Court decisions were to be attacked under German law or under International law. There was no objection [Page 575] to subjecting German Prize Court decisions to revision, but the revision should be efficacious if undertaken at all.
M. Fromageot observed that should the Conference decide to impugn German Prize Court decisions, it must of necessity appeal to international law. German Prize Courts consistently neglected what they termed the “so-called” international law. They only administered their own domestic regulations. In Allied Prize Courts, if any alternative to international law were followed, in any particular instance, that alternative must be one favourable to the owner of the captured property; failing this, a neutral might appeal to international law from any decree of the Court. It followed, therefore, that any revision of Prize Court orders must be made in accordance with International Law. Should the Conference so decide, the decision would be welcomed by many neutrals whose ships and cargoes had been seized by the Germans and whose subjects had in many cases lost their lives without compensation, as the German Courts had declared the action of the Germans to be justified.
Sir Robert Borden observed that international law was not a code, but was rather a series of agreements between civilized nations. The revision of certain isolated acts of German authority would not be sufficient to enforce on Germany the respect of civilized usages. It would be necessary to go further and declare that Germany must be bound by certain obligations, and a special clause to that effect would have to be inserted in the Treaty.
Mr. Lansing said that his proposal covered every form of misconduct on the High Seas. In America, International Law was recognised as a code and applied as such. In principle all were agreed that Germany must be compelled to admit the validity of Prize Court decisions already given in Allied and Associated countries. The question of future decisions remained. Germany might be compelled, if the third paragraph of the American proposal were accepted, to recognise future judgments also. He had already explained the importance of this to America. As to the examination of the German Prize Court procedure it would give an opportunity for probing the crimes committed by Germany at sea.
Sir Robert Borden suggested that the Drafting Committee should make another attempt to draft an Article. He still thought that the second paragraph of the American proposal was not quite adequate and he suggested that before dealing with the third paragraph the Drafting Committee should enquire how matters stood in the Economic and Financial Commissions.
Mr. Lansing observed that if the British view were adopted the third paragraph of the American proposal must also be adopted, otherwise British Prize Courts would continue condemning prizes [Page 576] and obtaining the proceeds, while the United States could not. To such an unequal bargain he could not agree. There was one other possible solution, namely that the United States Congress should pass legislation to extend Prize Court jurisdiction after the cessation of War. This would have to be done before the insertion of the Article in the Treaty. He did not like to ask the Congress to do this as it was against American tradition.
Sir Robert Borden said that he was not authorised at present to express acceptance.
Mr. Lansing then suggested that the Drafting Committee be instructed to make a draft preserving the substance of the third paragraph of the American proposal: the result might then be examined.
Sir Robert Borden agreed subject to the reservation he had previously made.
(It was then decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft taking into consideration the above discussion.)
6. The following draft article was before the meeting.
Article Regarding Termination of War From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war into which Germany successively involved the five Allied and Associated Powers and the other belligerent signatory Powers will come to an end.
From that moment and subject to the provisions of this treaty, official relations between these Powers and Germany will recommence.
Baron Sonnino asked why a distinction was made between the “five Allied and Associated Powers” and the “other belligerent signatory Powers”.
M. Fromageot said that as the situations of these Powers varied in several respects it had been necessary to adopt this somewhat cumbrous formula in every instance in order to avoid misunderstanding.
Mr. Lansing stated that he had an alternative formula to propose. He then read the following draft.
(5) American.
1. Proposed Clause in the Treaty of Peace terminating the State of War with Germany.
The Allied and Associated Powers and Germany hereby agree that the status of war created by Germany’s declaration of war against Russia on the first day of August, 1914, and to which status of war the Allied and Associated Powers have subsequently become Parties, shall terminate upon the deposit of ratifications of the present Treaty of Peace at . . . . ., by Germany and by any three of the five Allied and Associated Powers, in so far as they are concerned, and that the status of peace between Germany and such Powers shall immediately thereupon be restored. As regards the other signatory belligerent Powers, the status of war shall terminate and the status of peace shall be restored with Germany upon the dates of the respective deposits of ratifications by them.
[Page 577]The Allied and Associated Powers, including herein the Powers which have only severed diplomatic relations with Germany, believing that a strict compliance with the terms of the present Treaty should precede the resumption of that intercourse usual between civilised countries in a state of peace, in so far as such intercourse is not modified by the provisions of the present Treaty or is not inconsistent with its terms, severally agree from and after the expiration of three months from the date of the deposit of ratifications of the present Treaty, the restoration of peace as aforesaid, and a strict compliance by Germany with its provisions, to resume the ordinary diplomatic, consular and other official relations with Germany in so far as such relations are consistent with the provisions of the present Treaty, and from and after the said period of three months to appoint and accredit diplomatic and consular representatives to Germany; and Germany on its part agrees to appoint and accredit diplomatic and consular representatives to each of the Allied and Associated Powers.
Mr. Lansing explained that the draft of the Drafting Committee required the deposit of all ratifications before the cessation of the state of war. This would involve legislation which would necessarily be lengthy. Peace might therefore be delayed for an unconscionable time. His suggestion was that peace should ensue as soon as three of the big Powers had ratified the treaty. That was to say a cessation of the state of war as between these Powers and Germany would be brought about and the same result would follow as between Germany and the remaining Powers, as soon as their ratification of the treaty had been obtained.
M. Fromageot said that the question of determining when the Treaty should cojne into force, when and how ratifications were to be obtained, whether there must be unanimity or not, required general consideration. The Drafting Committee were dealing with a special point, and were not empowered to enter into political considerations which must be decided by the Supreme Council. The proposal made by Mr. Lansing that peace could be brought about by the ratification of three powers was a political question which the Drafting Committee had no authority to solve. He would suggest, however, that the proposal might not be acceptable to the Powers which had signed the Pact of London.3 With reference to the proposed delay of three months in resuming diplomatic relations, he would also observe that experience showed that the reestablishment of diplomatic agents might be necessary at once. The Drafting Committee had therefore thought it right to provide for an immediate resumption of official relations without mention of any postponement.
M. Pichon said that he could not agree to the proposal that three powers alone could pledge the remainder, France was bound by the [Page 578] Pact of London not to conclude a separate peace apart from the other signatories.
Mr. Lansing said he wished to see the operation of peace begin before all the belligerents had furnished ratifications, as this process might take a year or more.
M. Pichon suggested that peace might come into operation when the Five great Powers had ratified the Treaty.
Mr. Lansing thought that this was a matter that should be referred to the Council of Four together with the arguments put forward in the discussion.
Sir Robert Borden suggested that the second paragraph of the Article put forward by the Drafting Committee might with one alteration be substituted for the second paragraph of the American text. Instead of the words “from that moment”, some definite period might be substituted.
M. Fromageot observed that the second paragraph of the proposed article was a direct consequence of the first paragraph. The Conference would determine the conditions of the beginning of Peace and Peace would automatically start the moment these conditions were fulfilled.
Sir Robert Borden said that his intention was that the first clause of the American proposal should be substituted for the first clause of the drafting Committee’s proposal and that the second clause of the Drafting Committee’s proposal should be amended and substituted for the remainder of the American text.
Mr. Lansing said that the real problem was being eluded. It was said that Peace would ensue on the coming into force of the Treaty. How and when the Treaty should come into force was not determined.
M. Fromageot pointed out that the expression “from the coming into force of the present Treaty” was repeatedly used. The Drafting Committee had asked the Conference what were to be the conditions of the coming into force of the Treaty. No reply had been vouchsafed. The Committee was therefore compelled to use the phrase repeatedly without offering any explanation of what it connoted. Under the circumstances this was unavoidable.
Mr. Lansing said that the Council of Four had asked the Council of Five to determine when the war would end, and the answer apparently was when the treaty came into force.
At this stage M. Pichon was called away.
After a short interval the discussion was resumed.
Mr. Lansing said that two proposals were before the meeting. The one, brief, and the other somewhat lengthy. He suggested that the Drafting Committee should endeavour to reconcile the two. It [Page 579] was important in any case to assert the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of the war. He had, however, another draft to submit to the meeting regarding a supplementary treaty or convention to carry into effect the principles established by the present Treaty. He then read the following draft:—
“The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to draw up, after consultation with Germany, and to conclude a further Treaty or Treaties with Germany, and Germany by the present treaty agrees to accept such treaty or treaties, which shall incorporate such terms and conditions as the Allied and Associated Powers shall deem necessary to supplement and to give full force and effect to the present treaty and to establish upon a permanent basis the relations of Germany with the other High Contracting Powers.
The Five Allied and Associated Powers shall determine the date when and place where negotiations shall take place for the subsequent treaty or treaties.”
M. Fromageot said that with regard to the assertion of Germany’s responsibility the draft put forward by the Drafting Committee fully dealt with this matter. He referred to the words “the state of war into which Germany successively involved the Five Allied and Associated Powers and the other belligerent signatory powers”. Mr. Lansing’s second proposal was that a general clause should be framed in the Treaty, providing for any additional conventions that might be required. This could easily be done, but he would point out that a great number of special conventions were already stipulated for in the body of the Treaty.
M. Sonnino questioned whether it was possible to impose on Germany the acceptance of a future convention without any specification whatever. Were Germany to sign an undertaking to agree to a blank treaty in the future, she would not be free when the time came to negotiate in any way. Germany would probably refuse to tie her hands in advance.
Mr. Lansing observed that the subsequent convention was intended to supplement the principles of the first treaty.
M. Fromageot said that if he understood the proposal aright, its purpose was to provide an executive postscript to the treaty, such a procedure would not shock the Germans, as it was a method commonly employed by them in their own legislation.
M. Sonnino said that it was desirable to avoid giving the Germans a pretext for telling the Allies they did not know what they wished them to agree to. Care must be taken in framing the draft to avoid this.
(It was then decided to refer the various proposals to the Drafting Committee, in order that an Article be framed in accordance with the tenour of the above discussion.)
[Page 580]7. The following draft article was before the meeting:—
Draft Article Binding Germany To Accept Treaties of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey “Germany undertakes to recognise the full force of the Treaties of Peace and additional Conventions which may be concluded between the Five Allied and Associated Powers and by the other signatory belligerent Powers with the Powers who fought on her side, and to recognise whatever dispositions may be made concerning territories of the former monarchy of Austria-Hungary, of Bulgaria, and of Turkey.”
It was pointed out by M. Sonnino that the form of words employed in the last line was somewhat ambiguous.
(Subject to rectification by the Drafting Committee, and to M. Pichon’s acceptance, the above article was accepted.)
8. The following draft article was before the meeting:—
Draft Article in Regard to Russia “Germany undertakes to recognise the full force of whatever treaties or arrangements may be entered into by the Five Allied and Associated Powers, and the other signatory Belligerent Powers with the States which have been or may be constituted out of Russia, or part of whose territory may in August, 1914, have formed part of Russia, and to recognise the frontiers of any such States as determined therein.”
M. Sonnino remarked that an expression of opinion was contained in this article regarding Russia, which it might be better not to express.
M. Fromageot said that the Drafting Committee had not intended to pre-judge anything concerning Russia. He did not think the form of words employed prejudiced any ultimate decisions.
M. Sonnino pointed out certain discrepancies between the French and the English versions of the Article. The French version appeared to be the more adequate.
(It was agreed that the English version should be made to harmonise with the French, and, subject to agreement by M. Pichon, the Article, as in the French version, was accepted.)
Mr. Lansing proposed that an additional paragraph be added to this article, decreeing the abrogation of the treaties made in 1917 [1918] at Brest-Litovsk4 and Bucarest.5
M. Sonnino pointed out that this had been already attained in the terms of the Armistice.
Mr. Lansing remarked that the Armistice would be itself abolished by the Treaty.
Sir Robert Borden said that the Economic Council had framed a clause covering this very question. (He referred to Article (n) Part II of the Report of the Economic Commission).
[Page 581]He asked in this connection what effect the abrogation of these Treaties would have on the relations of Germany and Russia. Could the abrogation of a Treaty between two parties at the instance of third parties bring about a state of war between the first two, even without their consent?
(It was agreed that the recommendation of the Economic Council should be harmonised with the Article proposed by the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee was asked to undertake this.)
9. Arms Traffic M. Sonnino said that it might be desirable in the Treaty to insert a clause requiring Germany’s assent to any regulations the Allied and Associated Powers might make with regard to traffic in arms. It had been agreed that Germany was to forfeit all her colonies. She might therefore be disposed to make mischief in the colonies belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers, and with this object to engage in illicit traffic in arms.
Mr. Lansing observed that the Military Clauses already contained a prohibition of the manufacture and export of arms.
M. Sonnino pointed out that this clause did not affect the trade in arms manufactured in other countries than Germany and their transference by German agency from any such country to Allied colonial possessions. It was therefore desirable to frame a clause protecting the Allied and Associated Powers from this form of mischief.
(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee should undertake to frame a clause to the above effect.)
10. Agenda for Next Meeting It was decided that the report of the Drafting Committee on these various subjects should be considered on the following Saturday, at 3 p.m.
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Paris, 18th April, 1919.
- BC–12, vol. iii, p. 738.↩
- FM–4, p. 563.↩
- Great Britain, Cd. 7737, Treaty Series, 1915, No. 1; Cd. 8014, Treaty Series, 1915, No. 9; and Cd. 8107, Treaty Series, 1915, No. 14.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, p. 442.↩
- Ibid., 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 771.↩
- Translation from the French supplied by the editors.↩
- Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 4 (1911), pp. 7, 8.↩