Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/3

FM–3

Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, April 1st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, April 1, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Hon. R. Lansing	Mr. Shotwell
Secretary	Mr. Dulles
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. Robinson
British Empire	Mr. Seymour
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	British Empire
Secretaries	Item 2
Mr. H. Norman	Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes
Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice	Sir M. Delevingne
France	Item 3
M. Pichon	Sir Eyre Crowe
M. Tardieu	Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Secretaries	Lt. Comdr. J. G. Latham
M. Berthelot	France
M. Arnavon	M. Cambon
M. de Bearn	M. Hermitte
Italy	M. Laroche
H. E., Baron Sonnino	Japan
Secretary-General	M. Oka
Count Aldrovandi
Secretary
M. Bertele
Japan
H. E., Baron Makino
Secretary-General
M. Otchiai
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Lieut. Burden
British Empire	Capt. E. Abraham
France	Capt. A. Portier
Italy	Lt. Zanchi
Japan	M. Saburi
Interpreter:—M. de Cammerlynck.

1. Arrangements for Meeting the Germans M. Pichon said that he had been asked to defer the first question on the Agenda as M. Clemenceau proposed to raise the question in the Council of Four.

2. Proposed Plenary Conference to Consider Report of the Commission on Labour Mr. Lansing said that it seemed to him to be more suitable that the heads of Governments should decide whether or not a Plenary Session should be held. It would be possible however for the Meeting to consider the question and make a recommendation, but it was a matter of high policy.

Mr. Balfour said that the alternatives were to decide on the holding of a Plenary Conference without consulting the heads of Governments; or on the merits of the report itself to recommend the holding of such a Conference.

Mr. Barnes said that on behalf of the Labour Commission he was not asking the Meeting to discuss the merits of the report. He was the bearer of a message from the Commission—a message already transmitted some time ago through the Secretary of the Conference before the departure of Mr. Gompers¹—to the effect that the report of the Commission be heard by the body which had set up the Commission, namely the Peace Conference. Since the framing of the report certain amendments had been suggested and without the authority of the Peace Conference the Commission could not reassemble to deal with them.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether Mr. Barnes proposed a debate in the Plenary Session on controversial questions. This appeared to him a very alarming prospect.

Mr. Barnes said that the procedure in the Plenary Conference would probably be very similar to what had taken place regarding the League of Nations. The main result would be that due publicity would be given to the subject. This would lead to the suggestion of useful amendments which the Commission might then be asked to study.

M. Pichon thought that the method proposed by Mr. Barnes would be satisfactory as providing both for the ventilation of the subject desired by Mr. Barnes and also for the discussion of any changes that might be suggested, not in the Plenary Session as feared by Mr. Balfour, but in the Commission itself.

Baron Makino said that he wished to make an observation on this point. The Japanese expert Delegates had from time to time as the Convention was discussed, expressed their opinion and made reservations. Among the points in reserve were some which were very important for Japan, and on the solution of these points Japan’s final attitude to the Convention depended. If there was to be a serious discussion, the Japanese Delegates would ask for the earliest opportunity to express their views regarding these reservations. Labour conditions in Japan were very different from those prevailing in Europe and America. Japan had a large and growing population, and a narrow field for its energies. The result was a relative insufficiency of employment and comparatively low wages. The object of the Labour Conference was to establish throughout the world uniform standards. These standards in some respects were very remote from those at present prevailing in Japan. Should they be enforced in Japan the result might be a destruction of Japanese industries. Though there was a clause providing for the ratification of the Conference by the various Powers concerned, it was a foregone conclusion as matters now stood that many would not be able to adopt the standard proposed. Japan would be in a very difficult position unless some proviso were introduced permitting some elasticity in the application of the principles set out in the draft Convention. Failing this, Japan would not be able to accept the Convention.

Mr. Barnes said that Baron Makino’s statement strengthened the request for a Plenary Meeting. The Japanese Delegation wished to put in proposals after the passing of the report. It might be suggested that the Commission should discuss these proposals. To this the Commission would reply that it had no authority to reassemble until its report had been submitted to the body which had entrusted the task to it.

Baron Sonnino said that the procedure suggested by Mr. Barnes might be a little dangerous if used as a precedent. Mr. Barnes said that the Commission could not examine amendments made after its report had been concluded, until reauthorised to meet and do so by the Peace Conference. On the other hand, it was regarded as undesirable that the debate should take place in the Conference itself. But if all the amendments were to be brought up in the Conference, a debate could not be prevented. If discussion took place in the Conference, great delay would ensue. He therefore suggested that when any Delegation presented amendments, the Commission dealing with the subject should examine them, and present a supplementary report. Otherwise, a discussion in the Conference itself leading to further discussions in the Commission would conduce only to waste of time.

Mr. Lansing said that he agreed with Baron Sonnino. It was desirable to avoid setting a precedent in so cumbersome a method of procedure. Other Commissions would also make reports subject to reservations by one or other of the Delegates whose counter proposals could be appended to the report as memoranda and then referred to the Peace Conference. In respect to publicity he did not think there was much to seek, as “The Times” of the previous day had published the whole report. In this connection he wished to draw attention once more to the constant leakage that occurred from the various Commissions. From this he wished to exclude the Committee on Responsibilities over which he presided, and to every member of which he had explained that he would be held personally responsible for any news he might divulge to the Press.

Mr. Barnes explained that the Commission as such had no amendment or reservations to deal with, and for that reason no ground or authority for reassembling.

Mr. Lansing said that this might be so but his suggestion was that the framers of any amendments subsequent to the acceptance of the report should append them to the report.

Baron Sonnino said that this would not prevent discussion at the Conference.

Mr. Lansing agreed that it was quite impossible to do so.

Baron Sonnino remarked that to offer the Conference conflicting conclusions was to force the Conference to indulge in a debate.

Mr. Barnes said that what had been said regarding publicity was entirely in favour of the holding of a Plenary Meeting. The draft of the Commission’s Report was coming out piecemeal in the Press. It would be far better that all newspapers should obtain the whole report at once. Indiscretions had occurred in “The Times” but “The Times” was not read by workmen. It was the desire of the Commission that workmen throughout the world should have a chance of knowing the whole of the Commission’s proposals, and of discussing them. After general criticism and the suggestion of amendments by the Japanese and others, the Commission could meet again just as the Commission of the League of Nations had done.

Mr. Lansing proposed that the Commission should publish its report and thus save a Plenary Meeting.

Mr. Barnes said that this would not satisfy the Commission as the papers would not give the same prominence to the report of a Commission as to the report of a Plenary Conference.

Mr. Lansing said that he was strongly opposed to the holding of a Plenary Conference at this stage, unless the report were accompanied by all the amendments proposed.

M. Pichon enquired whether Mr. Barnes had any objection to annexing to the report of the Commission any modification that might be suggested by the Japanese Delegates or others.

Mr. Barnes said that the labour question was one of the most important submitted to the Peace Conference. He thought, therefore that it should be given a prominent place in the Agenda. To speak quite plainly, the work of the Commission had been shelved. The Commission had sat for two months and had failed to secure the attention of the Peace Conference for the result of its work. The whole world was in a ferment and very largely on this very question. Late events in Hungary pointed the moral. He thought it was most important to issue this report in the most striking manner possible, in order to convince the world that the Peace Conference was taking the labour question seriously. Working men all over the world should have their attention aroused, and be stimulated to consider and criticise the Commission’s proposals. The alternative was merely to issue the report of the Commission to the newspapers. He did not think that without the Plenary Meeting all the newspapers would print it.

Mr. Lansing said that he had a suggestion to offer which might, he hoped, meet Mr. Barnes’ views. He quite agreed with Mr. Barnes that prominence should be given to the Report of the Commission but there were many other Commissions, all of which regarded their work as of great importance to the world and so indeed it was. His suggestion was, therefore, that each Commission should print its Report and circulate it to all the delegations represented at the Peace Conference. These delegations, after considering the Reports, would reach their own conclusions and ultimately present them in concrete form at the discussion which must ultimately take place in the plenary session, the powers of which could not be limited or eliminated.

Mr. Barnes said that, if he understood this suggestion aright, it was that the Commission should circulate a certain number of copies of its Report before the meeting of the Plenary Conference. Copies were to be sent to plenipotentiaries alone. This could be done in a day; but unless the Plenary Conference were held promptly, the Conference would be liable to the charge of refusing to make open covenants openly. The Plenary Conference would gather in the end and make its decisions before the labour world outside had had an opportunity of discussing the proposals.

Mr. Lansing said that this would result in keeping the question open for months until all the labour organizations in the world had digested the puzzle.

Mr. Balfour thought that nothing would be gained by bringing the matter before the plenary session at the present stage. It was quite true that the question was bound to be discussed at sometime in the plenary session. But in the case of the League of Nations there had been a very limited discussion. Big speeches had been made by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and others. The Conference which had no very clear ideas on the subject had adopted the general principles and left the details to be worked out by the Commission. On this subject, however, there would be a long debate which might not be concluded in the course of one afternoon. Neither could he anticipate any advantage from the discussion of the amendments in a plenary session. On the other hand, he could see great force in Mr. Barnes’ main contention which was not concerned only with technical questions of procedure. Mr. Barnes feared that among the multiform interests dealt with by the Conference prominence would not be given to labour questions which high expediency rendered desirable. He thought this point sufficiently important to be submitted to the Prime Ministers. He therefore suggested that the views expressed should be summarised and that they should be asked to decide whether the small inconveniences arising from the holding of a plenary conference should not be made to yield to the greater interest of displaying to the world the work that was being done in Paris to satisfy the needs of labour. The Secretaries might be asked to give a brief summary of the points at issue and to submit them to the Meeting of the Heads of Governments.

Baron Sonnino said that he thought the Meeting was agreed on two points (a) that some publicity was required. Such publicity would be better if general than if brought about by indiscretions of “The Times”. This matter it was within the discretion of the Meeting to decide, (b) The Summoning of a plenary session of the Conference immediately or at a later stage was a matter presenting a political aspect of some importance. It should therefore be determined by the Heads of Governments. He would further add that if publicity was given to the Report, it should equally be given to the reservations or amendments made by Japan.

Mr. Barnes said that he wished to make a final appeal to the Meeting to have the Report of the Commission published in the most striking manner possible, in order to arouse the interest of labour throughout the world. By the procedure which it seemed the Meeting was inclined to favour, the work of the Labour Commission would taper off to an inglorious end. So important had it seemed to the Commission to avoid delay that it had decided that a Labour Congress should be held at Washington during the year. An Agenda for this Congress had even been prepared. This Agenda contained such questions as the 8-hour day or its equivalent, the employment of women at night, the use of poisonous processes and other serious questions, the preparation of which involved lengthy enquiries in many Countries. These enquiries would be hampered by the complication of languages and in some countries by the lack of organized Labour Ministries. If further delays were imposed, it would be impossible to get this mass of work done before the meeting of the Congress. As to the amendments suggested to the Report, unless the Commission received a mandate from the Plenary Conference, it would be unable to deal with them and to begin working the convention within the year.

Baron Sonnino said that the proposals he had made had not diminished the importance of the publicity in any manner. He proposed that full publicity for the Report should be authorised at once. This would stir public interest and the question would come before the Conference with all the added zest of public discussion. Should a plenary meeting be summoned at once, little advantage would result. A discussion would be immediate, no doubt, but interest was at present chiefly concentrated on territorial questions. It would be better, therefore, to ask for the decision of the Heads of Governments.

Mr. Balfour said that he agreed that publicity was desirable for the report of the Commission, but the precise form of publicity desired by Mr. Barnes could not be granted without consent of the Heads of Governments. Mr. Barnes thought that if the Heads of Governments did not take his view the Commission would not have power to consider the amendments proposed. This might be cured by directing the Commission to deal with any amendment brought forward whether by Governments or by spontaneous suggestions provoked by publication. The Commission could then take up any such question as it thought fit on its own initiative.

Baron Makino said that the Japanese Delegation had attended meetings of the Commission at which from time to time various articles of the Convention had been modified. This had entailed continual telegraphing to Japan and inevitable delay in framing the final proposals of the Japanese Government. He was now, however, in a position to give the final views of Japan. If the Heads of Governments were to make a decision on this matter, he would ask that he be empowered to explain the peculiar position of Japan to them personally.

M. Pichon said that he would transmit to the Heads of Governments Baron Makino’s request.

Mr. Lansing said that he understood it was agreed that the report would be circulated at once by the Secretary-General to all Delegations and that it would be published at once.

(This was agreed to.)

M. Pichon suggested that if the Japanese Delegate was to go in person to the meeting of the Heads of Governments, Mr. Barnes should also be authorised to go in person, as representing the Labour Commission.

The following statement to be forwarded to the meeting of the Heads of Governments was then adopted:

That the Prime Ministers be moved to decide whether they consider that the report of the Commission on Labour should be laid before the Conference at a plenary session in the immediate future, in addition to copies being sent to all the delegates, as was authorized.

The view set forth at this meeting by Mr. Barnes, the British Delegate, is that it is of the highest importance to secure the fullest publicity for the conclusions of the Commission; he considers that only a plenary session can ensure that the decisions taken concerning the international regulation of Labour should produce the requisite impression on public opinion throughout the world.

Mr. Lansing considers that a plenary session of the Conference would add nothing to the publicity which would be secured by the distribution of the papers to the different Delegates and to the Press. He also considers that a discussion at a plenary session would involve delay. If, after an exhaustive study of the report by the Delegates a plenary session is demanded, the question of holding one can be usefully raised.

Should the Prime Ministers decide not to adopt the plan of an immediate plenary session, it would be necessary to give the Commission new instructions without which it could not resume its labours.

Baron Makino, wishing to present reservations in the name of Japan, desires to be present at the meeting of the Prime Ministers at which this question will be examined.

It was proposed that Mr. Barnes should also attend this meeting as the representative of the Commission on Labour.

Mr. Barnes said that he was not satisfied with this decision as he had been charged by the Commission to ask for a plenary session of the Conference.

(At this stage Mr. Barnes and his colleagues withdrew.)

Report of the Czecho-Slovak Commission Mr. Lansing suggested that only that part of the report dealing with the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Germany should be considered, as it was desired to collect all the elements of a preliminary treaty with Germany. The boundaries between Czecho-Slovakia and other countries might be considered at a later stage.

M. Sonnino agreed to this procedure.

M. Cambon said that the task of the Commission had been one of considerable intricacy. It has attempted to do justice to ethnic claims but economic and strategic considerations had also to be given weight as a purely racial frontier would have left Czecho-Slovakia defenceless and economically crippled. He did not propose to explain the frontier in minute detail, as many points had been left to the decision of the Frontier Commission which would ultimately be sent to mark the boundaries. The Eastern point of contact with Germany began at Neustadt.

Mr. Balfour observed that it could not be laid down as certain that this would be the point of contact between Czecho-Slovakia and Germany until the frontier between Poland and Germany had been fixed.

M. Cambon said that the Commission had framed certain proposals regarding Teschen and Ratibor, but had found that its recommendations did not accord with those made by the Polish Commission at Warsaw. These areas were therefore reserved, pending a joint session of representatives of the Committee on Polish Affairs and of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak questions, which, it was hoped, would be able to harmonise the views of both. In any case it was probable that the point of contact of Germany would be in the region of Neustadt. The boundary from this place westward followed as a rule the old administrative boundary along the mountains. Some alteration of this line, however, was recommended near Glatz. The red line on the map indicated the claims of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Commission had not thought it right to grant them, but by diminishing the salient made by the German territory surrounding Glatz, had improved the strategic position of the new State in this quarter.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether this modification transferred a German population to Bohemia.

M. Cambon replied that the population transferred was not numerous.

Mr. Lansing asked whether the reservations made by the American delegates applied to this area or not.

M. Cambon said that they did not apply to this area.

Mr. Lansing thought that the reservations had a general character and a general application. The American Delegates objected to the whole method of drawing frontier lines on strategic principles.

M. Cambon said that it was not strategic interests but considerations of national defence that guided the Commission.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether there was any difference.

M. Cambon replied that he had himself heard President Wilson declare that the new States should be set up under conditions which would enable them to survive. The Commission had been entrusted with the task of setting up a new State in Central Europe. This State had perforce an odd shape, its territory was so narrow as to run the risk of being over-run at the very outset of hostilities. It was for this reason that the Commission had thought it advisable to reduce the glacis surrounding Glatz.

Mr. Lansing said he did not wish to debate the question of Glatz. He wished, however, to point out that the fixing of frontier lines with a view to their military strength and in contemplation of war was directly contrary to the whole spirit of the League of Nations, of international disarmament, and of the policy of the United States as set forth in the declarations of President Wilson.

M. Cambon, in reply, said that the report would reveal that the American delegates had not made any general reservations. They had only made two reservations on special points, to which he would refer later. It was not his province to discuss general policy, but he thought he might be allowed to say that the ethnological principle was not the only one the Commission was to apply. If a nation was to be composed strictly according to the national sentiments of each village, the result would be a country as discontinuous as the spots on a panther’s skin. Such, he presumed, was not the result the Conference desired the Commission to recommend. The Commission had received deputations from many localities requesting the constitution of numberless small republics on the pattern of San Marino and Andorra. He assumed that the Conference did not wish this tendency encouraged, especially in Central Europe, where national security was not well established.

M. Cambon, continuing, said that there was not much to say about the line traced to the West of the Glatz salient until it reached the neighbourhood of Reichenberg. At this point the Commission had ceded a salient of territory surrounding Friedland to Germany, though it had previously been Austrian territory. This was done as a compensation for the ground lost by Germany near Glatz. Germany, moreover, gained the advantage of holding the railway from Zittau to the North, and therefore gained more than she lost. Further West, near Romburg, the Bohemian frontier made a bulge into Germany. The majority of the Commission, namely, the British, French and Italian delegates, had been in favour of maintaining the old administrative line. The American delegate, however, had made a reservation on this point.

Mr. Balfour asked M. Cambon to explain for what reasons the Commission had decided to leave the salient within Bohemia.

M. Cambon said that there were historical reasons for doing so.

Mr. Lansing observed that in this salient there were 90,000 Germans and no Czechs.

M. Cambon replied that the Commission had come to the conclusion that nature had so clearly marked the outlines of the country that it was undesirable to alter them without very cogent reasons. Further, it had thought it inadvisable to make a gratuitous offer to Germany of additional population, and thereby to create a precedent for the attribution of other Austro-Germans to the main federation.

Mr. Lansing remarked that the Commission had, nevertheless, done this in respect of Friedland. He further pointed out that the line recommended by the American Delegation was a better geographical line than that proposed by the majority of the Commission.

M. Cambon said that the majority had thought it reasonable to follow the old administrative border, which roughly followed the crests of the hills and had seen no sufficient reasons for disturbing the habits of the people formed by long connection with the administrative unit of Bohemia.

Mr. Lansing asked whether the Commission would approve of a plebiscite in this area.

M. Laroche said that this question had been raised in the Commission, which, after consideration, had decided that a plebiscite could not be proposed in an isolated salient without extending it to the remainder of the German Bohemians. If this were done, the Czecho-Slovak State would be reduced to very slender proportions.

Mr. Lansing observed that this was not a good reason to justify an injustice.

M. Laroche denied that an injustice was being done. The inhabitants of these regions were accustomed to live in close connection with the rest of Bohemia, and did not desire separation. Moreover, the German colonisation was of recent date. The result of the policy suggested by Mr. Lansing might be that the whole of Bohemia would elect to join Germany in order not to be separated from the German-Bohemians.

M. Cambon said that there was little to remark about the boundaries further West up to Asch. This place the Czecho-Slovak Government had agreed to give up. The Commission took note of this, but the American Delegation desired to cut off a considerable salient in addition. The British, French and Italian delegates had not concurred, and had thought it better to leave the people in this area in their old entourage.

Mr. Lansing observed that in the two salients discussed the line drawn by the American Delegation cut four railroads whereas that adopted by the other delegations cut ten. In the last salient mentioned there were 175,000 Germans and 3,000 Czechs. As far as he was able to judge, there was no valid reason against assigning this salient to Germany. Bohemia would lose nothing essential. There were in it some lignite mines, producing 7 per cent of the lignite in Bohemia, but as Bohemia exported lignite it was clear that it could get on without these mines.

M. Cambon said that it was for the defence of Bohemia that the Commission had decided to keep the railway lines alluded to by Mr. Lansing within Czecho-Slovakia.

Mr. Lansing said that he made reservations on this point.

M. Pichon said that on behalf of France, he also had reservations to make. He could not allow Germany to be fortified by populations taken from what had been Austrian Dominions, taken, moreover, from Bohemia, which, he trusted, would remain an Ally of France, and handed over to Germany, which, as far as he was concerned, still remained a country to be feared. If America refused to take into account considerations of national defence, France was not in a position to neglect them.

Mr. Lansing asked whether M. Pichon had noted that in yielding Friedland to Germany the Commission had reinforced Germany by 60,000 inhabitants.

M. Pichon said that he was not prepared to generalise this practice.

M. Cambon observed that this was done in compensation for the readjustment of the frontier near Glatz. He further pointed out that the railways at Eger were all directed towards Czecho-Slovakia. They were lines of penetration and any power commanding the junction would have control of the lines.

The boundary further South called for no special remark.

(Further Discussion on the Commission’s Report was deferred until a solution of the differences between that Committee and the Committee on Polish Affairs had been adjusted.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 2nd April, 1919.

1. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor and United States representative on the Commission on International Labor Legislation.