Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/1

FM–1

Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Foreign Office, Paris, on Thursday, March 27th, 1919, at 11:30 a.m.

Paris, March 27, 1919, 11:30 a.m.

Present

America, United States of	British Empire	France
Mr. Lansing.	Mr. Balfour.	M. Pichon.
Mr. Hoover.	Lord Robert Cecil.	M. Seydoux.
	Sir Maurice Hankey	M. Arnavon (Interpreter)
	Italy
	Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.

(Note:—This Meeting was arranged at short notice at the beginning of a Meeting between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and M. Orlando, held at 11.00 a.m. at President Wilson’s house at the Place des Etats-Unis.)

(1). M. Pichon explained the political importance of allowing Bavaria to get supplies from other directions than the north. At present all the supplies for Bavaria were sent by the Berlin organisation, and this tended to increase the political influence of Prussia. The best way to obviate this was to enable Bavaria to receive supplies from the south. M. Calonder, the President of the Swiss Republic, was now in Paris, and he understood from him that Switzerland would facilitate the supply of Bavaria through Switzerland, provided that her own stocks were made up to the extent on which they were drawn, and that the necessary coal for transportation purposes was forthcoming. The Revictualling of Bavaria

M. Seydoux thought that the revictualling of Bavaria from the south could be carried on outside of the decisions taken at Brussels. There it had been decided that the revictualling of Germany should be compensated for by exports. France needed coal and glass, which Bavaria could export, and he suggested that food might be supplied in exchange. It was difficult for France to obtain credit in dollars or sterling in neutral countries to pay for what she required. He therefore suggested this exchange of goods. At Brussels it had been agreed that a fair price should be given for the exports of Germany. Why, therefore, should we not exchange French goods against Bavarian? Since the beginning of the war the supply of Switzerland had had to be carried out through France. Now, however, the line was open for traffic as far as Strassburg. Consequently, our means of supply were greatly improved, as this would supplement lines formerly used for the supply of Switzerland. His proposal was to supply Bavaria by rail from Strassburg. In the same manner the goods which Bavaria could supply would be brought back through Strassburg.

Lord Robert Cecil pointed out the transportation difficulties involved in revictualling Bavaria through Switzerland. It would be better to send the supplies from Strassburg to Bavaria direct. In order to reach Bavaria through Switzerland, it would be necessary to send the supplies through France. M. Loucheur,¹ however, had emphasised the very difficult transportation situation in France. He thought it of the first importance not to overstrain this, and particularly not to interfere with the transportation of coal to Italy.

Mr. Lansing said that the real question involved was one of policy. Did we want to separate Bavaria from Germany?

Mr. Hoover said that the Allied and Associated Powers had entered into a series of contracts with the German Central Government, under which the latter had undertaken the fair distribution of supplies throughout the whole of Germany, including Bavaria. There was a financial problem involved. The people with whom the Allied and Associated Powers were dealing drew on the resources of the whole of Germany for payments. To make a separate financial arrangement would involve separate means of payment being found for Bavaria. If these goods came to France from Bavaria, it was doubtful if France had supplies to furnish in return. To replace them, therefore, food supplies would have to be imported from elsewhere, and dollars or credits would have to be found. One difficulty was that there was a serious shortage of food stuffs available for Europe. As far as he knew, they did not exceed from 130,000 to 140,000 tons, which he had under his control at Rotterdam and Copenhagen, and some 20,000 tons which he understood the British Government could spare.

Lord Robert Cecil interjected at this point that 150,000 tons was probably an over-estimate.

Mr. Hoover, continuing, said that in any event the supplies would have to receive access to Bavaria by the Rhine. Otherwise, they would have to be brought from Bordeaux right across France, whereas, by using the Rhine, an immediate and easy transport was available.

Mr. Balfour agreed that Mr. Lansing’s point was fundamental. First, however, he asked Mr. Hoover to explain how supplies to Bavaria could be paid for. Had Bavaria special commodities she could use for exportation apart from and independently of supplies to be exported by arrangement with the Central German Government?

Mr. Hoover said that Bavaria had some supplies. The amount of supplies, however, available for export from the whole of Germany was trivial. He estimated the value of the food supplies that Germany must import in the next three months at 300 million dollars. The amount she could export did not exceed 40 million dollars in value.

M. Sonnino asked whether the quantity approved of food that could be sent to Bavaria was an addition to the supplies promised to Germany? He understood it was not. If it was part of the German ration it could be sent to Bavaria after agreement with Germany. If Germany would agree there would be no great difficulty.

M. Seydoux suggested that what we wanted was to revictual Bavaria as soon as possible, in fact, to show special good-will to Bavaria. To do this we must use the Rhine, but he agreed that there were no additional supplies available for this. We could not increase the total supplies but we might find some small quantities for Bavaria which could be sent by the Rhine or by rail. During the War “we had always managed to supply Switzerland, though” at times she had gone short. Now, however, we had at our disposal means of communication vastly superior to what we had during the War. Moreover, the Rhine route would be much cheaper. Hence he asked why should we not send goods to Bavaria to enable her to resist anarchy.

Mr. Lansing pointed out that this brought us back to the question of policy.

M. Sonnino said it would not be a question of policy if it were done with the assent of the German Government.

Lord Robert Cecil summed up the real situation as he understood it. At Brussels we had concluded an agreement in regard to supplies to Germany. The principal difficulty had been one of payment. Ultimately certain methods had been arranged whereby Germany would pay partly in gold, partly in securities, etc. The whole of these resources for payment were disposed of by the Central German Government. Consequently any food sent to any part of Germany belonged to the people who had undertaken to pay for it. It could not be sent to Bavaria without the consent of Berlin. Also part of the arrangement was that the food should be fairly distributed by the Central Government. To send food to one part of Germany was to upset the bargain. If we had additional supplies to spare it might become a matter of consideration whether we should furnish them to Bavaria, but then the political question would arise.

M. Pichon suggested to remit the question to the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Lansing said not until the question of policy is decided.

Mr. Hoover said that the arrangement with the Germans comprised two methods. (1) An arrangement with the Central Government at Berlin, (2) a relaxation of the Blockade which would enable German merchants to buy in neutral countries on the understanding that what they bought would be deducted from the total ration for Germany. There was nothing to prevent Bavarian merchants purchasing from the Swiss and we had undertaken to make good to Switzerland what they sold, but without increase to the total ration.

Mr. Balfour enquired how could Switzerland obtain additional food if there was no surplus of food available?

Mr. Hoover said there was sufficient food in the world, but the difficulty of making it available was one of transport. The Swiss had certain stocks which they might send to their neighbours, replacing them later. This, at any rate, was one method by which what was desired could take place though he did not know whether there was any probability that it would work out in this manner.

M. Seydoux said that if Germany was allowed to buy goods in Switzerland it would change nothing. What Bavaria took from Switzerland would be treated as part of the German ration which remained a fixed quantity. Switzerland would revictual Bavaria and the Allies would have the trouble of transporting it to Switzerland across France and would derive no benefit from the transaction. The difficulties of transport, however, were just as great in supplying Switzerland as in supplying Bavaria direct. Why should we not obtain the political advantage of sending supplies straight to Bavaria.

M. Sonnino said that some political effect would be obtained by sending supplies direct from Switzerland inasmuch as Bavaria would get some relief.

Mr. Balfour asked that before discussing the political situation the economic situation should be cleared up. He understood that there was only a certain quantity of food available for Europe. It was known perfectly well where it was, in Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Great Britain or in America. If it was sent to Bavaria either through Swiss merchants or through any other channel—

Lord Robert Cecil interrupted to explain that the difficulty was entirely one of transport. If the Swiss would supply from their own stocks the effect would be to increase the total stock of food available, because later on the transport situation would be better and Switzerland could be supplied.

M. Seydoux asked why France should not be allowed to do what it was proposed to allow Switzerland to do? If the Swiss could give part of their supplies to Bavaria why should France not do the same and obtain in exchange the glass and coal which she required?

Mr. Lansing said he understood that France had given an undertaking that all possible surplus should be sent to Rotterdam.

Lord Robert Cecil confirmed this. If France had surpluses he hoped she would save them as it would affect the shipping situation all over the world.

M. Seydoux said that any surplus which could be sent to Bavaria would only amount to a small quantity, which however, might have some political effect.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that the whole question came back to its political effect.

Mr. Hoover said that small operations of this kind had no real value. The arrival of small quantities of supplies in Vienna had only encouraged false hopes and it was not until a regular system of supplies had been arranged that we had with difficulty obtained control of the food situation in Vienna.

(Count Aldrovandi withdrew at this point.)

Lord Robert Cecil agreed with Mr. Hoover. He said that he did not understand that we had permitted German merchants to buy in neutral countries as they liked on condition that what they imported was deducted from the ration. He did not think we had promised this. His impression of the bargain was that the German Government should be allowed to make its own arrangements in neutral countries for the purchase of food and to distribute it as part of their total ration. He did not understand that anything an individual bought was to come off the ration.

Mr. Hoover remarked that we had said that any German could buy, but that his purchase would come off the general ration. It was the responsibility of the German Government to control individual purchases as they thought fit.

M. Seydoux pointed out that the blockade organisation in neutral countries controlled and supervised these operations. When the food sections heard that supplies had been sold to Germany they had to replace them out of the total rations. If they authorised their replacement, this was allowed, otherwise it was not.

Mr. Hoover said the German Government would not allow a large amount of trading round the frontier.

M. Sonnino suggested that we should ask the agreement of the German Government to send a certain quantity of food by the Rhine direct to Bavaria.

M. Pichon said that in this case the best way to handle the question was to send it to the Supreme Economic Council as the political question did not arise in the first instance. We should remit to them the question of whether it was feasible to find some way of improving the revictualling of Bavaria rapidly and in full agreement with the Brussels arrangement. There was a political question involved but the first question was to decide whether it could be done consistently with our agreements.

Mr. Lansing asked why we should study the question unless we wished to give special treatment to Bavaria.

M. Pichon said that one reason was that we wanted to prevent the developing of Bolshevism in Bavaria which was a country in which we could rely on for order being maintained. In Bavaria there were men who had always been favourable to the Entente, and we should facilitate their tasks.

Mr. Lansing said that if our object was to get rid of Bolshevism the best way was to consider the Berlin Government which was certainly not Bolshevist. He doubted the expediency of interfering with the internal affairs of any country.

Mr. Balfour said that the question was one of the first political importance but he did not think it could be decided here. Those present might lay the case before their colleagues and ask their views. Before discussing the political question however there were other aspects such as our agreement with Germany and the quantities of supplies available, which ought to be settled. He thought that these questions could be settled here, if they could not they might be remitted to the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Hoover said that if the question was sent to the Supreme Economic Council the first thing they would do was to ask “What was the policy”?

Lord Robert Cecil said that if the present body decided the economic question it would create confusion. The economic aspect of the question should be dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council, and the political question could be settled by some such body as that present.

M. Sonnino proposed that a definite reference should be made to the Supreme Economic Council enquiring whether it was possible without violating the Brussels engagement to send supplies to Bavaria.

(After some further discussion the following question was referred to the Supreme Economic Council:—

Whether, having regard to the terms of the Brussels agreement, it is economically possible to send food independently to Bavaria, apart altogether from the political expediency of doing so.)

3. [sic] Lord Robert Cecil asked whether the Ministers present could decide the question raised by the Supreme Economic Council as to the blockade of Austria and of Esthonia.

Blockade of Austria and Esthonia Mr. Balfour referred to the question raised by the British Admiralty as to whether, in view of the fact that the Germans in Latvia were fighting the Bolshevists some relaxation of the blockade should not be permitted so as to allow ships of under 1,800 tons to carry food and coal to Latvia.

Lord Robert Cecil said that this did not affect the Esthonian question which was merely one of sending food to Esthonia with very careful provisions to prevent it reaching the Bolshevists.

(It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers should meet again on the following day to consider questions of the Blockade of Austria and Esthonia and other questions which Mr. Balfour undertook to remit.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 27th March, 1919.

1. Louis Loucheur, French Minister of Industrial Reconstruction and representative on the Supreme Economic Council.